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A TREATISE
ON
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

*WITH PRINCIPAL REFERENCE TO ITS
PRACTICE IN ENGLAND.*

BY

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DENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SIXTH EDITION

BY

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PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

IN the last edition of his Treatise on Private International Law, which was published in 1912, Professor Westlake was assisted by Mr. Topham, who, owing to pressure of other work, has been unable to take any part in preparing this present edition. Westlake before his death had expressed a wish that I should help to bring his treatise up to date when the occasion arose; and although many circumstances have made it difficult to do the work with the full devotion which it called for, and, except for short periods, I have been far, during recent years, from a law library, yet a feeling of *pietas* towards my teacher has impelled me to do what I could in fulfilling his wish.

The number of important decisions which have been given upon the subject by the English Courts during the last decade is remarkable; and one cannot read the Law Reports of more recent years without being struck with the extent to which the Courts are called upon to consider foreign systems of law. As the Empire grows in population and diversity, and as commerce and industry become more and more international, conflicts of law are bound to increase, and it becomes ever more desirable that England should take her part, as Professor Westlake constantly urged, in International Conferences for establishing common principles in dealing with these conflicts.

I have not made any changes in the arrangement of the work nor added any fresh chapters, and for the most part I have preserved Westlake's text and made such modifications only as the alterations in the Statute Law and the decisions of the Courts have required.

But a number of sections have had to be modified, and on four topics in particular the changes have been so substantial that the text has been completely re-written:

1. The British Nationality Acts of 1914 and 1918 have changed fundamentally the Rules about Nationality as set out in Westlake's Chapter.

2. The decision of the House of Lords in the case of *Casdagli v. Casdagli*, which is indeed in the sense in which Westlake advocated that the law should be interpreted, has called for a re-statement of the rules as to domicile in Oriental countries.

3. The decision of the House of Lords in the case of *The Continental Tyre Company v. Daimler Company*, given during the War, has established a new doctrine in England concerning the character of trading companies.

4. The Bankruptcy Act of 1914 has involved a re-statement of several of the rules of English Private International Law on that subject.

Other matters in which the decisions given, or the rules issued, have called for modification are: service of the writ out of the jurisdiction, execution of foreign judgments, determination of the rate of exchange in an action involving foreign law, and extritoriality of public vessels.

I have not cut short the historical argument and the logical reasoning of Westlake set out in former editions, because his Treatise is not designed simply as a note-book of cases but, rather, as the Treatise of a Juris-consult; and it would be wrong to change its character. At the same time, I have in some instances shortened his statement of particular cases where the full facts appear no longer to be essential to the argument, in order that the bulk of the book should not be excessively increased. In one or two sections I have changed his statement, not on account of more recent decisions, but because his guarded language can now, by the passage of time,

PREFACE TO THE SIXTH EDITION.

be made more definite. I would mention in particular the rule regarding the effect of the marriage contract on the immovable property of the spouses, on which the authoritative criticism of Professor Dicey justifies the more certain definition of what Westlake had left indefinite.

Undoubtedly Westlake's expression of the law, ever concise and exact, is not too easy reading, and requires careful thought to understand it; but the principles of this difficult branch of law cannot be mastered without effort, and I have not thought it desirable to change his wording, except where the matter has been dealt with by subsequent decisions. I am very conscious that, where it has fallen to me to state a rule afresh, I have not been able to reproduce adequately the exact and accurate method of my master.

I owe a debt of gratitude to my father Mr. Herbert Bentwich, of the Inner Temple, who, in my absence in a remote *Provincia*, has helped to see the manuscript through the Press.

NORMAN BENTWICH.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
JERUSALEM,
June, 1922.

EXTRACT FROM
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION.

THE spelling *domicile*, intended to rhyme with *exile*, and corresponding with the analogy in form between *domicilium* and *exilium*, has been retained. It would be remarkable if *domicil*, which, by its analogy to *exil* and *sourcil*, would seem to have a French origin, should ultimately prevail in England, while in France the rivalry of the two forms has been definitely decided in favour of *domicile*.

The following modes of citation have been employed :—

Clunet: *Journal du Droit International Privé et de la Jurisprudence Comparée, fondé et publié, par Édouard Clunet* ;

Lainé: *Introduction au Droit International Privé, contenant une étude historique et critique de la théorie des statuts*, par Armand Lainé, 2 tomes, Paris, 1888, to which book I am greatly indebted for historical matter ;

R. de D. I. et de L. C.: *Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée (Bruxelles)* ;

Syst. § 361, Guthrie 322 : Savigny's *System des heutigen Römischen rechts*, § 361 ; Guthrie's translation, 2nd ed., p. 322.

J. WESTLAKE.

CHELSEA,

24th July, 1905.

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
ADDENDA	xxxvii.
CHAPTER I.	
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER II.	
DOMICILE AND NATIONALITY— <i>RENVOI</i>	23
CHAPTER III.	
CAPACITY, AND FOREIGN GUARDIANSHIPS AND CURATORSHIPS	40
CHAPTER IV.	
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, LEGITIMACY.	
<i>Marriage</i>	51
<i>Effect of Marriage on Property</i>	69
<i>Divorce</i>	83
<i>Legitimacy</i>	99
CHAPTER V.	
SUCCESSION TO MOVABLES ON DEATH	105
<i>The Grant of Probate or Administration</i>	109
<i>Validity of Wills of Personal Estate</i>	117
<i>What Personal Estate passes by the Grant of Probate or Administration, or must be accounted for by the English Executor or Administrator</i>	124
<i>Principal and Ancillary Administrations, and Questions arising in Administration prior to the Distribution of the Surplus</i>	130
<i>Distribution of the Surplus in an Administration</i>	146
CHAPTER VI.	
BANKRUPTCY	156
CHAPTER VII.	
MOVABLES	183
CHAPTER VIII.	
IMMOVABLES	207

CHAPTER IX.

	PAGE
GENERAL NOTIONS ON JURISDICTION	223

CHAPTER X.

JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND, AND EXTERRITORIALITY	237
<i>Note on Actions for Trespass to Foreign Soil</i>	254
<i>Exterritoriality</i>	256

CHAPTER XI.

TORTS	267
--------------	-----

CHAPTER XII.

CONTRACTS	280
<i>Formalities of Contracts</i>	280
<i>Interpretation of Contracts</i>	283
<i>Intrinsic Validity and Effects of Contracts</i>	285
<i>Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes</i>	300
<i>Obligations quasi ex contractu</i>	308

CHAPTER XIII.

TRANSFER AND EXTINCTION OF OBLIGATIONS	310
<i>Transfer of Obligations</i>	312
<i>Extinction of Obligations</i>	313

CHAPTER XIV.

DOMICILE	319
<i>Connection of Domicile with Law: Anglo-Indian, Anglo-Egyptian and such-like Domiciles</i>	319
<i>Domicile of Origin and of Persons not sui juris</i>	330
<i>Domicile of Choice</i>	334
<i>Rules as to Change of Domicile</i>	341
<i>Trade Domicile in Time of War</i>	352

CHAPTER XV.

BRITISH NATIONALITY	354
<i>Natural-born Subjects at Common Law</i>	355
<i>Natural-born Subjects by Statute</i>	355
<i>Naturalization, Denization, and Resumption of British Nationality</i>	358
<i>Declaration of Alienage and Expatriation</i>	361
<i>Effect of Family Relations on Nationality</i>	362
<i>Transfer of Nationality in cases of Cession</i>	364
<i>Under a Personal Union and after its Dissolution</i>	364
<i>Conflicts of Nationality and Statelessness</i>	365

CONTENTS.

xi

CHAPTER XVI.

CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS	PAGE 367
--------------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-------------

CHAPTER XVII.

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS	379
-----------------------------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

PROCEDURE	404
<i>Proof of Foreign Laws</i>	407
<i>Various</i>	412

CHAPTER XIX.

CONCLUSION	414
------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

INDEX	417
-------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

LIST OF CASES CITED.

[The Numbers are those of the Pages.]

- ABBOTT v. Abbott, 406
 Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra, 323, 325, 326, 328, 329
 Abdy, Lee v., 44, 203
 Aboulloff v. Oppenheimer, 397
 Acklam, Doe v., 364
 Actiengesellschaft, &c. Cudell & Co., Dunlop, &c. Co. v., 377
 Adair, Anstruther v., 80
 Adam, *Re*, 361
 — v. British and Foreign Steamship Co., 272
 Adams v. Clutterbuck, 208, 215
 —, Forbes v., 208
 Adamson, Copin v., 383
 Adv.-Gen. Thomson v., 140
 Aeneas Macdonald's Case, 355
 Aganoor's Trusts, *Re*, 108
 Agnese, *Re*, 127
 Agnes Otto, The, 270
 Agnew v. Usher, 248
 Agular, Geyer v., 399
 Aikman v. Aikman, 344, 350
 Aitchison v. Dixon, 346
 Aktiebolaget, &c., *Re*, 252
 —, Westman v., 239, 376
 Aktiesselskabet "Hercules" v. Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co., 377
 Albany Street Police Station Superintendent, R. v., 357
 Albion Insurance Co v. Mills, 295
 Alcock v. Smith, 204, 302
 Aldrich v. British Griffin Iron Co., 413
 Alexander, *Re*, 123
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 372
 — v. Vaughan, 166
 Alexander & Co. v. Valentine & Sons, 250
 Alexandria Water Co. v. Musgrave, 373
 Alson's Trusts, *Re*, 56
 Alvon v. Furnival, 169, 381, 397
 Allan, Manitoba Corporation v., 248
 —, Phillips v., 316
 Allardice v. Onslow, 345
 Allardice and Onslow v. Cannon, 36
 Allcock Coch v., 412
 Allen v. Anderson, 153, 210
 — v. Cannon, 166
 — v. Kemble, 305, 308, 405
 Allen's Will, 330
 Alliance Bank of Sumla v. Carey, 283, 314
 Alston, Trinidad Shipping Co. v., 289
 Alvares, Dillon v., 400, 401
 Alves v. Hodgson, 281, 282
 Amalia, The, 275
 American Leather Co., Ricaud v., 200
 American Thread Co. v. Joyce, 372
 Amsterdamsch Trustees, Duder v., 217, 251
 Anderson, *Re*, 169
 —, Allen v., 153, 210
 —, Atkinson v., 103
 — v. Caunter, 128, 129
 —, Dodsworth v., 166
 —, Grant v., 241, 242
 — v. Laneville, 344
 —, Laneville v., 36, 114, 117
 —, Lenders v., 250, 252
 —, The Queen v., 204
 André Châle, *Ex parte*, *Re* Artola Hermanos, 167
 Andros, *Re*, 155
 Angell, Pellecat v., 292
 Anghinelli v. Anghinelli, 91
 Anglesea, Phipps v., 215
 Anglesey, Case of Lord, 219
 Anglo-Australian Bank, Embericos v., 204, 302
 Anglo-Austrian Bank, *Re*, 295
 Anglo-Italian Bank, Moor v., 219
 Angus v. Angus, 217
 Annette and Dora, The, 243, 257, 258
 Anonymous, 63, 146, 299
 Anstruther v. Adair, 80
 — v. Chalmer, 148, 150
 Antwerp, &c. Line, Bell & Co v., 248
 Apollinaris Co.'s Trade Marks, *Re*, 413
 Apthorne, London Bank of Mexico, &c. v., 373
 Aramburu, d', Viesca v., 111
 Archbold, Harvey v., 299
 Archer v. Preston, 219
 Argent v. Argent, 98
 Arglasse v. Muschamp, 217, 219
 Arkwright, Doe v., 364
 Armitage v. Att.-Gen., 86, 87, 94
 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 402

- Armytage *v.* Armytage, 88, 90, 91
 Arnold *v.* Arnold, 140, 151
 Arnott, Casey *v.*, 248
 — *v.* Redfern, 295, 396
 Arthur *v.* Hughes, 128
 Artola Hermanos, *Re, Ex parte* André Châle, 167
 Aseguradora Española, Mutzenbecher *v.*, 248
 Ashburton, Baring *v.*, 152, 153
 Ashbury *v.* Ellis, 383
 Astor, *Re*, 116
 Atkins *v.* Smith, 129
 Atkinson *v.* Anderson, 103
 — *v.* Recruiting Officer, Bury St. Edmunds, 364
 Atlas Insurance Co., Haas *v.*, 109
 Att.-Gen. *v.* Alexander, 372
 —, Armitage *v.*, 86, 87, 94
 — *v.* Beatson, 140
 — *v.* Bouwens, 126, 138
 —, Brinkley *v.*, 69
 — *v.* Campbell, 143, 144
 —, Campbell *v.*, 412
 — *v.* Cockerell, 140
 — *v.* Dimond, 137
 — *v.* Drapers' Co., 248
 —, Fashender *v.*, 363
 — *v.* Felce, 144
 — *v.* Fitzgerald, 329
 — *v.* Forbes, 140
 — *v.* Glendinning, 127
 — *v.* Higgins, 138
 — *v.* Hope, 137
 — *v.* Jewish Colonization Association, 139, 144
 — *v.* Johnson, 138, 144
 — *v.* Kent, 349
 — *v.* Lepine, 371
 — *v.* London, City of, 371
 —, Markwald *v.*, 360
 — *v.* Mill, 211
 — *v.* Napier, 141
 —, New York Breweries *v.*, 109, 138
 —, Partington *v.*, 138
 — *v.* Pottinger, 350
 — *v.* Pratt, 137, 138
 —, Roberts *v.*, *Re* Johnson, 36, 38
 — *v.* Rowe, 349, 350
 —, Scott *v.*, 88
 —, Shaw *v.*, 94, 97
 — *v.* Sturge, 371
 —, Sudeley (Lord) *v.*, 138
 — *v.* Wahlstatt, 348
 —, Wallace *v.*, 141
 —, Winans *v.*, 127, 139, 336, 339, 341, 342, 344
 Att.-Gen. of Hong Kong *v.* Kwok-a-Sing, 269
 Att.-Gen. for Ireland, Swift *v.*, 55
 Att.-Gen. of New South Wales, Platt *v.*, 346
 Att.-Gen. for Ontario, Woodruff *v.*, 139
 Attrill, Huntington *v.*, 382
 Aubery, Edinburgh (Provost of) *v.*, 371
 Audley, Chetham *v.*, 134
 Auerbach, Crozier & Co. *v.*, 249
 August, The, 296
 Auriol *v.* Thomas, 308
 Australasian Investment Co., *Ex parte*, 202
 Austria, Emperor of, *v.* Day and Kossuth, 206
 Ayers, Willans *v.*, 308
 Ayton, Nouvelle Banque de l'Union *v.*, 408
 BACON *v.* Bacon, 355
 Badart, *Re*, 143, 144
 Badcock *v.* Cumberland Gap Co., 378
 Baddeley, Willis & Co. *v.*, 240
 Badische Anilin, &c. *v.* Basel Chemical Works, 250, 298
 —, Chemische Fabrik, &c. *v.*, 250, 252
 — *v.* Henry Johnson & Co., 298
 Bailie *v.* Bailie, 133
 Bain *v.* Whitehaven & Furness Junction Railway Co., 406
 Baker, *Re*, 46
 —, Johnstone *v.*, 210
 Balcarres, &c. Co., Wilson & Co. *v.*, 253
 Bald, *Re*, Bald *v.* Bald, 79
 Baldwin, Lewis *v.*, 371
 Balfour *v.* Cooper, 215
 — *v.* Scott, 147, 148
 Ballantine *v.* Golding, 316
 Baltica, The, 352
 Baltimore, Penn. *v.*, 217, 219
 Banco de Portugal, *Ex parte*, 179
 — *v.* Waddell, 179
 Bank of Africa *v.* Cohen, 212, 218, 294
 Bank of Australasia *v.* Harding, 392, 397
 — *v.* Nias, 392, 395, 397
 Bank of England, City of Berne *v.*, 260
 —, De la Chaumette *v.*, 312
 —, Stewart *v.*, 264
 Bank of Montreal *v.* Bethune, 376
 Bank of Scotland, Logan *v.*, 238, 252, 377
 Bankes, *Re*, Reynolds *v.* Ellis, 44, 78
 Barber, Cockerell *v.*, 134, 151
 — *v.* Lamb, 397
 Barbut's Case, 266
 Barclay, Taylor *v.*, 291
 —, Thompson *v.*, 291
 Barford *v.* Barford, 410
 Baring *v.* Ashburton, 152, 153
 —, De Tastet *v.*, 308
 — *v.* Inland Revenue Commissioners, 204
 Barlow's Will, *Re*, 47
 Barnard, *Re*, Barnard *v.* White, 79
 Barne, *Re*, 165
 Barnes *v.* Vincent, 121, 122
 Barnett's Trusts, *Re*, 148
 Baroda, Gaekwar of, Statham *v.*, 258, 260
 Baron Liebig's Cocoa, &c. Works, *Re*, 254
 Barrett, Voinet *v.*, 388
 Barretto *v.* Young, 123
 Barrington (Lord), Hood *v.*, 211
 Barron, Gill *v.*, 317
 Barros, de, Sottomayor *v.*, 41, 42, 47, 60, 62

- Barrow, City Bank v., 200
 — v. Myers, 249
 Barry, Brodie v., 153
 — v. Van den Hurk, 299
 Barselmann, Haarbleicher v., 304
 Bartels, Grimwood v., 212
 Bartholomay Brewing Co. v. Wyatt, 373
 Bartley v. Hodges, 316
 Basel Chemical Works, Badische
 Anilin, &c. v., 250, 298
 Bateman v. Service, 373, 376
 — v. Bateman, 91, 92
 Bater v. Bater, 88, 97, 392, 396
 Batho, Phillips v., 90, 272, 390
 Batthyany v. Walford, 221, 270
 Bayley v. Edwards, 221, 400
 Bazett v. Meyer, 291
 —, Simeon v., 291
 Bearcroft, Compton v., 59, 60
 Beatson, Att.-Gen. v., 140
 Beattie, Johnstone v., 44, 45, 332
 — v. Johnstone, 45
 Beauchene, de, Hodgson v., 347, 351,
 352
 Beaufoy, Campbell v., 148
 Beaumont, Re, 332
 — v. Olivera, 212
 Beavan v. Hastings, 129
 Beaver v. Master in Equity, 138
 Beazley, Conway v., 97
 Becker, Vivasah v., 266
 Bockford v. Kemble, 220
 — v. Wade, 216
 Becquet v. MacCarthy, 385
 Bedale, Boyes v., 155
 Begrez, Fisher v., 265
 Behrens, Castrique v., 396
 Belfast Shipowners' Co., Re, 177
 Belgenland, The, 274
 Belisario, Lundo v., 410
 Bell & Co. v. Antwerp, &c., Lane, 248
 Bell v. Goerz & Co., 372
 — v. Kennedy, 320, 340
 — v. Martin, 221
 —, Tyler v., 128, 129
 Bellamont, Connor v., 299
 Bellamy, Bodily v., 299
 Bempde v. Johnstone, 148, 333
 Bennett, Field v., 240
 —, Holland v., 249
 Bent v. Young, 220
 Bentley v. Northouse, 312
 —, Scott v., 46
 Berchtoldt, Chatfield v., 209
 Berdan v. Greenwood, 412
 Bergerem v. Marsh, 170
 Bernal v. Bernal, 151, 152
 Bernales, de, Cosio v., 44
 —, National Bank of St. Charles v.,
 373
 — v. New York Herald, 240, 242,
 250
 Berne, City of, v. Bank of England,
 260
 Bernes, Stanley v., 119, 347
 Bertram v. Duhamel, 300
 Best, Taylor v., 265
 Bethell, Re, 69
 Bethune, Bank of Montreal v., 376
 Bevan, Scott v., 300
 Beyer Peacock & Co., *Ex parte*, Re,
 Clark, 165
 Bianchi, Re, 115, 343
 Biddell Bros. v. Horst & Co., 249
 Biggs v. Lawrence, 292
 Bingham, Ommaney v., 148
 —, Pardo v., 135, 313
 Bingley, Waite v., 212
 Binney, Mutrie v., 400
 Bircham, Currie v., 126
 Bird v. Sedgwick, 166
 Biré v. Thompson, 291
 Birt v. Boutinez, 98
 Birtwhistle v. Vardill, 222, 223
 Bishop, Gresham Life Assurance Co.,
 v., 373
 Black, Re, 111
 Black Point Syndicate v. Eastern Con-
 cessions, 217
 Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Williams &
 Sons, 291
 Blackwood v. The Queen, 138
 Blain, *Ex parte*, Re Sawers, 164
 Blake v. Smith, 396
 Blakeman, Hovey v., 134
 Blakes, *Ex parte*, 174
 Blanc, Trafford v., 108, 396
 Bland v. Low, 313, 406
 —, Robinson v., 288, 293
 Blessington, The Lady, 243
 Bligh, Obicini v., 385
 Blithman, Re, 169, 170
 Bloxam v. Favre, 120
 Bockwoldt, Peruvian Guano Co. v.,
 400, 402
 Bode's (Baron de) Case, 408, 409
 Bodily v. Bellamy, 299
 Boger v. Boger, 90, 254
 Boissière & Co. v. Brockner & Co., 389,
 392
 Bold Buccleugh, The, 401
 Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, Re, 265
 Bolton, Re, 116
 Bonacina, Re, 294, 318
 Bonaker, New v., 371
 Bond v. Bond, 89
 — v. Graham, 128
 Bonelli, Re, 410
 Bonhote v. Bonhote, 409
 Bonnefoi, Re, Surrey v. Perrin, 131,
 132, 151
 Bonnell v. Preston, 240
 Bonneval, de, v. de Bonneval, 35, 118,
 352
 Booth v. Leycester, 398
 Borax Consolidated, Income, &c.,
 Trust, Ltd. v., 289
 Bos, Princess of Reuss v., 168
 Bouard, Vanquelin v., 109, 127, 383,
 395
 Boucher v. Lawson, 291
 Bouchet v. Tullledge, 382
 Boulanger, Talleyrand v., 405
 Bourgoise, Re, 46, 357
 Bourke v. Ricketts, 146
 Boutinez, Birt v., 98
 Bouwens, Att.-Gen. v., 126, 138
 Bowaman v. Reeve, 146

- Bowes, *Re*, 38
 Bowles v. Orr, 396
 Boyes v. Bedale, 155
 Boyse, *Re*, Crofton v. Crofton, 133, 412
 Bozzelli's Settlement, *Re*, 55, 57, 58
 Braddell, Steele v., 60
 Bradford v. Young, 151
 Bradlaugh v. De Rin, 308
 Bradshaw, Richardson v., 179
 Braga, The, The Repeater v., 278
 Braidwood, Cowan v., 385
 Brailey v. Rhodesia, Ltd., 410
 Brampton, King v., 67
 Brandon, *Ex parte*, 167
 Brandon's Case, *Re* Marseilles Railway, 303
 Branley v. South-Eastern Railway Co., 297
 Brazilian Telegraph Co., Chatenay v., 200, 298
 Bremer v. Freeman, 36, 121, 334, 411
 Brennan, Roberts v., 92
 Brentano, von, *Re*, 114
 Brettillot v. Santos, 405
 Brickwood v. Miller, 180
 Bridport, Nelson v., 221, 409, 411
 Brieseiman, *Re*, 110
 Briggs v. Briggs, 97
 Brightwell, Wallis v., 215
 Brigella, The, 297
 Brinkley v. Art.-Gen., 69
 Bristol Steam Navigation Co., Speller v., 253
 Bristow v. Sequeville, 281, 282, 410
 British American Continental Bank, *Re*, *Adda*.
 British Controlled Oilfields, Ltd. v. Stagg, 218, 250
 British Griffin Co. v. Aldrich, 413
 British and Foreign Steamship Co., Adam v., 272
 British Indemnity Co., Oesterreichische Export v., 251
 British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 313
 British South Africa Co., Companhia de Moçambique v., 218, 255
 — v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, 212, 217, 290, 294
 British Waggon Co. v. Gray, 250
 Broadmayne, The, 257
 Brockner & Co., Boissière & Co. v., 389, 392
 Brodbelt, Raymond v., 146
 Brodie v. Barry, 153
 Brogden, Crozet v., 413
 Brook v. Brook, 42, 43, 57, 58, 60
 Brookes v. Harrison, 199
 Brooking, Peillon v., 44, 203
 Brown, *Re*, 47, 48
 — v. Brown, 409
 — v. Collins, 48
 —, Collins Co. v., 376
 —, Douglas v., 407
 — v. Gracey, 407
 — v. Gregson, 154
 —, Leroux v., 281, 404
 — v. Maurice, 145
 —, Potter v., 316
 Brown v. Smith, 349
 —, Séquard, *Re*, 36, 121
 Browne v. Phillips, 111
 Broxburn Oil Co., Burland v., 252
 Bruce, *Re*, 140, 364
 — v. Bruce, 147, 344
 —, MacColl v., 122
 Brunel v. Brunel, 335
 Brunswick, Duke of, v. Hanover, King of, 258, 262
 Bruyère, Pepin v., 214
 Buceleugh v. Hoare, 210
 Buchanan v. Rucker, 384
 —, Smith v., 316
 Bull, Sydney Municipal Council v., 221
 Bullock v. Caird, 405
 Bunbury v. Bunbury, 219
 Burbidge, *Re*, 44
 Burchard v. Macfarlane, 412
 Burgess, Kent v., 55
 Burke, *Re*, 170
 Burland v. Broxburn Oil Co., Burland's Trade Mark, *Re*, 252
 — v. R., 139
 Burn v. Cole, 111
 — v. Farrar, 67
 Burnand v. Rodonachin, 297
 Burns, MacIver v., 242
 —, New v., 412
 Burrows v. Jamneau, 304, 398
 Burslem, Lopez v., 407
 Burton v. Fisher, 342
 Bury St. Edmunds Recruiting Officer, Atkinson v., 364
 Busche, von dem, *Re*, 116
 Buseck, von, *Re*, 121
 Bute, Stuart v., 45
 Butler v. Freeman, 55
 Butterfield, Urquhart v., 331, 351
 CADELL v. Grant, 371
 Cail v. Papayanni, 275
 Caine v. Palace Steamship Co., 395
 Caird, Bullock v., 405
 Calcutta Jute Mills Co. v. Nicholson, 373
 Caldwell v. Vanvliessengen, 272
 Caledonian Railway, Palmer v., 378
 Callandar v. Dittrich, 398
 Callander, Wynne v., 293
 Callaway, 116
 Callender, Sykes & Co. v. Colonial Sec. of Lagos, 172, 318
 Calvin's Case, 355, 365
 Cambefort, Russell v., 241
 Cammell v. Sewell, 195, 196, 198-200
 Campbell, *Re*, 252,
 — v. Att.-Gen., 412
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 143, 144
 — v. Beaufoy, 148
 — v. Campbell, 151
 — v. Dent, 294
 —, Duncan v., 284
 — v. French, 73
 — v. Graham, 151
 —, Meiklan v., 132
 — v. Sandford, 151
 — v. Stein, 313

- Camphausen, Padley *v.*, 239
 Canadian Pacific Railway Co. *v.* Parent, 269
 Canham, Gold *v.*, 394
 Cannan, Duncan *v.*, 44, 81
 Cannon, Allen *v.*, 166
 Cannon, Onslow & Allardice *v.*, 36
 Canterbury (Mayor of) *v.* Wyburn, 211
 Cap Blanco, The, 401
 Capdevielle, *Re*, 141
 Capel, *Re*, 81
 Capital Fire Insurance Assn., *Re*, 168
 Carbery, Freke *v.*, 211
 Carey, Alliance Bank of Simla *v.*, 283, 314
 Carlebach's Case, 357
 Carl Johan, The, 273
 Carnegie, Hope *v.*, 133, 219
 Carr *v.* Francis Times & Co., 270
 —, The Queen *v.*, 204
 Carrick *v.* Hancock, 389
 Carron Iron Co. *v.* Maclaren, 133, 377
 Carter, San Paulo Railway Co. *v.*, 373
 Carteret *v.* Petty, 218, 219, 221
 —, Toller *v.*, 220
 Cartwright, Stirling-Maxwell *v.*, 130
 —, Williams *v.*, 252
 Caruth, Irwin *v.*, 113
 Casdagli *v.* Casdagli, 321, 325, 328, 329, 336, 341, 346
 Casey *v.* Arnott, 248
 Cash *v.* Kennion, 300
 —, Mauger *v.*, 396
 Cass *v.* Cass, 87
 Castrique *v.* Behrens, 396
 — *v.* Imrie, 195-197, 199, 396
 Catherwood, James *v.*, 282
 Catterina Chiazzare, The, 400
 Caunter, Anderson *v.*, 128, 129
 Cavan *v.* Stewart, 384, 387, 389
 Cayzer, Irwin & Co., John Russell & Co. *v.*, 238, 252
 Cazalet, Newman *v.*, 297
 Central Leather Co., Oetjer *v.*, 200
 Central Sugar Factories of Brazil, *Re*, 176
 Cesena Sulphur Co. *v.* Nicholson, 373
 Challenge and Duc D'Aumale, The, 389
 Chalmer, Anstruther *v.*, 148, 160
 Chalmers *v.* Wingfield, 342
 —, Guthrie & Co., Thieri *v.*, 46
 Chamberlain *v.* Napier, 81
 Chamberlain's Settlement, *Re*, 361
 Chambres, Norris *v.*, 218
 Champant *v.* Ranelagh, 299
 Champernowne, Murray *v.*, 209
 Chancellor, The, 278
 Channel Coaling Co. *v.* Ross, 250
 Chapman, *Ex parte*, *Re* Pilling, 413
 — *v.* Chapman and Buist, 89
 — *v.* Cottrell, 304, 307
 Charkieh, The, 257
 Chartered Mercantile Bank of India *v.* Netherlands, &c., Navigation Co., 276, 295
 —, Minna Craig S.S. Co. *v.*, 176
 Chatard's Settlement, *Re*, 48
 Chatenay *v.* Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co., 200, 298
 Chatfield *v.* Berchtoldt, 209
 Chaumette, De la, *v.* Bank of England, 312
 Chavarri, Lopez *v.*, 252
 Cheang Thye Phin *v.* Tan Ah Loy, 56
 Cheetham, Isherwood *v.*, 117
 Chemische Fabrik *v.* Badische Fabrik, 350, 252
 —, Saccharin Corporation Co. *v.*, 377
 Chetham *v.* Audley, 134
 Chetti *v.* Chetti, 41, 43, 58, 61, 62
 Chevalier de Mello Mattos, *Ex parte*, 180
 Chichester *v.* Donegal, 92
 Christian *v.* Christian, 91
 Christiana, The, 277
 Christiansborg, The, 400
 Christie, De Penny *v.*, 250
 Church Missionary Society, Coutts & Co. *v.*, 122
 Cigala, *Re*, 144
 City Bank *v.* Barrow, 200
 City of Berne *v.* Bank of England, 260
 City of Glasgow Bank, *Re*, 379
 City of Mecca, The, 380
 Clare County Council *v.* Wilson, 248
 Claretie, Mayer *v.*, 240
 Clark, *Re*, M'Keekne *v.* Clark, 126, 151
 — *Re*, *ex parte* Beyer & Co., Ltd., 165
 — *Re*, *ex parte* Clark, 164
 —, Kodak *v.*, 373
 Clark & Co., Lysaght, Ltd. *v.*, 242
 Clarke, *Re* 117, 151
 —, de Serie *v.*, 73
 —, Halford *v.*, 217, 294
 — *v.* Ormonde, 218
 Clason, O'Neil *v.*, 241
 Clegg *v.* Levy, 282, 410
 Clerkenwell Commissioners of Taxes, *R. v.*, 373
 Cliff's Trusts, *Re*, 152
 Clinton, *Re*, Clinton *v.* Clinton, 219
 Cloete, *Re*, *ex parte* Cloete, 266
 Clugas *v.* Penaluna, 292
 Clutterbuck, Adams *v.*, 208, 215
 Clydebank Engineering, &c Co., Yzquerdo *v.*, 261
 Clydesdale Bank, Ltd. *v.* Schroeder & Co., 199, 389
 Coch *v.* Alcock & Co., 412
 Cockerell, Alt-Gen. *v.*, 140
 — *v.* Barber, 134, 151
 — *v.* Dickens, 174-176
 Cocquerel, *Re*, 111
 Cohen, Bank of Africa *v.*, 212, 218, 294
 — *v.* Rothfield, 401
 — *v.* South-Eastern Railway Co. 297
 Coldingham Parish Council *v.* Smith, 104
 Cole, Burn *v.*, 111
 Coleman, Reynolds *v.*, 248
 Collier, *Ex parte* Ellis and, 164
 — *v.* Rivaz, 35, 121, 334
 Collins, Brown *v.*, 48
 — *v.* North British, &c., Co., 251
 Collins Co. *v.* Brown, 376

- Collins Co. v. Reeves, 376
 Colliss v. Hector, 81
 Colls v. Robins, 254
 Colombian Government v. Rothschild, 260
 Colonial Bank, Williams v., 201
 Colonial Gold Reef Co. v. Free State Co., 373
 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society, Re, 375
 Colquhoun v. Heddon, 378
 Colston, Quarrier v., 293
 Comber v. Leyland, 249
 Commercial Bank of India, Re, 168
 Commercial Bank of South Australia, Re, 168, 308
 Commissioners of Inland Revenue, see Inland Revenue Commissioners
 Commissioners of Stamps v. Hope, 138
 Commissioners of Stamps of Queensland, Harding v., 141
 Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, R. v., 139
 Compagnie Franco-Belge, &c., South African Republic v., 260
 Compagnie Générale d'Eaux Minérales, Re, 240, 254
 Compagnie Générale Transatlantique v. Low & Co., 377
 Companhia de Moçambique v. British South Africa Co., 218, 255
 Companhia Naviera Sota y Aznar, Ralli Bros v., 289, 291, 299
 Compania Anonima Aurora, de Hart v., 295
 Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, Haggin v., 377
 —, Mason and Barry v., 377
 Compton v. Bearcroft, 59, 60
 Concha v. Concha, 217
 — v. Murieta, 411
 —, de Mora v., 411
 Connelly v. Connelly, 98
 Connolly Bros., Re, Wood v. Connolly Bros., 402
 Connor v. Bellamont, 299
 Constitution, The, 257
 Consuelo, Duchess of Manchester, Re, 139
 Continental Tyre Co. v. Daimler, 369
 Convery v. Lanarkshire Tramways Co., 272
 Conway v. Beazley, 97
 —, Stapleton v., 299
 Conway's (Countess de) Case, 362
 Cood v. Cood, 217
 Coode, Re, 115
 Cook v. Dey, 239
 — v. Gregson, 135
 —, Studd v., 215, 284
 Cooke v. Charles Vogeler Co., 164
 Cooke's Trusts, Re, 42
 Coombs v. Quiney, 281
 Cooper, Balfour v., 215
 — v. Cooper, 42, 408
 — v. Waldegrave, 299, 304
 Cooper-King v. Cooper-King, 409
 Coote v. Jecks, 199
 Cope v. Doherty, 275
 Copin v. Adamson, 383
 Coppin v. Coppin, 215
 Corbridge v. Somerville, 386, 341, 344, 346
 Cosio v. de Bernales, 44
 Cosnahan, Re, 112, 117
 Cossé Brissac, De, v. Rathbone, 388, 395
 Costa, da, Sylva v., 48
 Costa Rica, Republic of, v. Erlanger, 260
 —, Strousberg v., 261, 263
 Cotesworth, Ford v., 291
 Cottingham, Neal v., 169
 Cottingham's Case, 394, 403
 Cotton v. R., 139
 Cottrell, Chapman v., 304, 307
 Coutts & Co. v. Church Missionary Society, 122
 —, Pélégryn v., 46
 Cowan v. Braidwood, 385
 — v. O'Connor, 298
 Cox v. Mitchell, 400
 Craig, Re, 170
 Craigie v. Lewin, 350
 Craguish, Re, Craguish v. Hewitt, 82, 331, 344, 346
 Cranstown v. Johnston, 217
 Crathic, The, 180
 Crawford, Woolsey v., 308
 Crédit Général, Re, Liegeron's Claim, Adda.
 Crédit Lyonnais, Jacobs v., 289
 Crema v. Crema, 97
 Cresswell v. Parker, 252
 Crispin, Ex parte, 167
 — v. Doglioni, 108
 —, Sharpe v., 333, 339, 349
 Cristiani, Trubner v. Trubner and, 254
 Croft v. King, 252
 Crofton v. Crofton, 133, 412
 Croker v. Hertford, 119
 Crompton's Judicial Factor v. Finch-Noyes, 332
 Crookenden v. Fuller, 36, 123, 346
 Crosland v. Wrigley, 284
 Croza, Poitier v., 265
 Crozet v. Brogden, 413
 Crozier & Co. v. Auerbach, 249
 Cruikshank v. Roberts, 401
 Cudell & Co., Dunlop v., 377
 Culling v. Culling, 68
 Cumberland Gap Park Co., Badcock v., 378
 Cumming, Société des Hôtels, &c. v., 300
 Cunha, da, Re, 41
 Cunningham, Ex parte, 165, 348, 351
 — v. Down, 291
 —, Mather v., 326
 Curlier, De Nicols v., 72—74, 173, 213
 Curling v. Thornton, 119
 —, Thornton v., 148
 Currie v. Bircham, 126
 — v. McKnight, 194
 —, Rothschild v., 306
 Curtis v. Hutton, 211
 Cust v. Goring, 210
 Cutforth, Griffith v., Adda.
 Cuthbert, Royal Bank of Scotland v., 160, 170

- DA COSTA, Sylva v., 48
 Dacre, Pitt v., 216
 Da Cunha, *Re*, 41
 Daily Record, Watson & Sons v., 250
 Daimler, Continental Tyre Co. v., 369
 Dalhousie v. McDouall, 101, 348
 Dallas, Hamilton v., 334, 351
 Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 57, 96, 410
 Daly, *Re*, 123
 Daniel v. Luker, 127
 Danubian Factories v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 205
 d'Aramburu, Viesca v., 111
 Darell, Moore v., 117
 Darling, Mackie v., 47, 50
 Davidson, *Re*, 169, 170
 Davidsson v. Hill, 272
 Davies, Williams v., 172
 Davis, Selkirk v., 170, 171, 174
 Dawkins v. Simonetti, 402
 Dawson, *Re*, 212
 — v. Jay, 45
 Day, Emperor of Austria v., 206
 de Barros, Sottomayor v., 41, 42, 57, 60, 62, 93
 de Beauchesne, Hodgson v., 347, 351, 352
 de Beers Consolidated Mines, British South Africa Co. v., 212, 217, 290, 294
 — v. Howe, 372
 de Bernales, Cosio v., 44
 —, National Bank of St. Charles v., 373
 — v. New York Herald, 240, 242, 250
 de Bode's (Baron) Case, 408, 409
 de Bonneval v. de Bonneval, 35, 118, 352
 Decaix, McCarthy v., 96-98
 Deck v. Deck, 89
 de Clermont, Guard v., 389, 391
 de Conway's (Countess) Case, 362
 de Cossé Brissac v. Rathbone, 388, 395
 de Fogassieras v. Duport, 214
 de Gasquet-James v. Mecklenberg, 92, 93
 de Geer v. Stone, 355, 358
 de Greuchy v. Wills, 309
 de Hart v. Compania Anonima, &c., Aurora, 297
 Deichler, Murphy v., 123
 de la Chaumette v. Bank of England, 312
 de la Ferté, Lyne v., 118
 de Larragotti, *Re*, 46
 de la Rue, *Re*, 116
 de la Saussaye, *Re*, 116
 de la Vega v. Vianna, 405
 de Linden, *Re*, 46
 Delta, The, 401
 de Montaigu v. de Montaigu, 88
 de Mora v. Concha, 411
 Dempsey, Norden S.S. Co. v., 296
 de Nicola v. Curlier, 72-74, 173, 213
 de Noailles, *Re*, 148
 Dent, Campbell v., 294
 —, R. v., 410
 de Penny, *Re*, de Penny v. Christie, 250, 252
 Deponthieu, Jollet v., 169
 Derflinger, The, 326
 de Rin, Bradlaugh v., 304
 de Robeck, Hopkins v., 266
 de Roven, Dupleix v., 380
 de Saumarez, *Re*, 145
 Deschamps v. Miller, 219
 de Serre v. Clarke, 73
 Despatie v. Tremblay, 56
 Dessilla v. Fels, 412
 d'Este's Settlement Trusts, *Re*, Poulter v. d'Este, 122, 123
 de Tastet v. Baring, 308
 d'Etchegoyen v. d'Etchegoyen, 346
 Deutsche National Bank v. Paul, 249, 251
 de Valdor, Worms v., 49, 50
 de Vigny, *Re*, 117
 de Virte, *Re*, Vaiani v. Ruglioni, 154
 d'Evreux, Macnamara v., 291
 Dewar v. Maitland, 153
 — v. Span, 299
 de Wilton, *Re*, de Wilton v. Montefiore, 58
 de Wütz v. Hendricks, 291
 Dey, Cook v., 239
 de Zichy-Ferraris v. Hertford, 119
 d'Hormisgee v. Grey, 413
 d'Huart v. Harkness, 122
 Dickens, Cockerell v., 174-176
 Dicks v. Dicks, 91, 92
 Didisheim v. London and Westminster Bank, 46
 di Ferdinando v. Simon Smits & Co., 299
 Digby, van Grutten v., 78
 Dillon v. Alvares, 400, 401
 Dimond, Att.-Gen. v., 137
 di Savini v. Lousada, 45
 di Sora v. Philipps, 283, 411
 Dittrich, Callandar v., 398
 Dixon, Atchison v., 346
 —, Hansen v., 290, 298
 Dobree, *Ex parte*, 179
 — v. Napier, 270
 Dobson v. Festi & Co., 241
 Dodsworth v. Anderson, 166
 Doe v. Acklam, 364
 — v. Arkwright, 364
 — v. Mulcaster, 364
 Doetsch, *Re*, 135, 405
 Doglioni, Crispin v., 108
 Doherty, Cope v., 275
 Dolphin v. Robins, 97, 122, 333
 Don, *Re*, 224
 — v. Lippmann, 313, 385, 395
 Donegal, Chichester v., 92
 Donegal, Houlditch v., 395
 Donegani v. Donegani, 361
 Donovan, Page v., 119
 D'Orléans, *Re*, 41, 110, 352
 Dormer, Williams v., 92, 334
 Dormoy, *Re*, 409
 Dost Aly Khan, *Re*, 111, 409
 Doucet v. Geoghegan, 344, 346
 Dougherty, Harvey v., 252
 Douglas v. Brown, 407
 — v. Douglas, 336, 339, 340

- Douglas v. Forrest, 385, 387
 —, Munroe v., 348
 Douglas's (Sir C.) Case, 148
 Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby, 153
 Doulson v. Matthews, 255
 Doutre, Queen v., 295
 Dowdale, Richardson v., 129
 Dowdale's Case, 129
 Down, Cunningham v., 291
 Drake, Saunders v., 151
 Drapers' Co., Att.-Gen. v., 248
 Drax, *Re*, Savile v. Drax, 216
 Dresser, Meyer v., 405
 Drevon v. Drevon, 347, 348
 Drew v. Drew, 409
 Drexel v. Drexel, 248, 342, 347
 Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Co., 413
 —, Republic of Peru v., 261
 —, Société Générale de Paris v., 398
 —, Twycross v., 263
 Driefontein Mines, Janson v., 352
 Droege v. Stuart, 296
 Druce, Reimers v., 395, 396
 Drummond, British Linen Co. v., 313
 — v. Drummond, 146, 210
 —, President of U.S.A. v., 352
 Drummond's Case, 362
 Dubout v. Macpherson, 253
 Duc D'Aumale, The, 251
 Ducroz, Stokes v., 140, 209
 Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor, 217, 251
 Dues v. Smith, 73
 Duhamel, Bertram v., 300
 Dui Biehler & Brooks, Ltd. v. Farmer, 372
 Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 258, 262
 Dulaney v. Merry & Son, 170
 Dumergue, Vallée v., 383
 Dumfries, The, 278
 Duncan v. Campbell, 284
 — v. Cannan, 44, 81
 — v. Lawson, 211, 214
 —, Lawson v., 146, 210
 Duncannon (Viscount of) v. Duke of Manchester, 159
 Dundas v. Dundas, 153
 Dundee, The, 273
 Dungannon v. Hackett, 299
 Dunlop, Innes v., 312
 Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Dunlop, 250
 Dunlop Tyre Co. v. Cudell & Co., 377
 Dunsany, Wilson v., 135
 Dupleix, The, 240
 — v. De Roven, 380
 Duport, de Fogassiers v., 214
 Durant, Isaacson v., 365
 Dutch East India Co. v. Henriques, 373
 Dutch Rhenish Railway Co., Sudlow v., 371
 Dutch West India Co. v. Henriques, 373
 Duval & Co. v. Gana, 248
 Duvernay, White v., 46
 Dynamite A.G. v. Rio Tinto Co., 407
 EAGAR, Naylor v., 400
 Eames v. Hacon, 132
 Earl, *Re*, 112
 Eason, Ross v., 251
 East India Co., Ekins v., 279
 —, Freeman v., 198
 —, Mayor of Lyons v., 371
 —, Skinner v., 255
 Eastern Concessions, Ltd., Black Point Syndicate v., 217
 Eastern Extension, &c., Telegraph Co., Commissioner of Taxes v., 373
 Easton, Grant v., 379
 Eckford, Haldane v., 347
 Eclipse, The, 278
 Ede, Paget v., 220
 Edie, Pray v., 413
 Edinburgh, Provost of, v. Aubery, 371
 Edwards, Bayley v., 221, 400
 — v. Ronald, 317
 Edwards-Moss, Mackenzie v., 79, 333
 Egan, *Re*, 149
 Egbert v. Short, 238
 Eglinton Chemical Co., Yorkshire Tannery v., 251
 Egyptian Hotels, Ltd., Mitchell v., 373
 Eider, The, 249
 Ekins v. East India Co., 279
 Elias, *Re*, 46
 Eliza Cornish, The, otherwise The Segredo, 191, 193, 196, 200
 Ellefsen, Imlay v., 400, 405
 Elliott, *Re*, Elliott v. Johnson, 149
 — v. Minto, 146, 210
 Ellis and Collier, *Ex parte*, *Re* Hallman, 164
 —, Ashbury v., 383
 — v. Lloyd, 299
 — v. McHenry, 317, 318
 —, Reynolds v., *Re* Bankes, 44, 78
 Elton, The, 251
 Emanuel v. Symon, 383, 385, 387
 Embricos v. Anglo-Australian Bank, 204, 302
 Emery v. Hill, 371
 Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kosuth, 206
 English, Scottish and Australian Bank, *Re*, 168
 Enohin v. Wylie, 114, 132
 Erichsen v. Last, 372
 Erlanger, Republic of Costa Rica v., 260
 Erminia Foscolo, The, 401
 Ertel, Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co., 292
 Este v. Smyth, 66
 Este's, D', Settlement Trusts, 122, 123
 Etchegoyen, D', v. d'Etchegoyen, 346
 Eumaeus, The, 326
 Eustace, Kildare v., 219
 Evans, *Re*, 165
 Evreux, d', Macnamara v., 291
 Ewer, Walpole v., 297
 Ewin, *Re*, 137, 140
 Ewing v. Orr Ewing, 130
 Explorer, The, 272
 Express, The, 296
 Eyre, Phillips v., 269

- FABRE, Hewitson v., 239
 Fabrigas, Mostyn v., 236, 255, 269, 271
 Factage Parisien, *Re*, 168
 Fairlie, Freeman v., 134
 —, Logan v., 128, 140
 —, Lowe v., 128
 Falkenstein, Heilmann v., 401, 402
 Famous Lasky, &c., Ltd., Serre v., 298
 Faridkote, Rajah of, Sirdar Gurdial Singh v., 385, 386
 Farmer, Dui Biehler and Brooks, Ltd., v., 372
 —, Shilling v., 255
 Farnie, Harvey v., 69, 97, 98
 Farra, Abd-ul-Messih v., 323, 325, 326, 328, 329
 Farrar, Burn, v., 67
 Fashender v. Att.-Gen., 363
 Favre, Bloxam v., 120
 Fawcus, *Re*, 413
 Federal Bank of Australia, *Re*, 168
 Felce, Att.-Gen. v., 144
 Fels, Dessilla v., 412
 Fenner, Robinson v., 392, 396
 Fenton v. Livingstone, 222
 —, Reynolds v., 385, 389
 Ferguson v. Spencer, 317
 Fergusson, *Re*, 151
 — v. Pyffe, 299, 314
 —, Gilbertson v., 372
 Fernandes' Executors, *Ex parte*, 109, 138
 Ferrand, Wilson v., 400
 Festi & Co., Dobson v., 241
 Feyerick v. Hubbard, 383
 Field v. Bennett, 240
 Finch-Noyes, Crompton's Judicial Factor v., 332
 Findlay, Shearman v., 254
 Finlay v. Finlay, 406
 Firbank, & Co., Worcester City Banking Co. v., 242
 Firebrace v. Firebrace, 91
 Fischer, Raulin v., 382
 Fisher v. Bcgrez, 265
 —, Burton v., 342
 Fitch v. Weber, 362
 Fitzgerald, *Re*, Surman v. Fitzgerald, 79, 293
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 329
 Fitzjames, Melan v., 405
 Fitzpatrick, Hervey v., 128, 129
 Flack's Case, *Re* Central Sugar Factories of Brazil, 176
 Fleming, Harris v., 252
 Fletcher, Lever v., 291
 —, Planché v., 291
 Florence Land and Public Works Co., Norton v., 219, 221
 Flower, Tourton v., 109
 Fogo, Simpson v., 196, 199
 Polliott v. Ogden, 169, 414
 —, Ogden v., 414
 Fontes, Machado v., 269, 272
 Forbes v. Adams, 208
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 140
 Forbes v. Forbes, 341, 343, 346, 350
 —, Jackson v., 140
 —, Mackenzie v., 209
 —, Odwin v., 317
 — v. Steven, 140, 209
 Ford v. Cotesworth, 191
 — v. Shepard, 240
 Forgo, *Re*, 34
 Fornjot, The, 243
 Forrest, Douglas v., 385, 387
 Forsbacka, &c., Okura & Co. v., 242, 377
 Forsyth v. Forsyth, 79
 Foster v. Globe Syndicate, Ltd., 258
 — v. Vassall, 219
 Foubert v. Turst, 82
 Foxwell, King v., 343
 Francis Times & Co., Carr v., 270
 Francis v. Rucker, 308
 Franconia, Owners of, Harris v., 253
 Franke and Rasche, *Re*, 305
 Frankland v. McGusty, 397
 Fraser, P. A., *Re*, 116
 —, Sinclair v., 394, 396
 —, Yeates v., 371
 Freeman, Biemer v., 36, 121, 334, 411
 —, Butler v., 55
 — v. East India Co., 198
 — v. Fairlie, 134
 —, Nouvion v., 381
 Free State Co., Colonial Gold Reef Co. v., 373
 Freke v. Carbery, 211
 Fremont, Gibbs v., 308
 French, Campbell v., 73
 Fiere v. Frere, 35, 121
 Freudenberg, Porter v., 239, 352
 Freyberger, *Ex parte*, 361
 Fuerst, Jeannot v., 381, 383
 Fuller, Crookenden v., 36, 123, 346
 Fulton, Saxby v., 293
 Furness, Rasdon Ironworks v., 376, 392
 Furnival, Alvon v., 169, 381, 397
 Pyffe, Fergusson v., 299, 314
 GABRIAN v. Maxwell & Co., 389
 Gadban, Musurus Bey v., 264
 Gaetano and Maria, The, 275, 296
 Gagara, The, 257, 258, 261
 Galbraith v. Grimshaw, 181
 — v. Neville, 394
 —, Witted v., 251, 252
 Gally, *Re*, 120
 Gambier v. Gambier, 47
 Gans, Duval & Co. v., 248
 Garbutt, Macartney v., 266
 Garcia del Rio, Jones v., 291
 Garcias, Ricardo v., 398
 Gardiner v. Houghton, 316
 Garett, Winchelsea v., 146
 Garnet, Pierson v., 151
 Garnett, McCormick v., 73, 408
 —, Stewart v., 216
 Garnier, *Re*, 48
 Garrett, Law v., 401
 Garvan, Roach v., 403

- Gaskell, Marchioness of Huntly *v.*, 341
 Geddes *v.* Mowat, 171
 Geer, De, *v.* Stone, 355, 358
 Geiselbrecht, Kannreuther *v.*, 135
 Gemma, The, 240
 General Accident Co., New Fenix
 Compagnie, &c., de Madrid *v.*,
 413
 General Co. for Promotion of Land
 Credit, *Re*, 168
 General Iron Screw Collier Co. *v.*
 Schurmanns, 275
 General South American Co., *Re*, 308
 General Steam Navigation Co. *v.*
 Guillon, 376, 388, 389, 398
 Genesee Mutual Insurance Co. *v.*
 Westman, 376
 Gentili, *Re*, 211
 Geoghegan, Doucet *v.*, 344, 346
 Georges, *Re*, 218
 Gerson, Kaufman *v.*, 293
 Geschwind *v.* Huntington, 341
 Geyer *v.* Aguilar, 399
 Ghukis *v.* Musurus, 248
 Gibbons, Malony *v.*, 389
 Gibbs *v.* Fremont, 308
 Gibbs (Antony) & Sons *v.* La Société,
 &c., des Métaux, 316
 Gibson & Co. *v.* Gibson (1913), 240,
 385
 Gibson *v.* Gibson (1921), 409
 Giffard, Hawksford *v.*, 379
 Gilbertson *v.* Fergusson, 372
 Gill *v.* Barron, 317
 Gillespie, *Re*, *Ex parte* Robartes,
 308
 Gillig *v.* Gillig, 86, 94
 Girolamo, The, 273, 277
 Gladstone *v.* Musurus Bey, 263, 264
 — *v.* Ottoman Bank, 263
 Glasgow and South Western Railway
 Co., Mackereth *v.*, 377
 Glendinning, Att.-Gen. *v.*, 127
 Globe Syndicate, Foster *v.*, 258
 Godard *v.* Gray, 396
 Goerz & Co. *v.* Bell, 372
 Gold *v.* Canham, 394
 Golding, Ballantine *v.*, 316
 Goldsmid, *Ex parte*, 180
 Goldziher's Claim, *Adda*.
 Golubchick, The, 243
 Goodman, *Re*, 155
 — *v.* Goodman, 102, 155
 Gould, Richards *v.*, 210, 282
 Gordon's Executors, Inland Revenue
 Commissioners *v.*, 329
 Gordon's Settlement, *Re*, 254
 Goring, Cust *v.*, 210
 Gould, Shaw *v.*, 96, 97, 101
 —, Smith *v.*, 407
 Goyt *v.* Zimmermann, 349
 Governor, &c., of New Zealand, Slo-
 man *v.*, 258
 Gracey, Brown *v.*, 407
 Graham, Bond *v.*, 128
 —, Campbell *v.*, 151
 — *v.* Massey, 218
 — *v.* Maxwell, 133, 402
 Graham, Milne *v.*, 312
 Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. *v.*
 Stanley, 373
 Grand Trunk, &c., Railway Co.,
 Aktiesselskabet Hercules *v.*, 377
 Grant *v.* Anderson, 241, 242
 —, Cadell *v.*, 371
 — *v.* Easton, 379
 Grassi, *Re*, Stubberfield *v.* Grassi, 214
 Gray, British Wagon Co. *v.*, 250
 —, Godard *v.*, 396
 Great Australian Gold Mining Co. *v.*
 Martin, 239
 Green *v.* Green, 94
 Greenbank, Hearle *v.*, 154
 Greenwood, Berdan *v.*, 412
 Greenwood *v.* F. J. Smidth & Co.,
 Adda.
 Greer *v.* Poole, 296, 297
 Gregory, Jurado *v.*, 380
 Gregson, Brown *v.*, 154
 —, Cook *v.*, 135
 Grell *v.* Levy, 294
 Gresham Life Insurance Co. *v.* Bishop,
 373
 Greta, The, 296
 Greuchy, De, Wills *v.*, 309
 Grey, D'Hornusgee *v.*, 413
 — *v.* Manitoba, &c., Railway, 219
 —, Shelby *v.*, 315
 Grey's Trusts, *Re*, Grey *v.* Stamford,
 155
 Griefswald, The, 398
 Grierson *v.* Grierson, 59
 Griffith *v.* Cutforth, *Adda*.
 Grimshaw, Galbraith *v.*, 181
 Grimthorpe's Settlement, *Re*, 334
 Grinwood *v.* Bartels, 212
 Groos (No. 2), *Re* (1916), 44, 148
 —, *Re* (1904), 114, 119
 Grove, *Re*, 102
 Gruban, Kirchner & Co. *v.*, 401
 Grundt & Oetli, *Re*, 116
 Guaranty Trust Co. *v.* Hannay & Co.,
 39, 302, 396, 406, 407
 Guépratte *v.* Young, 44, 76, 81, 280
 Guard *v.* de Clermont, 389, 391
 Guibert, Lloyd *v.*, 194, 275, 295, 296,
 407
 Guillebert, *Ex parte*, 299
 Guillon, General Steam Navigation Co.
 v., 376, 388, 389, 398
 Gumm, Hooper *v.*, 201
 —, McLellan *v.*, 201
 Gumpach, von, Hart *v.*, 269
 Gurney, Harrison *v.*, 218
 —, Jones *v.*, 413
 Gutch, Williams *v.*, 278
 Guthrie *v.* Walrond, 151
 Gutierrez, *Ex parte*, 167
 Guy Mannering, The, 270
 Gyles, McCheane *v.*, 251, 253
 HAARLEBICHER *v.* Barselmann, 304
 Haas *v.* Atlas Insurance Co., 109
 Hackett, Dungannon *v.*, 299
 Hacon, Eames *v.*, 132
 Hagen, The, 251, 402

- Haggin v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris, 377
 Haldane v. Eckford, 347
 Hale & Co., Hememann & Co. v., 241
 Halford v. Clarke, 217, 294
 Hall & Odber, 382, 397
 Hall, White v., 217
 Hallen, Tassell v., 248, 251
 Halley, The, 202, 270, 278
 Hallman, *Re*, *Ex parte* Ellis and Collier, 164
 Hallyburton, *Re*, 123
 Hamburgh American Steamship Co. v. North of Scotland Banking Co., 278
 Hamilton v. Dallas, 334, 351
 —, Thomas v., 249
 —, United States v., 204
 —, Walker v., 308
 Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery, 285
 Hancock, Carrick v., 389
 Hankey, Tatnall v., 123
 Hannay & Co., Guaranty Trust Co. v., 39, 302, 396, 406, 407
 Hanover, King of, Duke of Brunswick v., 258, 262
 Hansen v. Dixon, 290, 298
 Hanson v. Walker, 135
 Happaz, Parapano v., 323
 Harding, Bank of Australasia v., 392, 397
 — v. Commissioners of Stamps for Queensland, 141
 Hare v. Nasmyth, 35, 117, 118
 Harford v. Morris, 56, 59, 67
 Harkness, D'Huart v., 122
 Harris, *Re*, 115
 — v. Fleming, 252
 —, Morocco Bound Syndicate v., 251
 — v. Owners of Franconia, 253
 — v. Quine, 314
 — v. Scaramanga, 297
 —, Spratt v., 115
 — v. Taylor, 388, 391
 Harrison, Brookes v., 199
 — v. Gurney, 218
 — v. Harrison, 210
 Harrop v. Harrop, 381
 Hart v. Von Gumpach, 269
 Hart, De, v. Compania Anonima de Seguros Aurora, 297
 Hartley, Tulloch v., 219, 406
 Harvey v. Archbold, 299
 — v. Dougherty, 252
 — v. Farnie, 69, 97, 98
 Hastings, Beavan v., 129
 Hawker, Société des Hôtels Réunis v., 293, 294
 Hawkins, Tozier v., 250
 Hawksford, Giffard v., 379
 Hawthorne, *Re*, 218
 Hay v. Northcote, 64
 —, Sidaway v., 317
 Haynes, Massey v., 251
 Hayward, *Re*, Hayward v. Hayward, 169, 170
 Hearle v. Greenbank, 154
 Heath v. Samson, 349
 Hector, Colliss v., 81
 Heddon v. Colquhoun, 378
 Heilmann v. Falkenstein, 401, 402
 Hememann & Co. v. Hale & Co., 241
 Hellman, *Re*, 42, 43, 47
 Helm, Hyman v., 402
 Hemsbeyle v. Lyall Shipping Co., 249
 Henderson, *Re*, 381
 — v. Henderson, 393—395, 398, 399
 Hendricks, De Wütz v., 291
 Hendrie, Oliphant v., 371
 Henley v. Soper, 397
 Henriques, Dutch East India Co. v., 373
 —, Dutch West India Co. v., 373
 Henty v. The Queen, 138
 Hepburn v. Skirving, 333
 Herbert v. Herbert, 57, 68
 —, Jerningham v., 210
 Heriz v. Riern, 291
 Hernando, *Re*, Hernando v. Sawtell, 79, 82
 Hertford, Croker v., 119
 —, de Zichy Ferraris v., 119
 Hervey v. Fitzpatrick, 128, 129
 Hessing v. Sutherland, 46
 Hewit, *Re*, Lawson v. Duncan, 146, 210
 Howison v. Fabre, 239
 Hewitt, Craignish v., 82, 331, 344, 346
 — v. Hewitt, 79
 Hicks v. Martin, 290
 — v. Powell, 221
 Higgins, Att.-Gen. v., 138
 —, Iacon v., 55
 Hilderley, Pechell v., 121
 Hill, *Re*, 110, 111
 —, Davidson v., 272
 —, Emery v., 371
 Hillyard v. Smith, 250
 Hinchcliff, Meyding v., 410
 Hirschfeld v. Smith, 306
 Hitchins v. Hitchins, 412
 H.M.S. King Alfred, The, 278
 Hoare, Buccleugh v., 210
 —, Pike v., 218
 Hodges, Bartley v., 316
 Hodgson, Alves v., 281, 282
 — v. de Beauchesne, 347, 351, 352
 Hog, Lashley v., 74, 82
 — v. Lashley, 148
 Holland v. Bennett, 249
 —, Taylor v., 313
 Hollyford Copper Mining Co., *Re*, 379
 Holman v. Johnson, 292
 Holmes, *Re*, 222
 — v. Holmes, 215
 Holthausen, *Ex parte*, 180
 Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Lhonneux Limor & Co. v., 377
 —, Att.-Gen. for, v. Kwok-a-Sing, 269
 Hood v. Lord Barrington, 211
 Hooper v. Gumm, 201
 Hope, Att.-Gen. v., 137
 — v. Carnegie, 133, 219

- Hope, Commissioners of Stamps v., 138
 — v. Hope, 294, 406
 Hopkins v. de Robeck, 266
 —, Sproule v., 93
 Hordern, Pouey v., 79
 Horne v. Rouquette, 306, 307
 Horngold v. Horngold, 347
 Horsman, Newland v., 397
 Horst & Co., Biddell Bros. v., 249
 Hoskins v. Matthews, 337
 Houghton, Gardiner v., 316
 Houlditch v. Donegall, 395
 Houston, *Re*, 45, 47, 49
 Hovey v. Blakeman, 134
 Howden, *Re*, 116
 Howe, De Beers Consolidated Mines
 v., 372
 Hoyeremann's Agency, St. Gobain, &c.
 Co. v., 242
 Hoyles, *Re*, Row v. Jagg, 209, 210, 211
 Huart, D' v. Harkness, 122
 Hubbard, Feyerick v., 383
 Huber, *Re*, 123
 — v. Steiner, 314
 Huet v. Le Mesurier, 41
 Hughes, Arthur v., 128
 —, Pemberton v., 94, 392
 Hullet v. King of Spain, 260
 Hume, Whicker v., 336, 338, 340, 344,
 347
 Hummel v. Hummel, 122
 Humphreys, R. v., 104
 Hunter, Liverpool Marine Credit Co
 v., 199, 405
 — v. Nicholls, 214
 —, Philips v., 178, 185, 394
 — v. Potts, 177, 178
 — v. Stewart, 399
 Huntington v. Attrill, 382
 —, Geschwind v., 361
 Huntly (Marchioness of) v. Gaskell, 341
 Huthwaite v. Phayre, 109
 Hutton, Curtis v., 211
 Hyde v. Hyde, 69
 Hyman v. Helm, 402
 Hypatia, *The*, 352

 ILLIDGE, Santos v., 292
 Inlay v. Ellefsen, 400, 405
 Imperial Bank, Republic of Liberia v.,
 260
 Imperial Japanese Government v. P.
 & O. Steamship Co., 261, 266
 Imrie, Castrique v., 195-197, 199
 Income and General Investment Trust
 Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated, 289
 Indigo Co. v. Ogilvy, 241
 Industrie, *The*, 296
 Inglis v. Robertson, 200
 — v. Usherwood, 197
 Inland Revenue Commissioners, Baring
 v., 204
 —, Danubian Sugar Factories v., 205
 —, Gordon's Executors v., 329
 —, Lawson v., 139
 — v. Maple & Co. (Paris), Ltd., 205
 —, Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd.
 v., 205
 —, Revelstoke (Lord) v., 204

 Inland Revenue Commissioners, Smelt-
 ing Company of Australia v., 205
 —, Velasquez v., 205
 —, Wingate (James) & Co. v., 372
 Innes v. Dunlop, 312
 — v. Mitchell, 132, 396
 —, Sandilands v., 128, 130
 International Pulp and Paper Co., *Re*,
 168, 174
 Ireland, Att.-Gen. for, Swift v., 55
 Irwin v. Caruth, 113
 —, Whelan v., 413
 Isaacson v. Durant, 365
 Isherwood v. Cheetham, 117

 JACKSON v. Forbes, 140
 — v. Petrie, 217
 —, Wynne v., 282
 Jacobs v. Crédit Lyonnais, 289
 Jaffe v. Keel, 363
 Jaffer v. Williams, 387
 Jaffrey, Lord Advocate v., 333
 Jagg, Row v., 209-211
 James v. Catherwood, 282
 — v. James, 344
 —, Miller v., 117
 James Westall, *The*, 413
 Jamineau, Burrows v., 304, 398
 Janson v. Driefontein Mines, 352
 Janverin, Middleton v., 56, 57
 Jasep, *The*, 402
 Jassy, *The*, 257
 Jauncy v. Sealey, 129
 Jay, Dawson v., 45
 Jeannot v. Fuerst, 381, 383
 Jecks, Coote v., 199
 Jeffery v. McTaggart, 171
 Jellard, *Re*, 254
 Jenney v. Mackintosh, 219, 251
 Jephson v. Riera, 364
 Jerningham v. Herbert, 210
 Jeves v. Shadwell, 141
 Jewish Colonization Society, Att.-Gen
 v., 139, 144
 Johannesburg Municipal Council v.
 Steward, 401
 Johnson & Co., Badische Anilin, &c.,
 v., 298
 Johnson, *Re*, 30, 107, 108, 326, 335
 —, *Re*, Roberts v. Att.Gen., 30, 36,
 38
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 138, 144
 —, Elliott v., 149
 —, Holman v., 292
 — v. Taylor Bros., 249
 — v. Telford, 153
 Johnston, Cranstown v., 217
 Johnstone v. Baker, 210
 — v. Beattie, 44, 45, 332
 —, Beattie v., 45
 —, Bempde v., 148, 333
 Johore (Sultan of), Mighell v., 258, 260
 Jollet v. Deponthieu, 169
 Jonathan Goodhue, *The*, 203
 Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 291
 — v. Gurney, 413
 — v. Scottish Accident Insurance
 Co., 368

- Hope, Commissioners of Stamps v., 138
 — v. Hope, 294, 406
 Hopkins v. de Robeck, 266
 —, Sproule v., 93
 Hordern, Pouey v., 79
 Horne v. Rouquette, 306, 307
 Horngold v. Horngold, 347
 Horsman, Newland v., 397
 Horst & Co., Biddell Bros. v., 249
 Hoskins v. Matthews, 337
 Houghton, Gardiner v., 316
 Houlditch v. Donegall, 395
 Houstoun, *Re*, 45, 47, 49
 Hovey v. Blakeman, 134
 Howden, *Re*, 116
 Howe, De Beers Consolidated Mines
 v., 372
 Hoyer mann's Agency, St. Gobain, &c.
 Co. v., 242
 Hoyles, *Re*, Row v. Jagg, 209, 210, 211
 Huart, D' v. Harkness, 122
 Hubbard, Feyerick v., 383
 Huber, *Re*, 123
 — v. Steiner, 314
 Huet v. Le Mesurier, 41
 Hughes, Arthur v., 128
 —, Pemberton v., 94, 392
 Hullet v. King of Spain, 260
 Hume, Whucker v., 336, 338, 340, 344,
 347
 Hummel v. Hummel, 122
 Humphreys, R. v., 104
 Hunter, Liverpool Marine Credit Co
 v., 199, 405
 — v. Nicholls, 214
 —, Philips v., 178, 185, 394
 — v. Potts, 177, 178
 — v. Stewart, 399
 Huntington v. Attrill, 382
 —, Geschwind v., 361
 Huntly (Marchioness of) v. Gaskell, 341
 Huthwaite v. Playre, 109
 Hutton, Curtis v., 211
 Hyde v. Hyde, 69
 Hyman v. Helm, 402
 Hypatia, *The*, 352

 ILLIDGE, Santos v., 292
 Inlay v. Ellefsen, 400, 405
 Imperial Bank, Republic of Liberia v.,
 260
 Imperial Japanese Government v. P.
 & O. Steamship Co., 261, 266
 Imrie, Castrique v., 195-197, 199
 Income and General Investment Trust
 Ltd. v. Borax Consolidated, 289
 Indigo Co. v. Ogilvy, 241
 Industrie, *The*, 296
 Inglis v. Robertson, 200
 — v. Usherwood, 197
 Inland Revenue Commissioners, Baring
 v., 204
 —, Danubian Sugar Factories v., 205
 —, Gordon's Executors v., 329
 —, Lawson v., 139
 — v. Maple & Co. (Paris), Ltd., 205
 —, Muller & Co.'s Margarine, Ltd.
 v., 205
 —, Revelstoke (Lord) v., 204

 Inland Revenue Commissioners, Smelt-
 ing Company of Australia v., 205
 —, Velasquez v., 205
 —, Wingate (James) & Co. v., 372
 Innes v. Dunlop, 312
 — v. Mitchell, 132, 396
 —, Sandilands v., 128, 130
 International Pulp and Paper Co., *Re*,
 168, 174
 Ireland, Att.-Gen. for, Swift v., 55
 Irwin v. Caruth, 113
 —, Whelan v., 413
 Isaacson v. Durant, 365
 Isherwood v. Cheetham, 117

 JACKSON v. Forbes, 140
 — v. Petrie, 217
 —, Wynne v., 282
 Jacobs v. Crédit Lyonnais, 289
 Jaffe v. Keel, 363
 Jaffer v. Williams, 387
 Jaffrey, Lord Advocate v., 333
 Jagg, Row v., 209-211
 James v. Catherwood, 282
 — v. James, 344
 —, Miller v., 117
 James Westall, *The*, 413
 Jamineau, Burrows v., 304, 398
 Janson v. Driefontein Mines, 352
 Janverin, Middleton v., 56, 57
 Jasep, *The*, 402
 Jassy, *The*, 257
 Jauncy v. Sealey, 129
 Jay, Dawson v., 45
 Jeannot v. Fuerst, 381, 383
 Jecks, Coote v., 199
 Jeffery v. McTaggart, 171
 Jellard, *Re*, 254
 Jenney v. Mackintosh, 219, 251
 Jephson v. Riera, 364
 Jerningham v. Herbert, 210
 Jevess v. Shadwell, 141
 Jewish Colonization Society, Att-Gen
 v., 139, 144
 Johannesburg Municipal Council v.
 Steward, 401
 Johnson & Co., Badische Anilin, &c.,
 v., 298
 Johnson, *Re*, 30, 107, 108, 326, 335
 —, *Re*, Roberts v. Att.Gen., 30, 36,
 38
 —, Att.-Gen. v., 138, 144
 —, Elliott v., 149
 —, Holman v., 292
 — v. Taylor Bros., 249
 — v. Telford, 153
 Johnston, Cranstown v., 217
 Johnstone v. Baker, 210
 — v. Beattie, 44, 45, 332
 —, Beattie v., 45
 —, Bempde v., 148, 333
 Johore (Sultan of), Mighell v., 258, 260
 Jollet v. Deponthieu, 169
 Jonathan Goodhue, *The*, 203
 Jones v. Garcia del Rio, 291
 — v. Gurney, 413
 — v. Scottish Accident, Insurance
 Co., 368

- Jones's Divorce Bill, 412
 Jonge Klassina, The, 352
 Joyce, American Thread Co. v., 372
 Joynt v. McCrum, 251, 252
 Jurado v. Gregory, 380

 KALETEN, The, 243
 Kannreuther v. Geiselbrecht, 135
 Karnak, The, 296
 Kaufman v. Gerson, 293
 Kaye v. Sutherland, 248
 Keefe, Quinn v., 316
 Keel, Jaffe v., 363
 Kelly v. Selwyn, 202
 —, Swift v., 55
 Kemble, Allen v., 305, 308, 405
 —, Beckford v., 220
 Kemp v. Necchi, 240
 Kennedy, Bell v., 320, 340
 Kennion, Cash v., 300
 Kent, Att.-Gen. v., 349
 — v. Burgess, 55
 Keyes v. Keyes and Gray, 85, 405
 Keymer v. Reddy, 240
 Keyser, New York, & Co. v., 48
 Kildare v. Eustace, 219
 Kinahan v. Kinahan, 252
 King, The. See R.
 King v. Brampton, 67
 —, Croft v., 252
 — v. Foxwell, 343
 —, South African Breweries v., 290,
 295
 King & Co.'s Trade Mark, 254
 Kirchner & Co. v. Gruban, 401
 Kirwan's Trusts, Re, 122
 Klæbe, Re, 135
 Klingemann, Re, 409
 Knight, Re, 48
 —, Waring v., 179
 Kodak, Ltd. v. Clark, 373
 Kolchmann v. Meurice, 249
 Korvine's Trusts, Re, 148, 199
 Kossuth, Emperor of Austria v., 206
 Krageroe, The, The Repeater v., 278
 Kramische, Naylor, Bewgor & Co. v.,
 292
 Krupp, Re, 414
 —, Vavasour v., 263
 Kwok-a-Sing, Att.-Gen. of Hong Kong
 v., 269
 Kynnaid v. Leslie, 59

 LA ASEGURADORA ESPAÑOLA, Mutzen-
 becher v., 248
 La Bourgogne, 377
 La Chaumette, De v. Bank of Eng-
 land, 312
 La Cloche, Spurrier v., 285
 La Compagnie Générale d'Eaux Minér-
 ales, &c., Re, 240, 254
 Lacon v. Higgins, 55
 —, Schrichand & Co. v., 404
 Lacroix, Re, 36, 120, 121
 Lady Blessington, The, 243
 Lagos, Colonial Secretary of, Callender,
 Sykes & Co. v., 172, 318
 L'Fitt v. L'Batt, 152
 Laidlay v. Lord Advocate, 138

 Lamb, Barber v., 397
 Lambe v. Manuel, 141
 Lanarkshire Tramways, Convery v.,
 272
 Lane, Re, Lane v. Robin, 251
 Laneville v. Anderson, 36, 114, 117
 —, Anderson v., 344
 Lansdowne v. Lansdowne, 80, 215
 Larivière v. Morgan, 263
 Larpent v. Sindry, 118
 Larragotti, De, Re, 46
 La Saussaye, De, Re, 116
 Lashley v. Hog, 74, 82
 —, Hog v., 148
 Lassalle, Re, 342, 343
 Last, Erichsen v., 372
 Latter, Tomlin v., 122, 151
 Lauderdale Peerage, 102, 348
 Laughlin, Wansborough Paper Co. v.,
 250
 Lautre v. Teesdale, 56, 63, 67
 Law v. Garrett, 401
 Lawes, Vadala v., 397
 Lawford v. Pryce, 124
 Lawrence, Biggs v., 292
 Lawson, Boucher v., 291
 — v. Commissioners of Inland
 Revenue, 139
 — v. Duncan, 146, 210
 —, Duncan v., 211, 214
 — v. Vacuum Brake Co., 412
 Lawson's Trusts, Re, 169, 170
 Leach v. Leach, 138
 Leal's Settlement, Re, 122
 Lebel v. Tucker, 303
 Le Chevalier v. Lynch, 174
 Le Couturier, Rey v., 205, 376, 414
 Lee v. Abdy, 44, 203
 Le Mesurier, Ex parte, 179
 —, Huet v., 41
 — v. Le Mesurier, 84-86, 89, 90
 Lenders v. Anderson, 250, 252
 Leon, The, 277
 Leon XIII., The, 243
 Lepage, Ostell v., 399
 Lepine, Att.-Gen. v., 371
 Leroux v. Brown, 281, 404
 Lesley, Reg. v., 270
 Leslie, Kynnaid v., 59
 Le Sueur v. Le Sueur, 89, 338
 Lever v. Fletcher, 291
 Levy, Re, 111
 —, Clegg v., 282, 410
 —, Grell v., 294
 — v. Levy and De Renance, 90
 — v. Solomon, 101, 102
 Lewal's Trusts, Re, 124, 152
 Lewin, Craigie v., 350
 Lewis (Otto), Ex parte, 48
 Lewis v. Baldwin, 371
 —, McHenry v., 400, 401
 — v. Owen, 316
 Leycester, Booth v., 398
 Leyland, Comber v., 249
 Lhoneux Limon & Co. v. Hong Kong
 and Shanghai Banking Corpora-
 tion, 377
 Liberia, Republic of v. Imperial Bank,
 260

- Liebenthal & Co., Montgomery & Co. v., 240, 250
 Liebig's Cocoa Works, *Re*, 254
 Liebmann's Case, 366
 Liegeron's Claim, *Re* Crédit Général, *Adda*.
 Lightowler v. Lightowler, 251
 Linden, *de*, *Re*, 46
 Linden, von, *Re*, 110
 Lindo v. Belisario, 410
 Lindsay, Tovey v., 98, 349
 Linke v. Van Aerde, 93
 Lippmann, Don v., 313, 385, 395
 Lister's Judicial Factor v. Symons, 79
 Liverpool Cotton Association, Merri-field v., 397
 Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter, 199, 405
 Livietta, The, 204
 Livingstone, Fenton v., 222
 Lloyd v. Guibert, 194, 275, 295, 296, 407
 — v. Petitjean, 66
 Lloyd Generale Italiano, *Re*, 169
 Logan v. Bank of Scotland, 238, 252, 377
 — v. Fairlie, 128, 140
 Lolley's Case, 96-98
 London and Westminster Bank, Didisheim v., 46
 London Bank of Mexico and South America v. Apthorpe, 373
 London Chartered Bank of Australia, Williams v., 201
 London, City of, Att.-Gen. v., 371
 Lopez v. Burslem, 407
 — v. Chavarri, 252
 —, Reg. v., 204
 Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey, 333
 —, Laidlay v., 138
 Lord, Moorhouse v., 335, 336, 337-339, 344, 345
 Lorillard, *Re*, *Adda*.
 Lousada, di Savini v., 45
 Loustalan v. Loustalan, 72, 76, 117, 348
 Lovelace, *Re*, 143
 Lovitt, King v., 139
 Low (Thomas) & Co. v. Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, 377
 Low, *Re*, Bland v. Low, 313
 Lowe v. Fairlie, 128
 —, Macgregor v., 291
 Lowenfeld, Scarpetta v., 392
 Loyd, Ellis v., 299
 Ludwig, Matheson v., 405
 Luker, Daniel v., 127
 Luna, The, 201
 Lushington v. Sewell, 216
 Luther v. James Sagor & Co., 200, 261, 294
 Lyaë v. Lyall, 143, 144
 Lyall Shipping Co., Hemsbeeyck v., 249
 Lynch, Le Chevalier v., 174
 — v. Provisional Government of Paraguay, 108
 —, R. v., 361, 362
 Lyne v. de la Ferté, 118
 Lyne's Settlement Trusts, *Re*, 124, 209
 Lyons, Mayor of v. East India Co., 371
 Lysaght, Ltd. v. Clark & Co., 242
 McALLISTER, Maghee v., 97
 Macartney, *Re*, 203, 294, 381, 395
 — v. Garbutt, 266
 MacCarthy, Bequet v., 385
 MacCarthy v. Decaix, 96-98
 McCheane v. Gyles, 251, 253
 McClure, Maxwell v., 346, 347
 MacColl v. Bruce, 122
 McCormick v. Garnett, 73, 408
 McCrum, Joynt v., 251, 252
 McCulloch, *Re*, 167
 Macdonald v. Macdonald, 149
 Macdonald's Case, 355
 M'Donnell v. M'Donnell, 381
 McDouall, Dalhousie v., 101, 348
 McFarland, Stephens v., 41
 Macfarlane, Burchard v., 412
 — v. Norris, 405
 Macfayden & Co., *Re*, 165, 179
 M'Feetridge v. Stewarts and Lloyds, 41
 McGettigan v. North Eastern Railway Co., 249
 Macgregor v. Lowe, 291
 McGusty, Frankland v., 397
 McHenry, Ellis v., 317, 318
 — v. Lewis, 400, 401
 McIntosh v. Ogilvie, 178
 MacIver v. Burns, 242
 McKecknie v. Clark, 127, 151
 Mackenzie, *Re* (1886), 112
 —, *Re*, Mackenzie v. Edwards and Moss (1911), 79, 333
 — v. Forbes, 209
 Mackereth v. Glasgow and South Western Railway Co., 377
 Mackie v. Darling, 47, 50
 Mackintosh, Jenney v., 219, 251
 McKnight, Currie v., 194
 Maclaren, Carron Iron Co. v., 183, 377
 — v. Stainton, 377
 M'Lellan v. Gumm, 201
 Macmaster, Pedder v., 316
 Macnamara v. d'Evreux, 291
 Macnichol, *Re*, 127
 Macpherson, Dubout v., 253
 MacRae, United States v., 261, 406
 Macreight, *Re*, Paxton v. Macreight, 348
 McTaggart, Jeffery v., 171
 Machado v. Fontes, 269, 272
 Madrazo v. Willes, 279
 Madrid and Valencia Railway Co., *Re*, 168
 Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin, 264
 Magee's Children, *Re*, 45
 Maghee v. McAllister, 97
 Main, Patience v., 342
 Maitland, Dewar v., 153
 Malcolm v. Martin, 146, 151
 Male v. Roberts, 40
 Mali Ivo, The, 400
 Mallac, Simonin v., 41, 58-61, 93
 Malony v. Gibbons, 389
 Maltass v. Maltass, 327, 345

- Manar, The, 401
 Manchester, Consuelo Duchess of, *Re*,
 • Duncannon v. Duke of Manches-
 ter, 139
 Manger v. Cash, 396
 Manitoba, &c. Corporation v. Allan,
 248
 Manitoba, &c. Railway, Grey v., 219
 Mannors v. Pearson & Co., 300
 Mannheim, The, 401
 Manning v. Manning, 86
 —, Newton v., 46
 Manuel, Lambe v., 141
 Maple & Co., Inland Revenue Com-
 missioners v., 205
 Maraver, *Re*, 115
 Markwald v. Att.-Gen., 360
 Marrett, *Re*, Chalmers v. Wingfield,
 342
 Marseilles Extension Railway and
 Land Co., *Re*, 303
 Marsh, Bergerem v., 170
 Marshall v. Marshall, 252
 — v. Murgatroyd, 204
 Martin, *Re*, Loustalan v. Loustalan,
 72, 76, 117, 119, 348
 —, Bell v., 221
 —, Great Australian Gold Mining
 Co. v., 239
 —, Hicks v., 290
 —, Magdalena Steam Navigation
 Co. v., 264
 —, Malcolm v., 146, 151
 — v. Martin, 221
 — v. Nadel, 203
 — v. Nicolls, 395
 Mary Moffat, *Re*, 110
 Mary Thomas, The, 290, 297
 Mason and Barry v. Comptoir d'Es-
 compte de Paris, 377
 Maspons v. Mildred, 298
 Massey, Graham v., 218
 — v. Haynes, 251
 Masson, Stevenson v., 347
 Master in Equity, Beaver v., 138
 Mather v. Cunningham, 326
 Matheson v. Ludwig, 405
 Matheson Brothers, Ltd., *Re*, 168
 Matthews, Doulson v., 254
 —, Hoskins v., 337
 Mattos, *Ex parte* de Mello, 180
 Maudslay, Sons & Field, *Re*, 179,
 205
 Maule v. Murray, 397
 Maurice, *Re*, Brown v. Maurice, 145
 Maxwell, Graham v., 133, 402
 — v. McClure, 346, 347
 —, Smith v., 57
 Maxwell & Co., Gabrian v., 389
 Mayer v. Claretie, 240
 Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co., 371
 Meatyard, *Re*, 41, 110
 Mecklenburg, de Gasquet-James v.,
 92, 93
 Meens v. Thellusson, 383
 Mégret, *Re*, Tweedie v. Tweedie, 79
 Meiklan v. Campbell, 132
 Melan v. Fitzjames, 405
 Melbourn, *Ex parte*, 136, 180
 Mello Mattos, Chevalier de, *Ex parte*,
 180
 Melville, Preston v., 131
 Mercantile Bank of Australia, *Re*, 168
 Mercantile Investment, &c. Co. v.
 River Plate Trust, &c. Co. 217
 Merrifield v. Liverpool Cotton Associa-
 tion, 397
 Merry & Son, Dulaney v., 170
 Messicano, The, 257
 Metcalfe, *Re*, 50
 Mette v. Mette, 41, 57, 58, 62
 Meurice, Kolchmann v., 249
 Meyding v. Hincheliff, 410
 Meyer, Bazett v., 291
 — v. Dresser, 405
 — v. Ralli, 396
 Middleton v. Janverin, 56, 57
 —, Wood v., 248
 Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 258, 260
 Mildred, Maspons v., 298
 Milford, The, 202, 203
 Mill, Att.-Gen. v., 211
 Miller, *Re*, 215, 284
 —, Brickwood v., 180
 —, Deschamps v., 219
 — v. James, 117
 Mills, Albion Insurance Co. v., 295
 —, Pattison v., 295
 Milne v. Graham, 312
 Milward & Co., *Re*, 413
 Minet v. Vulliamy, 371
 Minna Craig S.S. Co. v. Chartered
 Mercantile Bank, &c., 176
 Minto, Elliott v., 146, 210
 Mir Ammureddin, *Re*, 69, 87, 94, 104,
 328
 Missouri Steamship Co., *Re*, 289, 296
 Mitchell, *Re*, 48
 —, *Re*, *Ex parte* Cunningham, 165,
 348, 351
 —, Cox v., 400, 401
 — v. Egyptian Hotels, Ltd., 373
 —, Innes v., 132, 396
 M. Moxham, The, 254, 269
 Moffatt, Smith v., 171
 Moisson, Quelin v., 316
 Molleson, Phosphate Sewage Co. v.,
 406
 Montaigu, de, v. de Montaigu, 88
 Montefiore, de Wilton v., 58
 Montgomery v. Zarifi, 79, 82
 Montgomery & Co. v. Liebenenthal, 240,
 250
 Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank, 219
 Moore v. Darell, 117
 Moorhouse v. Lord, 335-339, 344, 345
 Mora, de v. Concha, 411
 Morgan, *Re*, 48
 —, Larivière v., 263
 Morocco Bound Syndicate v. Harris,
 251
 Morris, Harford v., 56, 69, 67
 Morrison, New Zealand Loan, &c. Co.
 v., 317, 318
 Moses, *Re*, Moses v. Valentine, 211
 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 236, 254, 269
 Mottichund, Ruckmaboye v., 313
 Moulis v. Owen, 293, 304, 404

- Mowat, Geddes *v.*, 171
 Mowbray & Robinson *v.* Rosser, *Adda*.
 Mulcaster, Doe *v.*, 364
 Muller & Co.'s Margarine *v.* Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 205
 Munro *v.* Munro, 101, 102, 340
 — *v.* Saunders, 102
 Munroe *v.* Douglas, 343
 Murgatroyd, Marshall *v.*, 204
 Murieta, Concha *v.*, 411
 Murphy *v.* Deichler, 123
 Murray, *Re*, 115
 — *v.* Champernowne, 209
 —, Maule *v.*, 397
 —, Nisbett *v.*, 151
 Muschamp, Arglasse *v.*, 217, 219
 Musgrave, Alexandria Water Co. *v.*, 373
 Musurus, Ghikis *v.*, 248
 Musurus Bey *v.* Gadban, 264
 —, Gladstone *v.*, 263, 264
 Mutrie *v.* Binney, 400
 Mutzenbecher *v.* La Aseguradora Española, 248
 Myers, Barrow *v.*, 249
- NADEL, Martin *v.*, 203
 Naguib, R. *v.*, 69
 Napier, Att.-Gen. *v.*, 141
 —, Chamberlain *v.*, 81
 —, Dobree *v.*, 270
 — *v.* Schneider, 308
 Nasmyth, Hare *v.*, 35, 117, 118
 National Bank of St. Charles *v.* de Bernales, 373
 Nautik, The, 243
 Nawab Nazim of Bengal's Infants, *Re*, 103
 Naylor *v.* Eagar, 400
 Naylor, Bewgor & Co. *v.* Krainische, 292
 Neal *v.* Cottingham, 169
 Necchi, Kemp *v.*, 240
 Neck *v.* Taylor, 413
 Nelson, *Re*, 318
 — *v.* Bridport, 221, 409, 411
 Neptune the Second, The, 277
 Netherlands, &c. Navigation Co., Chartered Mercantile Bank of India *v.*, 276, 295
 Neville, Galbraith *v.*, 394
 New *v.* Bonaker, 371
 — *v.* Burns, 412
 Newbattle, The, 260
 Newby *v.* Van Oppen and Colt's, &c. Co., 375, 377
 New Fenix Compagnie *v.* General Accident Co., 413
 Newland *v.* Horsman, 397
 Newman *v.* Cazalet, 297
 New South Wales, Att.-Gen. of, Platt *v.*, 346
 Newton *v.* Manning, 46
 — *v.* Newton, 91
 New York Breweries *v.* Att.-Gen., 109, 138
 New York Herald, De Bernales *v.*, 240, 242, 250
- New York Security and Trust Co. *v.* Keyser, 48
 New Zealand Loan, &c. Co. *v.* Morrison, 317, 318
 New Zealand, Governor of, Sloman *v.*, 258
 Nias, Bank of Australasia *v.*, 392, 395, 397
 Niboyet *v.* Niboyet, 84, 89-92
 Nicholls, *Re*, Hunter *v.* Nicholls, 214
 Nicholson, Calcutta Jute Mills Co. *v.*, 373
 —, Cesena Sulphur Co. *v.*, 373
 Nickerson, Pope *v.*, 296
 Nicolls, Martin *v.*, 395
 —, Smith *v.*, 397
 Nina, The, 243
 Nisbett *v.* Murray, 151
 Noailles, *Re*, 198
 Nobel Dynamite Co. *v.* Wyatt, 373
 Noell *v.* Robinson, 212
 Norden Steamship Co. *v.* Dempsey, 296
 Nordenfelt, *Re*, 165
 Norris *v.* Chambres, 218
 —, Macfarlane *v.*, 405
 North American Land and Timber Co., Watkins *v.*, 238
 North British, &c., Co., Collins *v.*, 251
 North Carolina Estate Co., *Re*, 177
 Northcote, Hay *v.*, 64
 North Eastern Railway Co. *v.* McGettigan, 249
 North of Scotland Banking Co., Hamburg American Steamship Co. *v.*, 278
 North Western Bank *v.* Poynter, 200, 203
 Northouse, Bentley *v.*, 312
 Norton *v.* Florence Land and Public Works Co., 219, 221
 —, *Re*, Norton *v.* Norton, 238
 Nostra Signora de los Dolores, The, 270
 Nouvelle Banque de l'Union *v.* Ayton, 408
 Novvion *v.* Freeman, 381
 Novelli *v.* Rossi, 396
 Novello *v.* Toogood, 265
 Nugent *v.* Vetzera, 45
 Nunneley *v.* Nunneley, 79
- OBICINI *v.* Bligh, 385
 O'Callaghan *v.* Thomond, 312
 O'Connor, Cowan *v.*, 298
 Ochsenbein *v.* Papelier, 396
 Odber, Hall *v.*, 382, 397
 Odwin *v.* Forbes, 317
 Oesterreichische Export *v.* British Indemnity Co., 251
 Oetjer *v.* Central Leather Co., 200
 Oetl and Grundt, *Re*, 116
 Ogden *v.* Folliott, 414
 —, Folliott *v.*, 169, 414
 — *v.* Ogden, 41, 43, 58, 60-62, 88, 89, 93
 Ogilvie, *Re*, 154
 —, McIntosh *v.*, 178
 Ogilvy, Indigo Co. *v.*, 241
 O'Hagan, Viditz *v.*, 44, 78

- Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka, &c., 242, 377
 Oldenburg, Prince P. G., *Re*, 119, 409
 Oliphant, *Re*, 114, 115
 — v. Hendrie, 371
 Oliveira, Beaumont v., 212
 Olivier v. Townes, 190
 O'Loghlen, *Ex parte*, 167
 Ominaney v. Bingham, 148
 O'Neil v. Clason, 241
 Onslow and Allardice v. Cannon, 36
 Onslow, Allardice v., 345
 Ontario, Att.-Gen. for, Woodruff v., 139
 Oppenheimer, Abouloff v., 397
 Orcutt v. Orms, 125
 Oriental Inland Steam Co., *Re*, 174
 Orléans, d', *Re*, 41, 110, 352
 Ormonde, Clarke v., 218
 Orms, Orcutt v., 125
 Orr, Bowles v., 396
 Orr Ewing, Ewing v., 130
 — v. Orr Ewing, 130
 Ory v. Winter, 813
 Ostell v. Lepage, 399
 Otto Lewis, *Ex parte*, 48
 Ottoman Bank, Gladstone v., 263
 Overmann, Rouquette v., 304, 306, 308, 405
 Owen, Lewis v., 316
 —, Moulis v., 293, 304, 404
 —, Rex v., 254
 Oxholm, Wolff v., 404, 414
- PADLEY v. Camphausen, 239
 Page v. Donovan, 119
 Paget, *Ex parte*, 413
 — v. Ede, 220
 Palace Steamship Co., Caine v., 395
 Palmer v. Caledonian Railway Co., 378
 — v. Palmer, 92
 —, Thompson v., 248
 Panhard Motor Co. Société Panhard
 Levassor v., 376
 Papayanni, Cail v., 275
 Papelier, Ochsenein v., 396
 Paragotis v. Pontrac, 272
 Paraguay, Provisional Government of,
 Lynch v., 108
 Parapano v. Happaz, 323
 Pardo v. Bingham, 135, 313
 Parent, Canadian Pacific Railway v.,
 269
 Parker, Cresswell v., 252
 Parkinson v. Potter, 266
 Parks, Seagrove v., 239
 Parlement Belge, The, 257
 Partington v. Att.-Gen., 138
 Pascal, *Ex parte*, 167
 Patience v. Main, 342
 Patria, The, 296
 Patrick v. Shedden, 381
 —, Shedden v., 103
 Patten, *Re*, 349
 Pattison v. Mills, 295
 Paul v. Roy, 381
 —, Deutsche Bank v., 249, 251
 Paxton v. Macreight, 348
 Payne v. Rex, 138
- Pearse, *Re*, Pearse v. Pearse, 138, 218
 Pearson, *Re*, *Ex parte* Pearson, 164
 Pearson & Co., Manners v., 300
 Peat, *Re*, 216
 Pechell v. Hilderley, 121
 Pedder v. Macmaster, 316
 Peillon v. Brooking, 44, 203
 Pélégryn v. Coutts, 46
 Pellecat v. Angell, 292
 Pemberton v. Hughes, 94, 392
 Pena Copper Mines, Ltd. v. Rio Tinto,
 Ltd., 401
 Penaluna, Clugas v., 292
 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga-
 tion Co. v. Shand, 286, 297
 —, Japanese Government v., 261, 266
 Penn v. Baltimore, 217, 219
 Pepin v. Bruyère, 214
 Pepper v. Pepper, 55
 Percy and Kelly Cobalt, &c. Mining
 Co., *Re*, 413
 Perez, Triana & Co., Western National
 Bank v., 241
 Perrin v. Perrin, 91, 92
 —, Surrey v., 132
 Pertreis v. Tondear, 65
 Peru, Republic of v. Dreyfus, 261
 — v. Weguelin, 260
 Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt, 400,
 402
 —, Dreyfus v., 413
 Peruvian Railways Co., *Re*, 168
 Peshawur, The, 401
 Peter v. Stirling, 145
 Petitjean, Lloyd v., 66
 Petrie, Jackson v., 217
 Petty, *Re*, 118
 —, Carteret v., 218, 219, 221
 Phayre, Huthwaite v., 109
 Philips v. Hunter, 178, 185, 394
 Philipps, d. Sora v., 283, 411
 Phillipps v. Allan, 316
 — v. Batho, 90, 272, 390
 —, Browne v., 111
 — v. Eyre, 269
 — v. Phillips, *Adda*.
 Philpotts v. Reed, 317
 Phipps v. Anglesca, 215
 Phosphate Sewage Co. v. Molleson, 406
 Pickering v. Stephenson, 371
 Piercy, *Re*, Whitwham v. Piercy, 209
 Pierson v. Garnet, 151
 Pietroni, Transatlantic Co. v., 401
 Pike v. Hoare, 218
 Pilkington, Scott v., 381
 Pilling, *Re*, 413
 Pipon v. Pipon, 131, 147
 Pitt v. Dacre, 216
 Planché v. Fletcher, 291
 Planters' Bank, United States Bank v.,
 257
 Platt v. Att.-Gen. of New South
 Wales, 346
 Plummer v. Woodburne, 398
 Poitier v. Croza, 265
 Pollard, *Ex parte*, 217
 Pollexfen v. Sibson, 241
 Polzeath, The, 369
 Pompe, Suse v., 308

- Pontrac, Paragotis, *v.*, 272
 Poole, Greer *v.*, 296, 297
 Pope *v.* Nickerson, 296
 Porter *v.* Freudenberg, 239, 352
 Porto Alexandre, The, 257
 Portugal, Queen of, Rothschild *v.*, 260
 Pottinger *v.* Wightman, 332
 Potter *v.* Brown, 316
 —, Parkinson *v.*, 266
 Pottinger, Att.-Gen. *v.*, 350
 Potts, Hunter *v.*, 177, 178
 Pouey *v.* Hordern, 79
 Poulter *v.* D'Este, 122
 Powell, Hicks *v.*, 221
 Power *v.* Whitmore, 297
 Poyles, Thompson *v.*, 291, 299
 Poynter, North Western Bank *v.*, 200, 203
 Pratt, Att.-Gen. *v.*, 137, 138
 — *v.* The North British Co., 251
 Pray *v.* Edie, 413
 President of U.S.A. *v.* Drummond, 352
 Preston, Archer *v.*, 219
 —, Bonnell *v.*, 240
 — *v.* Melville, 131
 Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway Co., *Re*, 413
 Price, *Re*, 122, 152
 — *v.* Dewhurst, 109, 396
 Prins Hendrik, 270
 Prioleau *v.* United States, 260
 —, United States *v.*, 261
 Professional Life Assurance Co., Sheehy *v.*, 382
 Provisional Government of Paraguay, Lynch *v.*, 108
 Provost of Edinburgh *v.* Aubery, 371
 Pryce, *Re*, 124
 Public Trustee, Stoeck *v.*, 366

 QUARRIER *v.* Colston, 293
 Queen, The. *See* R.
 Queen *v.* Doutre, 295
 Queen of Portugal, Rothschild *v.*, 260
 Queensland, Commissioners of Stamps for, Harding *v.*, 141
 Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co., *Re*, 202
 Queensland National Bank, *Re*, 168
 Quelin *v.* Moisson, 316
 Quin *v.* Keefe, 316
 Quine, Harris *v.*, 314
 Quiney, Coombs *v.*, 281

 R. *v.* Albany Street Police Station Superintendent, 357
 — *v.* Anderson, 204
 —, Blackwood *v.*, 138
 —, Burland *v.*, 139
 — *v.* Carr, 204
 — *v.* Clerkenwell Commissioners of Taxes, 373
 — *v.* Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes, 139
 —, Cotton *v.*, 139
 — *v.* Dent, 410
 —, Henty *v.*, 138
 — *v.* Humphreys, 104

 R. *v.* Lesley, 270
 — *v.* Lopez, 204
 — *v.* Lovitt, 139
 — *v.* Lynch, 361, 362
 — *v.* Naguib, 69
 — *v.* Owen, 254
 —, Payne *v.*, 138
 — *v.* Rotherfield Greys (Inhabitants of), 332
 — *v.* Sattler, 204
 — *v.* Speyer, 358
 —, Stern *v.*, 127
 — *v.* Vine Street Police Station Superintendent, 366
 —, Walsh *v.*, 203
 —, West Rand Gold Mining Co. *v.*, 261
 —, Winans *v.*, 139
 R.S.A., *Re*, 46
 Raffanel, *Re*, 342
 Ralli, Meyer *v.*, 396
 Ralli Brothers *v.* Companhia Naviera, &c., 289, 291, 299
 Ranelagh, Champant *v.*, 299
 Rankin's Estate, *Re*, 113
 Rathbone, De Cossé Brissac *v.*, 388, 395
 Rayment *v.* Rayment & Stuart, 89, 254, 272, 390
 Raymond *v.* Brodbelt, 146
 Rea, *Re*, Rea *v.* Rea, 208
 Read, *Re*, 112
 —, Strother *v.*, 170, 171
 —, Waymell *v.*, 292
 Reddy, Keymer *v.*, 240
 Redfern, Arnott *v.*, 295, 396
 Reed, Philpotts *v.*, 317
 Reeve, Bowman *v.*, 146
 Reeves, Collins Co. *v.*, 376
 Regina. *See* R.
 Reid, *Re*, 119
 Remers *v.* Druce, 395, 396
 Rein *v.* Stein, 248
 Reiner *v.* Salisbury, 223
 Repeater, The *v.* The Braga or Krag-eroe, 278
 Republic of Costa Rica *v.* Erlanger, 260
 —, Strousberg *v.*, 261, 263
 Republic of Liberia *v.* Imperial Bank, 260
 Republic of Peru *v.* Dreyfus, 261
 — *v.* Weguehn, 260
 Reuss (Princess of) *v.* Bos, 168
 Revelstoke (Lord) *v.* Inland Revenue Commissioners, 204
 Rex. *See* R.
 Rey *v.* Le Couturier, 205, 376, 414
 Reynolds *v.* Coleman, 248
 — *v.* Ellis, *Re* Bankes, 44, 78
 — *v.* Fenton, 385, 389
 Rhodesia Consolidated, Ltd., Brailey *v.*, 410
 Ricardo *v.* Garcias, 398
 Ricaud *v.* American Metal Co., 200
 Richards *v.* Gould, 210, 282
 Richardson *v.* Bradshaw, 179
 — *v.* Dowdale, 129
 Richnitzer, von Hellefeld *v.*, 242
 Ricketts, Bourke *v.*, 146

- Riera, Heriz v., 291
 —, Jephson v., 364
 — v. Riera, 91
 Rin, de, Bradlaugh v., 303
 Rio Tinto Co., Ltd., Ertel Bieber & Co. v., 292
 — v. Dynamite A. G., 407
 —, Pena Copper Mines v., 401
 Risdon Iron Works v. Furness, 376, 392
 Rivaz, Collier v., 35, 121, 334
 River Plate Trust, &c. Co., Mercantile Investment, &c., Co. v., 217
 Roach v. Garvan, 403
 Robartes, *Ex parte*, *Re* Gillespie, 308
 Robarts, Cruikshank v., 401
 Robeck, de, Hopkins v., 266
 Roberdeau v. Rous, 219, 221
 Roberts v. Att.-Gen., *Re* Johnson, 36
 — v. Brennan, 92
 —, Male v., 40
 Robertson, *Ex parte*, 174
 —, Inglis v., 200
 Robey v. Snæfell Mining Co., 248
 Robin, Lane v., 251
 Robins, Colls v., 254
 —, Dolphin v., 97, 122, 333
 —, Sadler v., 382
 Robinson, *Re*, 167
 — v. Bland, 288, 293
 — v. Fenner, 392, 396
 —, Noell v., 212
 Rodocanachi, Burnand v., 297
 Roe v. Roe, 409
 Rogers, *Ex parte*, 171
 Rogerson, *Re*, 110
 Ronald, Edwards v., 317
 Rose v. Ross, 102
 —, Whyte v., 109, 110, 125, 127
 Ross, Channel Coaling Co. v., 250
 — v. Eason, 251
 —, Rose v., 102
 —, Solomons v., 169
 — v. Woodford, 412
 Rosser, Mowbray & Robinson v., *Adda*.
 Rossi, Novelli v., 396
 Rotherfield Greys (Inhabitants of),
 R. v., 332
 Rothfield, Cohen v., 401
 Rothschild, Colombian Government v.,
 260
 — v. Currie, 306
 — v. Queen of Portugal, 260
 Rouquette, Horne v., 306, 307,
 — v. Overmann, 304, 306, 308, 405
 Rous, Roberdeau v., 219, 221
 Rousillon v. Rousillon, 294, 386
 Roven, de, Duplex v., 380
 Row v. Jagg, 209-211
 Rowe, Att.-Gen. v., 349, 350
 Roy, Paul v., 381
 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuthbert, or
 v. Stein's Assignees, 160, 170
 Royal Exchange Assurance v. Sjöfor-
 saktings Aktiebolaget, 289
 Royal Wax Candle Co., Scott v., 376
 Rucker, Buchanan v., 384
 —, Francis v., 308
 Rucklidge, Western Suburban, &c.
 Building Society v., 240
 Ruckmaboeye v. Mottichund, 313
 Ruddiman's Trusts, *Re*, 254
 Ruding v. Smith, 63, 67
 Rue, de la, *Re*, 116
 Ruglioni de Virte, Vaiani v., 154
 Rule, *Re*, 117
 Rush v. Rush and Pimenta, 89, 254
 Russell (John) & Co. v. Cayzer, Irwin
 & Co., 238, 252
 Russell v. Cambefort, 241
 — v. Smyth, 382
 Ryan v. Ryan, 98
 SACCHARIN Corporation Co. v. Chem-
 ische Fabrik Co., 377
 Sackville (Lord), West v., 412
 Sadler v. Robins, 382
 Sagor (James) & Co., Luther v., 200,
 261, 294
 St. Giorgio, Weatherby v., 132
 St. Gobain, &c. v. Hoyeremann's, &c.,
 242
 St. John, Scholefield v., 122
 Sanders, *Re*, 113
 Saumarez, de, *Re*, 145
 Salisbury, Reiner v., 222
 Salting, Stamp Duty Commissioners
 v., 138
 Samson, Heath v., 349
 San Paulo Railway Co. v. Carter, 373
 Sanders, *Re*, 113
 Sandford, Campbell v., 151
 Sandilands v. Innes, 128, 130
 Sandos, Brettillot v., 405
 Santo Teodoro v. Santo Teodoro, 89
 Santos v. Illidge, 292
 Sargazurieta, *Re*, 48
 Sattler Reg. v., 204
 Saumarez, *Re*, 145
 Saunders v. Drake, 151
 —, Munro v., 102
 Saussaye, de la, *Re*, 116
 Savile v. Drax, 216
 Savini, di, v. Lousada, 45
 Sawyer v. Shute, 73
 Sowers, *Re*, *Ex parte* Blain, 164
 Sawtell, Hernando v., 79, 82
 Saxby v. Fulton, 293
 Saxonia, The, 278
 Scaramanga, Harris v., 297
 Scarpetta v. Lowenfeld, 392
 Schibsy v. Westenholz, 384, 386-388
 Schiff, *Re*, 116
 Schneider, Napier v., 308
 Scholefield, *Re*, 122, 123, 153, 406
 Schrichand & Co. v. Lacon, 404
 Schroeder & Co., Clydesdale Bank Ltd.
 v., 199, 389
 Schurmanns, General Iron Screw
 Collier Co. v., 275
 Schwab, Westerman v., 117, 119
 Scinde Railway Co., *Ex parte*, 174
 Scotia, S.S., Young v., 258
 Scotland, The, 274
 Scott, *Re* (No. 1), 144
 —, *Re* (No. 2), 140
 — v. Att.-Gen., 88
 —, Balfour v., 147, 148

- Scott v. Bentley, 46
 — v. Bevan, 300
 — v. Pilkington, 381
 — v. Royal Wax-Candle Co., 376
 — v. Seymour, 271, 400
 Scottish Accident Insurance Co., Jones v., 368
 Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., Watkins v., 368
 Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, 56, 57, 403
 Seagrove v. Parks, 239
 Sealey, Jauncy v., 129
 Seaman, *Re*, 116
 Sedgwick, Bird v., 166
 — v. Yedras Mining Co., 240
 Segredo, The, 191, 193, 196, 200
 Selkirk v. Davis, 170, 171, 174
 Selot's Trust, *Re*, 49
 Selwyn, Kelly v., 202
 Semenza, *Re*, 413
 Sequerville, Bristow v., 281, 282, 410
 Serre, de, v. Clarke, 73
 Serre v. Famous Lasky Film, &c. Co., Ltd., 298
 Service, Bateman v., 376
 Sewell, Cammell v., 195, 196, 198-200
 —, Lushington v., 216
 Seymour, Scott v., 271, 400
 Shadwell, Jeyes v., 141
 Shand, Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v., 286, 297
 Sharp v. Taylor, 291
 Sharpe v. Crispin, 333, 334, 349
 Shaw v. Att.-Gen., 94, 97
 — v. Gould, 96, 97, 101
 — v. Staughton, 127
 Shearman v. Findlay, 253
 Shedden v. Patrick, 103
 —, Patrick v., 381
 Sheehy v. Professional Life Assurance Co., 382
 Shelby v. Grey, 315
 Shephard, Ford v., 240
 Shilling v. Farmer, 255
 Short, Egbert v., 238
 Shrimpton, Watts v., 73, 78, 82
 Shute, Sawyer v., 73
 Sibeth, *Ex parte*, *Re* Sibeth, 81
 Sibson, Pollexfen v., 241
 Sidaway v. Hay, 317
 Sill v. Worswick, 177-179, 184
 Simeon v. Bazett, 291
 Simonetti, Dawkins v., 402
 Simonin v. Mallac, 41, 58-61, 93
 Simpson, *Re*, Coutts & Co. v. Church Missionary Society, 122
 — v. Fogo, 196, 199
 Sinclair v. Fraser, 394, 396
 — v. Sinclair, 403
 Sindry, Larpent v., 118
 Sanger, Williams v., 144
 Sirdar Gurdial Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, 385, 386
 Sjöforsakrings Aktiebolaget, Royal Exchange Assurance v., 289
 Skinner v. East India Co., 255
 — v. Skinner, 87
 Skirving, Hepburn v., 333
 Skottowe v. Young, 103
 Sloman v. Governor of New Zealand, 258
 Smallpage's Case, *Re* Marseilles Railway, 303
 Smelting Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 205
 Smidth (F. J.) & Co., Greenwood v., *Adda*.
 Smith, *Ex parte*, 166
 —, *Re* (1850), 349
 —, *Re* (1864), 143
 —, *Re* (1868), 110
 —, *Re* (1876), 253
 —, *Re* (1916), 216
 —, Alcock v., 204, 302
 —, Atkins v., 129
 —, Blake v., 396
 —, Brown v., 349
 — v. Buchanan, 316
 —, Coldingham Parish Council v., 104
 —, Dues v., 73
 — v. Gould, 407
 —, Hillyard v., 250
 —, Hirschfeld v., 306
 — v. Maxwell, 57
 — v. Moffatt, 171
 — v. Nicolls, 397
 —, Ruding v., 63, 67
 — v. Smith, 212
 — v. Weguelin, 263
 Smits & Co., di Ferdinando v., 299
 Smyth, *Re*, Leach v. Leach, 138
 —, Este v., 66
 —, Russell v., 382
 Snæfell Mining Co., Robey v., 248
 Società di Navigazione, &c., Thames, &c. Insurance Co. v., 372, 377
 Société, &c. des Hôtels Réunis v. Cumming, 200
 — v. Hawker, 293, 294
 Société, &c. des Métaux, Gibbs & Sons, v., 316
 Société, &c. Panhard - Levassor, Panhard, &c. Motor Co. v., 376
 Société Générale v. Dreyfus Bros., 398
 Solicitor to Treasury, Vaucher v., *Re* Grove, 102
 Solomon, Levy v., 101, 102
 Solomons v. Ross, 169
 Somerville, Corbridge v., 336, 341, 344, 346
 — v. Somerville, 146, 148, 347
 Soper, Henley v., 397
 Sora, di, v. Philipps, 283, 411
 Sottomajor, *Re*, 46
 Sottomayor v. De Barros, 41, 42, 57, 60, 62, 93
 Soulie, *Re*, 34
 South African Breweries v. King, 290, 295
 South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge, &c., 260
 South Eastern Ry. Co., Branley v., 297
 —, Cohen v., 297
 South Eastern Ry. Co. of Portugal, *Re*, 177
 Spain, King of, v. Hullett, 260

- Span, *Dewar v.*, 299
 Speller *v. Bristol Steam Navigation Co.*, 253
 Spencer, *Ferguson v.*, 317
 Speyer, *R. v.*, 358
 Spiller *v. Turner*, 298
 Spratt *v. Harris*, 115
 Sproule *v. Hopkins*, 93
 Spurrier *v. La Cloche*, 285
 Spurway *v. Spurway*, 346
 Stagg, *British Controlled Oilfields v.*, 219, 250
 Stainton, *Maclaren v.*, 377
 Stamford, *Grey v.*, 155
 Stamp Duty Commissioners *v. Salting*, 138
 Stanley *v. Bernes*, 119, 347
 —, *Gramophone and Typewriter, Ltd. v.*, 373
 Stansfield, *Waterhouse v.*, 221
 Stapleton *v. Conway*, 299
 Stark, *Re*, 48
 Statham *v. Statham and Gaekwar of Baroda*, 258, 260
 Stathatos *v. Stathatos*, 88, 334
 Staughton, *Shaw v.*, 127
 Steele *v. Braddell*, 61
 Steer, *Re*, 346
 Steigerwald, *Re*, 111
 Stein, *Campbell v.*, 313
 —, *Rein v.*, 248
 Stein's Assignees, or Cuthbert, *Royal Bank of Scotland v.*, 160, 170
 Steiner, *Huber v.*, 314
 Stephens *v. McFarland*, 41
 Stephenson, *Pickering v.*, 371
 Stern *v. The Queen*, 127
 Stettin, *The*, 295
 Steven, *Forbes v.*, 140, 209
 Stevenson *v. Masson*, 347
 Steward, *Johannesburg Municipal Council v.*, 401
 —, *Thurburn v.*, 136, 180
 Stewart, *Re*, 115
 —, *v. Bank of England*, 264
 —, *Cavan v.*, 384, 387, 389
 —, *v. Garnett*, 216
 —, *Hunter v.*, 399
 Stewarts & Lloyds, *M'Feetridge v.*, 41
 Stirling, *Re*, *Stirling v. Stirling*, 97
 —, *Peter v.*, 145
 Stirling-Maxwell *v. Cartwright*, 130
 Stoeck *v. Public Trustee*, 366
 Stokes, *Re*, *Stokes v. Ducroz*, 140, 209
 Stone, *De Geer v.*, 355, 358
 Strathmore Peerage, 102
 Strother *v. Read*, 170, 171
 Strousberg *v. Republic of Costa Rica*, 261, 263
 Stuart *v. Bute*, 45
 —, *Droege v.*, 296
 Stubberfield *v. Grassi*, 214
 Studd *v. Cooke*, 215, 284
 Stumpel *v. Stumpel and Zeppel*, 254
 Sturge, *Att.-Gen. v.*, 371
 Suarez *v. Suarez*, 264, 265
 Sudeley (Lord) *v. Att.-Gen.*, 138
 Sudlow *v. Dutch Rhenish Railway Co.*, 371
 Sumner, *Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co.*, 298
 Surman *v. Fitzgerald*, 79, 293
 Surrey *v. Perrin*, 132
 Suse *v. Pompe*, 308
 Sussex Peerage, *The*, 60, 63, 409, 410
 Sutherland, *Hessing v.*, 46
 —, *Kaye v.*, 248
 Swift *v. Kelly*, 55
 Swift *v. Att.-Gen. for Ireland*, 55
 Sydney Municipal Council *v. Bull*, 221
 Sylva *v. da Costa*, 48
 Symon, *Emanuel v.*, 383, 385, 387
 Symons, *Lister's Judicial Factor v.*, 79
 TAGUS, *The*, 203, 407
 Talisker Distillery, *Hamlyn & Co. v.*, 285
 Talleyrand *v. Boulanger*, 405
 Tamplin, *Re*, 116
 Tan Ah Loy, *Cheang Thye Phin v.*, 56
 Tano *v. Tano*, 323
 Tarleton *v. Tarleton*, 394
 Tassel *v. Hallen*, 248, 251
 Tastet, *de v. Baring*, 308
 Tatnall *v. Hankey*, 123
 Taylor *v. Barclay*, 291
 —, *v. Best*, 265
 —, *Harris v.*, 388, 391
 —, *v. Holland*, 313
 —, *Neck v.*, 413
 —, *Sharp v.*, 291
 —, *Vecht v.*, 361
 Taylor Bros., *Johnson v.*, 249
 Teesdale, *Lautour v.*, 56, 63, 67
 Telford, *Johnson v.*, 153
 Tennent, *Welch v.*, 76
 Tervaete, *The, Adda*.
 Thames and Mersey Insurance Co. *v. Società di Navigazione, &c.*, 372, 377
 Thanemore S.S. Co. *v. Thompson*, 251
 Thellusson, *Meeus v.*, 383
 Thery *v. Chalmers, Guthrie & Co.*, 46
 Thomas, *Auriol v.*, 308
 —, *v. Hamilton*, 249
 Thomond, *O'Callaghan v.*, 312
 Thompson *v. Barclay*, 291
 —, *Biré v.*, 291
 —, *v. Palmer*, 248
 —, *v. Powles*, 291, 299
 —, *Thanemore S.S. Co. v.*, 251
 Thomson *v. Adv.-Gen.*, 140
 —, *Yates v.*, 153
 Thorne *v. Watkins*, 147
 Thornton *v. Curling*, 148
 —, *Curling v.*, 119
 —, *v. Thornton*, 91, 400
 Thurburn *v. Steward*, 136, 180
 Tindall, *Ex parte*, 412
 Toller *v. Carteret*, 220
 Tomlin *v. Latter*, 122, 152
 Tondear, *Pertreis v.*, 65
 Toogood, *Novello v.*, 265
 Tootal's Trusts, *Re*, 109, 123, 322, 325, 329
 Tourton *v. Flower*, 109
 Tovey *v. Lindsay*, 98, 349
 Townes, *Olivier v.*, 190

- Tozier v. Hawkins, 250
 Trafford v. Blanc, 108, 396
 Trail, Twyford v., 129
 Transatlantic Co. v. Pietroni, 401
 Tréfond, *Re*, 114, 123
 Tremblay, Despatie v., 56
 Trimbey v. Vignier, 303
 Trinidad Shipping Co. v. Alston, 289
 Trotter v. Trotter, 149, 153
 Trubner v. Trubner and Cristiani, 254
 Trufort, *Re*, 36, 107, 108, 396
 Tucker, Lebel v., 303
 Tulledge, Bouchet v., 382
 Tulloch v. Hartley, 219, 406
 Turnbull v. Walker, 385
 Turner, *Re*, 410
 —, Spiller v., 298
 Turst, Foubert v., 82
 Tweedie v. Tweedie, *Re* Mégret, 79
 Two Sicilies, King of, v. Willcox, 406
 Twycross v. Dreyfus, 263
 Twyford v. Trail, 129
 Tyler v. Bell, 128, 129
 Tyrone v. Waterford, 151

 UDNY v. Udney, 42, 102, 331, 340, 343
 Ullee, *Re*, 69, 103
 Umphelby, Douglas-Menzies v., 153
 Union Bank of Australia, *Ex parte*, 202
 Union Bank of Calcutta, *Re*, 169
 United States v. Hamilton, 204
 — v. MacRae, 261, 406
 — v. Prioleau, 261
 —, Prioleau v., 260
 — v. Wagner, 260
 — (President of) v. Drummond, 352
 United States Bank v. Planters Bank, 257
 Urquhart, *Re*, 165
 — v. Butterfield, 331, 351
 Usher, Agnew v., 248
 Usherwood, Inglis v., 197
 Ussher v. Ussher, 56

 VACUUM BRAKE CO., Lawson v., 412
 Vadala v. Lawes, 397
 Vaiani v. Ruglioni de Virte, 154
 Valdor, de, Worms v., 49, 50
 Valentine, Moses v., 211
 Valentine & Sons, Alexander & Co. v., 250
 Vallance, *Re*, 110, 123
 Vallée v. Dumergue, 383
 van Aerde, Linke v., 93
 van den Hurk, Barry v., 299
 van Grutten v. Digby, 78
 Vannini, *Re*, 110, 123
 Van Oppen and Colt's, &c. Co., Newby v., 375, 377
 Vanquelin v. Bouard, 109, 127, 383, 395
 Vánvlissengen, Caldwell v., 272
 Vanzeller, *Re*, 180
 Vardill, Birtwhistle v., 222, 223
 Vardopulo v. Vardopulo, 402
 Vassall, Foster v., 219
 Vaucher v. Solicitor to Treasury, 102
 Vaughan, Alexander v., 166

 Vavasasseur v. Krupp, 263
 Vecht v. Taylor, 361
 Vega, de la, v. Vianna, 405
 Velasquez v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 205
 Vernon, The, 277
 Vetzera, Nugent v., 45
 Vianna, de la Vega v., 405
 Viditz v. O'Hagan, 44, 78
 Viesca v. d'Aramburu, 111
 Vignier, Trimbey v., 303
 Vigny, de, *Re*, 117
 Vincent, Barnes v., 121, 122
 Vine St. Police Station Supt., R. v., 366
 Virte, de, *Re*, 154
 Vivar, The, 253
 Vivash v. Becker, 266
 Vizianagaram Co., Ltd., *Ex parte*, 165
 Vogeler (C. A.) Co., Cooke v., 164
 Voinet v. Barrett, 388
 Volturmo, The, 300
 von Brentano, *Re*, 114
 von Buseck, *Re*, 114
 von dem Busche, *Re*, 116
 von Gumpach, Hart v., 269
 von Hellefeld v. Richnitzer, 242
 von Linden, *Re*, 110
 Vulliamy, Minet v., 371

 WADDELL, Banco de Portugal v., 179
 Wade, Beckford v., 216
 Wagner, United States v., 260
 Wahlstatt, Att.-Gen. v., 348
 Waite v. Bingley, 212
 Waldegrave, Cooper v., 299, 304
 Waldegrave Peerage, 67
 Walford, Bathynany v., 221, 270
 Walker, *Re*, 122
 — v. Hamilton, 308
 —, Hanson v., 135
 —, Turnbull v., 385
 — v. Witter, 379, 394
 Wallace v. Att.-Gen., 141
 Wallis v. Brightwell, 215
 Wallop, *Re*, 141, 143
 Walpole v. Ewer, 297
 Walrond, Guthrie v., 151
 Walsh v. The Queen, 203
 Wansbrough Paper Co. v. Laughlin, 250
 Waring v. Knight, 179
 Warrender v. Warrender, 62, 69, 87
 Warter v. Warter, 88
 Waterford, Tyrone v., 151
 Waterhouse v. Stansfield, 221
 Watkins, *Ex parte*, 47
 — v. North American Land and Timber Co., 238
 — v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., 368
 —, Thorne v., 147
 Watson & Sons v. Daily Record, 250
 Watts v. Shrimpton, 73, 78, 82
 Waymell v. Read, 292
 Weatherby v. St. Giorgio, 132
 Webb & Co., Sumner Permaig & Co. v., 298
 Weber, *Re*, 366
 —, Fitch v., 362

- Wedderburn *v.* Wedderburn, 402
 Weguelin, Republic of Peru *v.*, 260
 —, Smith *v.*, 263
 Welch *v.* Tennent, 76
 Wells *v.* Williams, 352
 West *v.* Lord Sackville, 412
 West Rand Gold Mining Co. *v.* R., 261
 Westenholz, Schibsky *v.*, 384, 386-388
 Westerman *v.* Schwab, 117, 119
 Western National Bank of New York
v. Perez Triana & Co., 241
 Western Suburban, &c., Building
 Society *v.* Rucklige, 240
 Westlake *v.* Westlake, 55
 Westman *v.* Aktiebolaget, &c., 239, 376
 —, Genesee Mutual Insurance Co.
v., 376
 Wheelan *v.* Irwin, 413
 Whicker *v.* Hume, 336, 338, 340, 344,
 347
 White, Barnard *v.*, 79
 — *v.* Duvernay, 46
 — *v.* Hall, 217
 Whitehaven, &c., Railway Co., Bain
v., 406
 Whitelegg, *Re*, 409
 Whitmore, Power *v.*, 297
 Whitwham *v.* Piercy, 209
 Whyte *v.* Rose, 109, 110, 125, 127
 Wightman, Pottinger *v.*, 332
 Wild Ranger, *The*, 275
 Wilkinson's Settlement, *Re*, 122
 Willans *v.* Ayres, 308
 Willcox, King of Two Sicilies *v.*, 406
 Willes, Madrazo *v.*, 279
 Williams *v.* —, 111
 — *v.* Cartwright, 252
 — *v.* Colonial Bank, 201
 — *v.* Davies, 172
 — *v.* Dormer, 92, 334
 — *v.* Gutch, 278
 —, Jaffer *v.*, 387
 — *v.* London Chartered Bank of
 Australia, 201
 — *v.* Singer, 144
 —, Wells *v.*, 352
 —, Yokohama Bank, Ltd. *v.*, 372
 Williams & Sons, Blackburn Bobbin
 Co. *v.*, 291
 Williamson, *Ex parte*, 166
 Willis & Co. *v.* Baddeley, 240
 Willoughby, *Re*, 46
 Wills, De Greuchy *v.*, 309
 Wilson, *Ex parte*, 179
 —, *Re*, 101
 —, Clare County Council *v.*, 248
 — *v.* Dunsany, 135
 — *v.* Ferrand, 400
 — *v.* Wilson, 86, 87, 346
 Wilson Sons & Co. *v.* Balcarres, &c.,
 Co., 253
 Wilson's (Captain) Case, 179
 Wilson's Trusts, 97
 Wilton, de, *Re*, de Wilton *v.* Monte-
 fiore, 58
 Winans *v.* Att.-Gen., 127, 139, 336,
 339, 341, 342, 344
 — *v.* King, 139
 Winchelsea *v.* Garett, 146
 Wingate (James) & Co. *v.* Inland
 Revenue, 372
 Wingfield, Chalmers *v.*, 342
 Winter, *Re*, 114, 115
 —, Ory *v.*, 313
 — *v.* Winter, 248
 Witted *v.* Galbraith, 251, 252
 Witter, Walker *v.*, 379, 394
 Wolf *v.* Oxholm, 404, 414
 Wood *v.* Connolly Bros., Ltd., 402
 — *v.* Middleton, 248
 Woodburne, Plummer *v.*, 398
 Woodford, Ross *v.*, 412
 Woodruff *v.* Att.-Gen. for Ontario, 139
 Woolf, *Re*, 116
 Woolsey *v.* Crawford, 308
 Worcester City, &c., Banking Co. *v.*
 Firbank, &c., Co., 242
 Worms *v.* de Valdor, 49, 50
 Worswick, Sill *v.*, 177-179, 184
 Wray *v.* Wray, &c., 254
 Wright, *Re*, 102
 Wrigley, Crosland *v.*, 284
 Wütz, de, *v.* Hendricks, 291
 Wyatt, Bartholomay Brewing Co. *v.*,
 373
 —, Nobel Dynamite Co. *v.*, 373
 Wyburn, Mayor of Canterbury *v.*, 211
 Wylie, Enoch *v.*, 114, 132
 Wynne *v.* Callander, 293
 — *v.* Jackson, 282
 YATES *v.* Thomson, 153
 Yeates *v.* Fraser, 371
 Yedras Mining, Sedgwick *v.*, 240
 Yelverton *v.* Yelverton, 92
 Yokohama Bank, Ltd. *v.* Williams, 372
 Yorkshire Tannery *v.* Eglinton
 Chemical Co., 251
 Young, Barretto *v.*, 123
 —, Bent *v.*, 220
 —, Bradford *v.*, 151
 —, Guépratte *v.*, 44, 76, 81, 280
 —, Skottowe *v.*, 103
 — *v.* S.S. Scotia, 258
 Yzquierdo *v.* Clydebank Engineering
 Co., 261
 ZARIFI, Montgomery *v.*, 79, 82
 Zichy Ferraris, de, *v.* Hertford, 119
 Zimmermann, Gout *v.*, 349
 Zollverein, *The*, 275, 278

ADDENDA.

§ 27a, p. 55.—A marriage celebrated in a church hall, after publication of banns, by a priest of the Church of England between British subjects in a remote part of China where there was no Church of England was upheld on the ground that, owing to the impossibility of complying with the British Acts as to marriage, the parties, who enjoyed the rights of extra-territoriality, were entitled to resort to their common-law rights.

Phillips v. Phillips, [1921] 38 T. L. R. 150—Duke, P

36a, p. 73.—It is pointed out by Dicey (*Conflict of Laws* (3rd ed.), p. 692) that the citation of the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1881, s. 1, in support of the view that the husband's change of domicile during the marriage has no effect on the law regulating the matrimonial property is erroneous. In any case this citation is no longer in point, because the Scottish Statute of 1881 has been replaced by the Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1920, defining anew the rights of husband and wife in respect of movable property. The rules are applicable where the husband is domiciled in Scotland; and no exception is made for the case where the original matrimonial domicile was not in Scotland. By the Scottish law, therefore, a change of domicile by a husband originally domiciled in England to Scotland during the marriage would affect the rights of the husband and wife in their movable property. The provision in the later statute gives some support to the argument that the law of the husband's domicile may affect the marriage property in any case where there is no express contract or implied contract in law regulating the property of the husband and wife according to the rules of the original matrimonial domicile.

§ 106, p. 133.—So long as claims of creditors are outstanding, whether in the English or the foreign administration of the estate, there are no beneficial assets to be distributed in accordance with the law of the domicile. But if foreign creditors fail to appear in the English administration and to establish their debts, or if their claims are barred by reason of the Statute of Limitations, although they would not be so barred by the law of the country in which the deceased was domiciled, any surplus assets in the British administration will be distributed by the English Court to the beneficiaries in accordance with the law of the deceased's domicile.

Re Lorillard (*Griffith v. Cutforth*), W. N. 1922, p. 75—Eve, J.

§ 111, p. 136.—Where a testator domiciled in America had left estate both in England and in America, and the claims of judgment creditors exhausted the estate in America, while no claims were made against the English estate by the American creditors, but subsequently an application was made by the American administrator for the delivery of the surplus assets of the testator's estate in England, it was held that it was incumbent upon the executors who proved the testator's will in England to apply the assets in discharge of all the debts of the testator of which they had notice, whether in England or America. The American creditors, if they came in, would have to show that the orders or certificates which had been made in America were sufficient to support a claim in England, and that their debts were not barred in England by the Statute of Limitations.

Re Lorillard (u.s.).

§ 113a, p. 139.—The case of *Att.-Gen. v. Burns* is now reported in [1922] 1 K. B. 491.

§ 125b, p. 154.—In the particular case of *Brown v. Gregson* it would have been contrary to equity to apply the doctrine of election, as well as contrary to the *lex situs* of the immovables.

§ 130, p. 167.—Where petitioning creditors in England issued a bankruptcy notice against a debtor, and, subsequent to the service of the notice, the debtor presented his own petition for sequestration in Scotland which was granted on the same day, it was held that a receiving order was properly made in England, there being assets in England. Inasmuch as it was by the debtor's own act that he was prevented from complying with the English bankruptcy notice, he could not be allowed to avail himself of the Scottish proceedings for that purpose. *In re a Debtor*, [1922] W. N. 163. C. A., Sterndale, Warrington, Younger. The Court distinguished the case of *In re Robinson* because in that case there were no assets in England, whereas in this there were such assets.

§ 186, p. 249.—Add, after reference to *Thomas v. Hamilton*, 17 Q. B. D. 592 :—*Atkins v. Thompson*, [1922] 2 I. R. 102.

§ 190a, p. 257.—The immunity from arrest of a public ship no longer applies after it has ceased to be employed in the service of the Government; and the process of the Court in respect of an action occurring while the vessel was in the public service may then be enforced against it.

Where a vessel which belonged to the Belgian Government and was being employed for public purposes collided with another vessel, and after the collision was sold by the Government to a private owner, it was held that the owners of the ship with which it had collided could enforce a maritime lien on the vessel.

The Tervaete, W. N. 1922, p. 106—Duke, P.

The ground on which jurisdiction over the public ships of foreign States was declined in British Courts was not that the acts of Sovereign Powers by their servants were incapable of conferring rights or creating obligations which might be put in suit, nor that the public property of States used for their public purposes could not, because of their public character, be subjected to claims by individuals which were capable of judicial cognisance. A foreign State, by its authorised agents, could impose a charge or lien upon one of its public ships, and the charge or lien might be enforced if it could be done without directly or indirectly impleading the foreign State.

The Tervaete (u.s.).

§ 194, p. 264.—An official agent of the Soviet Government recognized for the purposes of a trade agreement between the British Government and the Russian Soviet Republic was held not to be entitled to immunity from civil process accorded to the accredited representatives of foreign States. The Trade Agreement provided only for immunity of official agents thereunder from arrest and search.

Fenton Textile Association v. Krassin, [1922] C. A.; 38 T. L. R. 259.

§ 211, p. 284.—The interpretation of words under a contract of sale made between two Englishmen concerning goods in America was determined according to English law; and the Court refused to admit evidence of a customary meaning in America of the word "shipped," which was inconsistent with the term expressed in the English contract.

Mowbray & Robinson v. Rosser, L. J. 1922, p. 102—Sterndale, Warrington, Scrutton.

§ 226, p. 299.—The case of *La Société des Hôtels, &c. v. Cummings* is now reported in [1922] 1 K. B. 451.

Atkin, L.J., expressly reserved his opinion as to the date at which the rate of exchange should be calculated in a case where a

foreign creditor to whom a debt is due in a foreign country in the currency of that country sues his debtor in the English Courts for the foreign debt. That question did not arise to be settled in the case cited because the Court found that the foreign creditor had been paid all that was due prior to the judgment. He apparently inclined (at p. 465) to the view that the debtor's obligation is to pay in the foreign currency, and so continues until the debt is merged in the judgment, which should give him the English equivalent at that date of the foreign currency.

§ 226a, p. 300.—The fact that a winding-up order has been made against a company after the breach of contract occurred, or after a statement of account admitting the debt was rendered by the company, and that a claim has been made in the winding-up proceedings, does not affect the date for conversion of the foreign into English money, which is the date of the breach of the contract or the date on which the application for a statement of account was sent.

Re British-American Continental Bank, Ltd, Goldziher's Claim: and Crédit Général, Liegeron's Claim, [1922] W. N., p. 102
—P. O. Lawrence, J.

§ 304, p. 373.—The circumstances in which a foreign company was held not to be resident in England for the purpose of payment of income tax were further considered in *Greenwood v. F. J. Smidth & Co.*, [1922] 91 L. J., p. 349 (H. L.)—Buckmaster, Atkinson, Wrenbury, Carson; confirming *C. A., Sterndale, Atkin, Younger*, [1921] 3 K. B. 584, and *Rowlatt*, [1920] 3 K. B. 275.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

PRIVATE international law is that department of national law which arises from the fact that there are in the world different territorial jurisdictions possessing different laws.*

In order to explain more fully the position which private international law occupies in the field of law, that field must be looked at rather widely. The word *law* is applied both to the laws of nature and to human laws, and if we were discussing an ordinary division of national law, as mortgage or larceny, there would be no need to speak of any laws except human ones. But theories of natural law, or of a law of nature, have been so mixed up with international law that justice can hardly be done to our present subject without noticing every sense in which the word *law* is used.

The laws of nature are invariable uniformities: if any deviation were proved, the conclusion would not be that the law had been broken, but that the supposed law did not exist. Human laws are continually broken, and courts of justice, and armies so far as their employment is properly defensive, are instituted to correct their breach. It is true that if we look at the rule prescribed by a human law rather than at its observance, the singleness of the rule, compared with the multiplicity of the instances which call for its application, reminds us of the uniformities of nature; and probably this was the similarity which caused the word *law* to be extended from human laws to natural. Then, the extension having been made, it has sometimes been attempted to give it a philosophical justification by

* The existence within one territory of different juristic systems having different laws—e.g., the Hindu, the Moslem, and the Anglo-Indian systems of personal law which are applied in British India—falls also within the scope of the subject.

the remark that human laws will certainly be mischievous, and probably will not long endure, if they are not framed with due regard to the natural laws that govern the facts about which they are concerned. Thus, a law about buildings will miss its aim if it disregards the natural laws of health, and one about spirituous liquors if it disregards the natural laws of human conduct. Now this may be expressed by saying that human laws ought to be conformable to natural ones; and then it is easy, first to forget the difference between *ought to be* and *are* conformable, and secondly to forget that even when human laws are conformable to natural ones, that no more implies a likeness between them in kind, than the conformity of a marksman's aim to the laws which govern the flight of his bullet implies a likeness in kind between the act of aiming and the flight of the bullet. The truth is that it would be difficult to frame any proposition in which the word *law* should stand, and which should be true both of the laws of nature and of human laws, unless such proposition were a mere statement, more or less disguised, of the fact that each are in some sense uniformities; and the homonymy of the laws of nature and human laws must therefore be regarded as little more than fortuitous.

If this is so, human laws are not a division, correlative to the laws of nature, of a single field of law, but are a subject incapable of being brought under any wider general head. Indeed more will have to be said before it can be assumed that even all the human institutions which are called laws can be properly brought under one general head, for international law has been denied a claim to be law in the sense in which national law is such.

The prominent feature of national law is that it is a body of rules, to be uniformly applied to the cases that fall within them, and of which the breach is redressed or punished by a force irresistible to the individual subject, and regularly applied through courts of justice. This redress or punishment, which is generally spoken of as the enforcement of the law, though that term might more properly imply its specific enforcement, makes the chief difference between law and usage. Law is often traceable to usage, in the sense that what was once usage afterwards became law without express enactment. Examples of this may be found in the history of the law of many countries with regard to the distribution of the estates of deceased persons, and the effect of marriage on the property of the husband and wife. In

such cases the passage from usage to law is sometimes represented as gradual. That, however, can never really have been so. The frequency of the usage may have gradually increased, and so also may the stringency of the general disapprobation with which its breach was visited. But either there was no administration of justice at the place and time in question, and then society was too barbarous for any thing answering to national law to exist in it, or else, when the administration of justice began to redress or punish the breach of the usage, a distinct step was taken, however little it may have been noticed at the moment, by which the boundary between usage and law was crossed.

The breach of international law has not hitherto been redressed or punished by any force regular in its action and irresistible to individual states; but it is one of the principal purposes of the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice now established under it to secure something like the same respect for the international law as the national sovereign and national courts secure for the national law. The rules which are understood to compose that law are often so vague that the uniformity of their application cannot be conclusively tested, even for the purpose of argument, so difficult is it to ascertain the individual cases to which they should apply. The latter circumstance results from the former. No set of rules, national or international, will ever be reduced to a reasonable certainty unless they are regularly applied, or some authoritative judgment is passed on the question of their application. Hence it would be difficult to frame any verbal definition of law which should include both national and international law. The very notion of uniformity, on which a link, thin and insufficient for the purposes of a serious classification, may be established between national laws and those of nature, fails us here, unless for many of the uniformities of international law we accept the pious intentions of writers instead of the hard facts of statecraft and hereditary enmity. There is, however, another mode of defining than by verbal formulas. In zoology and botany a genus is defined by the circumstance that every species within it is on the whole more like one or two typical species than it is to any species outside the genus. Now there are rules of international law, as those concerning diplomatic intercourse, which receive an amount of observance equal to that which is received by national laws. In the case of other rules, the risk that the

mischievousness of a breach will recoil on the perpetrators is greater than in the case of most of the social usages which prevail between the subjects of a state. But again the extremes of vagueness and inobservance are presented by rules so important as those which are vaunted as protecting populations from arbitrary conquest, and private property on land from capture and appropriation in war. The experience of the Great War has shown how feeble is the sanction for the observance of rules passed with great solemnity at the Hague Conferences for regulating the conduct of war. On the other hand, the combination of nearly all civilised States against the Powers which flouted the sanctity of treaties and conventions may help to inculcate an enhanced respect for the rules of the international society. The truth is that the precision and stringency of international law range from a point below that of ordinary social usages, to a point at which the redressing or punishing power lacks only regularity of action, the strength of its irregular manifestations being sufficient for practical purposes. If then any one, taking national law described as in the last paragraph for the typical species of human law, should yet conclude that international law is on the whole more like to it than to the usages which we see prevailing outside law, there seems to be no sufficient ground for rejecting his conclusion as unphilosophical or contrary to facts. Nor is it wonderful that the type definitions of the sciences of organic life should be found to give a better model than the verbal formulas of mechanics, for classifying the phenomena which are produced by the living force of humanity. In fine, national and international laws may be accepted as divisions of the field of human law, without disrespect to those who have contended that the latter division would better be called positive international morality.

In the field thus mapped out, the place of private international law is in the division of national law. Private international law is administered by national courts, and generally to subjects, though, when states submit themselves to national courts, its doctrines are applied to them as well as those of any other department of national law. The actions in which it is administered are not a distinct class, like those in which criminal law is administered, but it finds its unity in a certain class of questions which may arise in any action, those namely in which it is sought in what national jurisdiction an action ought to be brought, or by what national law it ought to be decided. The word *jurisdic-*

tion is popularly used in the general sense of competence, as when the common law and equity jurisdictions, which differed in respect of the matter, were formerly contrasted in England, or as when the jurisdiction of a county court, which is limited in respect of the value, is contrasted with that of the High Court. But in the present subject we have to do principally with jurisdiction in the territorial sense, except for the question of different juristic systems in one territory. We are concerned, too, with jurisdictions not in so far as, like those of two county courts, they may be territorially distinguished within a country which enjoys in the last resort a unity of legal administration, but only with reference to territories which are separate for the purpose of law, as England and France, or England and Scotland. Such jurisdictions and their laws may be called national, in harmony with the use already made in this chapter of the term *national law*; and then the department which treats of the selection to be made in each action between various national jurisdictions and laws will not unreasonably be called international law, distinguished by the epithet *private* from the international law which prevails between states, and which may be distinguished as public. Hence in this subject the force of the term *private* is independent of any classification of national law into public and private. Those classifications, of which several have been proposed, generally assign criminal law to the public branch, but the question of the principles on which treaties for the extradition of criminals ought to be framed, being intimately concerned with the question in what national jurisdiction a criminal ought to be tried, is not separable from private international law as here understood.*

The principal grounds for selecting a particular national jurisdiction in which to bring an action are that the subject of the action, if a thing, is situate, if a contract, was made, or was to be performed, if a delict, was committed, within the territory: hence the *forum situs*, or *rei sitæ*, *contractus*, *delicti*, the two latter of which are classed together as the *forum speciale obligationis*. Or that the jurisdiction is that in which all the claims relating to a certain thing or group of things ought to be adjudicated on together, the *forum concursus*; or that to which the defendant is personally subject, the *forum rei*. The last

* The opposite view, that all law ought first to be divided into public and private and each of these departments subdivided into national and international, is expressed by the form "international private law."

mentioned forum, in the Roman and derived laws, has always supposed that between the judge and his justiciable, if I may use a foreign term to express a foreign conception, there was a more or less durable tie, the precise nature of which, and the measure of its permanence, are connected with the questions of political nationality and domicile. Among the ancient principles of English law, on the other hand, there is found a competence based on the fact of the writ by which the action is commenced being served on the defendant within the territory. This seems to have been regarded as a case of the *forum rei*, the defendant's mere presence within the territory being supposed to make him personally subject to the jurisdiction, irrespective of any special ground, such as that of the *forum speciale obligationis*; but it was certainly a peculiar conception of the *forum rei*.

Supposing that on some such ground as those above mentioned the action is entertained by the national jurisdiction in which it is brought, the principal grounds for selecting a particular law to be applied in deciding it are analogous to those for selecting a jurisdiction. Thus we have the *lex situs*, *loci contractus*, *loci delicti commissi*, and *loci concursus*; and wherever the *forum rei* is understood as being based on a more or less durable tie between the judge and his justiciable, we also have the conception of a personal law. The latter was anciently the *lex domicilii*, and to a great extent is so still, but the modern tendency is to substitute political nationality for domicile as the test of personal law, so far as possible. Of course, as between two or more national jurisdictions comprised in one state, such as England, Scotland, and the province of Quebec, such a substitution is not possible, and there at least the *lex domicilii* must maintain its ground. Another law often invoked is the *lex loci actus*, that of the place where an instrument was executed, or where proceedings have been had under judicial or other public authority. And since validity is often claimed in one jurisdiction for judgments pronounced in another, by virtue both of the *lex loci actus* and, in matters of status, of the personal law, it follows that the question in what jurisdiction an action ought to be brought may be asked in two ways: first, in order to know what are the actions which a particular jurisdiction will entertain when they are brought in it, and secondly, in order to know when the judgment pronounced in an action will be allowed any force beyond the limits of the jurisdiction in which it was pronounced. Lastly, the Court's own law, the *lex fori*, is a competitor always on the

spot, and applicable when the claim of no other law is established, sometimes even applicable on positive grounds.

Such are the questions of private international law, and the various forums and laws which they bring into competition. Now since private international law is administered by national courts, it follows that each court must apply any solution of these questions which its own national law may be found to prescribe. And the national law is very likely to contain an answer to the question under what conditions an action is maintainable in its own courts, while it may probably be silent with regard to the law according to which any particular action is to be decided, or to the validity to be allowed to foreign judgments. What then is to be inferred from the silence of the national law on these topics? The inference that the national law itself must always be applied, and that no validity is to be allowed to foreign judgments, would have led to practical results so shocking to all notions of justice that it has never been drawn: it has been regularly assumed that the national law tacitly adopts some maxims according to which foreign laws and foreign judgments are sometimes admitted to be of force. The law of England is, or was, pre-eminently in the case here considered. Its statute book, and the writings of those of its earlier sages whose names are revered as those of the law itself, are almost entirely blank on the head of foreign laws and judgments; but maxims have been adopted by the courts by means of which an extensive and tolerably consistent jurisprudence has been built up. The value set in England on judicial precedent is such that this jurisprudence, so far as it is consistent, must now in its turn be considered as a part of the national law, and therefore binding on the courts unless and until the legislature shall alter it. But with a view to its completion, whether by legislative aid or by the further action of the courts, the questions, whence the maxims adopted in England were derived, and what was the justification for adopting them, are not yet of merely historical or speculative importance.

The maxims adopted in England on questions of private international law were derived from those which prevailed on the continent. The earliest channel through which they filtered into the insular system was that of the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts, which professedly administered laws of more than insular extension. Then, about the time of our Revolution, the increasing mercantile and political intercourse with the

continent obliged our lawyers to renew their acquaintance with its legal literature, five centuries after Vacarius taught the *Corpus Juris* in England; and the views so imported bear traces of the fact that the Dutch was then the newest school, and perhaps also of the fact that Holland was the country with which we had the closest political connection. I do not know enough of the history of Scotch law to assert it, but probably the union with Scotland, coupled with the fact that it had been usual for Scotch advocates to complete their legal education in Holland, may have had some effect in the same direction. Now the leading features of the system which by the middle of the eighteenth century had been elaborated on the continent were these.

Statutes which disposed about things were real, and such statutes, existing in the places where the things were situate, were to be applied, as the *lex situs*, even in other jurisdictions. So far as concerned movables, this was largely modified by the maxims *mobilia sequuntur personam*, which was opposed to such property being deemed to have a situation of its own.

Statutes which disposed about persons were personal, and such statutes, existing in the places where the persons were domiciled, were to be applied, as the *lex domicilii*, even in other jurisdictions. The chief application of this was to questions of status and capacity.

Statutes which were not clearly either real or personal were mixed, and effect might be given to them in other jurisdictions than those in which they existed, either on the ground of the *lex situs* or on that of the *lex domicilii*, according as it was thought that they approached more nearly in character to real or to personal statutes; or else questions not clearly referable either to the real or to the personal statute might be decided on one or other of certain maxims which stood outside the doctrine of statutes, namely:

The *lex loci contractus* governed obligations arising out of a contract;

The *lex loci actus* governed the forms of instruments, and the validity of proceedings had abroad under judicial or other public authority;

The *lex fori* governed the procedure in the action itself; and the same law, in its character of the *lex loci concursus*, governed questions arising out of the circumstance that several claims, possibly originating under different laws, have to be adjudicated

on at once, such for example as the question of the ranking of creditors against a bankrupt's estate.

It must not be supposed that even on the continent the system thus sketched out was certain or coherent. As some among many examples of the vagueness which really beset it, there may be cited the endless discussions whether particular statutes were real or personal, or, if allowed to be mixed, whether they approached more nearly to real or to personal statutes; whether the *lex loci contractus* ought to be understood as the law of the place where a contract was entered into, or of that where it was to be performed; whether the prescription by which an obligation is extinguished ought to be measured by the *lex loci contractus*, as a limitation of the obligation itself, or by the *lex fori*, as a law of procedure determining the time for bringing an action on it; and, with regard to the *lex actus*, whether it was necessary to draw up instruments in the form prescribed by it, or whether an option as to the form of instruments was allowed between the *lex loci actus* and the law of the place where they were to operate.

As little must it be supposed that the system, such as it was, was imported wholesale into England. Certain parts of it, which suited the national temper or some peculiarity of English law, were eagerly seized on. Thus the principle of the *lex situs*, or of the real statute, was in harmony with the importance attached to landed property, and the estates and interests which English law permitted to be held in land were so peculiar that great confusion would have arisen if its tenure could have been interfered with by deeds in foreign form, or by matrimonial engagements tacitly entered into under and with reference to foreign laws. Hence the application of the *lex situs* to land received in England its utmost development, as against the *lex loci actus* and the *lex loci contractus*. On the other hand, the English courts were extremely backward in admitting a personal law of status and capacity, dependent on domicile, doubtless because the personal forum, which lies at the root of personal law, was not conceived in England, as already mentioned, to depend so much on a durable tie between the judge and his justiciable as on the defendant's casual presence within the territory. And the principle of the *lex loci actus* for the forms of instruments was not only opposed in England by the considerations just mentioned with regard to land, but from another cause can scarcely be said to have been received at all. The institution of public notaries fell early in this country into great disuse, and deeds and wills

were drawn in private, with such legal assistance as the parties might think fit to obtain. Hence it did not easily occur to the mind of an English lawyer that the necessity of recourse to a public officer, who would of course adopt the form of his own country, might make the forms of the *locus actus* unavoidable. It was only in 1861, by Lord Kingsdown's Act, that the *lex loci actus* was admitted in England as a sufficient support for the formal validity of a will.

But it is not enough to have noticed the reception in England of continental maxims on topics of private international law. In order that the subject may be fully understood, something must be said of the long history through which it had passed before England came into contact with it.

The Roman law before its codification by Justinian was composed of two parts. One was the *jus civile*, the special law of the citizens, by which only Roman citizens were bound or could defend themselves, except so far as it had been extended to others (1) by express enactment, as in 193 B.C. the legal limitation of the rate of interest was extended to loans made to citizens by persons having the Latin franchise or being members of one of the dependent allied states (*socii ac nomen Latinum*: Livy, xxxv. 7); or (2) by a fiction attributing citizenship to a party where justice required it, as the civil action of theft was judicially applied both for and against *peregrini*: Gaius, iv. 37. The other comprised such law as was equally observed by all the peoples known to the Romans, and was therefore referred by the latter to natural reason as its source, and called *jus gentium*, *quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur*: Gaius, i. 1. We may pass over the controversies as to the date and mode of introduction of the generalization thus known as the *jus gentium*, and as to its application. What is important here to observe is that besides the two parts of their own law the Roman judges took account of other laws, not necessarily foreign to the Roman world, but belonging to aggregates which, being distinct at least for the purpose of private law, may be called civil or jural societies. Several passages proving this occur in the scanty fragments of pre-Justinian law which have come down to us otherwise than in the Corpus Juris. Gaius (i. 92) speaks of a child born of a *peregrina* to a *peregrinus*, *cui secundum leges moresque peregrinorum conjuncta est*. And (iii. 120) he says: *Sponsoris et fidei promissoris heres non tenetur, nisi si de peregrino fidei promissore quæramus et alio jure civitas ejus tenetur*. And

Ulpian (xx. 14) says that a *dedititius* cannot make a will, not as a Roman citizen *cum sit peregrinus*, nor as a *peregrinus*, *quoniam nullius certæ civitatis civis est ut adversus leges civitatis suæ testetur*. These passages were not inserted in the *Corpus Juris*, perhaps because Caracalla's gift of Roman citizenship to all the free inhabitants of the empire greatly reduced, though certainly without entirely abolishing, the number of cases in which the law of a provincial *civitas* could operate.* But the *Corpus Juris* preserves many passages in which a diversity of laws, or of customs practically equivalent to laws, is referred to, though coupled, not with *civitas* or any word implying a personal condition of a certain population, but with *regio* or some other word descriptive of locality: Dig. xxi. 2, 6—*si fundus venierit, ex consuetudine ejus regionis in qua negotium gestum est pro evictione caveri oportet*; Dig. xxii. 1. 1. pr.—*ex more regionis ubi contractum est*; Dig. xxiv. 4. 1. § 15—*mos regionis*; Dig. 1. 17. 34—*regio, mos, id quod frequentatur*; Cod. vi. 23. 9—*speciale privilegium patriæ tuæ*; Cod. vi. 32. 2—*leges moresque locorum*; Cod. viii. 49, 1—*lex municipii*.† We see then that at the time of the fall of the Western empire, diversities of law or of practically authoritative customs existed within the population called Roman as opposed to the Heruli, the Ostrogoths, or any other section of the northern conquerors. But neither the texts cited nor any others help us much to understand by what rules their application was determined where circumstances might suggest a conflict between two of them, or between one of them and the general Roman law. Often a text seems to assume that all the relevant circumstances point to one law only, so that the only conclusion to be drawn from it is the assertion in principle of the admissibility of particular law. Probably, however, we shall not be wrong if we get the impression of a system in which personal law was less limited than in any modern system by the place of an occurrence or the site of property, and in which, as

* Savigny thought that Caracalla's gift did not change the personal law of a provincial (*Syst. d. heut. Röm. Rechts*, § 357), but von Bar takes the opposite view (p. 14). It must, however, be remembered that Caracalla's gift was only to those then living and by a legal consequence to their descendants. A new, although much smaller, free population, not endowed with Roman citizenship, must have arisen in the provinces from a variety of circumstances, and even on von Bar's view would have maintained the pre-Justinianean passages in question in some amount of use.

† Savigny held that the regional customs mentioned in the Digest were only accepted as keys to the intentions of parties, or as furnishing the measure of damages. Even so, however, they must have been practically equivalent to laws.

Savigny teaches, a man's personal law was that of the *civitas* to which he belonged by hereditary *origo*, though domicile was more important for jurisdiction.*

In the times which followed, a system very highly, perhaps more highly, personal came into use. The members of each conquering northern nation lived within the late empire by their own law, leaving each conquered nation, whether the last conquered or one more deeply submerged, to the enjoyment of its own. For example, as in Italy the Lombards left the Roman law, with its particular variants which have been mentioned, intact for the Romans, so the Franks in Italy left both it and the Lombard law intact for those respective nations, while bringing in not only their own law for themselves, but also, for those who accompanied them, all the other laws recognized in their dominions beyond the Alps. If in any of the Germanic kingdoms a Germanic stranger arrived the law of whose nation was not recognized in it, he fell under the law of the nation which he found supreme. You might know, or might meet in the course of a day's business, several persons living under different laws in the same city. It was just as now in India, where Europeans, Hindoos and Mahometans have their respective family or religious laws, only in Europe during the dark ages the diversity must have been more striking, because it invaded more depart-

*The rule was that "a person may be cited as defendant in every town in which he has citizenship by *origo*, and also in every town in which he has a domicile." But in the *Corpus Juris* we hear comparatively little of the former jurisdiction. "In the first place that rule had complete application only in Italy, not in the provinces, in which there were no municipal magistrates with jurisdiction. Here, therefore, *origo* could found no jurisdiction, while on the contrary the abstract notion of domicile was just as applicable to the territory of a province, and therefore to the jurisdiction of the imperial governor, as to the territory of a particular town. But several of the passages cited expressly speak of the provinces only, and others may also have spoken of them, although in their present form it is not apparent. In the second place, perhaps the application of the *forum originis* to one who had *origo* and *domicilium* in two different municipalities was always limited to the case in which he happened to be found in the town to which he belonged by *origo*. But even if such a restrictive rule of law had not existed, the plaintiff must still, for his own interest, have preferred the *forum domicilii*, because the defendant was more easily and conveniently reached in the place of his domicile." Savigny, *Syst. d. heut. Röm. Rechts.* § 355; Guthrie's translation, pp. 112, 113. Savigny's conclusions as to law were that, "(a) in a contract between two citizens of different states, the purely positive law of the foreign state cannot militate against either of the parties; they are rather to be judged according to the *jus gentium*, yet for political reasons the contrary may be prescribed in particular cases; (b) the right of citizenship in a particular town usually determines for each individual to what positive law he is personally subject, and according to which, therefore, he must be judged." § 356; Guthrie, p. 117.

ments of law at the same time that there was more social intercourse between the persons whom it affected. The general rule was that the law of the defendant governed; if an obligation could not be established against him by his own law, there was no other to which he was subject. But marriage was to be celebrated according to the law of the husband, and so strictly was this rule adhered to that wives who had been married by *their* law could be dismissed at caprice, a practice to which in the year 895 the Council of Tribur could oppose none but religious sanctions.*

In Italy this system of personal laws, belonging to groups of persons not distinguished by citizenship or residence but by race, came to an end through the great preponderance of the group, or rather mass, living by Roman law, and the absorption of the other groups into it. This we know to have happened, and we can see many causes for it. The political significance of the *civitates*, and probably even their topographical limits, must have been largely effaced by the Germanic conquest, and correspondingly the legal importance of *origo* must have given way before that of domicile, the Roman mass being thus welded into a non-political whole capable of receiving accessions with little friction. The Germanic conquerors, except in the Lombard plain, were less numerous than they were beyond the Alps. On the other hand, many of the cities are known to have attained a flourishing position even during the dark and early middle ages, and the industry and commerce to which they owed that position must have called for Roman law and jurisdiction, and have invited those Germans who adopted such pursuits to avail themselves of them. And when most of the nobles had come to reside in the cities, as well from a preference for city life as from the compulsion which in some cases was applied by the city people, few vestiges can have remained of any Germanic jurisdiction capable of upholding Germanic personal laws. Certain it is that when, in the twelfth century, the renewed study of the *Corpus Juris* brings the legal condition of Italy again into daylight, we find the whole people subject to Roman law, with variants called the statutes of the cities, and to a jurisdiction based on domicile.

The glossators of the *Corpus Juris* were unable to point out the analogy which the statutes of the Italian cities bore to the laws of the *peregrini* and the *civitates* mentioned by Gaius and Ulpian,

*Mansi, t. 18, col. 151. I have been directed to this example by Savigny, *Gesch. des Röm. rechts im Mitt.*, vol. 1, § 46.

because they did not possess the fragments of pre-Justinian law in which the position of the *civitates* is marked so much more clearly than by anything in the Digest or the Code. But that they in fact regarded the statutes from the same point of view is shown by the text on which they hung what they had to say about them. This was the first law of the Code, that by which the Emperors Gratian, Valentinian and Theodosius required all their subjects to profess the Trinitarian doctrine: *Cunctos populos quos clementiæ nostræ regit imperium in tali volumus religione versari*, &c. Here was an acknowledgment that a ruler could legislate only for his subjects, and accordingly Accursius or some one else wrote the following gloss: *Argumentum. Quodsi Bononiensis conveniatur Mutinæ, non debet judicari secundum statuta Mutinæ, quibus non subest; cum dicat quos nostræ clementiæ regit imperium*. Let us see what was involved in approaching the subject in this manner. First, since the field of application of a statute was held to belong to principles of justice to be determined by reasoning, there was involved a denial of the doctrine to which John Voet and Huber were long afterwards led by an exaggeration of territorial sovereignty, namely, that no jurisdiction can apply any other law than the *lex fori* except at the demand of courtesy or interest. Secondly, since the reasoning started from the notion of personal subjection to a lawgiver, it followed that, whatever rules for delimiting the fields of application of the statutes *inter se* should be established, they would have to be equally adopted as between the legislations binding peoples differing in that political subjection which we now call nationality; and this was assumed from the first by the post-glossators. Only, since a common political subjection to the Roman empire revived by the Germans existed for most of the cities of which the statutes were under consideration, it followed that, besides the questions concerning the limits of the application of the statutes *inter se*, other questions were raised concerning their relation to the common Roman law, to which they were regarded as exceptions introduced either by subordinate authority or by some forgotten exercise of imperial authority.*

* Venice did not acknowledge the supremacy of the emperor, yet as the Visigoths made their wills with only two witnesses, while the Roman law required five, one doctor trusted that they had received some forgotten dispensation from the successors of Justinian, while another argued, that since by the Roman law a parent could with two witnesses divide his property between his children, a city, which was the parent of her subjects, might authorize them to distribute their substance with no more elaborate formality. Bartolus, Cod. 1, 1, 1.

North of the Alps the course of legal history during the dark and early middle ages was different. The personal laws were crushed out by the pressure of feudal authority, which established itself in France on the fall of the Carlovingians, though in Germany the struggle of the central government against the usurpations of the strong lasted longer. The baronial fiefs or *châtellenies* became little states, of each of which the inhabitants held scant intercourse with those of any other. The stranger, *aubain*, became a serf by living a year and a day on the lord's soil, or a burgess by living a year and a day in a town, being aggregated in either case to the local community. Customs grew up which became the laws of the local courts. Few were the occasions when a want was felt for any other law than that of the *châtellenie*. When they occurred, the rude justice of the *châtelain* applied some traditions, in France chiefly of Roman and in Germany of Germanic origin. Fewer still must in the eleventh and twelfth centuries have been the occasions which, under modern jurisprudence, would have called for the application of any law foreign to the *châtellenie*, and we cannot doubt that any such foreign law was usually ignored, and the judgment given according to the *lex fori*, as if John Voet and Huber, with their extreme doctrine of territoriality put without their qualifying doctrine of international courtesy, were already authorities. Law had a base in feudal property, for its limits as well as for its substance, and as soon as a principle could disengage itself from the obscurity, it was that of the French *brocard*, *toutes les coutumes sont réelles*—exclusive within their territories, of no effect outside them. The limits of application of a law might depend on those of the lawgiver's authority, but that authority was regarded as being over territory rather than over persons.

It was during the course of the thirteenth century that any further elaboration of the gloss on the Corpus Juris was superseded by independent legal treatises or commentaries on particular texts, starting the great series of the post-glossators, among whom the most famous name is that of Bartolus, in the fourteenth century. The series, at least so far as our subject is concerned, extends so far as to include Dumoulin (Molinæus), in the middle of the sixteenth. Their contributions to our subject still chiefly take the form of commentaries on the law *cunctos populos*, the first law of the Code, and their object is to lay down the rules for the fields of application of different statutes, the necessity of which had been foreseen in the gloss.

It is probable that some of the rules which they support only by reasoning, including, after the fashion of the time, the citation of numerous really irrelevant texts of the Digest and Code, were already applied in a practice which they did not notice because it wanted written authority, and perhaps consistency. Indeed, it is difficult to suppose that a society so advanced as that which by this time existed in Italy and the south of France, in the universities and law schools of which countries the post-glossators mostly learnt and taught, can have dispensed with some practice on the subject. Thus, when the doctors submit contracts to the law of the place where they are entered into (*lex loci contractus celebrati*), it can hardly be doubted that this must have been already the rule for the great fairs at which so much of the business of those times was transacted. And when they make domicile the test of one's being bound by a statute on capacity, quoting the law that the president of a province can appoint guardians only for those belonging to the province or domiciled in it (Dig. xxvi. 5. 1. § 2), probably the quotation was not so irrelevant as it is sometimes represented, but was based on the postulate that the jurisdiction which alone could supply capacity if wanting must furnish the measure of the want to be supplied, in accordance with the maxim, *paria sunt forum alicubi sortiri et statutis ligari: si ibi forum, ergo et jus*. But in the main the task which lay before the post-glossators in determining the legitimate field of operation of laws was to effect a reconciliation, or at least a *modus vivendi*, between the Roman principle enforced by the gloss, that law depends on personal subjection to it, and the feudal principle which, as we have seen, made law territorial. The former pointed to laying great stress on the domicile of the owner of property, the latter to laying the stress on its situation, with a possible variation dependent on its being movable or immovable; and the opposition of the two culminates in the question of succession on death. The south of France was the meeting-ground of those principles. Of the four predecessors of Bartolus whose works he cites, all of whom were active within the thirteenth century, only one was a native of Italy, the others respectively of Languedoc, Lorraine and Bourbonnais; three of the four studied law in Italy, and two taught it at Toulouse or Orleans.* So great is the difficulty

* Gulielmus Durantis (Languedoc), Jacobus de Ravena or de Ravanis (Révigny, Lorraine), Petrus a Bella Pertica (Bourbonnais), and Cinus (Pistoia): 1 Leiné, 118—122.

of delimiting the principles referred to, that to this day it remains the chief problem of private international law as a theoretical science.

There followed two centuries of discussion, which left the science much as Bartolus had left it, the statutes of which the operation was to be territorial, and which were called real, having to be ascertained by the answer to a question about which there could be no agreement because it was insoluble, whether their motive was more concerned with things or with persons. At last an important contribution to the science was made by Dumoulin, one of the greatest legal geniuses that have worked on it. His tendency was to allow more influence to the intention of parties than to legal rules, and accordingly to regard customs rather as usages to which men were presumed to conform than as binding dispositions. This may be instanced by the doctrine, developed in his 53rd *consilium*, that where a marriage is celebrated without express contract, between persons domiciled within the area governed by a custom, that custom receives a contractual force through their tacit adoption of it, by which it applies even to the immovable property of the pair situate under another custom, contrary to the then prevailing opinion in favour of the *lex situs* in such case. But Dumoulin was immediately contradicted with asperity by d'Argentré, a Breton noble and magistrate, who in the interest of provincial autonomy* carried the reality of the customs to a higher point than it had yet reached in the French parliaments and universities, though it is possible that there may always have been remote feudal courts into which the learning of the post-glossators had never penetrated. To the statutes which were classed as real or personal he added a mixed class, in which both things and persons are had in view; but these, he maintained, ought to be treated as real. The only statutes for which he admitted an extra-territorial operation were those which disposed *de universali*

* Ils servaient l'un et l'autre, à leurs risques et périls, avec une égale sincérité. des causes d'égale importance. Dumoulin luttait pour l'autorité royale et l'unité du droit, d'Argentré pour la féodalité et pour l'autonomie juridique des provinces.

. . Les haines et les persécutions que s'attira Dumoulin sont bien connues; la vie de cet homme d'étude fut une des plus agitées qui furent menées dans un siècle des plus orageux. Quant à d'Argentré, s'il contribua, grâce à la modération de sa conduite politique, à préserver son pays des malheurs de la guerre religieuse, la loyauté avec laquelle il écrivait son *Histoire de Bretagne* n'en fit pas pardonner la liberté; celle-ci lui valut les disgrâces de la cour et du parlement; devenu suspect il finit par être impliqué dans des troubles qui eurent lieu à Rennes, par quitter cette ville, et, peu après, par mourir de chagrin. 1 Lainé, 814.

*personæ statu, and that pure, citra rerum immobilium mixturam et abstracte ab omni materia reali.**

The system of d'Argentré did not at once gain much influence in the higher circles of French jurisprudence. The conflict of laws arose far oftener between the different provinces of the kingdom than between any of them and foreign states, and in the France of the seventeenth century the cause of provincial autonomy was too losing a one for legal doctrines tending in its direction to be successful. But elsewhere the growth of international intercourse, the independence of the United Netherlands, of which the union qualified but little the independence of their several provinces, and the practical separation of the Belgian provinces from the empire combined with their strong attachment to their franchises, caused the conflict of laws to be considered more as arising between separate political sovereignties. For such sovereignties feudalism had established the territorial character as dominant, and the jurists of the Low Countries welcomed the principle of d'Argentré, and carried them even further with unflinching logic. An edict of the Spanish governors of Belgium in 1611 provided that if there were different customs as to last wills in the place of a testator's residence and in that where his property was situate, the customs and usages of the situation were to be followed in what touched the quality of the property (*i.e.*, movable or immovable), the power to dispose of it, at what age, and with what form and solemnity. In 1634 an official interpretation declared that only essential solemnities (*solemnités du fond*) were intended by this, not exterior forms, but the *lex situs* was left as the rule for capacity, depending on age or otherwise, as Burgundus had taught in his work, *Ad consuetudines Flandriæ aliarumque gentium controversiæ*, published in 1621. In that work, which he wrote while a barrister at Ghent, he described d'Argentré as *vir excellentissimi ingenii*, and put the realistic aspect of the new doctrine on the conflict of laws in a striking light. "Property," he said, "is the blood and soul of a man, and does not follow persons, but draws them to it. The solemnities of a will are a certain quality impressed on the property." Almost at the same time the connection of the doctrine with territorial sovereignty was asserted by Grotius with equal strength. In the *De jure belli ac pacis*, published in 1625, after observing that civil laws

* De statutis personalibus et realibus. Nos. 7, 8, 14.

make some promises of minors void, and grant restitution against others, he says (l. 2, c. 11, s. 5) that "these things are proper to civil law, and consequently have nothing to do with the law of nature and the *jus gentium*, except that it is natural to observe civil laws in the places where they have force. Wherefore, even if a foreigner contracts with a citizen, he will be bound by those laws, because he who contracts in any place is under the laws of that place as a temporary subject." Grotius had said (l. 1, c. 1, s. 13, 14) that civil law draws its origin from the will of the civil power; his meaning must therefore be that the presumable will of a legislator is to grasp all that falls within the reach of his power. He does not will to enact a law of which the legitimate field of operation shall be determined by a science of jurisprudence, but to enact a law which shall apply to every question arising in his territory—for example, the capacity of a foreigner contracting in it. The *lex fori* is thus set up as in principle the only law for transactions within the jurisdiction, whatever assuagement of that severity Grotius would have admitted if the main purpose of his book had allowed him to enlarge on the subject. In the passage cited he goes on to say that "it will be quite otherwise if a contract be made at sea or in an unoccupied island, or by letter between persons in different countries, for such contracts are governed by the law of nature alone"; so he did not shrink from the conclusion that the territorial principle as he understood it, pushed to its logical extreme, does not leave even the *lex fori* for the decision of many cases, but refers them practically to the judge's opinion of what is equitable.

From this time forward the new ideas prevailed in the North. The very titles of the principal books show that the notion of determining the proper field of each law had given way to that of arbitrating on the conflict between laws, a conflict which inevitably arises whenever territorial sovereignty and the temporary subjection of passing foreigners are insisted on with any strength, in relation to transactions which, by their scope, or by the persons who enter into them, are connected with more territories than one. Thus within the seventeenth century we have Paul Voet, *De statutis eorumque concursu*; Huber, *De conflictu legum*; both these Dutch; and Hertius, a German, *De collisione legum*. They went to different lengths, and the formal statement that the admission of any foreign law rests only on a comity contrasted with justice was reserved for Huber and the younger

(John) Voet. The latter admitted foreign laws *ex comitate, liberaliter et officiose ultro citroque, nullo alioquin ad id jure obstricta*. And Huber laid down three axioms which have become famous: "(1) The laws of every state reign within its territory and govern all its subjects, but have no force elsewhere; (2) All those who are found within its territory, whether with a permanent or temporary residence, are to be considered as subjects of the state; (3) The rulers of states admit by comity the laws of every people, after having been applied within its territory, to preserve their effect everywhere, provided that neither other states nor their subjects receive thereby any injury to their power or to their rights."

In the eighteenth century activity on our subject passed again to France, but Froland, Bouhier and Boullenois were able only to rearrange the old ideas in new and hesitating combinations. Such, however, as were their results, they formed the ultimate doctrine of *les statutaires*, which was considered to survive the introduction of the Code Napoleon so far as it was untouched by it, and to govern its interpretation. Its leading features were those which have been set forth on pp. 8, 9, as having been elaborated on the continent by the middle of the eighteenth century, while the more particular affinity of the doctrines adopted in England to those of the Dutch school will be recognized in the extreme application of the *lex situs* mentioned on p. 9. Only, while English writers and judges freely borrowed the term "comity" from John Voet and Huber, it may be doubted whether they meant it strictly in a sense independent of justice. Although on the continent comity and justice are usually regarded as forming an antithesis, it is probable that in this country the prevailing view has been that while a concession is made in not determining every question by the *lex fori*, that concession is dictated not only by a convenience amounting to necessity, but also by deference to a science of law embodying justice, which the law of the land was deemed to have adopted as governing its own interpretation and application, and from which it was conceived that the rules of the comity were drawn. Imperfect acquaintance with the continental literature of the subject led to an over-estimate of the agreement which existed about the science and the rules, and as soon as any rule was accepted by the English courts, the practice of those courts to follow their precedents prevented a further investigation which might have damaged the belief in its universal recognition. In

this way a system of private international law applied in England was founded; but of late years the courts have acted with greater independence in applying the wider legal knowledge which has been acquired.

Since the eighteenth century the most remarkable contribution to the theory of private international law has been that made by Savigny, in the eighth volume of his *System des heutigen Römischen Rechts*, published in 1849. His general view about law, which he did not connect with a lawgiver, would probably, in any case, have prevented him from pursuing the old course of deducing the proper field of each law from a government sovereign, either over persons or over a territory; but his objection to that course was strongly reinforced by his observation of the failure to produce a coherent system in which it had resulted. He made the true question to be to what rule of law each legal relation is subject, thus attributing to the rules a kind of authority of their own, to which his philosophy of law led him, but into which we need not here enter further than to observe that the authority of each rule was connected by him with an area (*Rechtsgebiet*). So far as a rule applies simply to a person, as by defining his capacity to have and acquire rights and to act, the person was subject to it by his domicile within its area, a conclusion inevitable to one who approached the subject as an expositor of Roman law from which *origo* had dropped out. So far as the legal relation in question is one arising from contact between persons and things in or belonging to different areas, as in the cases of family law, obligations, and rights, whether to particular things or to things grouped together as in succession on death, the governing rule was that to which the relation belongs or is subject by its proper nature, which Savigny also describes as the rule in the area of which the relation has its seat. This was equivalent to entrusting the selection of the rule in the case of each legal relation to an appreciation of what justice and convenience require, for nothing is gained by interposing a seat of the relation which in its turn justice and convenience must point out. Apart, therefore, from the value of his judgment in discussing particular questions, Savigny's chief contribution to our subject lay in directing attention to the substantial nature of each legal situation to be dealt with rather than to the sovereignty over persons or places, and in the check which he thereby gave to the exaggerated application of the *lex situs* which had set in with d'Argentré. The spirit of this teaching has not ceased to

operate, though sovereignty at present bulks so largely in the view of writers on our subject that few carry it out without referring to that consideration.

Thus one of the latest and ablest of them, M. Pillet, while treating the choice between laws as a question of the respect due to the respective sovereignties from which they have emanated, lays down the principle that the preference is always to be given to that state which has the greatest interest in the solution.* But the interest which the sovereignties from which laws emanate have in the solution of a question arising between them can only be measured and compared by reason, and so the substantial nature of the legal relation to be dealt with re-enters as furnishing the test. That nature may be considered more from the point of view of the parties or more from that of the sovereignties concerned, though a sound judgment will not wholly lose sight of either. But at least a legislator will be deemed to have intended that his enactments shall be interpreted by science, not that they shall be applied to all legal situations within his physical control, or to the acts of all persons acting in his territory, except so far as he may concede exceptions by a comity contrasted with justice.†

* Pillet, *Principes du Droit International Privé*, 1903.

† For a discussion of recent Continental theories of the subject, see Baty, *Polarized Law*, p. 148, ff. 1914.

CHAPTER II.

DOMICILE AND NATIONALITY—RENOI.

A VERY summary view has now been given of the history of private international law to the close of the eighteenth century. Since then the development of the subject on the continent has been largely influenced in its external form by the codification of the law in the leading European countries, and by the international conventions of 1896, 1902, and 1905, on procedure, marriage, divorce and guardianship, resulting from the official conferences of 1893, 1894, and 1900 at The Hague, England unfortunately not having been a party either to the conferences or to the conventions.* In its substance the subject has been no less deeply affected by the substitution, widely accepted on the continent, of political nationality for domicile as the criterion of personal law, and by the controversy which has consequently sprung up about the doctrine called the *renvoi*. It will be easily seen how the difficulties of private international law must be increased when to the differences between the laws that can come into conflict there is added a difference as to the rules which are to regulate that conflict. The latter difference was not, indeed, first created by the introduction of nationality in some countries as the criterion of personal law while domicile was retained for that purpose in other countries. It existed, for instance, as the result of the want of agreement whether the *lex loci actus* was obligatory or only optional for the forms of acts, and whether for the form of a will the *lex loci actus* was not altogether overridden by the *lex domicilii* for movables and the *lex situs* for immovables. But the change of base from nationality to domicile, imperfect in the extent of its adoption, brought the conflict between rules of private international law into much greater practical importance than it before possessed, and this for England as well as for the continent, notwithstanding that

*The Conventions of 1902 and 1905 have been denounced by France and some of them by Belgium. The Convention of 1905 about civil procedure has been reaffirmed in Art. 287 of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany; but France is excepted from the States renewing their adhesion.

England has so far clung to the old principle of domicile. It is therefore necessary to give a general account of the matter before entering on any of the particular doctrines of our subject, in which it will meet us from time to time. And in doing so I shall abide as far as possible by the historical method which has been pursued in the previous chapter.

Before Savigny wrote, though as an expositor of Roman law, he had no concern with it, there had already begun on the continent of Europe the substitution of political nationality for domicile as the test to be applied to status and capacity. This, which may rank with the extreme territoriality championed by d'Argentré as the two greatest changes in our subject since the twelfth century, has been progressive, and is not yet complete. It arose as follows.

In France the reception of domicile as the criterion of the personal statute was early qualified by a very limited reference to political conditions, not, indeed, through any reintroduction of *origo* as a ground of jurisdiction, but through a jealousy of *domicilium* as such ground when by any possibility it might lead to consequences hurtful to Frenchmen. France attained early to the consciousness of a political unity within herself, marking her off from all foreign countries, the empire included, and which led, long before the consolidation of the royal power under Lewis the Eleventh, to certain peculiarities in her jurisprudence. The Roman notion of *domicilium* was revived as in Italy and other parts of the empire, so that a Frenchman could not be sued for a personal matter except before the judge of his domicile; but the foreigner (*aubain*), being in France with a residence there short of domicile, was not allowed, when sued by a Frenchman, to plead that his proper judge was the judge of a foreign domicile. His only protection was that the French plaintiff could not bring him before any tribunal he chose, but only before that of his actual residence. Also a foreign judgment had the force of *res judicata* in France when pronounced against a foreigner, but by the ordinance of 1629, Art. 121, a Frenchman could again dispute the merits of the cause before a French tribunal. Hence the personal statute of a Frenchman was that of his French domicile, and if he acquired a foreign domicile, neither a judgment there pronounced, nor the statute of that place operating through the medium of such a judgment, could affect his status or capacity in France. But the foreigner was bound as to his status and capacity by the *res judicata*, and therefore by the

statute, of his foreign domicile, though it is more than probable that, if sued in France by a Frenchman for matters transacted in France, he would not have been allowed to defend himself by that statute.* Suppose, however, that the foreigner established in France, not merely a simple residence, but such a residence as satisfied the Roman notion of *domacilium*; could this be counted in his favour? The French legists, either by a misconception or through a desire to justify the inequitable *droit d'aubaine*, seized on the Roman distinction between *jus civile* and *jus gentium*, and held that foreigners enjoyed the latter in France but not the former. Now the transfer of domicile was in Roman ideas a question of fact, *domicilium re et facto transfertur*: therefore it did not depend on the *jus civile*: therefore a foreigner was allowed to establish his domicile in France, with the effect of submitting his status and general capacity to the law of that domicile, his particular rights remaining limited by his exclusion from those which arose out of the *jus civile*, as succession to property on death, its transmission by will, the *patria potestas*, and adoption.† This exclusion is often spoken of as incapacity, and not without etymological accuracy; but questions about it must be distinguished from those about general capacity. A Frenchman, as a minor, may have wanted the latter capacity while enjoying rights, for instance, of succession: a foreigner in France may have been *sui juris* while deprived of such rights.

In this state of things the Code Napoleon (1803) enacted that—

The laws concerning the status and capacity of persons govern Frenchmen, even though residing in foreign countries. Art. 3.

Such was the natural outcome of the ancient French principles just explained. The internal differences of law, with regard to which the precise domicile within France was important, disappeared with the introduction of the code, but the political nationality of a Frenchman remained to govern his civil relations even abroad. The same code says—

The foreigner who may have been admitted by the authority of the government to establish his domicile in France shall enjoy there all civil rights, so long as he continues to reside there. Art. 13.

This article repeals, for the foreigner who has established his domicile in France with the authority of the government, the old

* See Demangeat, *Histoire de la condition civile des étrangers en France*, pp. 117—121.

† Demangeat, *lib. cit.*, pp. 123—155.

exclusion of aliens from the rights given by the *jus civile*, the difference between which and the *jus gentium* is still sometimes noticed by French lawyers even under the empire of the code, but it neither says nor implies anything as to the law by which the status and general capacity of any foreigner are to be determined. As to that matter, the prevailing opinion is that a silent revolution has been wrought by Art. 3, and that as the status and capacity of Frenchmen are to be determined by French law, so, by analogy, the status and capacity of foreigners, whether they have established a domicile in France with the authority of the government or not, must be determined by the law of their political country. Nevertheless, the French courts have often refused to allow a Frenchman to suffer from the incapacity by his personal law of a foreigner who contracts in France, when the foreigner would have been capable by French law, and the Frenchman, in good faith and not having acted with *légèreté* or imprudence, was ignorant of his incapacity. So much survived of the ancient practice, which in no case permitted a foreigner contracting in France to defend himself by his personal statute against a French plaintiff. But the most recent authorities pay respect to the incapacity of a foreigner by his personal law whenever he has not fraudulently concealed it from the French party.*

The next great example of codification in Europe was that given by the Austrian code of 1811, in force from 1st January, 1812. In it the French precedent was followed so far as to claim the authority of their national law over the capacity of Austrian subjects abroad (Art. 4), but it left the capacity of foreigners to the old rule of domicile (Art. 34), as the Prussian code of 1794 had done for the capacity of every one. After this the influence of nationality on private law received a great impetus from the circumstances of Italy, as a region possessing unity of language, social habits and sentiment, but without political unity, divided as it was between the foreign government of Austria and domestic governments controlled or supported by that of Austria. The conviction of an intimate connection between the political and the social or jural aspects of national life, which perhaps made its first appearance in the old French maxims which we have seen determining the line taken on our subject by the Code Napoleon,

* Surville et Arthuys, § 151, quoting judgments of 2nd July 1878 and 4th March 1890, 5 Clunet 202 and 18 Clunet 205.

was developed by the Italians into a theory on which their political unity and independence might be claimed, and on which the legislation of the resulting state would have to be based. Any body of people occupying a certain territory, and united among themselves and differentiated from their neighbours by race, or by what makes up the tie imagined and described as that of race, was a nationality and might claim a separate political development. So far the theory was preached and acted on in many European countries. But by the Italians, among whom the greatest name in this subject was that of Mancini, nationality was regarded as the product of a living force, which tended to show itself at once in the political and social spheres, so that the political organization might as well be the index to that which ought to exist for private law, as the social characteristics might be the index to the organization which ought to exist in the political sphere. On these principles, when the political unity of the country had been to a large extent achieved, the Italian code of 1865, in force from 1st January, 1866, was framed, and declared that—

The status and capacity of persons and their family relations are governed by the law of the nation to which they belong. Preliminary Art. 6.

The case of a political nationality including within its territorial limits the areas of several distinct systems of private law, as the British Empire includes England, Scotland, the province of Quebec, the Cape Colony, and many other regions distinct for the purposes of private law, was not contemplated in drawing up this enactment. But wherever the national law of a subject of such a complex unit is referred to, there is no possible alternative except to find the law sought in that of the domicile to which he belongs within his political nationality. For a British subject domiciled in England, English law must be regarded in Italy as his national law, and so forth.

From the date of the Italian code and the parallel decisions of the French courts as to the status and capacity of foreigners, the differences between laws as to the age of the majority have been complicated by differences as to the authority of the lawgivers. From the time gloss on the law *cunctos populos* to the nineteenth century, the age of majority was determined by the law of the domicile, because it was agreed that the lawgiver of a territory had authority to fix that age for those domiciled in it and for no others. There might be a difficulty in ascertaining

the domicile, but, that ascertained, there could be none in ascertaining the law. Now, however, we have an English or a Danish lawgiver fixing the age at twenty-one, and adhering to the old view that his authority over personal status depends on the English or Danish domicile of the persons to be affected, and an Italian lawgiver fixing the age at nineteen, and adopting the new view that his authority over personal status depends on the Italian nationality of the persons to be affected. If, then, one who is politically an Englishman or a Dane is domiciled in Italy and makes his will and dies there at the age of twenty, neither the English or Danish nor the Italian lawgiver has claimed authority to determine his majority. What, then, shall be done?

In order to answer that question it is usual to distinguish what are called the internal laws of a country from the rules of private international law adopted in it, the two parts together forming the whole law of the country. For example, twenty-one as the English or Danish age of majority and nineteen as the Italian, carefully separated from all consideration of an enacting authority having a definite range of legitimate action, are treated, as being the internal laws of the respective countries, and their whole laws on the subject are made up by adding the principle of domicile or nationality as the case may be. Then on one view, which is called in French *renvoi* and in German *Rückverweisung*, the rules of private international law are understood as referring a judge to the whole law of a given country, and not merely to its internal laws, so that in the case put above the principle of domicile would be understood as referring an English or Danish judge who might be seized of the case to the whole law of Italy as determining the majority of the *de cujus*; this reference being made, the principle of nationality, included in the whole law of Italy, would refer the same judge back to the whole law of his own country; that whole law would send him again to Italy; and so on for ever. No result is arrived at: there is a *circulus inextricabilis*. It is needless to say that in practice some means must be found, and are found even by the partisans of the *renvoi*, to stop the series of references back. But the opponents of the *renvoi* treat the theoretical possibility of the *circulus inextricabilis* as proof that the rules of private international law never refer a judge to the whole law of another country, but only to its internal laws. Thus they teach that if the affair of our *de cujus* comes before an English or Danish

judge, he must hold himself to be referred by his principle of domicile to the internal law of Italy, and must pronounce the testator to have attained majority at nineteen, and that if the same affair comes before an Italian judge, he must hold himself to be referred by his principle of nationality to the internal law of England or Denmark, and must pronounce the would-be testator not to have been of age because he was not twenty-one. And this view the opponents of the *renvoi* claim to have been the ancient one, although as long as the rules of private international law adopted in different countries did not differ, it did not matter whether they referred a judge to the internal law of another country or to its whole law, and the distinction between the internal and the whole law was not in fact made.

It is difficult to be satisfied with either of these doctrines, both based on a notion of internal law from which the necessary (and, *pace* the opponents of the *renvoi*, the historical) element of the authority claimed by the lawgiver has been eliminated. Let us suppose then that an English or Danish judge, seized of the affair of our *de cujus*, declines to single out the so-called internal part of the law of Italy as being alone pointed out to him by his principle of domicile; and suppose him to perceive that the Italian principle of nationality, by preventing the Italian lawgiver from claiming authority over the capacity of any but his political subjects, has made it impossible that any determination about the capacity of a British or Danish subject can enter into what in any true sense is the law of Italy. Then he will understand that the conflict of rules of private international law has had for its consequence that they lead to no result in the case before him. He will be thrown back on an examination of the true meaning of the principle of domicile in the law of his country. He will find that that principle is the expression of the view, entertained from the twelfth century or earlier to the nineteenth, that the world is divided for the purposes of private law into civil societies based on domicile, and that no lawgiver can properly attempt to withdraw his political subjects from any such civil society in which they may be included. He will further find that the law of Italy amounts to saying that no civil society based on domicile exists in that country, and he will finally consider that domicile is eliminated from the case, and that there is no reason for holding the political Dane or Englishman to have attained his majority sooner than he would have attained it in his own country. It is to the elimination of domicile, and not to

any throwing back to a previous domicile, that the law of Italy leads. But if the status of a British subject is concerned, some means must be found of connecting him with one of the systems of law existing in the British empire. This may be done by tracing him back, where possible, to some British domicile, which he can be said not to have abandoned because he has not abandoned it with legal efficacy; and Farwell, J., took that line in *Re Johnson* (below, p. 36). If it is not possible, at least the ancestry of the *de cujus* may be traced to a British subject who had a British domicile; and the result so reached must be accepted *ex necessitate*, not from any continuity in the deduction of domicile. If it should be suggested that the age of majority ought to depend on that of maturity, as indicated by the climate of the domicile, he will no doubt reply, first, that the domicile at the age of nineteen proves nothing as to the climate under which the *de cujus* may have been growing up towards maturity, and secondly, that historically such a consideration had nothing to do with the establishment of the principle of domicile.

The matter is so cardinal in relation to the real meaning of private international law, that, at the risk of being tedious, I will put it again in different language, but with a difference only of language. The English or Danish judge cannot hold the lad of nineteen to have attained his age unless he is prepared to answer the question, what lawgiver made him of age? That is independent of all views about the conflict of laws, for it results from the nature of law itself. Now the Italian code does indeed seem to lay down a rule about the status and capacity of all persons without exception, but this is only a misleading generality, for no one can doubt that the principle of nationality adopted in Italy prevents the Italian lawgiver from claiming authority over the capacity of a British or Danish subject. The English or Danish judge therefore cannot say that the Italian lawgiver made the *de cujus* of age at nineteen: Then, it will be asked, who is the lawgiver that keeps him a minor till he has attained twenty-one? And the answer is, the British or Danish lawgiver; for no one can doubt his authority over the capacity of his subjects if he chooses to exercise it, and the Italian lawgiver's disclaimer removes the objection which he would have felt to exercising it in the case of one of his subjects who was not domiciled in the British dominions or in Denmark. The result will coincide with that given by the *renvoi*, properly limited so as to avoid an endless series of references to and fro, but its real base

lies, not in the doctrine of *renvoi*, but in the duty of considering the essential nature of the legal relation in question in any concrete case, and the essential meaning of the rules of private international law adopted in the different countries concerned.

Writing in and for a country in which the principle of domicile is maintained, it is not my duty to express an opinion as to what an Italian judge ought to do if the case of our *de cujus* came before him. But I may say that I see no reason why he also should not hold the age of majority in the concrete case to be twenty-one. The same considerations as to the essential meaning of the Italian principle of nationality and the British and Danish principle of domicile, respectively, are open to him. And if he follows them, his decision in favour of the English or Danish age of majority will coincide with the result which would be given by regarding the rules of private international law as requiring the application only of the internal laws of the countries to which they point. But a different view has been adopted in the law introducing the German Civil Code (*einführungsgesetz*), in force from 1st January, 1900, of which the important articles are as follows:—*

Art. 7. The capacity of a person is to be judged according to the laws (*gesetze*) of the state to which he belongs.

If a foreigner who is of full age or has the legal condition of a person of full age acquires the character of a German subject, he retains the legal condition of a person of full age even though he is a minor according to the laws of Germany.

If a foreigner acts in the empire in any way for which he is incapable or of limited capacity, he is to be treated as capable for such act so far as he would have been capable by the laws (*gesetze*) of Germany. This rule is not applicable in matters of family law and of succession, or to dispositions of foreign immovables.

Art. 27. If by the law (*recht*) of a foreign state, of which the laws (*gesetze*) are declared by Art. 7, paragraph 1, Art. 13, paragraph 1, Art. 15, paragraph 2, Art. 17, paragraph 1, or Art. 25 to be applicable, the laws (*gesetze*) of Germany are to be applied, the latter shall be applied.†

Thus Germany has followed France and Italy in substituting nationality for domicile as the criterion of personal law, though

* It is noteworthy also that the International Convention drawn up at the Hague Conference of 1912 concerning a Uniform Law of Bills and Cheques contains a rule adopting the national law as the criterion of capacity to contract, subject to the acceptance of a reference from the national law to any other law. Article 74 runs:—*La capacité d'une personne pour s'engager . . . est déterminée par la loi nationale. Si cette loi nationale déclare compétente la loi d'un autre état, cette dernière loi est appliquée.*

† The matters treated of in the other articles referred to are marriage (Art. 13), the effect of marriage on property (Art. 15), divorce (Art. 17), and succession on death (Art. 25).

with express limitations intended for the security of transactions entered into in Germany, and while doing so has provided for the conflict of rules of private international law, as well in the case of capacity which we have been considering as in certain other parts of the subject. By *gesetze* the so-called internal laws of a country are meant, and by *recht* its whole legal system as resulting from them in combination with its rules of private international law. The German rules of the latter description are treated as pointing to the internal laws of another country, but if, in the cases to which Art. 27 extends, the rule of private international law of the country of which the internal laws are so indicated refers back to Germany, the *renvoi* is admitted by exception and without any further reference back, and the internal laws of Germany are to be applied. If an Italian judge adopts this system, he will hold that a British subject or a Dane domiciled in Italy attains his majority at nineteen. The system has been supported from the point of view of general theory by the great authority of von Bar, in theses which he presented to the Institute of International Law.

Thèses proposées par M. L. de Bar.

1. Chaque tribunal doit observer la loi de son pays en ce qui concerne l'application des lois étrangères.

2. Pourtant, s'il n'y a pas de disposition contraire expresse, le tribunal, conformément aux principes du droit international privé, doit respecter :

(a) La disposition d'une loi étrangère qui, en renonçant à lier ses nationaux quant au statut personnel en pays étranger, veut que ce statut personnel soit déterminé par la loi du *domicile*, ou même par la loi du lieu où l'acte dont il est question a été fait ;

(b) La décision de deux ou plusieurs législations étrangères qui, pourvu qu'il soit certain qu'une d'entre elles est nécessairement compétente, s'accorde en attribuant la décision d'une question à la même législation.

Septembre, 1900.*

It will be observed that the thesis (a) supposes a country (A) which makes nationality the criterion of personal laws, and that the country of the nationality so referred to (B) makes personal law depend on (C) the domicile of the *de cujus* or the country in which he has done the act in question. If (C) is the same as (A) we have the case of the German Art. 27, and decided in the same way as by that article. If (C) is different from (A) we no longer have a reference back (*rückverweisung*), but a further reference (*weiterverweisung*). Both are called *renvoi*, and von Bar gives the same rule for both: the internal laws of the country either

* 18 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, p. 41.

referred back to or further referred to are to be applied, the doctrine of *renvoi* being carried so far and then stopped. To illustrate this further reference let us suppose that the will of our old *de cujus*, an Englishman or Dane domiciled in Italy and making a will and dying there at the age of twenty, comes to be decided on in Germany. On the doctrine of the thesis he will be adjudged to have attained his majority at nineteen. In order that a case of *weiterverweisung* may come before an English judge, we may imagine that the further reference is made to the country where the act in question, say a marriage, has been done, by a country, say some American state, to which as the country of the domicile the first reference has been made by England, but which makes capacity to depend on the *lex loci actus*. If the country of the act makes the validity of the act to depend on its conformity with its own internal law, the case of von Bar's thesis (b) will be presented, for both the country first referred to and that further referred to will be agreed in placing the decision with the latter, while in the view of the English judge the competence will certainly lie with one or other of them. Probably, therefore, he will feel no hesitation in deciding by the *lex loci actus*. But if the country of the act should make a still further reference, say to that of the nationality, the English judge would have to consider the whole case with regard to the essential nature of all the legal relations and rules concerned.

The widest sanction which the German rules have received remains to be quoted. Official conferences on private international law were held at The Hague in 1893, 1894 and 1900, Great Britain, unfortunately, taking no part in them. Among their results were the signature on 12th June, 1902, of three conventions between twelve European states, respectively, concerning marriage, divorce and the guardianship of minors; and the signature on 17th July, 1905, of three conventions between seven European states, respectively on the personal relations and property of husband and wife, on successions and wills, and on the curatorship of adults.* Another convention of the latter

*France denounced her adhesion to the Conventions of 1902 in 1912 and to those of 1905 in 1916, on the ground that they interfered with questions of her public policy (see *Clunet*, 1914, p. 801 and 1917, p. 782). Belgium also denounced her adhesion to the Conventions of 1902 by decree dated 30th Oct. 1918. The Conventions of 1902 concerning the guardianship of minors and of 1905 concerning civil procedure are expressly reinstated between Germany and the other Allies and Associated Powers that were signatories to them by Arts. 282 and 287 of the Treaty of Versailles.

date, between fifteen European states, on procedure in civil cases, revised a convention of 14th November, 1896. The convention on marriage agrees with Arts. 7 and 27 of the German law, on the framing of which the interchange of opinion at the conferences must, of course, have exerted an influence, and is thus expressed: Art. 1. *Le droit de contracter mariage est réglé par la loi nationale de chacun des futurs époux, à moins qu'une disposition de cette loi ne se réfère expressément à une autre loi.** Thus the capacity of each party to contract a given marriage is governed by his national law, but if that law expressly makes such capacity to depend on the law of the domicile, thereby making it plain that it has no interest in the matter, its internal dispositions will not be applied.

On the continent of Europe the courts of law seem to adopt the *renvoi* oftener than to reject it. Dr. Bate, in his *Notes on the Doctrine of Renvoi in Private International Law*, pp. 24-26, enumerates the judicial pronouncements for and against that doctrine, from 1856, when it seems to have first come before a continental court, to 1901, with the following results: France, 13 for, 3 against; Belgium, 5 for, none against; Spain, 1 for, none against; Netherlands and Switzerland, each none for and 1 against; Germany, before the code came into force, 10 for, 12 against; totals, 29 for, 17 against.† Moreover, after the French Court of Appeal had for a period given conflicting decisions, the Court of Cassation in 1910 emphatically restated its opinion in favour of the *renvoi* (*L'Affaire Soulie*, Clunet (1910), p. 888). That opinion was originally given in the *Affaire Forgo* (10 Clunet (1883), 64). The French jurisprudence may therefore be regarded as decisively supporting the doctrine. But the opinions of eminent jurists against the *renvoi* preponderate numerically. The Institute of International Law gave in 1900, on "the principle of" a rather involved article, a vote which may be taken as condemning the *renvoi* by 21 to 6. The names of the majority were Asser, Boiceau, Buzzati, Catellani, Corsi, Descamps, Dupuis, Fauchille, Hilty, Holland, Kebedgy, Lehr, von Liszt, Lyon-Caen, Midosi, Renault, Comte Rostworowski,

* 4 R. de D. I. et de L. C. 2e série, p. 488; 28 Clunet 13. By Art. 2 some effect is also given to the law of the place of celebration, to which we shall have to refer in treating of marriage.

† This paragraph has been retained because the general trend of judicial decisions in the last ten years has been the same; the argument therefore holds. For a recent study of the question, see "*La Question de Renvoi*," by Dr. Rotu, Paris 1913.

de Roszkowski, Sacerdoti, Streit, Vesnitch; and those of the minority were von Bar, Brusa, Harburger, Roguin, Weiss, Westlake.*

The question, whether in its true meaning a rule of international law refers a judge to the whole law or merely to the internal law of the country indicated by it, was raised in England at an earlier date than that of any of the continental cases quoted by Dr. Bate as above. It is not necessary here to trace historically the connection of the succession to movables with the personal law or statute of the *de cuius*: it is enough to say that that connection was adopted in England in its extreme form, requiring not only that the distribution should be made in accordance with the law of the domicile of the *de cuius*, but also that a testator domiciled in England should make his will in the form given by the law of his domicile. Hence there arose a conflict between this English rule of private international law and the more widely received rule which at least allowed an act to be good if made in the form of the *locus actus*, even if it did not require it to be in that form. The cases turning on that conflict have furnished the English court with the opportunity, of which it has abundantly availed itself, of declaring that in matters of movable succession its rule of private international law refers it to the whole law of the country indicated by it, or, which is the same thing, to the judgment which would be passed in that country on the concrete case. Thus, in *De Bonneval v. De Bonneval* (1838), 1 Curt. 857, where the question was on the form of a will, Sir Herbert Jenner, having decided that the deceased was domiciled in France, said: "The courts of that country are the competent authority to determine the validity of his will and the succession to his personal estate, and, as in the case of *Hare v. Nasmyth*, 2 Add. 25,† the court suspends the proceedings here as to the validity of the will till it is pronounced valid or invalid by the tribunals of France." In accordance with this pronouncement wills of movables, not in the normal forms of the countries where the testators were domiciled, have been admitted to probate because it was held on the evidence that they would have been operative in those countries: *Collier v. Rivaz* (1841), 2 Curt. 855, Sir Herbert Jenner; *Frere v. Frere* (1847), 5 Notes of Cases 593, the same judge, then Sir H. Jenner

* 10 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International, pp. 84, 176, 177.

† A similar case, putting Scotland for France, before Sir John Nicholl in 1815.

Fust; *Crookenden v. Fuller* (1859), 1 Sw. & Tr. 441, Sir C. Cresswell; *Laneuville v. Anderson* (1860), 2 Sw. & Tr. 24, Sir C. Cresswell; *Onslow and Allardice v. Cannon* (1861), 2 Sw. & Tr. 137 (Dr. Deane, Q.C.[†], withdrawing his opposition when it was decided in Scotland that the will of a testator there domiciled would be valid if in the form of the *locus actus*); *Re Brown-Séguard*, [1894] 70 L. T., N. S. 811, Sir F. Jeune. And in *Re Lacroix* (1877), 2 P. D. 96, Sir J. Hannen held that in Lord Kingsdown's Act the "law of the place where [a will] was made" means the law which in the *locus actus* would be deemed applicable in the given case. In *Bremer v. Freeman* (1857), 10 Moore P. C. 306 (judgment of judicial committee pronounced by Lord Wensleydale), the will in English form of a testatrix domiciled in France was refused probate, the court having arrived by intricate reasoning at the conclusion that it would not be good in France.*

In *Re Trufort*, [1887] 36 Ch. D. 600, the meaning of our principle of domicile had to be considered by Mr. Justice Stirling in relation to the distribution of the movable succession of a Swiss citizen domiciled in France, with regard to which French law admits the authority of Switzerland both by its general reference to nationality and by a Franco-Swiss treaty of 1869. There had been a decision in Switzerland, and the learned judge, in accordance with the cases relating to the forms of wills, said (p. 612): "The claim of the party litigating in this court has been actually raised and decided in the courts which according to the law of the deceased's domicile were the proper and competent courts to decide. . . . I am bound by their decision."

So far the answer to the question with which we are dealing seems to have been given by the English courts almost as a matter of course, but it was seriously controverted before Mr. Justice Farwell in *Re Johnson, Roberts v. Att.-Gen.*, [1903] 1 Ch. 821. The case related to the distribution of the movable property of Miss Johnson, a British subject domiciled at her birth in Malta, but at the dates of her will and of her death in 1894 domiciled in the grand duchy of Baden, in which she was never naturalized. The English principle of domicile

* In this and in some others of the above cases the domicile in France or Belgium had not been established with the authority of the government of that respective country, but the domicile of private international law, which is the "domicile by the law of nations" of the Judicial Committee in *Bremer v. Freeman*, remains one established *animo et facto*, as it was before domiciles with government authorization were invented.

referred the judge to the law of Baden, and the master's certificate found that, "according to the law of Baden, the legal succession to the property of the deceased of which she has not disposed by will is governed solely by the law of the country of which the testatrix was a subject at the time of her death." Thus, in whatever sense the inquiry into the law of Baden may have been intended, it was answered by the master as meaning the whole law of that country and not merely its internal law. The learned judge practically accepted the finding as dealing properly with the question before him, and concluded "that a domicile of choice, ineffectual to create any rights and liabilities governing the distribution of movables in the country supposed to have been chosen, is for this purpose no domicile at all, and that the *propositus* therefore is left with his domicile of origin unaffected. The Baden courts would in effect have disavowed him and disclaimed jurisdiction." It may be remarked in passing that no reason was given, and there is none, for distinguishing a domicile of choice from one of origin for the purpose either of the succession to movables or of the personal statute generally. On the main point the judgment, as well as the reasoning which has been quoted from it, was in accordance with the doctrine which I have advocated. The Baden law having put the Baden domicile out of the case, the movables were distributed as if it had never existed, and therefore by the law of Malta. In other words, domicile was not resorted to as an arbitrary rule, but only so far as implying membership of a civil society existing for the purpose of private law, and not therefore valid in the case of a country where no such society based on domicile exists. The *circulus inextricabilis* alleged to result from the doctrine of *renvoi* did not terrify the learned judge. He put the case of a subject of Baden domiciled in England, and held that "an unavoidable conflict" would arise in it. "If and so far," he said, "as this court distributes his movables, they would be distributed according to our law; but if and so far as the courts in Baden distributed them, they would be distributed in accordance with Baden law." That is true, subject to the question whether the death of the *de cuius* would not fix the rules of succession for his movables at that date in either country, so that their distribution ought not to be affected by their subsequent removal from Baden to England or *vice versa*; but on any doctrine as to the meaning of the rules of private international law, whether that of *renvoi* or any other, concurring decisions

will not always be given in countries which differ as to the criterion of the personal statute.

There are countries in which the domicile of international law, also distinguished as that of fact, with which we have dealt in this chapter, is known (French civil code, § 102); but is of no effect for foreigners unless completed by government authorization (*ib.*; § 13), when it is distinguished as a legal domicile. The British subject who was the testator in *Re Bowes*, 1906, 22 T. L. R. 711, had his domicile of fact, but not a legal domicile, in France; and Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady, avowedly following Mr. Justice Farwell's decision in *Re Johnson*, held that his will was governed, both as to its construction and as to its administration, by English law. Thus the *renvoi* is adopted by the English cases when the international domicile fails as a ground of decision, either because (1) nationality and not domicile is adopted as the criterion in the foreign country in question—Baden in *Re Johnson*—or (2) the international domicile has not been accompanied by a legal sanction necessary in that country—France in *Re Bowes*.

I conclude with the opinion, as founded in reason, that a rule referring to a foreign law should be understood as referring to the whole of that law, necessarily including the limits which it sets to its own application, without a regard to which it would not be really that law which was applied. It is also the only opinion accepted in the English judgments, and is at least strongly supported on the continent.

In a recent case a question of *renvoi* arose in very different circumstances, but was not discussed by the court. The question was as to the construction of a bill of exchange drawn in America and accepted and payable in England. The bill was purchased by American dealers in bills, who sent it, together with the bill of lading for the goods in respect of which it was drawn, to the acceptors in England. They paid it at maturity; but, on the discovery that the bill of lading was a forgery and that no goods had been shipped under it, claimed that the bill was conditional on the genuineness of the bill of lading, and brought an action in America to recover the amount paid by them.

The American court held that the question whether the bill was conditional or unconditional should be decided according to the law of England. When an action was subsequently brought in England the English court decided that, in accordance with

the terms of Section 72 of the Bills of Exchange Act, the question whether the document was conditional or not was to be construed according to the American law, and, therefore, it examined that law, and gave its decision upon its interpretation of the American decisions. It is submitted that, the American court having held that the question of construction was for the English law to determine, the English court should have accepted the reference and decided the matter according to the English internal Law of Bills of Exchange. Scrutton, L.J., indeed, in the Court of Appeal, doubted whether the English court should have referred the matter back to the American law; but the question of acceptance or non-acceptance of the *renvoi* had not to be decided, because the Court of Appeal found that the result would be the same whether the document was construed by the English or by the American law.*

* *Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co.*, [1918] 2 K. B. 660.

CHAPTER III.

CAPACITY, AND FOREIGN GUARDIANSHIPS AND CURATORSHIPS.

I now come to the main object of this work, the rules which are received in England on private international law, and it seems best to follow the Italian code by commencing with the capacity and family relations of persons. Any proposition which can be laid down as supported by the weight of English authority, and any proposition as to which the English authorities are too discrepant for either the affirmative or the negative of it to be so laid down, will be numbered for convenience as a §. Such propositions will differ in their breadth and importance with the measure in which our courts have had occasion to pronounce themselves on the different parts of the subject. They must not therefore be taken as draft articles of a codifying act of parliament, but simply as a mode of presenting the actual state of English jurisprudence. Irish authorities will occasionally be quoted, since the laws of England and Ireland are the same on the matters in question. And the decisions of the House of Lords on Scotch appeals, and those of the privy council on colonial appeals, will be quoted without special remark, whenever it is evident that nothing was meant to turn on the reception of any particular rule of private international law as a part of the national law of the country appealed from.

§ 1. Whenever the operation of a personal law is admitted in England, the domicile of the person in question, and not his political nationality, is considered to determine such personal law.

§ 2. When the capacity of a person to act in any given way is questioned on the ground of his age, the solution of the question will be referred in England to his personal law.

• The following authorities were opposed to the admission of a personal law in such case. •

A person is of less than full age by every law to which reference could be made. His capacity to bind himself by a contract for the purpose of articles of a given description, necessities or other, is to be decided by "the law of the country where the contract arose." *Male v. Roberts* (1800), 3 Esp. 163,

Eldon. A person who is a minor by the law of his domicile resides and trades in another country, where he is adjudged insolvent. His personal property situate in the country of his domicile passes to the assignee in such insolvency. *Stephens v. McFarland* (1845), 8 Ir. Eq. 444, Blackburne. "In general, the personal competency or incompetency of individuals to contract has been held to depend upon the law of the place where the contract is made:" Cresswell, in *Simonin v. Mallac* (1860), 2 S. & T. 77; though his opinion in *Mette v. Mette*, quoted below under § 21, prevents this learned judge being counted as a positive authority in favour of the *lex loci contractus*. In *Sottomayor v. De Barros* (1879), 5 P. D. 94, Hannen, at p. 100, expressed himself in favour of the *lex loci contractus* as governing personal competency, after citing the pronouncement of Lord Justice Cotton in the same case in 1877, quoted below. And now the judgments in *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 46—Sir Gorell Barnes, Cozens-Hardy and Kennedy—and *Chetti v. Chetti*, [1909] P. 67—Sir Gorell Barnes—which are discussed below, tend strongly in the same direction, though it may be doubted how far what was said in them about capacity for marriage was intended to apply to capacity in general. A minor whose domicile was Irish and whose father was domiciled in Ireland took service as a labourer in Scotland; and having suffered injury made an agreement about compensation. Subsequently, he claimed damages against his employer and urged that the agreement was invalid on the ground that he was a minor by the Irish law. It was held that his capacity was determined by the *lex loci contractus* and not by his personal law, and his claim was dismissed. *McFeetridge v. Stewarts and Lloyd*, [1913] S. C. 773. In *Huet v. Le Mesurier* (1786), 1 Cox, 275, Kenyon required proof that a person who was baptized in Guernsey, and petitioned for the payment of money out of court, had attained twenty-one; but it does not appear that the petitioner was domiciled in Guernsey, nor was the fact that majority there is at twenty referred to. A case rather apparently than really opposed to the admission of a personal law is that of the Comte de Paris, held to be domiciled in France and under twenty-one, but emancipated in accordance with French law, so far only however as still to require the assistance of a curator, who had been duly appointed in accordance with the same law. Sir C. Cresswell refused to make a grant of administration to him assisted by his curator, and required him, according to the English practice, to elect his next of kin as his guardian for the purpose of administration on his behalf. *Re D'Orléans* (1859), 1 S. & T. 253; 28 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 129. This case was cited with approval by Jeune, in *The goods of Meatyard*, [1903] P., at p. 129. He explained it as a refusal to grant powers, to be exercised in England, to one whose minority by English law would prevent his exercising them.

The following authorities are in favour of the personal law.

Sir J. Nicholl granted administration, limited to the receipt of the dividends on a sum of stock, to a Portuguese lady would have been a minor by English law, but was emancipated by the law of her domicile, and who was entitled during her life to the dividends in question. Dr. Lushington, who moved for the grant, put it on the ground that by the law of her domicile the lady could not appoint a guardian; an argument which strengthens the assertion of the personal law as governing capacity. *Re da Cunha* (1828), 1 Hag. Ecc. 237. "The civil status is governed universally by one single principle, namely that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil status. For it is

on this basis that the personal rights of the party, that is to say the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy, must depend." Westbury, in *Udny v. Udny* (1869), L. R., 1 Sc. Ap. 457. "As in other contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend on the law of domicile." Cotton, in *Sottomayor v. De Barros* (1877), L. R. 3 P. D. 5: followed in *Re Cooke's Trusts* (1887), 56 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 637, Stirling. "The capacity to contract is regulated by the law of domicile." Halsbury, in *Cooper v. Cooper* (1888), 13 Ap. Ca. 99. In this case Lords Watson and Macnaghten declared against the *lex loci solutionis* as regulating the capacity to contract, but expressed no clear opinion between the domicile and the *locus contractus celebrati*, which happened to be the same. See also the next §.

The following authority admits the personal law, but not as exclusive.

A person domiciled abroad can give an effectual receipt for a legacy bequeathed to him by a testator domiciled in England, on attaining his majority by English law or by the law of his domicile, whichever first happens. *Re Hellmann* (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 363, Romilly.

It will be observed in the above that Lord Westbury puts majority or minority on the same footing as marriage, and that Lord Justice Cotton puts marriage on the same footing with other contracts. Indeed, in the case of marriage, there is an incapacity on the ground of age which cannot be distinguished in principle from incapacity on the ground of age to buy an estate, although the age for capacity with regard to those two subjects of contract may be different. There is also, in the case of marriage, a relative incapacity on the ground of consanguinity or affinity with the other party, which on the continent is treated as being as much a matter for the personal law as absolute incapacity on the ground of age. At least, as to both these points, the marriage cannot be valid if the personal law pronounce a party to it incapable, whether for age or for consanguinity, but a similar objection existing by the law of the place of celebration would equally be fatal to it, because without a lawful celebration the tie cannot arise. Now it will be seen hereafter that the same view of the influence of the personal law on marriage has been adopted in England, by a decision later than most of the authorities above cited against the admission of the personal law on minority generally. I refer advisedly to the decision of the House of Lords in *Brook v. Brook*, 9 H. L. 193, because in the determination of that case by the court of first instance, in which Sir C. Cresswell himself took part, the point of domicile was not clearly referred to as decisive. But the dicta of Lord Westbury and Lord Justice Cotton were subsequent

to the full and final consideration of *Brook v. Brook*, and the express reference which, as already observed, is made in them to marriage, would seem to have been intended to mark the sense of those learned judges that the determination with regard to marriage had fixed the rule for capacity in other cases as well. And the adhesion of Lord Halsbury to the same side gives it a decisive preponderance.*

Ought, however, all reference to the *lex loci contractus* on the subject of capacity to be excluded? The case of marriage is peculiar, in that in almost all countries that particular tie is not created without the intervention of public authority, applied by means of some ceremonial, civil or religious. It may therefore well be that such a ceremonial is void unless the conditions are present which the law of the place of celebration requires to be fulfilled in the contracting parties, no less than those which their personal laws require, and yet that, if the latter conditions are present, the former may not be necessary to the legal effect of a different kind of contract which no public minister is called on to authenticate. But other considerations may arise, and in pp. 26, 31, we have seen the exceptions to the principle of the personal law which are allowed in France and Germany to operate in favour of the validity of transactions. It is noteworthy that the article in The Hague Convention of 1912 concerning a Uniform Law for Bills and Cheques provides expressly that, while capacity to contract is normally governed by the national law;—"La personne qui serait incapable, d'après la loi indiquée par l'alinéa précédent, est, néanmoins, valablement tenue, si elle s'est obligée sur le territoire d'un Etat, d'après la législation duquel elle aurait été capable." Thus the *lex loci contractus* prevails over the personal law to make an engagement valid. Here, however, notwithstanding Lord Romilly's opinion in *Re Hellmann*, the limits which an all but invariable understanding sets in England to the authority of judges will certainly prevent them from establishing, without the aid of parliament, any similar exceptions to the rule of the personal law, once adopted as the general one for capacity. It will remain for parliament, in pursuance of conventions to be concluded with foreign countries, to select between domicile and political nationality as the criterion of personal law, and to establish such exceptions to

* The later decisions in the marriage cases of *Ogden v. Ogden* and *Chetti v. Chetti* (below, p. 60) have impaired this principle.

the application of the personal law as convenience may seem to require.

§ 3. When the capacity of a married woman to act in any given way is questioned on the ground of her coverture, the solution will also be referred in England to her personal law.

A woman having married during her minority, her capacity to repudiate and therefore also to confirm the marriage contract made for her was held to depend on the personal law which she acquired by her marriage. *Viditz v. O'Hagan*, [1900] 2 Ch. 87; *Lindley, Rigby, and Collins, reversing Cozens-Hardy*, [1899] 2 Ch. 569. In *Guépratte v. Young* (1851), 4 De G. & S. 217, Knight-Bruce, the capacity of a married woman to contract in England with the concurrence of her husband, on the subject of an expectation under an English settlement, their domicile being French, and the particular expectation having been comprised in her *dot* by a French contract made on their marriage, was referred by the vice-chancellor to the law of France. It is true that it was much discussed whether the law of France, as that of the marriage contract, permitted the contract before the court to be made, independently of any question about capacity properly so called; but the latter question was not, and could not have been, absent from the mind of the judge. In *Re Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis*, [1902] 2 Ch. 333, the capacity of a lady domiciled in England to bind herself by a marriage settlement was decided by English law, but the point was not adverted to whether, if the settlement was forbidden by the law of Italy, which was the husband's country, it was not void as a contract for which both parties were not competent. In *Re Groos (No. 2)*, [1915] 1 Ch. 572, Sargant, the capacity of a woman domiciled at her death in England to leave her property by will was decided by the English law, though the will was made when she was domiciled in Holland.

The question whether a foreign wife, having capacity by the law of her domicile to trade in partnership with her husband, can sue in England, jointly with him, on contracts made in such trade, was noticed in *Cosio v. De Bernales* (1824), 1 C. & P. 266, Ry. & Mo. 102, Abbott, but not decided, because the foreign law was not proved. In *Peillon v. Brooking* (1858), 25 Beav. 218, Romilly, it was held that a married woman was not freed from a restraint on anticipation, annexed to the bequest of income to her by an English will, by the circumstance that the law of her domicile did not allow of such a restraint on her capacity. In *Lee v. Abdy* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 309, Day and Wills, the assignment of a policy of insurance to the wife of the assignor was held void, but the assignment had been made in the domicile, and it was not made clear on which ground the law of that country was regarded as governing the wife's capacity to take the assignment. See *Duncan v. Cannan*, 18 Beav. 128, 7 D. M. G. 78, quoted below, under § 39.

§ 4. The authority of a foreign parent over his child living in England is recognized in England, to the extent to which an English parent would have similar authority.

Cottenham, in *Johnstone v. Beattie* (1843), 10 Cl. & F. 113, 114.

§ 5. When a foreign minor or lunatic is in England (even temporarily: *Re Burbidge*, [1902] 1 Ch. 426, Vaughan

Williams, Stirling and Cozens-Hardy) the English Court is undoubtedly competent to appoint a guardian of his person and estate in the case of a minor, or to issue a commission of lunacy in the case of a lunatic, notwithstanding that he has a foreign guardian, curator, or committee of his person or estate. But opinions have differed as to the cases in which this power ought to be exercised.

§ 6. With regard to the person, one view has been that a guardian or committee of the person, either appointed by foreign jurisdiction or holding the office by force of foreign law without judicial appointment, has no authority over his minor or lunatic in England; and that therefore, when the latter is in England, the English court ought, on application, to exercise the power mentioned in § 5.

Lunatics: *Re Houstoun* (1826), 1 Russ. 312, Eldon. Minors: *Beattie v. Johnstone* (1841), 1 Ph. 17, Cottenham; *Johnstone v. Beattie* (1843), 10 Cl. & F. 42, Lyndhurst, Cottenham, Langdale.

The other and better view is that guardians and committees, deriving their office from the proper personal law or jurisdiction of the minors or lunatics, have authority over such minors or lunatics in England, and that therefore the English court ought not in such cases to appoint guardians or committees of the person without special cause.

Brougham and Campbell, in *Johnstone v. Beattie*, u. s.; both expressing themselves with regard to minors, but Brougham also mentioning the case of lunatics, 10 Cl. & F. 97.

§ 7. And the English court, even in appointing a guardian or committee of the person, will support the authority of the guardian or committee existing under the personal law or jurisdiction, and not defeat it unless it should be abused.

Minors: *Nugent v. Vetzera* (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 704, Wood, where the minutes were as follows: "Declare that the order appointing guardians in this country shall be without prejudice to the order of the [Austrian] consular court appointing Signor Vetzera guardian, and that Vetzera, as such guardian, shall have the exclusive right to the custody and control of the infants. Liberty to the defendant to apply as to the removal of the children from this country or otherwise. Motion to discharge the service abroad refused. On the motion to appoint a guardian *ad litem*, the defendant Vetzera appointed guardian *ad litem*." *Di Savini v. Lousada* (1870), 18 W. R. 425, James. See *Stuart v. Bute* (1861), 9 H. L. 440, Campbell, Cranworth, Wensleydale, Chelmsford, Kingsdown. See also *Dawson v. Jay* (1854), 3 D. M. G. 764, Cranworth; Lord Campbell's comment on that case, in *Stuart v. Bute*, 3 H. L. 467; and *Re Magee's children*, 31 L. R. Ire. 513, Porter, where, the deceased father being a Roman Catholic and the

mother a Presbyterian, a Roman Catholic was appointed joint guardian with the mother.

Lunatics: *Re Sottomaior* (1874), 9 Ch. Ap. 677, Mellish, James.

§ 8. Where a minor is a British subject, though only by statute, the English court is competent to appoint him a guardian even though he is domiciled in a country politically foreign, and will do so in a proper case, notwithstanding that he is neither present within the jurisdiction nor has any property within it.

Re Willoughby (1885), 30 Ch. D. 324, Kay, affirmed by Cotton and Lindley, *Re Pavitt*, [1907] 1 I. R. 234, Meredith. In *Re Bourgoise* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 310, Cotton, Lindley and Bowen, the appointment was refused because the case was not a proper one.

A minor residing abroad being a necessary party, and she and her foreign guardian declining to appear, a guardian *ad litem* was appointed: *White v. Duvernay*, [1891] P. D. 290, Jeune.

§ 9. With regard to the estate—the guardian, curator, or committee of the estate, either appointed by the personal jurisdiction or holding the office by force of the personal law without judicial appointment, can sue and give receipts in England for the personal property of his minor or lunatic. Both as to this § and as to § 6, it will be observed that the office is often held by law without judicial appointment in the case of minors, though it can scarcely be so in that of lunatics. The doctrine of this § very much restricts the occasions for the exercise of the power mentioned in § 5, but where it is exercised the power of the English committee of the estate will be exclusive in England: *Re R. S. A.*, [1901] 2 K. B. 32, Rigby, Vaughan Williams, Stirling.

Lunatics: *Newton v. Manning* (1849), 1 M. & G. 362, Cottenham; *Re Elias* (1851), 3 M. & G. 234, Truro; *Scott v. Bentley* (1855), 1 K. & J. 281, Wood; *Hessing v. Sutherland* (1856), 25 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 687, Knight-Bruce and Turner; *Re Baker* (1871), L. R. 13 Eq. 168, Wickens, where the lunatic had been judicially found such in the colony of Victoria, and the colonial master in lunacy appeared by the colonial statute to be in the position of a committee; *Re De Linden*, [1897] 1 Ch. 453, Stirling; *Thiery v. Chalmers, Guthrie & Co.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 80, Kekewich; *Didisheim v. London and Westminster Bank*, [1900] 2 Ch. 15, Lindley, Rigby and Vaughan Williams, reversing North, where the doctrine was applied in favour of an *administrateur provisoire*, the lunacy of the person beneficially entitled not having been declared. The decision was followed in *Pélégryn v. Coutts*, [1915] 1 Ch. 696, Sargant, where it was held that English trustees showed undue caution in refusing to hand over securities deposited with them in England to an administrator appointed by a French court for a lunatic domiciled in France, the administrator having an express power to receive the securities. Where the funds and securities are in England, the court has a discretion about handing them to the foreign curator, as to the exercise of which see *Re de Larragotti*, [1907] 1 Ch. 14, Cozens-Hardy and Kennedy.

Where a woman was under restraint in New South Wales, but had not been found lunatic there nor was her estate vested in the master in lunacy there, although he had power to sue, it was held that he could not sue or give receipts for her estate in England, although a trustee would be justified in paying to him whatever he or any other proper authority in New South Wales decided that it was for her benefit to expend for her: *Re Barlow's Will* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 287, Cotton, Bowen and Fry, affirming Kay. Apparently the New South Wales master in lunacy could have sued and given receipts in England, (1) if the estate had been vested in him (Cotton), or (2) if there had been a declaration in New South Wales affecting the woman's status (Bowen and Fry). Now, however, it has been settled by *Re Brown*, [1895] 2 Ch. 666, Lindley, Lopes and Rigby, that vesting the proprietary right in the committee, &c., which is rarely done, is of no importance, his right to sue and give receipts being sufficient.

Lord Eldon seems to have questioned the power attributed in this § to a foreign committee of the estate of a lunatic: *Re Houstoun* (1826), 1 Russ. 312. But both as to this point and as to the authority over the person, with reference to which the case is quoted above, § 6, the report is so worded as to leave it possible that Lord Eldon only issued the commission because, the lunatic being in England, he thought it necessary for his protection that not merely a committee, but an English court, should have authority over him and his property.

Minors: A father claimed the enjoyment of his children's property up to the age of eighteen, under Art. 384 of the Code Napoleon, and Sir L. Shadwell appears to have rejected the claim only on the ground that the children were domiciled in this country, and not in that in which the Code Napoleon was in force. *Gambier v. Gambier* (1835), 7 Sim. 263. In *Re Hellmann*, however—(1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 363—where a legacy was bequeathed to an infant, Lord Romilly refused to direct the executors to pay it to the father, entitled by the law of the domicile to receive it as guardian. The latter case may perhaps be put on the ground of judicial discretion, as in § 10: otherwise it would not seem to be maintainable, for a distinction could hardly be drawn between recognizing the guardian of an orphan and recognizing the father as guardian during his child's life, or between recognizing a guardian by law and one judicially appointed, and the general doctrine seems to be sufficiently established as well by the cases with regard to lunatics as by that next cited. A Scotch *curator bonis* and *factor loco tutoris* is the proper person to retain the English assets of his Scotch minors. *Mackie v. Darling* (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 319, Wickens. In *Ex parte Watkins* (1752), 2 Ves. Sen. 470, it is said, but the saying appears to be only that of counsel, that the appointment in a colony of a guardian of personal estate failed as soon as the infant came to England. Lord Hardwicke appointed a guardian of the personal estate, for which there may have been some special necessity.

§ 10. But where the property is in the custody of the court, or can only be reached by an order to be made by the court under its jurisdiction as to trust property, or under the statutory jurisdiction as to property vested in lunatics, it is in the discretion of the court whether and to what extent it will hand over the property, or the income of it, to the foreign guardian, curator or committee.

Re Morgan (1849), 1 H. & T. 212, Cottenham; *Re Stark* (1850), 2 M. & G. 174, Langdale and Rolfe; *Re Sargazurieta* (1853), 20 L. T. 299, Cranworth; *Re Garnier* (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 532, Malins; *Re Knight*, [1898] 1 Ch. 257, Lindley, Rigby, Vaughan Williams; *Re Chatard's Settlement*, [1899] 1 Ch. 712, Kekewich; *New York Security and Trust Co. v. Keyser*, [1901] 1 Ch. 666, Cozens-Hardy. All these are cases with regard to lunatics.

§ 11. It is in the discretion of the court whether to treat a foreign minor as a ward of court, in a case where an English infant would be such a ward.

Brown v. Collins (1883), 25 Ch. D. 56, Kay.

§ 12. "Where any stock is standing in the name of or vested in a person residing out of the jurisdiction of the High Court, the judge in lunacy, upon proof to his satisfaction that the person has been declared lunatic and that his personal estate has been vested in a person appointed for the management thereof, according to the law of the place where he is residing, may order some fit person to make such transfer of the stock or any part thereof to or into the name of the person so appointed or otherwise, and also to receive and pay over the dividends thereof, as the judge thinks fit." Lunacy Act, 1890, st. 53 & 54 Vict. c. 5, s. 134.*

By the interpretation clause, s. 341, "stock includes any fund, annuity or security transferable in books kept by any company or society, or by instrument of transfer alone, or by instrument of transfer accompanied by other formalities, and any share or interest therein, and also shares in ships registered under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854" (now Merchant Shipping Act, 1894).

"Vested" in this enactment does not mean vested in the sense of English law, but is satisfied by a power to sue and give receipts; *Re Brown*, quoted under § 9. Security will not be required from the foreign curator if it would not be required from him in the country of his appointment. *Re Mitchell* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 515, James, Baggallay, Lush; decided on the similar enactment, st. 16 & 17 Vict. c. 70, s. 141.

§ 13. But no English legislation about lunatics or their committees can be applied to persons who have only been found lunatic in foreign proceedings, or to committees or curators appointed in foreign proceedings, without express words to that effect.

* *Sylva v. Da Costa* (1803), 8 Ves. 816, Eldon; overruling *Ex parte Otto Lewis* (1749), 1 Ves. Sen. 298, Hardwicke.

* By the Mentally Deficients Act, 1913, this part of the Lunacy Act is applied to the case of persons found mentally deficient.

§ 14. Nor can the English jurisdiction in lunacy be applied to any one unless an inquiry into the state of his mind is first made under an English commission.

Re Houstoun (1826), 1 Russ. 312, Eldon.

§ 15. The measures which in different legislations are taken to supply the defect of capacity are not confined to the case where that defect is total, but often extend to supplementing a capacity which is deemed to be only incomplete. Thus a wife may be capable of acting with her husband's concurrence, but not otherwise; a minor who has passed out of guardianship may still be capable of acting with the concurrence of a curator, but not otherwise. In such instances it would seem on principle that the modified capacity is one entire institution, and cannot be divided into an abstract capacity to be determined by the personal law, and the practical limits set to that capacity by the personal law, which are to be ignored. But a different view was taken in *Worms v. De Valdor* (1880), 49 L. J. Ch. 261, 41 L. T. 791, 28 W. R. 346, Fry. There a French plaintiff, who in France was incapable of suing without the concurrence of a *conseil judiciaire*, on the ground of his having been adjudicated a prodigal, was allowed to sue without the concurrence of his *conseil judiciaire*. It was shown that the plaintiff's condition in France was not that of total interdiction, and the learned judge said: "There being therefore no change of status, but merely a requirement of French law in particular cases, it appears to me that that does not prevent the plaintiff in this case from suing in this action." And on the same ground a Frenchman similarly circumstanced was held entitled to payment out of court of a fund, notwithstanding the opposition of his *conseil judiciaire*. *Re Selot's Trust*, [1902] 1 Ch. 488, Farwell, both as following *Worms v. De Valdor* and from his own opinion. But what is status except the sum of the particulars in which a person's condition differs from that of the normal person? If there had been no change of condition the question would not have arisen. The learned judge in the first case quoted with approval this passage from Story's *Conflict of Laws*, s. 104: "personal disqualifications not arising from the law of nature, but from the principles of the customary or positive law of a foreign country, and especially such as are of a penal nature, are not generally regarded in other countries where the like disqualifications do not exist." Probably no English judge would now

found any proposition on the law of nature, not in the sense of just and reasonable principles, but in that of an ascertainable code of rules. The true grounds for the two decisions are, therefore, first, that in the opinion of some a partial limitation of capacity ought not to be classified as a status, to which the answer is that it is capacity, and status in no other sense, on which the question turns, and secondly, that subjection to a *conseil judiciaire* is an institution foreign to English law. But so is the *curator bonis* of a person above the age of pupillarity, and yet the title of a Scotch *curator bonis* is recognized: *Mackie v. Darling*, quoted above, p. 47. If the personal law is admitted when it declares the complete incapacity of a person under a certain age, the capacity of one above that age can scarcely, with consistency, be accepted to any greater extent than that in which the personal law confers it, unless the limitation under which it lies by that law is penal, or otherwise falls under the next following §.

§ 16. An incapacity existing by a foreign law of a penal or religious nature, or so opposed to British principles as for example is slavery, will be disregarded in England. This is a more extensive doctrine than would result from the reservation in favour of any stringent domestic policy with which all rules for giving effect to foreign laws must be understood (see below, p. 51), for foreign penal laws may be thoroughly in accordance with English policy, but the doctrine seems nevertheless to have always been received in England in the whole extent here stated.

Lord Justice Fry's quotation with approval from Story in *Worms v. De Valdor*: see last §. The doctrine was held in England as to the incapacity resulting from religious profession abroad, even while that incapacity was known to English law. "If a man or woman be professed in religion in Normandy, or in any other foreign part, such a profession shall not disable them to bring any action in England, because it wanteth trial; but they must be professed in some house of religion within this realm, for that may be tried by the certificate of the ordinary, so as of foreign possessions the common law taketh no knowledge:" Co. Litt. 132 b. "Has it not always been held that profession in a foreign country did not cause civil death?" Knight-Bruce, in *Re Metcalfe* (1864), 2 D. J. S. 124.

CHAPTER IV.

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, LEGITIMACY.

Marriage.

MARRIAGE introduces us to the question of public order, to a reservation in favour of which, as it is understood in the judge's country, all rules for the application of foreign laws are subject. No attempt to define the limits of that reservation has ever succeeded, even to the extent of making its nature clearer than by saying that it exists in favour of any stringent domestic policy, and that it is for the law of each country, whether speaking by the mouth of its legislature or by that of its judges, to determine what parts of its policy are stringent enough to require its being invoked.

The Italian code has :

Notwithstanding the dispositions of the preceding articles, neither the laws acts or judgments of a foreign country, nor private dispositions or contracts, can in any case derogate from prohibitive laws of the kingdom concerning persons property or acts, or from laws which in any way whatever regard public order or good morals. Italian Code, Preliminary Article 12.

Correspondingly the Code Napoleon has :

Private contracts cannot derogate from laws which interest public order or good morals. Art. 6.

The reservation is in theory inevitable. It merely amounts to saying that, just as there are nations, like the Turks or the Chinese, whose views and ways are so different from ours that we could not establish at all between them and us a system of private international law, by which effect might as a general rule be given in Christian states to their laws and judgments, so, between Christian states, differences of views and ways may exist which may necessitate exceptions to the general rule of giving effect to their laws and judgments. Thus, even while slavery existed in certain Christian countries, the rights arising out of it

were very rarely recognized in those Christian countries where it did not exist. Now, however, the most important practical effect of the reservation is in connection with marriage and divorce.

Let us suppose that a marriage is contemplated in any country between persons who are foreigners to it by their personal law. So far as regards any objection which may be entertained to it on the ground of consanguinity, affinity, religion or morality, which are eminently questions of public order, it interests the *locus actus* or *contractus celebrati*, as being that place in which it will begin and may continue for an indefinite time to have effect, just as much as it interests the domicile in which the parties are likely to pass most of their lives, or the political state for which their union will produce new subjects. And the case is further distinguished from that of other contracts in that in most countries the tie of marriage is not created without the intervention of public authority, applied by means of some ceremonial, civil or religious, and that the introduction of any foreign or private form of contracting would offend against public order by its tendency to clandestinity. The one point on which the country in which the tie originates may well give way to the country of the personal law, as being alone seriously concerned, would seem to be the capacity of the parties as depending on age, including the consent of parents or guardians as supplying a capacity which would otherwise fail. If then the rules of private international law are to be framed on grounds of principle, and so that the validity of a given marriage may be determined alike in every country in which it shall be called in question, the form of contracting marriage ought to be referred to the *lex loci actus* or *contractus celebrati* absolutely and not merely as optional. The capacity of each party, as depending on age or the consent of third persons, ought to be referred with equal exclusiveness to his or her personal law; but respect ought to be paid to a prohibition either by the *lex loci contractus celebrati* or by the personal law of either party, on the ground of any other incapacity, relative or absolute. Marriage is a contract creating a status, and it might therefore fairly be expected that it should be subject to this combination of the law of contract and the law of status, but rules relieving it from some of the obstacles which so strict a view would raise may be introduced by international treaty, or even by independent legislation if some sacrifice be submitted to of the certainty that the validity of a given marriage will receive the same determination everywhere.

By the French and Italian codes the international aspect of the capacity for marriage is not dealt with otherwise than by the general provisions as to capacity which we have seen (above, pp. 25, 27). We have also seen (above, pp. 31, 32) how the German *einführungsgesetz* deals by Arts. 7 and 27 with general capacity, and these provisions are applied to marriage as follows:—

Art. 13, first paragraph. The entering into marriage, if either of the parties is a German, must be decided in relation to each of the parties according to the laws (*gesetze*) of the state to which he or she belongs. The same holds good for foreigners who enter into marriage in Germany. [This is one of the paragraphs to which Art. 27 applies. See above, p. 31.]

The convention of 1902 made between twelve states,* in its Art. 1 which we have seen above (p. 34), like the German Art. 13, requires the separate fulfilment by each party of the conditions of capacity to contract marriage; and this must be considered as beyond controversy. We shall see that, when the existence of the marriage tie is established, its effect on property may depend on the matrimonial domicile or the husband's nationality; but it would be illogical, while it remains to be seen whether the tie has been established, to give the determination of the woman's capacity to the personal law of the man. The convention then proceeds to the objections to particular marriages, and Art. 2 provides that the law of the place of celebration may prohibit a marriage of foreigners which would conflict with any absolute prohibition contained in it on the ground of consanguinity or affinity, of the adultery of the parties having caused the divorce of one of them, or of the parties having been convicted of conspiring against the life of the husband or wife of one of them. All these are relative incapacities, and it might be thought that the idea was to give to the place of celebration an equal authority in respect of them with that of the personal law. But this is not so, for there follows a provision that a marriage which has been celebrated in disregard of any such prohibition shall not be null, if valid according to the law indicated by Art. 1. And by a further clause of Art. 2 combined with Art. 6, a state is not bound to lend the authority of its own celebration to a marriage which would be contrary to

*It has since been denounced by both France and Belgium. On the other hand, it is notable that its provisions were adopted by the Mixed Court of Appeal in Egypt as a kind of *jus gentium*, although Egypt was not a party to the Convention. (See Clunet 1914, p. 643.)

its laws by reason of a prior marriage or of a religious obstacle, of which holy orders or vows may be taken as an example, but is bound to permit the celebration of such a marriage between two foreigners before a diplomatic or consular agent; while, if the parties succeed in getting such a marriage celebrated in the ordinary way, other countries must not give effect to the nullity arising in the place of celebration. So great indeed is the tenderness shown by the convention to parties who have gone through a form of marriage, that not only is capacity by the personal law allowed to prevail, to the extent which we have seen, over incapacity by the law of the place of celebration, but by Art. 3 the law of the place of celebration may permit the marriage of foreigners notwithstanding a prohibition by the personal law founded solely on religious motives, though other countries are to have the right not to recognize the validity of a marriage celebrated in those circumstances.

With regard to the form of marriage, the Italian code has only the general provision :

The external forms both of acts *inter vivos* and of last wills are determined by the law of the place where they are made. Nevertheless, it is optional for parties making dispositions or contracts to follow the forms of their national law, provided such law be common to all the parties. Italian Code, Preliminary Article 9.

But the German *einführungsgesetz* has both a general permission in Art. 11 and a special one in Art. 13.

Art. 11, first paragraph. The form of an act in the law (*rechtsgeschäft*) is determined by the laws (*gesetze*) governing the legal relation which is the object of the act. But it is sufficient to observe the laws (*gesetze*) of the place where the act is done.*

Art. 13, third paragraph. The form of a marriage which is celebrated in Germany is decided exclusively according to the German laws (*gesetze*).

The convention of 1902 has these provisions :

Art. 5. A marriage celebrated according to the law of the country where it takes place shall be recognized everywhere as valid so far as regards its form.

It is, nevertheless, understood that countries of which the law requires a religious celebration may refuse to recognize as valid marriages contracted by their nationals abroad without observing that requirement.

The dispositions of the national law as to the publication of banns are to be respected, but the want of such publication shall not cause the mar-

* This prevents the *renvoi* from being obligatory. If the whole law (*recht*) of the *locus actus* should refer to the form given by the internal laws of another country, it will still be sufficient to observe the form given by the internal laws of the *locus actus*.

riage to be null in any other countries than that of which the law has been violated.

An official (*authentique*) copy of the act of marriage shall be sent to the authorities of the country of each of the parties.

Art. 6. A marriage celebrated before a diplomatic or consular agent conformably to the law of his country shall be recognized everywhere as valid so far as regards its form, if neither of the parties is a subject of the state in which the marriage has been celebrated, and if that state does not object, which it cannot do if the marriage would be contrary to its laws by reason of a former marriage or a religious obstacle.

The reservation expressed by the second paragraph of Art. 5 is applicable to diplomatic and consular marriages.

Art. 7. A marriage which is null for defect of form in the country in which it has been celebrated may nevertheless be recognized as valid in other countries, if the form prescribed by the national law of each of the parties has been observed.

The anxiety to uphold what has been celebrated as a marriage, which the convention shows with relation to capacity, is here also traceable, but combined with a respect, which no doubt was necessary in order to its being concluded, for the objection felt in some countries to the absence of a religious form.

We have now to exhibit the English doctrines on the international validity of marriages.

§ 17. It is indispensable to the validity of a marriage that the *lex loci actus* be satisfied so far as regards the forms or ceremonies.

Butler v. Freeman (1756), Ambl. 303, Hardwicke; *Lacon v. Higgins* (1822), 3 Star. 171, Dow. & Ry. N. P. 38, Abbott; *Kent v. Burgess* (1840), 11 Sim. 361, Shadwell; *Re Bozzelli's Settlement*, [1902] 1 Ch., at p. 757, Swinfen Eady; *Westlake v. Westlake*, [1910] P. 167, Bagnall; *Deane v. Pepper*, [1921] L. J. Newsp., p. 413, where a marriage was held to be null which was celebrated between two English parties in Scotland by declaration at a marriage office, on the ground that the twenty-one days' residence required in Scotland before the marriage had not been completed according to the Scotch computation of the period. See also *Swift v. Kelly* (1835), 3 Knapp, 257, Brougham; where the validity of a marriage contracted at Rome depended on the sufficiency of the abjuration of protestantism by the parties, and the question whether their abjuration was sufficient was decided according to the law of the Roman Church. And see *Swift v. Att.-Gen. for Ireland*, [1912] A. C. 276, Loreburn, Halsbury, Atkinson, Haldane; an Irish statute invalidating certain marriages if performed by a Popish priest held not to apply to a marriage celebrated out of Ireland.

§ 17a. The religious or ecclesiastical law of a church will be disregarded if the requirements of the law of the state as to form have been observed.

Thus a marriage celebrated in a private house in Ireland by a Roman Catholic priest in the presence of one witness was valid though alleged to

be contrary to the rules of the Roman Church issued by the Pope in the *Ne Temere* decree of 1907. *Ussher v. Ussher*, [1912] 2 I. R. 445. Kenny, J., affirmed by O'Brien, C.J., Palles, C.B., Gibson, J., [1912] 2 I. R. 445. The old common law still applied in Ireland and under it the presence of witnesses at a marriage celebrated by a clergyman was not necessary. The same principle was upheld in *Despatie v. Tremblay*, P. C. [1921] A. C. 102, judgment of Moulton, when it was held that a civil marriage in Canada was valid, though in a prohibited degree according to the law of the Roman Church to which the parties belonged.

On the other hand, if the law of the state requires the observance of the rules of the religious community of the spouses, the marriage will be void if those rules are not followed. See *Re Alison's Trusts* (1874), 31 L. T. R. 638, where a marriage celebrated in Persia between an English protestant man and an Armenian protestant woman was held void because the rules of the religious community were not followed, as the law of Persia required.

A Chinese marriage has been recognized for Chinese subjects in Penang though no ceremony took place because the *lex loci actus* required no forms. *Cheang Thye Phin v. Tan at Loy*, [1920] A. C. 369.

§ 18. It is also indispensable to the validity of a marriage that the *lex loci actus* be satisfied so far as regards the consent of parents or guardians.

Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (1752), 2 Hagg. Cons. 395, Simpson; *Middleton v. Janverin* (1802), 2 Hagg. Cons. 437, Wynne. In both these cases there was also a defect of form according to the *lex loci actus*, and in the second, where the marriage was solemnized by the chaplain of the Dutch garrison at Furnes in Austrian Flanders, it does not appear that by the law of Austrian Flanders the want of consent would have been fatal to the marriage, although by Dutch law it was so. But in each case the court went on the broad ground that a marriage void for any reason by the *lex loci actus* cannot be set up by the *lex domicilii*.

In *Harford v. Morris*—(1776), 2 Hagg. Cons. 423, Hay, and (1781) and (1784), 2 Hagg. Cons. 436, Court of Delegates—the marriage, which was solemnized abroad, was invalid according to the *lex loci actus* for want both of form and of the necessary consent, and it was further alleged that it had been procured by force. Also, since Lord Hardwicke's marriage act had been passed in the interval between the marriages in *Scrimshire v. Scrimshire* on the one hand and those in *Harford v. Morris* and *Middleton v. Janverin* on the other, the want of consent, which at the earlier date would have rendered the marriage only irregular if celebrated in England without banns, would have been fatal to it at either of the two later dates. Hence the validity of the marriage in the two later cases could only be maintained on the ground that there existed a *jus gentium* on the subject of marriage, adopted by the old law of England, and which therefore, through the saving in Lord Hardwicke's Act of Scotland and of marriages solemnized beyond sea, continued in force as an English law of marriage for English persons married abroad, notwithstanding that the *lex loci actus* might be quite different. This doctrine must not be confounded with that in *Lautour v. Teesdale*; see below, §§ 26, 28. To the latter no objection can be made, because the maxims of private international law do not apply with reference to the native laws in India, between which and Christian legal systems there is no jural intercommunion. Stated as in *Harford v. Morris*, with reference to a marriage in Christian Europe, the doctrine went far towards the denial of all private international law.

§ 19. It is equally indispensable to the validity of a marriage that the *lex loci actus* be satisfied so far as regards the capacity of the parties to contract it, whether in respect of the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity, or in respect of any other cause of incapacity, absolute or relative.

This proposition does not appear to have been questioned in any English case, and it is covered by the broad view above referred to as having been taken in *Scrimshire v. Scrimshire* and *Middleton v. Janverin*, that a marriage void for any reason by the *lex loci actus* cannot be set up by the *lex domicilii*. A still broader doctrine would seem to have been propounded in *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple* (1811), 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, Scott, which was the case of a marriage in Scotland between a Scotch lady and a gentleman who is treated in the judgment as domiciled in England (see pp. 54, 60, 61). The discussion in the judgment turns entirely on the sufficiency of the compliance with the forms necessary in Scotland, and the want of the consent of Mr. Dalrymple's father is not alluded to. On the contrary, Sir William Scott says: "The only principle applicable to such a case by the law of England is that the validity of Miss Gordon's marriage rights must be tried by reference to the law of the country where, if they exist at all, they had their origin" (p. 59). The propositions contained in this and the two preceding §§ amount to the statement that no marriage rights can be valid unless they are valid by the law of the country where, if they exist at all, they had their origin; but § 21 will show that marriage rights which are countenanced by the law of the country where, if they exist at all, they had their origin, are not always deemed valid in England.

§ 20. A marriage in which the forms required by the *lex loci actus* have been satisfied is valid in England, in point of form.

Herbert v. Herbert (1819), 3 Phil. Eccl. 58, 2 Hagg. Cons. 263, Scott; *Smith v. Maxwell* (1824), Ry. & Mo. 80, Best; *Re Bozzelli's Settlement*, [1902] 2 Ch., at p. 757, Swinfen Eady.

§ 21. It is indispensable to the validity of a marriage that the personal law of each party be satisfied so far as regards his capacity to contract it, whether absolute, in respect of age, or relative in respect of the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity.*

Brook v. Brook (1857) and (1858), 3 Sm. & G. 481, Cresswell and Stuart; (1861), 9 H. L. 193, Campbell, Cranworth, St. Leonards, Wensleydale. In *Mette v. Mette* (1859), 1 S. & T. 416, Cresswell, the incapacity existed by the law of the man's domicile, but not by that of the woman's; and the marriage was held invalid expressly on the ground that the capacity of each party by his own law was necessary, and without reference to any superior claims of the law of the husband's domicile, as being that of the matrimonial domicile if the marriage be supposed to be valid. In *Sottomayor v. De Barros* (1877), 3 P. D. 1, Cotton, James, Baggallay; reversing S. C., (1877), 2 P. D. 81, Phillimore; the case of a marriage solemnized in England

* See note below at end of this section.

between parties domiciled one in England and the other in Portugal, but at this stage of the case treated as both domiciled in Portugal, and related to each other within degrees prohibited in Portugal but not in England; the circumstance that a marriage within the degrees in question would have been valid according to the *lex domicilii*, if a papal dispensation had been obtained, was adverted to but disregarded; and the Court of Appeal, in decreeing nullity, said that their opinion was "confined to the case where both the contracting parties are at the time of their marriage domiciled in a country the laws of which prohibit their marriage." In the same case, (1879), 5 P. D. 94, it being considered that one of the parties was domiciled in England, Hannen held the marriage good; but this authority is weakened, (1) by the learned judge's pronouncement in favour of the *lex loci contractus* as governing competency, cited above, p. 41; (2) by his taking Cresswell's opinion in favour of the *lex loci contractus* from *Simonin v. Mallac*, without reference to that learned judge's saying in *Mette v. Mette* "there could be no valid contract unless each was competent to contract with the other," 1 S. & T. 423; (3) by his reference to the statutes on the marriage of first cousins, which seems to imply that the rules of private international law are less applicable where the English law is contained in statutes than where it is the common law. In *Re De Wilton, De Wilton v. Montefiore*, [1900] 2 Ch. 481, Stirling, the dependence of capacity for marriage on domicile was held not to be subject to an exception for the marriages of Jews. Where, therefore, the parties were domiciled in England, a marriage between uncle and niece, celebrated at Wiesbaden according to Jewish law, was held to be null. The recognition of Jewish law extends only to the forms of marriage and not to questions of capacity.

And conversely a marriage in which the personal law of each party as regards his capacity is satisfied is valid in England so far as regards such capacity, notwithstanding that by English law it would be incestuous: *Re Bozzelli's Settlement*, [1902] 1 Ch. 751, Swinfen Eady, and the judgments of Lords Campbell and Cranworth in *Brook v. Brook* there quoted. There is no necessity to make an exception, as is sometimes done, for marriages regarded as incestuous by the general consent of Christendom, because no country with which the communion of private international law exists has such marriages.

It must be observed that § 21, and, substantially, the above note on it, are left as they stood in the preceding edition of this work. Doubt, however, has been thrown on the principle of this § by the decisions in *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P 46, and *Chetti v. Chetti*, [1909] P. 67, the discussion of which is placed after § 25.

§ 22. That an incapacity to marry of a penal nature, or resulting from religious vows or orders, will not be admitted in England on the ground of the personal law, is a consequence of the doctrine stated in § 16. With regard indeed to religious vows or orders, no principle of British policy can be deemed to be more stringent than that which would refuse to exclude a whole class of the population from the possibility of marriage. But where the penal or religious incapacity for marriage exists by

the *lex loci actus*, its direct effect is to prevent the marriage from ever having an inception, and its indirect effect must therefore be to prevent the ceremony or the consent from being regarded in England as having constituted a marriage.

It seems that, by the law of England, an attainted person is not incapacitated from contracting marriage; but the incapacity, if any, will not prevent the English court from recognizing a marriage contracted abroad by an Englishman attainted at home, supposing him to be capable—"in the land in which he is living,"—by the *lex loci contractus*, Erle, Willes. Keating and Montague Smith concurred. *Kynnaid v. Leslie* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 389.

§ 23. When by his personal law a party may in some form or other marry without the consent of parents or guardians, the want of such consent will not invalidate a marriage by him which satisfies the *lex loci actus*, although the form observed was not that which by his personal law would have rendered the consent unnecessary. In other words, a consent which is not essential in the domicile ranks, for the purposes of private international law, among the forms of marriage, and not among the conditions of capacity.

This is the case of what were called Gretna Green marriages, the validity of which appears to have first come up for formal decision in *Compton v. Bearcroft* (1767), Hay, and (1769), Court of Delegates, 2 Hagg. Cons. 430, 443, 444. The marriage in this case, in which Dumfries took the place of Gretna Green, was upheld by Sir George Hay on the same ground which he took in *Harford v. Morris*; but his sentence was affirmed by the Delegates on the ground of the *lex loci*. The same class of marriages was again upheld, and on the ground of the *lex loci*, in *Grierson v. Grierson* (1781), 2 Hagg. Cons. 86, 98, 99; and a similar decision was given as to the marriage of French persons in England, in *Simonin v. Mallac* (1860), 2 S. & T. 67, Cresswell.

§ 24. And a marriage celebrated in England is held valid under the doctrine of § 23, notwithstanding that it has been declared invalid in the country of the domicile on the ground of the purpose of the parties to evade the law of that country.

Simonin v. Mallac (1860), 2 S. & T. 67, Cresswell.

§ 25. When by his personal law a party cannot marry in any form without a certain consent, the want of such consent will invalidate a marriage by him notwithstanding that it satisfies the *lex loci actus*, unless, apparently, one of the parties is domiciled in England, and the marriage is celebrated in England according to the English form.

Sussex Peerage Case (1844), 11 Cl. & F. 85, Tindal, delivering the opinion of the judges; Lyndhurst, Brougham, Cottenham, Denman, Campbell. In this case the marriage required either the express consent of the King in Council, under the first section of the Royal Marriage Act, or the tacit consent of Parliament under the second section. See also *Sottomayor v. De Barros*, above, § 21.

There is an Irish decision contrary to the doctrine asserted in this §, *Steele v. Braddell* (1838), Milw. 1, Radcliff; and it seems to be approved by Lord Campbell, in *Brook v. Brook* (1861), 9 H. L. 216. If this be followed, the necessary consents must be placed altogether among the forms of marriage, and not among the conditions of capacity; and then the *Sussex Peerage Case* must be justified by ascribing to the Royal Marriage Act an intention to create a peculiarly stringent incapacity by British law, overriding the usual maxims of private international law. It need not be denied that such an intention would be within the competence of a statute of the domicile, although in *Simonin v. Mallac* (see § 24), the court gave no effect to the express claim of the French code to regulate the *état civil* of Frenchmen abroad, or that such an intention might very reasonably be ascribed to the Royal Marriage Act. But since any statute, which enacts that a marriage celebrated in any form without a certain consent shall be null and void, does certainly create an incapacity for marriage without that consent, it appears to me hazardous to draw distinctions on presumed intention only, as to the degree of stringency which that incapacity was meant to have; and I prefer to dissent from *Steele v. Braddell*, and to justify *Compton v. Bearcroft* and *Simonin v. Mallac* by the fact that in those cases the marriages were possible in the domicile if the proper forms had been there observed, as I understand Lord Campbell himself to do in *Brook v. Brook* (1861), 9 H. L. 215, 218.

The exception is thus stated because of the judgment in *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 46, Gorell Barnes, Cozens-Hardy, M.R., and Kennedy, L.J., reversing Bargrave Deane, J. The result was to pronounce the validity of a marriage which had been celebrated in England between a woman of British nationality domiciled in England and a man of French nationality domiciled in France, who fell under Art. 148 of the French code by which, being under 25, he "could not contract marriage" without a consent which he had not obtained, and Arts. 183 and 185, which limit the period for the nullity of his attempted marriage being declared. The case therefore goes beyond *Simonin v. Mallac*, where in consequence of the age of the parties the French consent which was missing would by Art. 152 as it then stood have become unnecessary after it had been three times refused in as many months, and might therefore be well treated as a form. In the case presented by *Ogden v. Ogden* the necessity of the consent could not be eluded before proceeding to the marriage ceremony, and it was therefore a condition of capacity. The court of appeal, however, treated the question before it as one relating to forms, saying (p. 82) "the observations made in this

judgment are directed to questions arising in connection with the formalities required on entering into a marriage, and are not to be understood as necessarily advocating an interference with any views which may be held in any country as to marriages which are absolutely prohibited by the law of that country." As an authority, therefore, *Ogden v. Ogden* seems to amount to the proposition that the incapacity of a party, as distinct from the unlawfulness of a marriage altogether, is a question of form, and, at least if it is that of one party only, will be disregarded in England when it arises from a foreign law. But in its long judgment the court of appeal manifested a great reluctance to admit any foreign determination of the capacity of a party, going so far as to say that "it may be doubted whether there is much substantial difference of opinion between foreign and English jurists as to the general rule that between persons *sui juris* the validity of the marriage is to be decided by the law of the place where it is celebrated," p. 58. Did the court consider that a person who in his own country cannot marry without a certain consent is *sui juris* as to marriage? Probably by a person *sui juris* is meant one to whose capacity for the marriage no objection exists by the law of the place of celebration.

Twenty days after the judgment in *Ogden v. Ogden* was pronounced, Sir Gorell Barnes decided the case of *Chetti v. Chetti*, [1909] P. 67. A Hindu, on the ground of an alleged personal incapacity by his religion, disputed the validity of a marriage which, being domiciled in India, he had contracted at a registrar's office in England with a woman domiciled in England. A simple answer would have sufficed, for notwithstanding the popular use of the term "laws" for the rules of the Hindu religion, and whatever binding force those rules might have been allowed if India had been under Hindu Government, it was clear that, in the sense in which "laws" are cognizable by a court of justice, Chetti was not even in India under any legal incapacity to contract a monogamous marriage with a Christian, only by doing so he would have lost caste among his co-religionists, and in order to do so he might perhaps have had to renounce his religion. It scarcely needs to be pointed out that an obstacle to the performance of any act which the agent is free to get rid of is no personal incapacity. If the performance of the act is not in itself a sufficient renunciation to remove the obstacle, the obstacle, so far as it remains, can only be a matter of form, like the consent in *Simonin v. Mallac*, the necessity of which would

have been made to vanish by a little delay. But the learned judge discussed the effect of personal incapacity as an obstacle to marriage, and arrived at a conclusion foreshadowed in *Sottomayor v. De Barros* and *Ogden v. Ogden*, and for which, being treated in *Chetti v. Chetti* as an element of decision, the latter case must be regarded as an authority. It is that personal incapacity is not an obstacle to marriage unless it exists by the law of the place of celebration, or by the laws of the countries in which at the time of the marriage both parties are domiciled. The future must show whether this doctrine or that of *Mette v. Mette* will prevail. In the meantime it is certain that it is not a juridical doctrine, that is, not one which can be reasoned out from legal principles. When a foreigner who by the law of his domicile has not a full capacity for marriage celebrates a marriage in England, an English court must, juridically, accept or reject the want of capacity as it is presented to it. Being a foreign one, the English court cannot modify it. If it accepts the incapacity as presented, it will never find that it contains an exception for the case of the person subject to it marrying abroad a party not subject to incapacity. If in spite of this the court rejects the incapacity presented when the other party to the marriage is capable, it leaves itself no ground for accepting it when the other party also is incapable. The legislature might draw the distinction, but it involves the tenet that foreign laws and the rights under them are not recognized *ex debito justitiæ* but by virtue of a comity extended to them when thought expedient. That may be a legislative motive, but as one for courts of law it was expressly condemned by Lord Brougham in the often cited case of *Warrender v. Warrender*, 21 Cl. & F. 530.*

Another noticeable point in the judgment in *Chetti v. Chetti* is that, as foreshadowed in *Ogden v. Ogden*, it denies the existence of any solid distinction between form and substance, at least in the conflict of laws on marriage. Where, it says, the English judgments cited "speak of essentials and forms, those who decided these cases were looking at them from an English standpoint; but it may be observed that what may be regarded as form in this country might in a foreign country be regarded as an

*In the question of legislation about marriages in Canada which was referred to the Judicial Committee in 1912, Haldane advised that a provincial legislature may make rules as to solemnization of marriage which may affect the validity of the contract. 1912, A. C. 886.

essential" (p. 82). Again, "if in a foreign country a marriage is declared void for want of consent, which we hold a matter of form only, what difference is there in substance between the position in such a case and the case where the consent is more than form?" (p. 84). On such a footing all discussion of the scope of the *lex loci actus* in private international law must be idle. Mistakes may have been committed, but I am unaware of any established difference between England and the continent on the limits of form and substance.

§ 26. Where a marriage valid according to the *lex loci actus* is impossible, from the want of any such law applicable to the case, parties may marry with the forms, so far as it is possible to observe them, and with the consents, respectively required by their own law.

Anonymous case in *Cruise on Dignities*, 276, Eldon; where it was supposed that there was no *lex loci* applicable to the marriage of Protestants at Rome, though it appears from the *Sussex Peerage Case*, 11 Cl. & F. 152, that the marriage in Protestant form might have been sustained as permitted by the *lex loci*. *Lautour v. Teesdale* (1816), 8 Taun. 830, Gibbs; where the impossibility arose from there being no *lex loci* applicable to the marriage of Europeans at Madras. and these, if British subjects, were therefore held entitled to marry there in accordance with English law as it stood before Lord Hardwicke's Act. *Ruding v. Smith* (1821), 2 Hagg. 371, Stowell; where the impossibility arose from the Dutch law at the Cape of Good Hope not applying to British persons passing through the place so soon after the conquest that its future legal system was not settled. And see the cases quoted under § 28.

§ 27. Marriages in embassies and consulates are subject to certain special rules which probably drew their origin from the exaggerated extritoriality formerly attributed to embassies, but are now maintained on the continent on the ground that the forms of the *lex loci actus* are not imperative but optional, and that the parties may adopt instead the forms which the legislation of their country provides for them in its foreign establishments. This ground will not extend beyond the case in which both the contracting parties are nationals of the state to which the embassy or consulate belongs. If only one of them is such a national, no principle operates to give the other the benefit of the privileged form, and it is generally held that the international validity of their marriage in point of ceremonial must fall under the *lex loci actus*. But any legislation, while providing for a couple of its nationals an internationally valid form of marriage in its embassies and consulates; may allow that form to carry a special validity in its own dominions for marriages

one only of the parties to which is its national; and this, as we shall see, is what the British law does. In that law, of which the general rule treats the form of the *lex loci actus* as imperative, at least for marriage, convenience rather than the continental ground referred to must be the support of the special rule, even where both parties are British. As to capacity an ambassadorial or consular marriage confers no privilege. Where both parties are nationals, general principles will be sufficient to refer their capacity to the law of their country, or to that of their domicile within it when it includes more than one system of private law. Where only one is a national the capacity of each must be decided by the law proper to it, and even the special validity which the legislation providing the form gives in its own dominions to the marriage of its own national will be subject to the fulfilment by the other party of the condition so arising.

§ 28. The British law now in force for the purpose thus explained is the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, s. 1 of which enacts that "all marriages between parties of whom one at least is a British subject, solemnized in the manner in this act provided in any foreign country or place by or before a marriage officer within the meaning of this act, shall be as valid in law as if the same had been solemnized in the United Kingdom with a due observance of all forms required by law." The special validity thus given for the British dominions is illustrated by *Hay v. Northcote*, [1900] 2 Ch. 262, Farwell, in which a marriage solemnized under the act before a British consul in France was held good, notwithstanding that it had been declared void in France for non-observance of the French form. The act further contains, in s. 4 (1), a provision that "the like consent shall be required to a marriage under this act as is required by law to marriages solemnized in England." Here the contrast of "England" with "the United Kingdom" mentioned in s. 1 must be noticed: it brings in the law of England as a prerogative British law for the purposes of the act. Of course, the act might have left the question of capacity to the British domicile of the parties, in which case an Australian and his deceased wife's sister, capable of intermarrying by the law of their colony or so-called state, might have intermarried effectually in a British embassy or consulate before such a marriage was made lawful in England. But the intention seems to have been that no marriage should be celebrated under the act which could not have been effectually celebrated in England, and therefore that English prohibitions on

the ground of consanguinity or affinity must be respected. It remains to mention that by Arts. 1 and 2 of the the Foreign Marriages Order in Council, 1913, made under the Act now being considered :—*

1.—(1) Where a marriage according to the local law of a foreign country is valid by English law, then before the marriage is solemnized in that country under the Foreign Marriage Act, the marriage officer must be satisfied either—

(a) That both of the parties are British subjects; or

(b) If only one of the parties is a British subject, that the other is not a subject or citizen of the country; or

(c) If one of the parties is a British subject and the other a subject or citizen of the country, that sufficient facilities do not exist for the solemnization of the marriage in the foreign country in accordance with the law of that country; or

(d) If the man about to be married is a British subject and the woman a subject or citizen of the country, that no objection will be taken by the authorities of the country to the solemnization of the marriage under the Foreign Marriage Act.

(2) [A right of appeal from the marriage officer to the Secretary of State, as to matters in this article.]

2. In the case of any marriage under the Foreign Marriage Act, if it appears to the marriage officer that the woman about to be married is a British subject and that the man is an alien, he must be satisfied—

(a) That the marriage will be recognized by the law of the foreign country to which the foreigner belongs; or

(b) That some other marriage ceremony, in addition to that under the Foreign Marriage Act, has taken place, or is about to take place, between the parties, and that such other ceremony is recognized by the law of the country to which the foreigner belongs;† or

(c) That the leave of the Secretary of State has been obtained.

Art. 2. Paragraphs (b) and (c) have been added to the former Order in Council issued in 1892 together with the Act. The new provisions are compatible with the object of the original restriction, namely, to protect female British subjects from the danger of being disowned by their foreign husbands in the country of the latter. With regard to (b) no objection has been found to permitting a British consular officer to perform a ceremony of marriage between a foreigner and a woman who was a British subject, but who has acquired the nationality of the foreigner by an immediately preceding marriage with him in some other form, and has thus technically lost her right to the benefit of the Foreign Marriage Act.

§ 29. The previous history of the English law as to marriages in embassies had been this. Sir W. Scott, in *Pertreys v. Tondear* (1790), 1 Hagg. Cons. 136, a case on the validity of a marriage celebrated in England in the chapel of the Bavarian ambassador, appears to have considered the matter only from the

* This Order in Council repeals an earlier Order of 1892.

† By the Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 46), a British subject proposing to marry a foreigner can ascertain through the Registrar of Marriages in his district, whether this marriage will be valid according to the foreign law.

point of view of extritoriality. From that point of view he doubted whether a privilege could exist where neither party was of the country of the ambassador, and where the woman on whose account it was claimed had not during her residence in England "been living in a house entitled to privilege," or, as he also expressed it, was not "domiciled in the family of the ambassador." Then came the st. 4 Geo. 4, c. 91 (1823), since repealed by the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, which enacted that all "marriages solemnized by a minister of the Church of England, in the chapel or house of any British ambassador or minister residing within the country to the court of which he is accredited, or in the chapel belonging to any British factory abroad, or in the house of any British subject residing at such factory, [should be] as valid in law as if the same had been solemnized within her majesty's dominions with a due observance of all forms required by law." This got rid of the notion that membership of the ambassador's household or retinue was necessary to the enjoyment of the privilege, and was so carried out in *Lloyd v. Petitjean* (1839), 2 Cur. 251, Lushington, and *Este v. Smyth* (1854), 18 Beav. 112, Romilly; in the latter of which cases a difference of opinion between French advocates as to whether the marriage, celebrated in the British ambassador's chapel at Paris, was valid in France did not prevent its being held valid in England. In the former case only one party was British and the other belonged to the country of the celebration. The factories mentioned in the st. 4 Geo. 4, c. 91, belonged to a system now obsolete.

§ 30. The Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, applies not only to British embassies and consulates in foreign states, for which the diplomatic representative, consul, or some other proper person will be appointed as marriage officer by the secretary of state, but also to colonial protectorates and other places in which British authority exists without complete British institutions. "A governor, high commissioner, resident, consular or other officer" may be appointed a marriage officer, and "such application [of the act] shall not be limited to places outside her majesty's dominions": s. 11 (c). The act further brings under its system marriages "solemnized on board one of her majesty's ships on a foreign station," the commanding officer being the marriage officer either under a secretary of state's warrant or under admiralty instructions: s. 12, and Art. 10 of the Order in council. And by s. 22 "it is declared that all marriages

solemnized within the British lines by any chaplain, or officer or other person officiating under the orders of the commanding officer, of a British army serving abroad, shall be as valid in law as if the same had been solemnized within the United Kingdom with a due observance of all forms required by law." The doctrine laid down by this declaration may be regarded as not being an exception to the general rule of the form of the *lex loci actus* for marriage, but rather as flowing from the principle that within the lines of an army, whether in hostile occupation of a place or admitted to it by a friendly government, its national law becomes the local law so far as concerns the institutions of personal status necessary for the troops and those who are attached to them. It is in accordance with this view that the chaplain or other person officiating is not made by s. 22 a marriage officer under the act, nor is he tied to the use of the forms given in the act, but it must be considered that a simple Scotch marriage would be sufficient for Scotch parties.

§ 31. Within the lines of a British army serving abroad, the soldiers and British subjects accompanying the army are not subject to the foreign law, even as a *lex actus*, and therefore may marry with the forms of their British law so far as it is possible to observe them.

King v. Brampton (1808), 10 East, 282, Ellenborough and Grose. In this case the marriage was not solemnized by any one officiating under the orders of the British commander. The King's troops were said by Lord Ellenborough to carry English law with them, for themselves "and other subjects who accompanied them, in the absence of proof that any other law was in force"; and the form of celebration was held to be such as would have been good in England before Lord Hardwicke's Act, so that it must have been intended to refer to the saving in that Act of marriages solemnized beyond sea. This corresponds with the view taken in *Lautour v. Teesdale*, as distinct from that of Sir George Hay in *Harford v. Morris*; see § 26. It is much easier to suppose that Parliament intended to reserve an English form of contracting marriages abroad for English persons not subject to any other *lex actus*, than to suppose that a similar reservation was intended to operate in cases where an applicable *lex actus* exists.

In *Burn v. Farrar* (1819), 2 Hagg. Cons. 369, Scott, the husband was an officer in the British army of occupation in France, and the eminent judge "doubted whether he was at all subject to the French law, as pleaded in the libel." Had the case gone on, the doubt would probably have been confirmed. It will be observed that the same judge decided the case of *Ruding v. Smith*, which presents much analogy: see above, § 26.

The authority of the commanding officer for the celebration of the marriage is not necessary, it is sufficient that the person officiating should be under his orders: *Waldegrave Peerage* (1837), 4 C. & F. 649, Cottenham and Brougham; a case depending on an enactment in st. 4, Geo. 4, c. 91, similar to that in the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, s. 22.

§ 32. Marriages celebrated on board public ships may well come within the principle of the preceding §, and the Confirmation of Marriages on Her Majesty's Ships Act, 1879, st. 42 & 43 Vict. c. 29, provided that all marriages between British subjects which had been "solemnized on board one of her majesty's vessels on a foreign station, in the presence of the officer commanding such vessel, whether solemnized according to any religious rite or ceremony or contracted *per verba de præsenti*, shall be valid in like manner as if the same had been solemnized within her majesty's dominions with the due observance of all forms required by law." And in the case of a marriage between British subjects, performed by the ship's chaplain in the presence of the captain, on board a ship of her majesty at Limasol, it was held that banns or licence were unnecessary, although the act just cited was not referred to in the judgment: *Culling v. Culling*, [1896] P. 116, Jeune. But the more limited space of shipboard as compared with the lines of an army, while it explains the reference in these authorities to the presence of the commanding officer, justifies the Foreign Marriage Act, 1892, in treating the two cases differently.

§ 32*a*. The Naval Marriage Act, 1915 (5 Geo. 5, c. 35) provides that where during the continuance of the war one of the parties to an intended marriage was a naval officer or seaman, and the parties had duly fulfilled all the conditions required by law to enable them to be married in a particular place of worship or in any parish, the marriage might be solemnized by the commanding officer of the ship or be lawfully solemnized in any other building.

§ 33. The validity of a marriage being established, the conjugal rights which flow from it must be decided according to the *lex fori*. This is a question of public order, or stringent domestic policy.

Herbert v. Herbert (1819), 3 Phil. Eccl. 58, 2 Hagg. Cons. 263, Scott; in which case it was in vain argued that a sentence for restitution of conjugal rights should only run from the expiration of a term during which, by the *lex loci contractus*, the husband was liable to imprisonment in a fortress, and the wife in a convent, as a punishment for the clandestinity of the marriage.

§ 34. Where the *lex loci contractus* allows polygamy, marriage under it, even in the case of a first wife, is a different thing from monogamous marriage, and will not be regarded in England as a marriage, nor will the matrimonial duties arising under it be

enforced, or any divorce or other relief granted for a breach of them.

Hyde v. Hyde (1886), L. R. 1 P. & D. 130, Penzance; following what was intimated by Lord Brougham in *Warrender v. Warrender* (1835), 2 Cl. & F. 531; 9 Bl. N. R. 112. *Re Bethell* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 220, Stirling. But a monogamous marriage contracted with a non-Christian under the law of a non-Christian but monogamous country by a Christian domiciled in this country will be recognized: *Brinkley v. Att.-Gen.* (1890), 15 P. D. 76, Hannen. And in *Harvey v. Farnie* (1880), 6 P. D. 47 (see p. 53), it was said *obiter*, per Lush, L.J.: "If one of the numerous wives of a Mohammedan was to come to this country and marry in this country she could not be indicted for bigamy, because our laws do not recognise a marriage solemnized in that country . . . as a marriage in our Christian country."

§ 34a. A marriage celebrated before an English public officer (clergyman, registrar, marriage officer under the Foreign Marriage Act, &c.), must always be understood to be a monogamous one, even though a party to it may be a Hindoo or other person who in his own country could have contracted a polygamous marriage; and a divorce from such a marriage can only be obtained, if at all, on the principles applied to Christian marriages. Cf. *Re Mir Anwareddin*, [1917] 1 K. B. 364, and see below p. 87. And a person may be guilty of bigamy if, having contracted such a marriage here, he afterwards marries a second wife in the lifetime of the first, though his own personal law permits polygamy.

R. v. Naguib, [1916] 116 L. T. R. 640, Reading, L.C.J., Bray and Atkin, affirming Avory, J. In that case an Egyptian married in Egypt according to Moslem law. Subsequently, when in England, he went through a form of marriage with an Englishwoman, and then, without having divorced this wife, went through a form of marriage with another Englishwoman. He was convicted of bigamy, the court holding that no regard should be paid to the polygamous marriage in Egypt, which, it was argued, rendered the first marriage in England null.

But there is *semble* no reason why persons to whom their personal law allows polygamy should not contract a polygamous marriage in England by such methods, not involving participation by any English public officer, as they may find available. See *Re Ullee*, below p. 103, where a marriage had taken place in England according to Moslem ritual.

Effect of Marriage on Property.

The doctrine which descended from the mediæval post-glossators was that the effect of marriage on immovables was governed by the *lex situs*, and that on movables by the *lex*

domicilii, so much freedom of contract, to be expressly exercised, being allowed to the parties as the respective law gave them. That was the delimitation arrived at between the real and personal statutes: in the absence of an express contract those statutes would respectively take effect as law, and this for movables as well as for immovables, the former being subjected to the personal statute of their owner by the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*. And the domicile meant was that of the husband at the time of the marriage, which by the marriage would become that of the wife also, if it was not hers before.

We have seen (above, p. 17) that a revolt against this doctrine was led by Dumoulin, in whose opinion marriage without express contract tacitly applied the custom of the domicile concerning immovables to the immovables situate in the area of another custom. Evidently the principle of that revolt was a reference of the matrimonial system to the will of the parties rather than to the operation of statutes as law, but Dumoulin did not carry that reference far, for the custom under which the parties married was the only index of their will on which he relied, so that for their immovables, wherever situate, he imposed on them in the absence of express contract the dispositions of the *lex domicilii* as rigidly as the older view imposed on them those of the *lex situs*. Savigny practically agreed with Dumoulin, though with great dialectical refinement he declined to assert implied or tacit contract in the matter, and described the extension of the *lex domicilii* as produced by voluntary submission to it, coupled with the improbability that the parties intended to make the arrangement of their property depend on the situation of the several parts composing it.* For those who adopted this modification of the older doctrine without carrying it further, the unity of the matrimonial system for movables and immovables came to be a principle, but it was a unity still on the whole depending in their view on law rather than on will, so that, when and where they adopted nationality as the criterion of the personal statute, the base of the matrimonial system of property was changed with it. It is thus that we have seen (above, p. 27) the Italian code placing family relations along with status and capacity under the law of the nationality, and that Art. 15 of the law introducing the German civil code determines the matrimonial system of property by the national law of the husband.

* Syst. § 379. Guthrie 293.

But other jurists, especially in France, have carried further the principle of respect for the will of the parties which lay at the bottom of Dumoulin's innovation. They are prepared to accept and give effect to any indicia of the will which they seek to ascertain, and this for immovables and movables alike. In the same spirit they interpret the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*, not as subjecting movables to the personal statute taking effect as law, but as grouping at the owner's domicile goods which equally with immovables have a local situation, but of which the real local situation is too uncertain and liable to vary to be taken into account. From this point of view the adoption of nationality instead of domicile as a basis of status and capacity does not lead to a similar transfer of the matrimonial system of property, but the law of the domicile remains the law of that system when no indication can be found that the will of the parties pointed in a different direction. Thus the Institute of International Law adopted at Lausanne in 1888 the resolution that *à défaut d'un contrat de mariage, la loi du domicile matrimonial—c'est-à-dire du premier établissement des époux—régit les droits patrimoniaux des époux, s'il n'appert par des circonstances ou des faits l'intention contraire des parties*.^{*} To judge this properly it must be noticed that the Institute had already, at Oxford in 1880, voted that *l'état et la capacité d'une personne sont régis par les lois de l'état auquel elle appartient par sa nationalité*.[†] And thus Surville and Arthuys, after laying down that the system of law under which husband and wife live who have not drawn up a marriage contract is not a statute in the sense of the theory of statutes, and that there is no room for seeking a criterion where everything turns on facts and their appreciation, sum up as follows the practice of the French Courts: *Telle est la seule vraie doctrine. Elle est suivie très généralement par notre jurisprudence française qui applique, suivant les circonstances, tantôt la loi nationale des époux, tantôt celle du domicile matrimonial, voire même d'autres lois. Ses arrêts, qui au premier abord paraissent inconciliables, sont au contraire des plus concordants si l'on admet la doctrine de la convention tacite dans toute son ampleur*. And they answer the objection, founded on the marriage of minors, to the notion of a free convention of the

^{*}10 Annuaire 78, Tableau Général 43.

[†]5 Annuaire 57, Tableau Général 34.

parties by citing the maxim: *Habilis ad nuptias, habilis ad pacta nuptialia*.*

§ 35. The law of the matrimonial domicile regulates the rights of the husband and wife to immovable property, whether in England or abroad, belonging to either of them, at least where that law by its rules of private international law holds the matrimonial system of property to be indivisible.

This statement is substituted for that in the last edition in view of the decision of *De Nicols v. Curlier* (below, p. 74), which has not been doubted for over 20 years.

§ 36. In the absence of express contract, the law of the matrimonial domicile regulates the rights of the husband and wife in the movable property belonging to either of them at the time of the marriage, or acquired by either of them during the marriage. By the matrimonial domicile is to be understood that of the husband at the date of the marriage, with a possible exception in favour of any other which may have been acquired immediately after the marriage, in pursuance of an agreement to that effect made before it.

With regard to the scope suggested in the last part of § 36 for the term "matrimonial domicile," Vaughan Williams, L.J., quoting it from previous editions of this book in *Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan*, [1900] P. 239, held that the agreement as to domicile must be express in order to have any effect on the property. Certainly those who regard the *lex domicilii* as governing the matrimonial system for movables by its own force, in the character of the personal statute, can find that statute only in the law of the husband's actual domicile at the date of the marriage. But those who accept the doctrine of the tacit convention, above explained, must find it in accordance with their ideas that a domicile chosen even by tacit agreement as the matrimonial one should bring in the law of that domicile as the matrimonial law. See the resolution of the Institute of International Law quoted above, p. 71. So too the Prussian code of 1794 said—"community of property can only arise from provincial laws or statutes when these are in force at the place where the consorts establish their first domicile after the consummation of the marriage," part 2, title 1, § 350.

§ 36a. Suppose that during the marriage the husband changes the domicile of himself and his wife. Those who adhere firmly to the view that the *lex domicilii* enters into the matrimonial system of property by its own force, in the character of the personal statute, are likely, though perhaps not obliged, to hold that the law of the new domicile will thenceforward take the place of

* Cours élémentaire de Droit International Privé, § 372, 2^e édition, pp. 397—398. See too the section on the matrimonial system of property where there has not been an express contract, in Weiss's *Traité théorique et pratique de Droit International Privé*, tome 3^{me}, pp. 547—561.

the matrimonial one in governing the relations of the parties in respect of property, or at least that it will do so as to future acquisitions, the rights as to property enjoyed before the change of domicile being allowed to stand as acquired rights. But justice is shocked by allowing the husband to affect the wife's position by a change for which he does not need her assent, and, as Savigny points out, the wife who has married without an express contract "has accepted the conjugal rights as fixed by the law of the domicile, and naturally has reckoned on its perpetual continuance."*

The principle that the law of the matrimonial domicile is not ousted by a change of domicile during the marriage has been adopted in the Married Women's Property Scotland Act (1881), st. 44 & 45 Vict. c. 21, of which s. 1, Nos. (1) and (5), are as follows: "(1) Where a marriage is contracted after the passing of this Act, and the husband shall at the time of the marriage have his domicile in Scotland, the whole movable or personal estate of the wife, whether acquired before or during the marriage, shall by operation of law be vested in the wife as her separate estates, and shall not be subject to the *jus mariti*. (5) Nothing herein contained shall exclude or abridge the power of settlement by antenuptial contract of marriage."

Sawer v. Shute (1792), 1 Anstr. 63, Court of Exchequer. This is perhaps the case referred to by Lord Loughborough in *Campbell v. French* (1797), 3 Ves. 323, and supposed by him to have been decided by Lord Thurlow. *Dues v. Smith* (1822), Jacob 544, Plumer; *McCormick v. Garnett* (1854), 5 D. M. G. 278, Knight-Bruce and Turner; *De Serre v. Clarke* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 587, Malins. No change of domicile was in question in any of these cases, but in *Watts v. Shrimpton* (1855), 21 Beav. 97, Romilly, a British subject domiciled in France married an Englishwoman in the British ambassador's chapel at Paris, and afterwards became naturalized as a Frenchman. The discussion arose about money to which the wife became entitled after such naturalization, and which was not comprised in an agreement which had been entered into on the marriage. Therefore a change of the personal law was in question, if political nationality should be accepted as the test of that law, but not if domicile should be taken as the test. The judge said: "I am of opinion that the marriage contract was English, and that the English law regulated the rights of the husband and wife at the time of the marriage; that, consequently, property coming to the wife subsequently must be dealt with according to the English law by the courts in this country, which have a dominion over the fund, although the husband is now a domiciled Frenchman." The last expression should have been "a naturalized Frenchman," and on the whole, whatever weight may be allowed to the dominion over the fund as an ingredient in the decision, it appears that the original personal law was treated as governing the rights even after a change in that law.

The principle that the law of the original matrimonial domicile governs the relations of the parties in respect of property, despite any change of domicile, during marriage was decisively laid down in *De Nicols v. Curlier*, [1898] 1 Ch.

* Syst. † 379, Guthrie 294.

403, *Kekewich*; reversed, [1898] 2 Ch. 60, by Lindley, Rigby and Collins; reversal reversed, [1900] A. C. 21,* by Halsbury, Macnaghten, Morris, Shand and Brampton. The consorts, both French by nationality and domicile, were married in France without express contract, and therefore under the system of community. They removed to England, where the husband was naturalized, and where they amassed by their industry a large fortune, of which a part was invested in English freeholds and leaseholds and a part remained in money and securities. The husband having died, leaving a will by which he had disposed of the whole as though he were sole owner, the widow claimed her share as of a community, and the House of Lords decided unanimously in her favour as to the personal chattels, which alone were before it. The evidence was that by French law the marriage placed the parties in the same position as if they had entered into an express contract to the effect of the Arts. 1401 to 1496 of the Code Civil, and on this their lordships held that there was between them a contract created by law, from which the husband could not free himself by a change of domicile. The Court of Appeal had held, unwillingly, that in a Scotch case of *Lashley v. Hog*, 4 Paton 581, 1 Robertson Sc. Ap. Ca. 4, Lords Eldon and Rosslyn had decided that the proprietary relations between husband and wife changed with the domicile; but the House of Lords arrived at the conclusion that that case turned on testamentary and not on matrimonial law. It is evident that there was nothing to differentiate the case under decision from the general one. There could be no argument to show that by French law a contract was made between the parties which would not equally apply in any country, and it must therefore be now treated as a general rule of the private international law practised in England that a change of domicile after the matrimonial domicile has been once established—or, by parity of reason, a postnuptial change of nationality—will not affect the matrimonial system of property.

The case of *De Nicols v. Curlier* came again before Kekewich, J., for a determination as to the English freeholds and leaseholds: [1900] 2 Ch. 410. On these the point put in argument for the widow, that they represented the investment of the money acquired during the marriage, which the House of Lords had practically declared to have been subject to community, would have been amply sufficient to support a decision in her

* On p. 22, "Westgate, Q.C." is a misprint for "Westlake, Q.C."

favour. But the learned judge decided in her favour on the ground that immovables, wherever situate, were within the scope of the contract made for the parties by the French code, the words of which—comprising in the community immovables acquired during the marriage otherwise than by succession or donation—he said appeared to be wide enough to include them, and which the expert evidence declared that they did include. Now there is no express mention of foreign immovables in the French code, and whether they are to be considered as tacitly included by it was indeed a matter for expert evidence, but not as a point of so-called internal French law, only as a point of the international law received in France. Taking the French international doctrine to be that the matrimonial system of property ought to be indivisible, and therefore independent of the situation of the objects comprised, it becomes a part of French law—not of the so-called internal law of France, but of French law as a whole—that persons who on their marriage tacitly contract under and by reference to it include foreign immovables in their contract. The law of the country where these are situate may prevent that contract from being carried into effect, but Kekewich, J., held that no such difficulty arose in the case before him from the Statute of Frauds, because community is partnership, to which it is settled that the requirement of a writing in order to confer an interest in land does not apply. Therefore the learned judge's reasons, which would equally have applied if the French code had declared immovables owned by the parties at the date of the marriage to enter into the community, really adopt Dumoulin's doctrine that the law of the matrimonial domicile (or matrimonial nationality, as the case may be) extends by tacit contract to foreign immovables, if not in every case, at least whenever the matrimonial domicile or nationality is in or of a country in which the matrimonial system of property is held to be indivisible as a matter of private international law. I approve of that result, holding the doctrine of tacit contract on marriage to be well founded, and that the unity of the matrimonial system of property generally coincides best with the wishes of persons who, by not entering into an express contract, show that they do not desire complicated or unusual arrangements.*

* The principle that immovable as well as movable property of the consorts should be regulated by one law is laid down also in the Hague Convention of 1905, s. 2.

In *Welch v. Tennent*, [1891] A. C. 639, Herschell, Watson, Morris, the matrimonial domicile was Scotch, and there was no express marriage contract. The wife claimed by Scotch law, as a surrogatum, the price of English freeholds which belonged to her at the time of her marriage and which she and her husband had sold; but the price was not held to represent her rights in the estates. In *Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan*, [1900] P. 211, the matrimonial domicile was held by Rigby and Vaughan Williams, L.J.J., to have been English, but the domicile was changed to France while the wife was still living. Those learned judges held that on her death English law operated to revoke a will which she had made before her marriage, and Vaughan Williams, L.J. (p. 240), considered that the English rule which avoids a woman's will on her marriage is part of the matrimonial and not of the testamentary law. Lindley, M.R., dissenting (and Jeune, President, in the court below), held that the domicile was always French.

If the marriage be accompanied by a settlement or express contract relating to property, we have the following rules, of which § 37 flows from the general principles of our subject and § 38 from the peculiar nature of English conveyancing.

§ 37. The formal requisites of a marriage settlement or contract will generally depend on the law of the place where it is made, the *lex loci actus*.

In *Guépratte v. Young* (1851), 4 De G. & S. 233, where however the contract was not one on marriage, Knight-Bruce quoted, as "generally true," the maxims: *si lex actui formam dat, inspiciendus est locus actus, non domicilii; si de solemnibus queritur aut de modo actus, ratio ejus loci habenda est ubi celebratur*.

§ 38. But if the marriage settlement or contract relates to English land, it cannot operate as a conveyance unless it is in proper English form for that purpose, although, if otherwise valid, it will have with regard to the land whatever operation it may be entitled to as a contract.

§ 39. With regard to the substance of the settlement or contract, the first question will be whether the unity of the matrimonial relation in its proprietary aspect is regarded by the judge as a principle requiring him to refer the whole matter to one law, which with the English adherence to domicile can only be that of the domicile. On this, which was the old view at least for movables, and in Dumoulin's doctrine for immovables too, it was possible in earlier editions of this work to say that "the legality and operation of a marriage settlement or contract, when its meaning has been ascertained, and generally its interpretation also, will be referred to the law of the matrimonial domicile." It would now be more correct to say that these questions are referred to the law which is judged from all the circumstances of the case

to be intended by the parties to govern their rights. The unity of the effect of marriage on property has not been so highly valued as to prevent express contracts dealing with certain pieces of property from receiving effect in accordance with the intentions of the parties, notwithstanding that the law of the matrimonial domicile may be opposed to such intention. In placing the will of the parties in the first rank of considerations, and declining to treat the law of the matrimonial domicile as the exclusive index of that will, the tendency referred to may be compared with that of the French decisions on the matrimonial law of property in the absence of contract (above, p. 71).

It is common for the laws of a country to fence marriage contracts with peculiar safeguards. Where these relate to form, as that such contracts shall be made by notarial act (*e.g.*, Art. 1394 of the Code Napoleon), the courts of the country in question may say, in the case of a contract entered into abroad, either that those safeguards must yield to the general rule that the *lex loci actus* determines forms, or that a compliance with them shall be demanded from the domiciled or political subjects of the country, as a point of its public policy affecting the marriages of those with whom it deems itself to be concerned. When the peculiar rules for marriage contracts relate to their substance, a compliance with them will of course be required by public policy on the marriage of those with whom the country deems itself to be concerned. But whether the peculiar requirements relate to form or to substance, if the parties disregard them in a special contract made with relation to property so circumstanced that the courts of another country can give effect to their intention about it, the courts of that country, not being bound to enforce the public policy of the country to which the parties belong, will find nothing in the general law of contract to prevent their giving effect to the intention. They may decline to treat the arrangements made on a marriage as presenting a special case in that law, and may deal on its general principles with so much of them as falls within their cognizance.

The question seems first to have arisen in England about form. Suppose that an Englishwoman marries a man domiciled in a country where marriage contracts are required to be made by notarial act, and that her fortune comprises money vested in English trustees under the trusts of an English will or settlement. She and her friends and their English solicitor naturally wish that any disposition which on her marriage may be made of

her fortune should be made by a deed in the English language and form, not only as being more intelligible to themselves, but as being also more intelligible to the trustees of the will or settlement under which her fortune is held, who will one day have to act on the disposition now to be made. The proper course would be to execute such a deed and incorporate it besides in a notarial act, so as to satisfy every possible requirement. But the notarial act is omitted, from haste or thoughtlessness. Will the English deed, which alone is executed, be operative? If it was executed in the foreign country, it does not satisfy the *lex loci actus*: If in England, and it should appear that the requirement of a notarial act is held in the foreign country to be a stringent rule of domestic policy, excluding the usual maxims of private international law, will the deed be permitted to operate in England when operative force is denied to it by the law of the matrimonial domicile, which generally regulates the rights of the husband and wife in movable property? Such cases have long been dealt with in this country with a strong disposition to give effect to the intention of the parties, and with that disregard of the *lex loci actus* which has been noticed above, p. 9, as characteristic of the English treatment of the subject. And of late years this mode of dealing with the form of marriage settlements has been repeatedly extended to their substance.

In *Van Grutten v. Digby* (1862), 31 Beav. 561, Romilly, where the deed in English form was executed in France, the judge said: "I hold it to be the law of this country that if a foreigner and Englishwoman make an express contract previous to marriage, and if on the faith of that contract the marriage afterwards takes place, and if the contract relates to the regulation of property within the jurisdiction and subject to the laws of this country, then and in that case this court will administer the law on the subject as if the whole matter were to be regulated by English law:" p. 567. This may be compared with the reference made by the same judge to the circumstance of his court having dominion over the fund, as a ground of decision in a case where the fund was not comprised in the contract made on the marriage: *Watts v. Shrimpton*, above, p. 73. Probably in both cases the dominion over the fund was not meant to be an element in the choice of the law to apply, but was referred to as giving to the court the opportunity of acting on its opinion as to the law. In *Viditz v. O'Hagan*, [1899] 2 Ch. 569, Cozens-Hardy, *Van Grutten v. Digby* was followed notwithstanding evidence that by the law of the Austrian matrimonial domicile the marriage articles acted on by the court were void as not being notarial, and, if good, had been effectually annulled by a postnuptial notarial act. In *Re Bankes, Reynolds v. Ellis*, [1902] 2 Ch. 333, Buckley, the court acted on a settlement made in English form on the marriage of an Englishwoman with an Italian by nationality and domicile, though saying, "the evidence is that, inasmuch as it openly violates the legal order of succession established by Italian law, it can have no effect at all in Italy." And conversely,

where the matrimonial domicile was English, the court has given effect to the settlement made in Scotch form of the property of a lady whose antenuptial domicile was Scotch: *Re Barnard*, *Barnard v. White* (1887), 56 L. T. 9, Kay; *Re Fitzgerald*, *Surman v. Fitzgerald*, [1904] 1 Ch. 573, Cozens-Hardy, Stirling and Vaughan Williams, founding on various indicia of intention. In the last case Stirling, L.J., differed from his colleagues only by holding, in agreement with Joyce, J., that the settlement, giving in accordance with Scotch law an alimentary provision to the husband, could not restrict his power of dealing with it, because the English law which refuses to recognise a restriction on anticipation by an adult male was a matter regarding public order. It seems to me that the majority of the Court of Appeal was right, for an assignee cannot maintain a claim to a Scotch alimentary provision consistently with its nature, and the enjoyment by the husband of such a provision, consistently with its nature and therefore in the only way in which it was given him, does not seem to be against the public policy of England. Effect was given to an Englishwoman's settlement in English form made in contemplation of her marriage with a Spaniard: *Re Hernando*, *Hernando v. Sawtell* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 284, Pearson. Where a domiciled Scotchman married a domiciled Englishwoman, and settlements were made by them respectively in Scottish and English form, it was held that the parties intended those settlements to be governed respectively by Scottish and English law, and such intention was followed: *Re Mackenzie*, *Mackenzie v. Edwards-Moss*, [1911] 1 Ch. 578, 596, Swinfen Eady. Where an antenuptial contract was made between an Englishman, resident in Scotland, and a Scotchwoman, in Scotch form, with a provision that the wife's fund, after her death, should go to her next-of-kin, and after marriage the matrimonial home was moved to England and the wife died there, it was held that the intention of the parties must be deemed to ascertain the next-of-kin by Scotch law: *Lister's Judicial Factor v. Symons*, [1914] S. C. 204.

Where, on the marriage of a husband domiciled in Scotland, and a wife domiciled in England, a marriage settlement was made in English form, with a provision that the rights of all persons claiming under it should be regulated by English law, and the matrimonial domicile was Scotch, and the husband obtained a divorce in Scotland, it was held that the husband was not entitled to the income of a fund according to Scotch law. English law exclusively must regulate the rights to the matrimonial property: *Montgomery v. Zarif*, H. L. (Finlay, Haldane and Shaw), [1919] L. J. P. C. 20.

A marriage settlement made in England but in Scotch form on the marriage of a domiciled Englishman with a domiciled Scotchwoman, was held to be a Scotch settlement: *Hewitt v. Hewitt*, [1914] 31 T. L. R. 13, Eve.

Where a marriage settlement takes effect in England under the doctrine of the above cases, a person having a power of appointment under it may exercise that power in a way in which he could not dispose of his property by the law of his matrimonial domicile: *Pouey v. Hordern*, [1900] 1 Ch. 492, Farwell; *Re Mégret*, *Tweedie v. Tweedie*, [1901] 1 Ch. 547, Cozens-Hardy. See *Re Bald*, *Bald v. Bald*, [1897] 76 L. T. 462, Byrne.

The court can, on divorce, vary a marriage settlement made with reference to the law of the wife's matrimonial domicile: *Nunneley v. Nunneley*, [1890] 15 P. D. 186, Hannen. Even although the matrimonial domicile was foreign, but that at the time of the divorce was English: *Forsyth v. Forsyth*, [1891] P. 363, Jeune.

This is a convenient place for giving an elementary notion of interpretation, as private international law is concerned with it.

Interpretation is a question of fact. *Prima facie*, the law of the place of contract will furnish the most proper clue to the meaning of the parties. If they have used words which there are technical, or have mentioned coins, weights, or measures which under the same name have a different value there and elsewhere, it is the technical sense or the value of that place which they are most likely to have contemplated. Whatever they have not mentioned, yet must necessarily have had in mind, they most likely intended to follow according to the law of the same place, or the usages there prevailing. Yet these are but presumptions, and therefore liable to be rebutted. If the agreement expressly stipulate for a performance elsewhere, the usages and technical language of the latter place, at least in all that relates to the performance, are more likely to have been present to the minds of the contractors than those of the place of contract. Still more will this be the case if the place of performance be in the country from which both parties derive their personal law. The Italian code, Preliminary Article 9, is certainly right in laying down—that the common personal law of the parties will, even without the circumstance of a stipulated performance in its country, afford a safer guide to their meaning than the law of the merely casual place of contract. On all these points, the greatest writers on private international law have abstained from laying down sweeping presumptions applicable to every description or example of agreement. But there can be no doubt that, generally, the interpretation of a marriage settlement or contract will be referred in England to the law of the matrimonial domicile, as being the place in which the performance of the contract is contemplated, and that from which the personal law of one party at least is derived.

Interpretation of a power to charge, on marriage, an annual sum on land in Ireland, and of the execution of that power, the domicile being in England. “If this were the case of a simple charge of £3,000 on lands in Ireland, the place of contract, the domicile of the parties, the place appointed for payment, and other circumstances might require consideration, and would furnish the ground for the decision of the case; but the instrument itself must in this case give the rule of decision—a settlement making various arrangements, some like to the provision in question, others different from it.” Eldon; *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne* (1820), 2 Bligh 60, 87. A marriage contract was made between persons domiciled in Scotland, and an equity was afterwards alleged to exist for a settlement out of a fund comprised in such contract. The operation of the contract by Scotch law was held to govern the case. *Anstruther v. Adair* (1834), 2 M. & K. 513, Brougham. A marriage settlement construed partly according to English law and partly according to Scotch, in obedience to the plain intent of the settlement itself:

Chamberlain v. Napier (1880), 15 Ch. D. 614, Hall. A husband is trustee in England for his wife of property which belongs to her separately under a foreign marriage settlement of which there is no trustee: *exp. Sibeth, Re Sibeth* (1885), 14 Q. B. D. 417, Brett, Cotton, Lindley. Where there was a conflict of opinion among Scotch experts as to the meaning of certain words in a settlement in Scotch form, though the matrimonial domicile was in Scotland, English canons of construction were applied by the English court: *Re Capel* (1914), W. N. 452, Eve. The English *lex fori* prevailed in the absence of any clear indication of the foreign law.

It is not easy to see how a change of domicile, important as are the questions it raises with regard to the matter of § 36a, can give rise to any question as to the operation of an express contract. But in *Duncan v. Cannan* (1854), 18 Beav. 128, Romilly, and (1855), 7 D. M. G. 78, Knight-Bruce and Turner, the matrimonial domicile was Scotch, and it was admitted that Scotch law governed. Under the contract, as operating by that law, the wife's concurrence in a receipt for a sum of money comprised in the contract was assumed to be necessary, and, if necessary, would certainly be effectual. She concurred in such a receipt after the domicile had been transferred to England, by the law of which country her receipt would be ineffectual, having regard to the words of the matrimonial contract, though by mentioning separate use the contract might have made her receipt effectual under the law of England. It was argued that Scotch law adopts the rule of private international law which determines capacity according to the actual domicile; that the wife, by the law of her actual domicile, wanted capacity to give a receipt; and that her receipt was therefore ineffectual. But all three judges held it to be effectual. There is no magic in the word "capacity." That which a person has capacity to do is simply that which he can effectually do; and his capacity, spoken of collectively, is the total of his abilities to do different things effectually. The matrimonial contract in this case gave the lady a pecuniary benefit, and the question whether she could still receive it after the change of domicile, was identical with the question raised about her capacity; they were not two questions, admitting of the former being solved by help of the answer to the latter. In *Guépratte v. Young* (see above, p. 44), the question of capacity related to the making of a new agreement.

§ 40. Where the marriage takes place on the faith of an agreement that the husband shall transfer his domicile to another country, the law of the latter country must be considered as that of the matrimonial domicile in what regards an express matrimonial contract as to property.

Colliss v. Hector (1875), L. R. 19 Eq. 334, Hall. See § 36, above, as to the true meaning of matrimonial domicile.

§ 41. If a settlement or express contract is made on the marriage, not comprising all the movable property of both consorts, the question whether it excludes any rights which would otherwise arise in the part not comprised in it will be decided by the law of the matrimonial domicile, as appropriate both to the operation of the settlement or contract and to the destination of the property on which it has no operation; subject however to

the wider reference to the will of the parties now made, as in § 39.

See *Watts v. Shrimpton*, above, p. 73.

§ 42. It is admitted in principle that the succession to either consort on death must be separated from the effect of marriage on property, and be regulated by the law of the last domicile of the deceased. In practice however there is occasionally some difficulty, on the question what points belong to the department of succession and what to the pecuniary effects of the marriage.*

In *Foubert v. Turst* (1702), Pre. Cha. 207, and (1703), 1 Bro. P. C., 38 fol., 129 oct., the consorts were in community under an antenuptial contract, except as to a sum of 800 *livres*, which was to "be the proper estate of the wife and her heirs of her part." There was also a postnuptial contract, which appears to have been held inoperative. The wife predeceasing the husband, and without issue, after a removal of the domicile from the custom of Paris to England, "her heirs of her part" according to the custom were of course entitled, by contract, to the 800 *livres*; but the husband, as successor to his wife by the law of England, claimed her share in the community as to the rest; while her relations claimed this also, evidently on the ground that the antenuptial contract had been made with the intervention of the wife's mother, who should therefore be considered as having stipulated for them by implication, when she stipulated for the community in return for the portion which she gave with her daughter. Lord Keeper Wright repelled this implication, holding that a contract, which so far as it went coincided with the custom of Paris, must be taken as an adoption of the custom. But his decree was reversed in the House of Lords, and the wife's share in the community given to the heirs of her part, on their counsel pointing out that in certain particulars, collateral to the stipulation of community, the contract deviated from the custom of Paris, whence it was argued that it could not in any part be considered as an adoption of it. The contract was probably most correctly interpreted by the higher court. If the antenuptial contract had been between the husband and wife alone, with no particular reason for implying a stipulation in favour of her relations, or if the parties had married under the custom of Paris without express contract, there is no reason to suppose that the House of Lords would not have held the husband entitled, as successor to his wife by the law of her last domicile, to the share in the community which the contract, or the law of the matrimonial domicile, would have given her on her death. In *Lashley v. Hog* (1804), 1 Robertson's Sc. Ap. Ca. 4, Lord Eldon said of *Foubert v. Turst* that "if there had been no contract the law of England would have regulated the rights of the husband and wife, who were domiciliated in England, at the dissolution of the marriage." This dictum has been quoted in favour of the new as against the matrimonial domicile, in the question which arises between them on the matter of § 36a: but it is not likely that Lord Eldon meant anything of that kind. See above, p. 74, and *Re Craginsh, Craginsh v. Hewitt*, [1892] 3 Ch. 180. In *Re Hernando, Hernando v. Sawtell* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 284, Pearson, a question again arose as to the rights of succession, having regard to the terms of the marriage settlement. See too *Montgomery v. Zarifi*, above, p. 79.

* See Savigny, syst. § 379, Guthrie, 247.

Divorce.

Two causes affecting the tie of marriage, jactitation of marriage and nullity of marriage, and two affecting the personal relations of the parties during the continuance of that tie, divorce *a mensa et toro* and restitution of conjugal rights, were ancient subjects of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. That is to say, the jurisdiction in them was exercised by the courts of bishops who acknowledged each other, and were acknowledged by the secular power in their respective countries, as officers of the same church; the laws administered in those courts were kept uniform by a common appeal to the pope; and the same laws distributed suits among those courts by rules of competence as authoritative as those which the law of England lays down for the competence of different county courts or the law of France for that of the tribunals of first instance. As long as this state of things continued, and between countries in which it continued, no question similar to those of private international law could arise about the causes in question. But in consequence of the reformation, the English bishops ceased to be officers of the same church with the continental bishops; an appeal from their courts to the crown was substituted for one to the pope; and divorce *a vinculo*, which the church did not grant at all, came to be granted by private act of parliament, but with a regularity in the procedure for obtaining it which in the opinion of the best authorities caused it to rank among legal remedies. And by the "act to amend the law relating to divorce and matrimonial causes in England," st. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, which came into operation in 1858, the episcopal jurisdiction in the matrimonial causes which had belonged to it was transferred to the crown, the name of divorce *a mensa et toro* was changed to judicial separation, and the procedure for divorce *a vinculo* was transferred from parliament to a regular court. In the meantime, the reformation in Scotland had led at a much earlier date to the transfer of the episcopal jurisdiction in matrimonial causes to the crown, and the establishment of judicial procedure for divorce *a vinculo*; and changes more or less similar have taken place at different times almost throughout the civilized world. Hence matrimonial causes now afford as prolific a field as any other for the questions of law and jurisdiction which constitute private international law. Among those questions it will be convenient to take first those

relating to jurisdiction, and, last, that of the cause for which a divorce will be granted.

The act of 1857 is silent as to the conditions of competence in the matter which had previously been of parliamentary cognizance, divorce, by which term I shall intend divorce *a vinculo* where it is not otherwise expressed. On the appeal in *Niboyet v. Niboyet* (1878), 4 P. D. 1, it was held by James and Cotton, L.JJ., against Brett, L.J., that those conditions must be taken from the ecclesiastical rules relating to suits for divorce *a mensa et toro* which had been subject to such rules. But after a period of uncertainty the opinion that divorce *a vinculo*, which affects status, is so different from the old ecclesiastical divorce *a mensa et toro*, which was administered for the health of the soul and did not affect status, that it must be subject to rules of its own, and that the novelty of the occasion in England must be availed of to establish those rules on the soundest principles, triumphed in *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, [1895] A. C. 517, an appeal from Ceylon in which the judgment of the judicial committee was given by Lord Watson. During the intervening period there was no doubt, as there is none now, that :

§ 43. The place where the marriage was contracted is of no importance with regard to the authority of the English court to grant a divorce.

And to this it may be added that there is equally no doubt that the authority of the English court to grant a divorce is independent of the place where the adultery was committed, or, if the husband is respondent, where the adultery and cruelty or desertion were committed; independent also of the domicile of the parties at the time of their marriage, if that was different from their domicile at the time of the suit.

But on the whole the decisions led to a doctrine that a divorce will be granted in England when the husband, being either petitioner or respondent, is either domiciled in England (§ 44), or resident there, not on a visit or as a traveller, and not having taken up that residence for the purpose of obtaining or facilitating a divorce (§ 45); but that on the other hand a divorce pronounced by a foreign court is treated as valid in England when, and only when, the parties were domiciled within the jurisdiction of that court at the time of the suit in it (§ 50). This difference between the conditions for granting a divorce and those for recognizing the validity of a foreign one, the former allowing the local English dissolution of a marriage which in

view of the latter we could not expect to see treated abroad as having been dissolved, was very regrettable. But while it was inevitable so long as divorce *a vinculo* was assimilated to that *a mensa et toro*, it was countenanced by certain Scotch decisions which upheld for the former a foundation in residence falling short of domicile, and described such residence as a matrimonial domicile distinct from one for succession, a use of the term "matrimonial domicile" which must not be confounded with its commoner employment to express the true domicile at the time or established on the occasion of marriage (§ 36). The doctrine in question was however dispelled by *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, the judgment in which put the matter, whether as English, Scotch or international, on a single and reasonable footing. The principle has been recently affirmed in a most emphatic and embarrassing fashion by the decision in *Keyes v. Keyes and Gray*, [1921] P. 205, Duke, where it was held that the court in India set up by statute to try matrimonial causes had no jurisdiction to decree a dissolution of marriage between parties not domiciled in India, though the marriage was celebrated and the parties were resident in India and the act of adultery was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. The Indian Councils Act, 1861, allows the Governor-General in Council to make laws and regulations, and the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, purported to permit an Indian court to grant divorce to a person professing the Christian religion and residing in India. But the court held that the statute of 1861 could not, in the light of principles enunciated later, empower the Governor-General to legislate for British subjects merely resident in India so as to affect their status as to marriage in the country of their domicile.

The following extracts from the judgment in the *Le Mesurier case* state the principles of the law, and are substituted for the §§ in earlier editions.

§§ 44, 45, '50. "When carefully examined, neither the English nor the Scottish decisions are in their lordships' opinion sufficient to establish the proposition that, in either of those countries, there exists a recognized rule of general law to the effect that a so-called rule of matrimonial domicile gives jurisdiction to dissolve marriage. . . . Their lordships have . . . come to the conclusion that, according to international law, the domicile for the time being of the married pair affords the only true test of jurisdiction to dissolve their marriage. They concur without reservation in the views expressed by Lord Penzance in

Wilson v. Wilson,* which were obviously meant to refer, not to questions arising in regard to the mutual rights of married persons, but to jurisdiction in the matter of divorce: 'It is the strong inclination of my own opinion that the only fair and satisfactory rule to adopt on this matter of jurisdiction is to insist upon the parties in all cases referring their matrimonial differences to the courts of the country in which they are domiciled. Different communities have different views and laws respecting matrimonial obligations, and a different estimate of the causes which should justify divorce. It is both just and reasonable therefore that the differences of married people should be adjusted in accordance with the laws of the community to which they belong, and dealt with by the tribunals which alone can administer those laws. An honest adherence to this principle, moreover, will preclude the scandal which arises when a man and woman are held to be man and wife in one country and strangers in another.' † Of course, it will be understood that, in thus referring to domicile, both Lord Penzance and Lord Watson intend to refer to the personal jurisdiction over the parties, as governing their status, which divorce affects. The English court will claim or disclaim authority to divorce the parties on the ground of their domicile being or not being English, and on no other ground; but, whatever may be their domicile, it must recognize their divorce pronounced by a jurisdiction which claimed authority over them on the ground of their nationality. And it will recognize a divorce pronounced by a jurisdiction to which the parties were not personally subject, if it would be held valid in the country to which the husband was personally subject at the time of the proceedings by domicile, or by nationality if that is there taken as the ground of subjection: *Armitage v. Att.-Gen.*, *Gillig v. Gillig*, [1906] P. 135, Gorell Barnes.

The English court will not, however, recognize a divorce granted by a Moslem husband in India to an English wife

* 1872, L. R., 2 P. & M. 435, at p. 442. In *Manning v. Manning* (1871), L. R., 2 P. & M. 223, p. 226, Lord Penzance had said: "When the case has been reversed, and when the courts of this country have had to consider how far persons who are domiciled Englishmen shall be bound by the decree of a foreign matrimonial court, the strong tendency has been to repudiate the power of the foreign court under such circumstances to dissolve an English marriage. It would be unfortunate if an opposite course should be followed by the courts of this country, when they are determining to what extent they will entertain the matrimonial suits of foreigners."

† *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, per Lord Watson, [1895] A. C., at pp. 536, 540.

married in England, though the divorce might be valid in the Moslem community of India to which the husband belongs, *Ex parte, Mir Anwareddin* [1917] 1 K. B., 882, Court of Appeal (Swinfen-Eady, Bankes, Lawrence, A. T., affirming Reading, C.J., Darling, Bray, J.J.).

In that case a Moslem native of India, domiciled there, married an Englishwoman at an English registry office. Later he separated from his wife and returned to India, where his wife refused to join him. He then obtained in India a decree of restitution of conjugal rights which was not complied with; and in accordance with Moslem law sent his wife a bill of divorcement, purporting to dissolve the marriage. Later, on his return to England, he petitioned for a divorce, which was refused on the ground that he was not domiciled in England. Thereupon he applied to an English registrar for a licence to marry again; and this was refused on the ground that there was a lawful impediment to the marriage.

The Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal, upholding the registrar's decision, held that there was neither principle nor authority that a marriage celebrated in England can be dissolved according to the law of England by mere operation of the law of the husband's religion without the decree of a court of law. An Englishwoman acquires by marriage the domicile of her husband, and is subject to the law of that domicile. But if she is a Christian she does not acquire the non-Christian religion of her husband, or enter into his religious community or become subject to his special religious system of law. If the Moslem husband had obtained a divorce from a court in India, the English court, on the authority of *Attorney-General v. Armitage*, would have recognized the decree and treated the marriage as dissolved. But the court in India can only grant a divorce when the two parties belong to the same religion; and here no decree was applied for.

It was suggested *obiter* by Lord Watson in *Skinner v. Skinner* (25 I. A., p. 43), that a Moslem husband who desires to divorce his wife can do so by Moslem law. But such a divorce, however good in a Moslem country, will not be recognized in an English court as a dissolution of a marriage with a woman who has married in England with an implied understanding that she will be a sole and permanent wife and not just a wife at her husband's pleasure.

The respondent in a divorce suit does not give jurisdiction to a court by appearing before it without protest and absolutely. And if the divorce would not have been recognised in the country of the husband's domicile, the English court will annul the second marriage by the divorced wife on a petition of the husband, he being a domiciled British subject. *Cass v. Cass*, [1910] 108 L. T. 397, Bigham.

It may be noted that in *Wilson v. Wilson* the marriage was contracted, and the adultery committed abroad, and the husband, who was the petitioner, had acquired an English domicile only after the adultery, and it does not appear that the wife had ever been in England. It therefore decides for England, as *Warrender v. Warrender*, 2 Cl. & F. 488, decided for Scotland, the possibility of founding jurisdiction in divorce against the wife on a domicile imputed to her by a rule of law.

When the law under which a divorce has been pronounced prohibits the marriage of either party within a given time, their marriage is not fully dissolved till the expiration of that time: *Warter v. Warter* (1890), 15 P. 152, Hannen. It might be put that their incapacity to remarry within the times adheres to them in other jurisdictions as a part of their status. But where the remarriage of the guilty party only is restricted, the incapacity so created is penal, and will not follow that party to England: *Scott v. Att.-Gen.* (1886), 11 P. D. 128, Hannen; decision explained in *Warter v. Warter*.

§ 46. But to the doctrine that "the [English] court does not now pronounce a decree of dissolution where the parties are not domiciled in this country," it must be added "except in favour of a wife deserted by her husband, or whose husband has so conducted himself towards her that she is justified in living apart from him, and who, up to the time when she was deserted or began so to be justified, was domiciled with her husband in this country"; Gorell Barnes, J., in *Armytage v. Armytage*, [1898] P. D. 178, at p. 185. He proceeded to say that in the case described, "without necessarily resorting to the American doctrine that in such circumstances a wife may acquire a domicile of her own in the country of the matrimonial home, it is considered that, in order to meet the injustice which might be done by compelling a wife to follow her husband from country to country, he cannot be allowed to assert for the purposes of the suit that he has ceased to be domiciled in this country." And see his remarks in *Bater v. Bater*, [1906] P. 216; and in *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 78.

The rule has been adopted, and indeed extended, in later cases (*Stathatos v. Stathatos* [1913] P. 46, Deane; and *De Montaignu v. De Montaignu* [1913] P. 154, Evans). In the former case it was said: "In proper circumstances the court here ought to assume jurisdiction in a wife's suit for divorce by treating her as having a domicile of her own sufficient to support such suit." The wife was domiciled in England at the time of her marriage with a foreigner. He obtained a decree of nullity in the foreign domicile which debarred her from suing for any relief. She reverted then to her English domicile, and the court granted her a decree of dissolution.

The grant of divorce to an Englishwoman married to a domiciled foreigner is in principle questionable.

The Matrimonial Causes Bill introduced into the House of Lords in 1920 to give effect to the recommendations of the Royal Commission, which before the war reported on the amendment of the law of divorce, proposed to give authority to the limited exception in section 5 as follows:

5. The jurisdiction of the High Court in divorce shall be limited to cases in which the parties to the marriage are domiciled in England and Wales:

Provided that where a wife has been deserted by her husband, or where her husband has been deported from the United Kingdom under any law for the time being in force relating to the deportation of aliens, and was immediately before the desertion or deportation domiciled in England or Wales, her domicile shall for the purposes of this Act be treated as the same as it was immediately before the desertion or deportation.

The same exception was confidently suggested by Brett, L.J., in *Niboyet v. Niboyet* (1878), 4 P. D., at p. 14—before *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, it is true, but while contending against his colleagues for the exclusive authority of the domicile which the latter case established. As to the older authorities, a divorce was granted to the wife under the circumstances stated in the exception, but on the ground of her political nationality being British: *Deck v. Deck* (1860), 2 S. & T. 90, Cresswell, Martin, Willes; who on the same day threw further doubt on the applicability of *Deck v. Deck* for this purpose by saying that *Bond v. Bond*, 2 S. & T. 93, was the same case with it in substance, though the point of the wife alone being domiciled or resident in England did not there arise. And in *Santo Teodoro v. Santo Teodoro* (1876), 5 P. D. 79, Phillimore, where the domicile was foreign throughout, a divorce was granted to a wife who continued to reside in England though the husband had left it. Where the wife came to reside in England only after her desertion it was refused: *Le Sueur v. Le Sueur* (1876), 1 P. D. 139, Phillimore.

§ 46a. Where a marriage is held good in England but is not recognized in the husband's country, so that the wife cannot there obtain a divorce, a case which may easily happen when a foreigner goes through the ceremony of marriage with an Englishwoman in England, if the dependence of capacity for marriage on the personal law is not here recognized, "it would seem reasonable to permit her to sue [in England] for the dissolution of the tie which is recognized therein, . . . in case she has grounds of suit which would entitle her to a divorce if her husband had been domiciled in her country." Sir Gorell Barnes (Lord Gorell) in *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 83.

§ 46b. "The jurisdiction of the court over the co-respondent, both as to damages and costs, in a suit properly instituted here, does not depend on domicile, allegiance or residence. If a foreign co-respondent is served in England, this court has for that reason jurisdiction over him. He can be served abroad, whatever his nationality, and if he is served abroad the statute authorizing such service gives to this court jurisdiction over him. In proper cases this court may exercise discretionary power, and dismiss or dispense with a co-respondent domiciled abroad, but he is not entitled to demand as of right that he be dismissed from the suit." Sir Samuel Evans, in *Rayment v. Rayment and Stuart* and *Chapman v. Chapman and Buist*, [1910] P. 271, at p. 292. Approved in *Rush v. Rush and Pimenta* (Duke, P.,

affirmed by C. A., Sterndale, M.R. See, too, *Phillips v. Batho* [1913] 3 K. B. 25, Scrutton, where damages granted by an Indian court against a co-respondent, though he was out of the jurisdiction, were held to be recoverable in England in an action on the Indian judgment. In earlier cases it was held that the court here had no jurisdiction over a co-respondent domiciled abroad, and the petitioner should proceed without citing him: *Levy v. Levy and De Romance* [1908] P. 256. *Boger v. Boger*, *Ib.* 300. But the later decisions indicate a steady tendency of the court to widen its jurisdiction over ancillary matters where the principal parties are subject to it.

§ 47. If the matter be considered on the ground of social rather than of legal principle, a doubt may be suggested whether it is necessary to identify the jurisdiction for judicial separation with that for divorce. The former decree leaves the parties man and wife, but gives to the injured party a protection against some of the consequences of that status; and it may therefore be reasonable to allow its benefit to be enjoyed within the territory by those who are resident in it, even though the court of their country or domicile should alone be held competent to dissolve the tie of marriage between them. In saying this—which was cited with approval by Gorell Barnes, J., in *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, [1898] P. D. 178, at p. 191—I was led to reserve the question of legal principle owing to Brett, L.J., in *Niboyet v. Niboyet*, holding that the exclusive rule of domicile applies to the court's "power to grant any relief which alters in any way that relation between the parties which arises by law from their marriage. It applies therefore," he said, "as it seems to me, to suits for judicial separation and to suits for the restitution of conjugal rights. I do not think it does apply to suits for a declaration of nullity of marriage or in respect of jactitation of marriage"; 4 P. D. 19. But the judicial committee, *per* Lord Watson, in *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, adopted the other view. They said: "There are unquestionably other remedies for matrimonial misconduct, short of dissolution, which according to the rules of the *jus gentium* may be administered by the courts of the country in which spouses, domiciled elsewhere, are for the time resident. If for instance a husband deserts his wife, although their residence be of a temporary character, these courts may compel him to aliment her; and in cases where the residence is of a more permanent character, and the husband treats his wife with such a degree of cruelty as to render her continuance in

his society intolerable, the weight of opinion among international jurists and the general practice is to the effect that the courts of the residence are warranted in giving the remedy of judicial separation, without reference to the domicile of the parties." This was acted on in *Armystage v. Armystage*, and again in *Anghinelli v. Anghinelli* [1918] P. 247, C. A., Swinfen Eady, M.R., Duke, Warrington, and must now be considered to be the law of the English court. In the latter case the husband's domicile was in Italy, but both parties at the commencement of the suit were resident in England and the wife before marriage was domiciled in England. The court granted a decree of separation, and distinguished the case from one of divorce, on the ground that it was not clear that a decree of judicial separation affected status.

See also *Christian v. Christian*, [1897] 78 L. T. 86, Jeune, and *Riera v. Riera*, [1914] 112 L. T. 223, Deane.

§ 48. The English court has jurisdiction to decree restitution of conjugal rights where both parties are resident in England at the time of the commencement of the action.

As to the question whether domicile is necessary to found the jurisdiction, there is an agreement to treat this matter on the same footing as judicial separation. In *Niboyet v. Niboyet*, Brett, L.J., paralleled both with divorce (above, § 47); in *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier* neither is distinctly mentioned by Lord Watson; and in *Armystage v. Armystage*, Gorell Barnes, J., though the case before him was one of judicial separation, showed by his reasoning that he held restitution of conjugal rights to be also cognizable on the ground of mere residence ([1898] P., at pp. 192, 193). And so the same judge held in *Dicks v. Dicks*, [1899] P. 275, and *Bateman v. Bateman*, [1901] P. 136; and he was followed by Evans, P., in *Perrin v. Perrin* [1914] P. 135.

The older cases to the same effect—*Newton v. Newton* (1885), 11 P. D. 11, Hannen, and *Thornton v. Thornton* (1886), 11 P. D. 176, Cotton, Bowen and Fry, affirming Butt—are subject to the remark that divorce was then held, on the authority of *Niboyet v. Niboyet*, to be cognizable on the ground of mere residence.

For the other point comprised in § 48, namely, that the residence of one party only will not be sufficient to found the jurisdiction, there is *Firebrace v. Firebrace* (1878), 4 P. D. 63, Hannen, where "the difficulty, amounting in most cases to an impossibility, of enforcing the decree of the court" against a respondent neither domiciled nor resident in the country, was referred to as a reason for not claiming jurisdiction over a husband who had failed in rendering conjugal rights to his wife while he was here. Nevertheless, if a wife who has been deserted in England remains there, it would

seem that she may bring her suit for restitution of conjugal rights on the ground of her own residence, on the principle of the exceptions to the strict rule of jurisdiction in §§ 46, 46a and 47. *Bateman v. Bateman*, u. s., would be an authority for this if it were clear that the husband in that case had changed his domicile; and the doctrine is not opposed to *Yelverton v. Yelverton* (1859), 1 S. & T. 574, Cresswell, where it was held that a wife cannot obtain a decree of restitution, the husband being neither domiciled nor resident in the country, notwithstanding her having established a residence in it since his desertion of her.

When neither party has had a residence or domicile in England, it is clear that no decree for restitution will be granted by the English Court. *De Gasquet James v. Mecklenburg*, [1914] P. 53, Evans.

In the case of *Perrin v. Perrin*, u. s., Evans, P., laid down the following rules of practice as to service:—

“In a suit for restitution of conjugal rights when it is stated in the petition either that the parties to the suit were domiciled in England at the time of the institution thereof; or that they had a matrimonial home in England at the date when their cohabitation ceased; or that they were both resident in England at the time of the institution of the suit, the petition and citation may be served either within or without his Majesty’s Dominions.

“When a suit for restitution of conjugal rights has been duly instituted, and a decree is made therein, such decree may be served either within or without his Majesty’s Dominions.”

In any further proceedings arising out of a non-compliance with the decree, the petitioner must satisfy the court that the respondent has been served therewith at a place from which he could reasonably have returned to his wife within the period named in the decree. *Bateman v. Bateman*, [1901] P. 136, Gorell Barnes; see also *Dicks v. Dicks*, [1899] P. 275, Gorell Barnes.

Substituted service of a decree for restitution was allowed where the respondent’s whereabouts were unknown. *Palmer v. Palmer*, [1921] W. N. 247, Horridge.

§ 49. The jurisdiction of the English court in suits for a declaration of nullity of marriage, or in respect of jactitation of marriage, is sufficiently founded by the defendant’s being resident in England, not on a visit or as a traveller, and not having taken up that residence for the purpose of the suit.

Williams v. Dormer (1851), Fust, and (1852), Dodson, 2 Robertson 505. “A decree of nullity of a pretended marriage is quite as much a decree *in rem*” [as one of divorce], “and has all the consequences. How would it be possible to make domicile the test of jurisdiction in such a case? Suppose the alleged wife were the complainant, her domicile would depend on the very matter in controversy. If she was really married, her domicile would be the domicile of her husband; if not married, then it would be her own previous domicile.” Lord Justice James, in *Niboyet v. Niboyet*, 4 P. D. 9. And see the quotation from Lord Justice Brett in the same case, under § 47. Thus both sides to the controversy mentioned on p. 90 are agreed as to this §. But the alleged wife, being the defendant and maintaining the marriage, is bound by her own contention to submit to the jurisdiction of the petitioner’s domicile: *Chichester v. Donegal* (1822), 1 Add. 5, at p. 19, Nicholl. In *Roberts v. Brennan*, [1902] P. 143, Jeune, no other ground appears for assuming the jurisdiction in a woman’s suit for

nullity except that the parties had lived together in England during some part of the time since the celebration of the disputed marriage; but it was an undefended case.

But in suits for a declaration of nullity of marriage jurisdiction has also been entertained in England on the ground of the marriage which is questioned having been contracted here. It is questionable, however, whether jurisdiction will any longer be entertained on this ground only. *De Gasquet James v. Mecklenburg* (u.s.).

Evans, P., refused a declaration of the validity of a marriage where neither party had domicile or residence in England, and he said: "The mere fact that the marriage was celebrated in England and petitioner purported to reside here at the date of the institution of proceedings, cannot give the court power to give a declaratory judgment as to the validity of the marriage." The court of the matrimonial domicile is the natural *forum* for determining the goodness of the marriage; and in this case the court of the husband's domicile had declared the marriage null and void. Possibly, if the foreign court had not so pronounced, the *scintilla* of jurisdiction derived from the marriage in England would have been accepted; but in view of the decision, the jurisdiction in a suit for nullity based on the *forum contractus* would now appear to be doubtful.

In *Simonin v. Mallac* (1860), 2 S. & T. 67, Cresswell held the jurisdiction founded against a defendant neither domiciled nor resident in England, nor a British subject, who also had been served abroad, because "the parties, by professing to enter into a contract in England, mutually gave to each other the right to have the force and effect of that contract determined by an English tribunal": p. 75. He quoted old authorities in favour of a *forum rei gestæ*, which he seems to have considered was supported by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 19. Now however that the Supreme Court Rules, 1883, have abandoned the *forum contractus celebrati* for the actions to which they apply, even could that forum be extended to the case where the existence of the contract is in question, the reason given in *Simonin v. Mallac* can hardly be maintained. But the jurisdiction in nullity on the ground of the disputed marriage having been celebrated in England was asserted in *Sottomayor v. De Barros* (1877), 2 P. D. 81, Phillimore; *Linke v. Van Aerde*, [1894] Times Reports, 1893-4, 426, Gorell Barnes; and *Sproule v. Hopkins*, [1903] 2 I. R. 133, Andrews.

§ 49a. A sentence of nullity in the domicile will not necessarily be authoritative in England: *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 46, Gorell Barnes, Cozens-Hardy, Kennedy; 2nd question, p. 78.

It is noteworthy, however, that the Matrimonial Causes Bill introduced into the House of Lords in 1920, proposed in section 6 to empower the English Court to give effect to a decree of divorce, judicial separation, or nullity, obtained by a British subject domiciled in England, while resident in any British possession; provided that the decree was made on grounds which would be recognized in England as sufficient for the decree.

The section also proposed to clear up the doubts raised in *Ogden v. Ogden* by providing:

(2) Where a woman who is a British subject domiciled in England or Wales marries a foreign subject, and the marriage is subsequently declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction in the foreign country of which the husband is a subject, the High Court may grant a decree nisi of nullity of marriage notwithstanding that the marriage was valid according to the law of the place of celebration of the marriage, and the provisions of this part of this Act with respect to such decrees shall apply accordingly.

§ 51. Not even where the husband had deserted the wife, or so conducted himself that she was justified in living apart from him, will a divorce be treated in England as valid which she has obtained in a country neither his actual domicile, nor that in which she has remained after a change by him of domicile in which she was justified in not following him.

The last clause of the § is based on the fact that the English court would grant a divorce to the wife who was justified in not following her husband in a change of domicile from England (above, § 46), combined with the principle, not only just but now apparently established, that the recognition of a foreign divorce and the grant of a divorce in this country ought to be governed by the same rules. For the rest of the § see *Shaw v. Att.-Gen.* (1870), L. R., 2 P. & M. 156, *Penzance*; *Green v. Green*, [1893] P. 89, *Gorell Barnes*.

§ 51a. Unless the divorce so obtained by the wife is recognized as valid by the law of the husband's actual domicile: *Armitage v. Att.-Gen.*, *Gillig v. Gillig*, [1906] P. 135, *Gorell Barnes*. But see *Ex parte Mir Anwareddin* (u.s.).

§ 52. Divorce can only be pronounced for cause sufficient by the *lex fori*; and when cause sufficient by the *lex fori* exists, the jurisdiction being established under the rules already considered, divorce cannot be refused because it would be refused either by the *lex loci contractus* of the marriage, or by the personal law of the parties at the time of the marriage, or by the law of the place where any fact occurred on which the application for a divorce is grounded, or by the personal law of the parties at the time when any such fact occurred. This doctrine is received in England, both for granting divorces there and for recognizing the validity of foreign divorces.

A divorce pronounced in Florida on the ground of ungovernable temper, where both parties were domiciled in Florida, was upheld in *Pemberton v. Hughes*, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, *Lindley, Rigby, Vaughan Williams*.

The complete dependence of the cause for divorce on the *lex fori*, if divorce be allowed at all, results for us in England from the reservation in favour of all stringent domestic policy which

is understood in private international law; see above, p. 51. The only law, except that of the forum, the claim of which to decide on the cause of divorce can be advanced with much plausibility, is the personal law of the parties derived from their matrimonial domicile. Representing marriage as a contract made at a given place, with contemplated performance in the matrimonial domicile, it may be said that the substance of the marriage, including the causes of its possible dissolution, must be affected by the place of contemplated performance to the same extent to which that place affects the operation of the marriage, or of any contract collateral to it, on property. The answer is that the substance of the marriage is not left to the choice of the parties, like its operation on their property. They are free to contract the marriage, but not to modify its substance. The existence of the marriage is an effect of contract, but its terms are not. The parties contract a mutual relation on some of the particulars of which different views are held in different countries, but as to which all nations agree in thinking it to be of the utmost social importance that all its particulars shall be determined by law.

In England, the propriety of putting in force our procedure for the dissolution of a marriage has never been disputed on the ground that a foreign law, having any possible relation to the matter, would either not divorce for the cause in question, or even would refuse to divorce at all. There are however authorities to the effect that what is called in them an English marriage cannot be dissolved by a foreign decree, for any cause for which it would not be dissoluble in England; and these authorities are complicated by an argument which used to be put forward when the English procedure for divorce was by private act of parliament, namely that English law, law being taken for the purpose of the argument in a narrow sense, did not admit divorce at all, and that therefore an English marriage was not dissoluble for any cause by a foreign decree. It will presently be seen to what extent the cases justify the statement in the §, that no limitation is now placed in this country on the cause for which any marriage can be dissolved by a competent court, so that the dissolution may be treated here as valid. But in the meantime a remark must be made on the circumstance that the cases referred to designate the marriages, as to the dissolution of which abroad the doubt arose, as English marriages. It would have been consistent with the extent to which domicile is now allowed by our courts to be influential with regard to marriage—see above,

§§ 21, 25—to hold that the sufficiency by English law of the cause for divorce was a question affecting the divorce of persons domiciled in England at the date of the foreign decree. The matrimonial domicile, as before observed, could not properly be introduced into the question, but the domicile, if any, which should govern with regard to a change of status, whether to or from marriage, would be that existing at the time of the change asserted. But the marriages on which the argument that they were not dissoluble by a foreign decree for a cause insufficient by English law, or even at all by any foreign decree, used to be urged before the passing of the Matrimonial Clauses Act, were those which had been contracted in England. This will appear the less surprising to any one who will consider what confused notions on the international bearings of marriage are displayed in some of the earlier English cases, or the excessive breadth of the reference to the *lex loci contractus*, quoted from *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple* under § 19.

In *Lolley's Case* (1812), Ru. & Ry. 237, all the judges were “unanimously of opinion that no sentence or act of any foreign country or State could dissolve an English marriage *a vinculo matrimonii*, for ground on which it was not liable to be dissolved *a vinculo matrimonii* in England.” Lolley’s first marriage was contracted in England, and his domicile at its date was English; but it is to the former point alone that the term “English marriage,” in the above resolution, has always been understood to refer, and was certainly meant to refer. He was divorced in Scotland, where he had only a very transient residence, at the suit of his wife, for his adultery, without the aggravating circumstances which in a very few cases induced Parliament to grant to the wife a divorce by private Act; and it is evidently to this that the resolution alludes, in speaking of a divorce for ground on which a marriage was not liable to be dissolved in England. The careful wording implies the opinion, which has been expressly adopted by the highest authorities, that divorce by private Act of Parliament was essentially a judicial proceeding, and that it would have been an error, even in 1812, to say that divorce *a vinculo* was not known to the regular course of English law. See Lords Westbury and Colonsay, in *Shaw v. Gould* (1868), L. R. 3 E. & I. A. 86, 91. Lolley married secondly in England, and was found guilty of bigamy: the conviction was sustained, after argument, by all the judges, who came to the resolution above cited, which in consequence of his continuing English domicile at the time of the divorce was not necessary to the decision of the case: and he was sent to the hulks for one or two years, the residue of the sentence being remitted. In *McCarthy v. Decaix* (1831), 2 Ru. & My. 614, Brougham; the question arose incidentally in a suit about property. The cause of the divorce, which in this case was granted in the domicile, does not appear; but the learned Chancellor thought himself bound to follow the resolution in *Lolley's Case*, which he, while strongly objecting to it, extended, perhaps inadvertently, by interpreting it as deciding that a marriage contracted in England was indissoluble by any foreign proceeding, and therefore of course for any cause alleged in such proceeding. But the resolution in *Lolley's Case*

does not appear to have passed at any time without question. Lord Eldon, before whom *McCarthy v. Decair* had been argued prior to its being heard by Lord Brougham, had refused to ignore the divorce in the domicile without further assistance: 2 Ru. & My. 619. Then, by Lushington, in *Conway v. Beazley* (1831), 3 Hagg. Eccl. 639; by Blackburne, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, in *Maghee v. McAllister* (1853), 3 Ir. Ch. 604; and by Cranworth and Kingsdown, in *Dolphin v. Robins* (1859), 7 H. L. 390; *Lolley's Case* was treated as not concluding the point where the divorce is granted in the domicile, though the decisions in the first and third cases were against the validity of the divorce, which had not been granted in the domicile. In *Wilson's Trusts* (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 247, Kindersley revived Brougham's extension of the resolution in *Lolley's Case*, and relied on it as against the foreign dissolution of a marriage which had been contracted in England before the Matrimonial Causes Act came into operation; but when his judgment was affirmed on other grounds, *sub nom.* *Shaw v. Gould* (1868), L. R. 3 E. & I. A. 55, Cranworth, Chelmsford, Westbury and Colonsay renewed the refusal to adopt the resolution even in its proper interpretation, and Lord Westbury (p. 84) strongly urged the inconvenience of referring to the *lex loci contractus* of a marriage on the subject of divorce. In *Shaw v. Att.-Gen.* (1870), Lord Penzance said that *Lolley's Case* had never been overruled, and referred to the grounds of divorce admitted in this country, as being possibly important with regard to the recognition in England of a divorce, granted in the actual domicile of the parties, from "an English marriage between English subjects," by which he probably meant a marriage in which both the *locus contractus* and the matrimonial domicile are English: L. R. 2 P. & M. 161.

Now however the resolution in *Lolley's Case*, and all reference to the causes for which a marriage is dissoluble in England when the question is about the validity to be allowed in this country to a foreign divorce, have been set aside, it may be supposed finally, by *Harvey v. Farnie* (1880), 5 P. D. 153, Hannen; affirmed (1880), 6 P. D. 35, James, Cotton and Lush; affirmed again (1882), 8 Ap. Ca. 43, Selborne, Blackburn and Watson.* See also *Briggs v. Briggs* (1880), 5 P. D. 163, Hannen.† In some of the judgments in these cases a desire was shown to save the credit of the famous resolution by interpreting the expression in it, "an English marriage," as referring to the matrimonial domicile and not to the place of celebration, and importing into it the further condition that the English domicile continues at the date of the foreign divorce. But, not to mention that the authorities nearest to the date probably knew best what was intended, and that a reference to the matrimonial domicile is not at all in the vein of that day, it may be remarked that such an interpretation would only shift the difficulty without getting rid of it. The judgments in *Harvey v. Farnie* and *Briggs v. Briggs* plainly show that the real intention in these latest

* S. P., *Bater v. Bater*, [1906] P. 209. But the cause for divorce, as possibly connected with the contract of marriage, cropped up again, though harmlessly, in *Re Stirling*; *Stirling v. Stirling*, [1908] 2 Ch. 344, Swinfen Eady.

† It has been held in the Australian courts that, where there has been desertion, and by the law of the domicile of the parties at the time of the desertion the court could have granted a judicial separation, but the husband subsequently acquired a domicile in a country where the court could grant a divorce, the court in that country should grant the decree of dissolution (see *Cremier v. Cremier*, [1905] V. L. R. 532). The redress granted is not that given in the foreign country but the particular redress attached to the particular offence by the *lex fori*.

cases was to support the divorce pronounced in the actual domicile for whatever cause, irrespective as well of the matrimonial domicile as of the place where the marriage was celebrated. Lord Justice James appears to have questioned whether the resolution in *Lolley's Case* is correctly reported, thinking it rather in the style of Lord Coke's time than in that of 1812: 6 P. D. 43, 44. But the difference from Lord Coke's time is probably less due to the judges, who have always given their reasons, than to the reporters, who then put the substance of the reasons sententiously, and now report the speech from the Bench as they would a speech from a platform. *Lolley's Case* is no doubt one of the last reported in the old sententious style, but that is not a cause for doubting that, as we have it, the so-called resolution in it correctly singles out the points on which the judges laid the stress of their decision. It only remains to observe that in the judgments in *Harvey v. Farnie* will be found proof that Lord Brougham's dicta in *McCarthy v. Decaix* were not called for by the matter before him. This is a converse error to that imputed to the reporter in *Lolley's Case*, who at least did not travel outside the facts, but is accused of having indicated too precisely on which of the facts the judges relied.

The *lex loci contractus* of a marriage was also more or less vaguely referred to, with reference to the validity of a divorce from it, in the following cases from which no rule can be extracted. *Tovey v. Lindsay* (1813), 1 Dow 117, Eldon and Redesdale; *Ryan v. Ryan* (1816), 2 Phil. Eccl. 332, Nicholl; *Connolly v. Connolly* (1851), 7 Mo. P. C. 438, Lushington, in which case the validity of a separation *a mensa et toro* was in question; *Argent v. Argent* (1865), 11 Jur. (N. S.) 864, Wilde; *Birt v. Boutinez* (1868), L. R. 1 P. & M. 487, Penzance.

The extent to which the rules of private international law adopted in England fall short of receiving universal assent is perhaps more remarkable in the matter of divorce than in any other part of our subject. To illustrate it, I will give the substance of the Hague convention of 12th June, 1902, on divorce, concluded between the twelve states mentioned on p. 37.* Neither divorce nor judicial separation (*séparation de corps*) is to be granted unless it is allowed both by the *lex fori* and by the national law of the parties, and that, both generally (Art. 1) and in the particular case (Art. 2). Nevertheless, the national law alone shall be observed if the *lex fori* directs or permits that course (Art. 3). The national law of the parties cannot give the character of a cause of divorce or of judicial separation to a fact which took place when the parties or one of them had another nationality (Art. 4). An action for divorce or judicial separation can be brought (1°) in the jurisdiction competent by the national law of the parties; (2°) in the competent jurisdiction of their domicile. If by their national law the domicile of the parties is not the same, the competent jurisdiction is that of the defendant's domicile. If the domicile has been

* Now denounced by France and Belgium. See above, p. 33.

abandoned or changed after the happening of the cause of divorce or judicial separation, the action may also be brought in the competent jurisdiction of the last common domicile. However, the national jurisdiction of the parties is reserved, so far as it is exclusively competent for actions for divorce or judicial separation. The foreign jurisdiction remains competent for a marriage which cannot be the subject of an action for divorce or judicial separation in the competent national jurisdiction (Art. 5). Where a husband and wife are not authorized to bring an action for divorce or judicial separation in the country where they are domiciled, either of them may nevertheless apply to the competent jurisdiction of that country for the provisional measures which its laws furnish in view of the cessation of the common life. Those measures shall be maintained if they are confirmed within a year by the national jurisdiction of the parties; they shall not last longer than the law of the domicile permits (Art. 6). Divorce and judicial separation, pronounced by a court competent according to Art. 5, shall be recognized everywhere, on condition that the clauses of the present convention have been observed, and that, if the judgment has been given in default of appearance, the defendant has been cited in accordance with the special dispositions required by his national law for the recognition of foreign judgments. Divorce and judicial separation pronounced by an administrative jurisdiction shall equally be recognized everywhere, if the law of each of the parties recognizes such divorce or separation (Art. 7). If the parties have not the same nationality, the law last common to them shall be considered as their national law for the application of the preceding articles (Art. 8).*

Legitimacy.

The subject of legitimacy is one with regard to which it is impossible fully to carry out the maxim of determining questions of status by the personal law of the party concerned, for whether the criterion be domicile or political nationality, the personal law of a newly born child will generally be that of its father if it be legitimate, but if it be illegitimate will be derived from its mother or from the place of its birth. Hence in numberless cases a decision on the personal law can only be reached through a previous decision on the legitimacy. But every question of

* Revue de D. I. et de L. C., 2^e série, t. 4, p. 492.

legitimacy must involve that of the validity of some marriage, and if the party concerned was born before the marriage it must involve the further question of the applicability to his case of a rule concerning subsequent legitimation existing in some national law. Also the validity of a marriage may depend on that of the divorce of one of the parties to it from a previous marriage, and thus the subject of legitimacy can be treated as a corollary to those of marriage and divorce, with an appendix relating to legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium*.

Different cases may occur on the remarriage of a divorced person during the life of his or her former consort. When it is the man who has been divorced and remarries, and at the date of his remarriage his personal law is that of a country in which, as well as in the *locus actus* of the remarriage, the whole series of transactions is held to be valid, it would seem to be an excess of refinement to make any objection on the ground that at the date of the divorce his personal law was that of a country in which the jurisdiction that granted the divorce would not be deemed internationally competent. He has changed his domicile or his political nationality between the dates of the divorce and the remarriage; he was competent to make such change, whether the divorce was valid or not; and it would be unreasonable to make the legitimacy of his children depend on his personal law at any date prior to that of the marriage from which they spring. But when the woman has been divorced and remarries, her power to change her domicile or political nationality in the interval depends on the validity of the divorce. Therefore if her personal law at the date of the divorce was that of a country which would not recognize it, she never acquired a capacity to remarry in accordance with her personal law; and pursuant to the doctrine that the capacity of each party to a marriage according to his personal law is requisite, which in § 21 has been expressed with regard to age and the prohibited degrees, it must be unavailing to allege that the divorce and the remarriage would be deemed valid in the *locus actus* of the latter and by the personal law of the second husband. Since the main scope of this work is to present the English authorities, it is not necessary here to discuss a case which does not appear to have arisen before our courts, namely that in which a sentence of judicial separation, pronounced in her undoubted country, may authorize a woman to transfer her domicile independently of her husband, and thereby to acquire a capacity for remarriage without any divorce which otherwise

than by reason of such transfer would be held valid in her former country. The next § shows that on the point which has occurred the English authorities take the view just now expressed.

§ 53. Where the capacity of a woman to remarry depends on the validity of a divorce the jurisdiction for which is not deemed in England to have been internationally competent, the children of the remarriage will be deemed illegitimate in England, notwithstanding that the remarriage is deemed to be valid in its *locus actus* and by the personal law of the new husband.

Re Wilson (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 247, Kindersley; confirmed, *sub nom. Shaw v. Gould* (1868), L. R. 3 E. & I. A. 55, Cranworth, Chelmsford, Westbury, Colonsay.

§ 54. With regard to the legitimation of a child by the subsequent marriage of its parents, neither the place of its birth nor that where the marriage is contracted is important. But such legitimation cannot take place unless permitted by the personal law of the father at the date of the marriage.

Since the legitimated child must acquire the personal law of its father, its legitimation in despite of the personal law of the father at the time of the legitimation would be a contradiction.

Dalhousie v. McDouall (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 817; *Munro v. Munro* (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 842; both decided together by Cottenham and Brougham. In these cases the father's domicile was held not to have been changed between the date of the birth and that of the marriage, but in stating the point before the house Brougham made no mention of the domicile of the father at the former date, but only at the latter: p. 882. Then he quoted the opinion of certain of the Scotch judges appealed from, that "the condition of children previously born . . . must be determined by the law of the country where the parents were domiciled at the birth and the marriage. If the domicile was not the same for both parents at these two periods, we should hold that that of the father at the time of the marriage should give the rule. But as they were the same in this case, the question does not arise." And with reference to the opinion thus quoted he added immediately, "thus agreeing clearly upon the point of law with the majority of the learned judges, though they differed in point of fact:" p. 884. Finally, he described himself as "agreeing with almost the whole of them," the Scotch judges, "upon the question of law:" p. 893. Lord Brougham therefore would have supported a wider statement than has been ventured on in the §, namely one that legitimation by subsequent marriage depends only on the law of the father's domicile at the date of the marriage; but Lord Cottenham contented himself with "the proposition, that the child of a Scotchman, though born in England, becomes legitimate for all civil purposes in Scotland by the subsequent marriage of the parents in England, if the domicile of the father was and continued throughout to be Scotch:" p. 875. The subsequent marriage of Jewish parents in England does not make their children already born abroad legitimate, the Jewish law on legitimation not being recognised as a personal law. *Levy v.*

Solomon (1877), 25 W. R. 342. See too *The Lauderdale Peerage*, 10 A. C. 692, at p. 739, Selborne.

§ 55. Neither however can the legitimation of a child by the subsequent marriage of its parents take place unless it is also permitted by the personal law of the father at the date of the birth.

This was decided by Vicechancellor Wood, in *Re Wright* (1856), 2 K. & J. 595, not noticing the contrary opinion of Lord Brougham shown under the last § and erroneously quoting Lord Cottenham as saying in *Munro v. Munro* that "the question in such cases must be, can the legitimization of the children be effected in the country in which the father is domiciled at their birth?" p. 614. The doctrine however was repeated by the same judge, as Lord Hatherley, in *Udny v. Udny* (1869), L. R. 1 S. & D. A. 447, and followed in *Goodman v. Goodman* (1862), 3 Giff. 643, Stuart; and it has since been again asserted in *Re Grove, Vaucher v. Solicitor to Treasury*, 40 Ch. D. 216, Cotton, Fry and Lopes (1888), affirming *Stirling* (1887).

Savigny's opinion is the same as that of the Scotch judges in *Munro v. Munro* and of Lord Brougham. He says: "legitimation by subsequent marriage is regulated according to the father's domicile at the time of the marriage, and in this respect the time of the birth of the child is immaterial. It has indeed been asserted that this latter point of time must be regarded, because by his birth the child has already established a certain legal relation, which only obtains fuller effect by the subsequent marriage of the parents; and it is added that the father could arbitrarily elect before the marriage a domicile disadvantageous to the child. But we cannot speak at all of a right of such children or of a violation of it, since it depends on the free will of the father not only whether he marries the mother at all, but even, if he contracts such a marriage, whether he will recognize the child. In both these cases the child obtains no right of legitimacy, for a true proof of filiation out of wedlock is impossible, and accordingly voluntary recognition, along with marriage and independently of it, can alone confer on the child the rights of legitimacy."*

The following cases bear on the subject of legitimacy, but it is not possible to extract a rule from them. *Strathmore Peerage* (1821), 6 Paton 645. •Eldon and Redesdale; *Munro v. Saunders*, or *Rose v. Ross* (1830), 6 Bligh N. R. 468, 4 Wils & Sh. 289, Eldon, Lyndhurst, Wynford. In Bligh's report of *Rose v. Ross* the date is incorrectly given as 1832, and the respondent is incorrectly named *Rose* in the title.

* Syst. § 380, Guthrie 250.

§ 56. A child whose legitimacy has been acquired through the subsequent marriage of its father, domiciled abroad, ranks as a child under the British legacy and succession duty acts.

Skottowe v. Young (1871), L. R. 11 Eq. 474, Stuart.

See the same principle applied to the statute of distributions and to the construction of wills of personalty in § 126, which might equally well have been placed here, but it was desirable to notice the point both here and in connection with personal successions.

§ 57. But if a child born in a country politically foreign be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of its parents, it will not thereby be naturalized under st. 4 Geo. 2, c. 21, although its father was a natural-born British subject; because the benefit of that act is expressly limited to children whose fathers were natural-born subjects at the time of their birth, and at the time of its birth the child was not only an alien but *filius nullius*, and in legal understanding had no natural-born subject for its father.

Shedden v. Patrick (1854), 1 Macq. 535, Cranworth, Brougham, St. Leonards.

§ 58. Where there has been no marriage at all between the parents, a foreign law entitling illegitimate children to succeed, as such, leaves them strangers in blood within the English Succession Duty Act.

Atkinson v. Anderson (1882), 21 Ch. D. 100, Hall.

There is a curious case of *Re Ullee, the Nawab Nazim of Bengal's infants* (1885), 53 L. T. (N. S.) 711, Chitty; 54 L. T. (N. S.) 286, Baggallay, Bowen and Fry. The Nawab Nazim, a Mahometan British subject, domiciled in British India, and who had at least one wife living in that country, went in England through a ceremony of marriage according to Mahometan rites with a Christian Englishwoman who did not know that he had any other wife. The issue of that union were treated by the British Government of India as being children of the Nawab Nazim, and it seems that this could not have been otherwise, whatever opinion was entertained about the effect of the marriage ceremony, because the father had recognised them and, as Mr. Justice Chitty said, "that the Mahommedan law allows recognition to establish legitimacy is clear from the authorities referred to by Mr. Macnaghten in his argument." The status of the children in England was discussed, but it was not necessary to determine it. Had it been so, Mr. (later Lord) Macnaghten's argument in favour of their legitimacy, which was in effect that the personal law of the father ought to be as efficacious in the case of legitimation by acknowledgment as in that of legitimation by subsequent marriage, appears to be conclusive, and Mr. Justice Chitty evidently leant to that opinion. If in similar circumstances it should become important to determine the effect of the ceremony as constituting a valid Mahometan marriage, the first question would be whether the woman intended such a marriage, and if she did it might be argued, in accordance with the principle of § 26, p. 63 and having regard to the man's Indian domicile,

that he might marry with the forms of his own law where the *lex loci actus* supplied no applicable form. See § 34a, p. 69. But a marriage of a Moslem Indian celebrated before a registrar in England will be assumed to be a Christian marriage. See *Ex parte Mir Anwareddin* (u.s.).

It must be observed, with regard to the doctrines on legitimation quoted in this section even from English authorities, that they do not determine the right of succeeding to real property in England. We shall see in due place that the right of inheriting English land is held to be limited by the condition of having been born in wedlock, in addition to that of being legitimate.

§ 58a. The question whether a child is a bastard depends entirely on the law of the domicile of the parents at the time of the birth: and the fact that the child is born abroad is immaterial as regards status—*R. v. Humphreys*, [1914] 3 K. B. 123, Bankes and Lush, JJ., Avory, J., dissenting. So too the liability of a father to maintain his son is determined solely by the law of the father's domicile—*Coldringham Parish Council v. Smith*, [1918] L. J. Newsp., p. 181, Sutton, J.

CHAPTER V.

SUCCESSION TO MOVABLES ON DEATH.

AFTER status, capacity, and family relations, I pass to the remaining cases in which property is considered in special connection with a person, in order to exhaust the applications of the personal law while on the subject of it; and of such applications the most important, after those connected with marriage, are those connected with death. These must for English practice be limited to movables, because for that branch of our subject English land is in no case subjected to the personal law but always to the *lex situs*.

In England, and in those countries and colonies of which the law is derived from that of England, the personal or movable property of a deceased person can only be possessed under a grant from public authority, usually judicial. Such grant is, in England, in one of three forms:

- (1) Probate of a will, granted to the persons, one or more, appointed in such will as executors;
- (2) Administration with the will annexed, where no executor is appointed by the will;
- (3) Administration, where the deceased left no will.

The executors or administrators have to realize the personal property of the deceased, pay his debts, and distribute the surplus among those who may be entitled under the will, or by law in case of intestacy. These duties are classed together under the name of administration, which term has therefore two meanings: it is used in opposition to probate, to express a certain description of public grant, and it is used to express that course of dealing with the property granted which is expected from the grantee, whatever was the kind of grant.

In cases where the deceased person died after the Land Transfer Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict. c. 65, came into operation, on 1st January, 1898, the real or immovable property also vests in the executor or administrator in the same way as personal property.

In those countries of which the law has been derived from that of Rome more directly than has been the case with the English law on the subject, the movable property of a deceased person, like his immovable property, descends on the heirs appointed by his will or entitled by law as the case may be, and in some cases on his universal legatees, subject of course to the acceptance of such heirs or legatees. And these are liable personally for the debts of the deceased, though, if they have accepted the succession with benefit of inventory, only to the amount of the property received by them, to which amount they are also liable for the particular legacies bequeathed by the will; but the beneficial interest is theirs, subject to the satisfaction of the debts and particular legacies. The appointment of executors by a testator is exceptional, and the power of making it is usually limited, as for instance by Art. 1026 of the Code Napoleon, which permits seisin of movable property alone to be given to the executors, and of this for not more than a year and a day.

In the former or English system, only the beneficial interest in the surplus of personal property (and since 1898 in the real property also), remaining after payment of debts, is transmitted on death, whether in the case of testacy or of intestacy. The personal property itself passes by the public grant, made after the death and implying no beneficial interest, though in the absence of an executor appointed by will it is usually made to some one beneficially interested. In the latter or continental system, the movable property is itself transmitted on death, whether in the case of testacy or of intestacy, and such transmission implies a beneficial interest, which is limited only by the debts and legacies to be satisfied out of it. This system, as will be perceived, is very similar to that which through successive legislative changes came to exist in England for real property before the Land Transfer Act, 1897. The common origin of both systems is the ancient principle of Roman law, by which the heir continued, and in that sense represented, the person of the deceased, both as to his rights and as to his obligations. The principle has been modified in England, for personal property, first by making a public grant necessary in all cases for the representation of a deceased person, and secondly by separating the beneficial interest in the representation from the representation itself; and the executor or administrator, called in England the personal representative, has thus come to be something very

different from the complete continuator of the deceased's person. In the continental system the principle has been modified only by the benefit of inventory, introduced by Justinian.

In working out the problems which arise for private international law out of these systems, the continental rule governs movable succession, whether testate or intestate, by the personal law of the deceased, this being extended by the Italian code, in accordance with the opinion of Savigny,* even to the immovable property of the deceased situate in other countries than his own.

The principle which lies at the base of the English authorities with regard to succession in personal property is in substance an adaptation of the same rule to the English system, and may be stated thus:

§ 59. The law of a deceased person's last domicile governs the beneficial interest in the surplus of his personal property, after payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration, that is of getting in and distributing such property; and this, whether in the case of testacy or in that of intestacy. The law here meant is the whole law of the last domicile, and not merely its so-called internal law. See the discussion of *renvoi* in Chapter II., and especially *Re Trufort* and *Re Johnson*, quoted on pp. 36, 37. In the latter case Farwell, J., explaining what the law of Baden must have intended by its reference to the British nationality of the *de cujus*, said that "distribution according to the law of the nationality means according to English law, but according to that law as applicable to the particular propositus, and not to Englishmen generally without regard to their domicile of origin:" [1903] 1 Ch. 835. The words "of origin" must be read only in connection with the particular case. If Miss Johnson had left Malta for another British domicile before she went to Baden, it is that British domicile of choice which would have governed.

And since no law can be so well expounded or applied as by the courts of the country where it is in force, the following corollary from the last § is well established:

§ 60. Where the court of a deceased person's last domicile has had an opportunity of declaring who are entitled to the beneficial interest in his personal property, subject to payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and expenses of administration, its authority is regarded in England as final, whether the question

* Syst. § 376, Guthrie 227.

arises on a claim to a grant of administration, on a claim to be heard as contradictor to a will propounded for probate, in the distribution of the English assets after payment of debts and the other expenses above mentioned, or in any other way. This consequence would not follow from the first sentence of § 59 on the theory of those who oppose the *renvoi* and the doctrine of Chapter II., for according to them the English court would have to follow the internal law of the last domicile, whereas a court of that country would apply its whole law. That the present § is well established in English practice is therefore another argument to disprove the alleged reception in England of the view that our rules of private international law refer only to the so-called internal laws of other countries.

Crispin v. Doglioni (1863), 3 S. & T. 96, Cresswell; (1866), L. R. 1 E. & L. A. 301, Chelmsford and Cranworth; *Re Trufort*, above, p. 39, and the citation from Farwell, J., in *Re Johnson*, under § 59.

§ 61. Where the law of the deceased's last domicile refers his movable succession to the law of his nationality, the doctrine of § 60 applies to the court of the country to which he belonged by nationality.

This is the very point of *Re Trufort*, *Trafford v. Blanc* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 600, Stirling. The question of domicile in Turkey and other countries with which we have not the full communion of private international law will be considered in the chapter on Domicile.

§ 62. By the law of the deceased's last domicile, in the preceding §§, must be understood that law as it existed at the date of his death. A retrospective law, passed since the death, will be disregarded by the English court in all questions concerning the succession.

Lynch v. Provisional Government of Paraguay (1871), L. R. 2 P. & M. 268, Penzance; *Re Aganoor's Trusts*, [1895] 64 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 521, Romer.

The more detailed international questions which arise in England on the matter of personal succession may conveniently be taken in the order of the proceedings in a particular case. First will come the rules as to the person to whom a grant of probate or administration is made, and those as to what wills are provable: both these operate at the same time in determining the grant, but the former are of more general application, because they comprise the case of intestacy as well as that of testacy. Next will come the rules as to what property *passes* by

the grant of probate or administration, and, last, those which decide the questions that can arise in the administration of such property, taking the word administration in the second of the two senses contrasted on p. 105.

The Grant of Probate or Administration.

§ 63. Whatever the domicile or political nationality of the deceased, his personal property situate in England cannot be lawfully possessed, or if recoverable in England cannot be sued for, without an English grant of probate or administration, unless the property be money due under an insurance policy upon his own life;

Tourton v. Flower (1735), 3 P. W. 369, Talbot. *New York Breweries Co., Lim. v. Att.-Gen.*, [1899] A. C. 62, Halsbury, Watson, Shand and Davey, affirming Smith, Rigby and Collins, who had reversed Wills and Grantham; a case of shares and debentures in an English company. *Price v. Dewhurst* (1838), 4 M. & C. 76, Cottenham; illustrating what is a necessary consequence of the §, that in the judicial administration of the personal estate of a deceased person, that is to say when the duty of the executors or administrators to administer is being carried out under the direction of a court—see the second sense of administration, p. 105—the court can take no notice of any will which has not been proved in England. *Ex parte Fernandes' Executors* (1870), L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 314, Giffard, reversing Romilly. The exception is based on a statutory provision (section 19 of the Revenue Act, 1889), which provides that in the case of a policy upon his own life taken out by a person dying domiciled out of the United Kingdom, the production of a grant from a court in the United Kingdom shall not be necessary to “establish the right to receive the amount assured.” *Haas v. Atlas Insurance Co.*, [1913] 2 K. B. 209, Scrutton.

In *Huthwaite v. Phayre* (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 159, Tindal, Bosanquet, Coltman and Erskine allowed an administrator under an Irish grant to sue on a deed which was assumed to have been *bona notabilia* in Ireland at the date of the death. But this was certainly an error: see *Whyte v. Rose*, under the next §. In *Vanquelin v. Bouard* (1863), 15 C. B. (N. S.) 341; second count and 16th plea; it was held by Erle, Williams, and Keating that a universal successor, entitled under the law of a deceased person's domicile to sue in his own right for debts comprised in the succession, could sue for them in England in his own name, without an English grant. At the same time they were anxious to save the rule laid down in this §, only they seemed to think that their own holding applied to a peculiar case, instead of the case before them being the general one under continental law.

If however the question does not relate to the personal estate of a deceased person as such, but to property which the persons acting under his will admit to be held by them in trust pursuant to it, *quare* whether the English court may not look at a foreign probate as it might look at any other document presented to it as containing the terms of the trust. *Re Tootal's Trusts* (1883), 23 Ch. D. 532 (pp. 541, 2), Chitty, may perhaps

be sustained on this ground, independent of the ground noticed in *Re Vallance* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 177, Pearson.

§ 64. And no grant from any foreign jurisdiction is necessary, to enable a suit for any personal property of the deceased to be maintained in England.

Whyte v. Rose (1842), 3 Q. B. 496, Tindal, Abinger, Coltman, Maule, Parke, Alderson, Rolfe; reversing the same case, (1840), ib. 493, Denman, Littledale, Patteson, Coleridge.

§ 65. The leading maxim for determining the person to whom the English grant should be made cannot be better expressed than by the following quotation. "I have before acted on the general principle that where the court of the country of the domicile of the deceased makes a grant to a party, who then comes to this court and satisfies it that by the proper authority of his own country he has been authorized to administer the estate of the deceased, I ought without further consideration to grant power to that person to administer the English assets." Lord Penzance in *Re Hill* (1870), L. R., 2 P. & M. 90. Only, "this court cannot follow the foreign law so far as to grant administration to any one who is personally disqualified from taking the grant. For instance, however much the foreign courts may think that a minor should have the grant, this court cannot go so far as to give it to such a person." Jeune, P., in *Re Meatyard*, [1903] P., at pp. 129, 130. In that case administration with the will annexed was granted to receivers appointed by the court of the domicile, passing over executors appointed by the will. Cf. *Re D'Orléans*, u.s., p. 41.

Lord Penzance is reported to have expressed the same maxim on another occasion as follows: "It is a general rule on which I have already acted that where a person dies domiciled in a foreign country, and the court of that country invests anybody, no matter whom, with the right to administer the estate, this court ought to follow the grant simply, because it is the grant of a foreign court, without investigating the grounds on which it was made, and without reference to the principles on which grants are made in this country." *Re Smith* (1868), 16 W. R. 1130, Wilde. But this mode of expressing the maxim is scarcely so accurate, for it will be seen that so long as power to administer is granted to the same person who has received it from the court of the domicile, it is not always necessary that he should receive it in the same form: below, § 69. In support of the present §, see also *Re Rogerson* (1840), 2 Cur. 656, Jenner.

The grant, whether or not in pursuance of a foreign grant, ought to be in such form as will enable the grantee to fulfil the duties imposed on him by the law of the domicile: *Re Briesemann*, [1894] P. 260, Jeune. See *Re von Linden*, [1896] P. 148, Jeune; *Re Mary Moffatt*, [1900] P. 152, Jeune; *Re Vannini*, [1901] P. 330, Jeune.

A converse rule to that of § 65, requiring that, where the deceased was domiciled in England, power to administer should be granted in the colonies to the person who had received such power in England, was laid down by the Privy Council as early as 1762, in *Burn v. Cole*, Ambl. 415, Mansfield. In *Browne v. Phillips* (1737), there cited, the Privy Council considered that the rule did not extend to the case where administration in the domicile had been granted to a creditor; and it may not be quite certain that Lord Mansfield disapproved this limitation, though his own words in *Burn v. Cole* do not repeat it. He cited however with disapproval the reason given for the rule in *Williams v. —* (1747), P. C., Lee, "that the plantations, being within the diocese of London, are subordinate to the prerogative of Canterbury;" "the better and more substantial reason for such a determination," he said, "is the residency."

Where a foreign court had assigned certain property of the testator to one of his heirs, administration was granted to that heir, limited to the property so assigned: *Re Dost Aly Khan* (1880), 6 P. D. 6, Hannen.

Administration with will annexed granted to attorneys for the use and benefit of one who by the executor in the domicile had been lawfully substituted as such for himself: *Re Black* (1887), 13 P. D. 5, Butt.

§ 65a. If no order has been made by the court of the foreign domicile appointing executors, the English court will, in a proper case, grant probate to executors appointed by an English will. The rule that the English court will not grant probate so as to conflict with any appointment made by the court of the deceased's foreign domicile only applies if the actual order is made by the foreign court, and not when proceedings only have been commenced—*Re Cocquerel*, [1918] P. 4, Evans.

§ 66. The rule of § 65 applies in favour of one who has received in the domicile a grant *de bonis non*, as well as to one who has received an original grant.

Re Hill (1870), L. R. 2 P. & M. 89, Penzance.

§ 67. And it has been applied in favour of one who in the domicile had been appointed judicial administrator, pending a suit to determine which of two wills was valid.

Viesca v. d'Aramburu (1839), 2 Cur. 277, Jenner.

§ 68. Also in favour of one who in the domicile has been appointed provisional executor, during the incapacity of the executor named by the will; and the grant of administration was then limited to such time as the authority of the provisional executor should continue in the domicile.

Re Steigerwald (1864), 19 Jur. (N. S.) 159, Wilde.

In *Re Levy*, [1908] P. 108, Gorell Barnes, where a foreign court appointed a judicial administrator for a limited time, the English court made a general grant to him. But it is doubtful if this decision would be followed. (See L. Q. R., [1913] p. 40).

§ 69. Where in the testator's domicile probate had been granted to one as executor according to the tenour, the case being such that according to English practice he would only have been entitled to administration with the will annexed, the grant to the foreign executor will only be administration with the will annexed.

Re Read (1828), 1 Hagg. Eccl. 474, Nicholl; *Re Mackenzie* (1856), Deane 17, Dodson; *Re Cosnahan* (1866), L. R. 1 P. & M. 183, Wilde; *Re Earl* (1867), L. R. 1 P. & M. 450, Wilde.

§ 70. "From and after the date aforesaid" [12th November, 1858] "it shall be competent to include in the inventory of the personal estate and effects of any person who shall have died domiciled in Scotland any personal estate or effects of the deceased situated in England or in Ireland, or in both: provided that the person applying for confirmation shall satisfy the commissary, and that the commissary shall by his interlocutor find, that the deceased died domiciled in Scotland, which interlocutor shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of domicile: provided also that the value of such personal estate and effects situated in England or Ireland respectively shall be separately stated in such inventory, and such inventory shall be impressed with a stamp corresponding to the entire value of the estate and effects included therein, wheresoever situated within the United Kingdom." Confirmation and Probate Act, 1858; st. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 56; s. 9.

"From and after the date aforesaid, when any confirmation of the executor of a person who shall in manner aforesaid be found to have died domiciled in Scotland, which includes besides the personal estate situated in Scotland also personal estate situated in England, shall be produced in the principal court of probate in England, and a copy thereof deposited with the registrar, together with a certified copy of the interlocutor of the commissary finding that such deceased person died domiciled in Scotland, such confirmation shall be sealed with the seal of the said court and returned to the person producing the same, and shall thereafter have the like force and effect in England as if a probate or letters of administration, as the case may be, had been granted by the said court of probate." *Ib.* s. 12.

This legislation provides, in fact, for a new form of English grant and proof, and therefore does not impair the necessity of an English grant for possession or suit in England, or the neces-

sity of an English proof before a court of administration in England can take notice of a will, as laid down under § 63.

Where confirmation of a Scotch will has been granted in Scotland to the executors, the resealing in England will be granted by the English probate authorities, although the confirmation is to a person who, according to English law, is not competent to be an executor: *Re Rankin's Estate*, [1918] P. 134, Court of Appeal, Swinfen Eady, Bankes, Eve; reversing Coleridge. The Scotch will appointed a corporation as executors, and it was held that the confirmation of the will must be resealed in England without question, although a corporation by English law cannot take out probate.

Sect. 13 of the same act is identical with s. 12, putting Ireland for England, and s. 14 makes a corresponding provision for giving efficacy in Scotland to probates and letters of administration granted in England or Ireland to the executors or administrators of persons who died domiciled in the latter countries respectively.

The English court can however grant probate or letters of administration in a case where the Irish grant has not in fact been resealed: *Irwin v. Caruth*, [1916] P. 23, Horridge.

§ 70a. Another new form of English grant is given by the Colonial Probates Act, 1892, which provides for the sealing in the United Kingdom of probates and letters of administration granted in British possessions which have made adequate provision for reciprocity, or by British courts in foreign countries. The latter of course are consular courts, either in countries really foreign or in British colonial protectorates.

Resealing of colonial letters of administration may be allowed in England though the intestate leaves no estate in England: *Re Sanders*, [1900] P. 292, Gorell.

70b. The Government of Ireland Act, 1920, has not affected the procedure in resealing Irish grants of administration, and the Colonial Probates Act, 1892, has no application to Ireland, *Re Robert Gault*, [1922] W. N. p. 116, Duke, P.

§ 71. Where the deceased died domiciled abroad, and no one has been authorized to administer his personal estate by any court of his domicile, either because such authorization was unnecessary by the law of that country or otherwise, the English court makes the grant:

First, to the executors, if any, appointed by the will or appearing from its tenour.

And where the will of a testator who died domiciled abroad contains a general appointment of executors, the English court

ought to grant probate of it to the executors so appointed without inquiring whether the will operates on any personal property in England, just as it would do in the case of the will of an English testator.

Lord Chelmsford, in *Enohin v. Wylie* (1862), 10 H. L. 1, p. 23. Lord Westbury, in the same case, p. 14, referred to the further circumstance that the will had been authenticated by the executors in the proper court of the domicile; but the proposition does not seem to need that qualification.

§ 72. But where a testator appoints by the same will different executors for his English and foreign property, it may reasonably be assumed that those appointed for the latter will not be entitled to any probate in England.

In *Re Winter*, cited under § 78, Sir C. Cresswell said: "I find that when a testator has left general executors and a limited executor, the practice has been to grant probate to each of them according to the terms of his appointment. I do not quite see the principle upon which that practice has obtained." With deference, the practice seems sound, and it leads to the conclusion that no probate can be granted to an executor specially appointed for property not within the jurisdiction.

Where a will is only good so far as it is an execution of a power of appointment, the grant will be limited to such property as the deceased had power to dispose of and did dispose of by will, unless a larger grant can be supported by necessary consents: *Re Tréfond*, [1899] P. 247, Jeune.

Where a testator domiciled abroad makes two wills, one dealing exclusively with land in England and appointing English executors, and the other dealing with foreign property and personalty in England and appointing a foreign executor, the court may make a grant to the executors of the former will limited to the realty in England and a *ceterorum* grant to the foreign executor: *Re Von Brentano*, [1911] P. 172, Evans.

§ 73. And an executor appointed by the will, but whose executorship has expired by the law of the testator's last domicile, is not entitled to any grant in England.

Laneville v. Anderson (1860), 2 S. & T. 24, Cresswell. Where by the law of the testator's last domicile the executor was only entitled to possession for a year, probate was granted limited to the expiration of one year from the death: *Re Groos*, [1904] P. 269, Gorell Barnes.

§ 74. In the case of foreign wills not expressly appointing executors, the English practice, where one is named as heir, is to grant him probate as executor according to the tenour, but only to grant administration with the will annexed to a universal legatee.

Re Oliphant (1860), 30 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 82, Cresswell; *Re Groos* (ub. sup.). And see what is said under § 65 as to the form of the grant to be made.

§ 75. Reverting to § 71, if there is no will, or no executors are appointed by the will or appear from its tenour, the second class of persons entitled to the grant, which under these circumstances must be one of administration and not of probate, is composed of those who as heirs, next of kin, or legatees, are interested in the beneficial succession, that is to say in the surplus after payment of debts and funeral and administration expenses. The English practice will be followed in selecting the grantees, subject to referring the question of beneficial interest to the law of the deceased's last domicile, understood as in § 59.

Re Stewart (1838), 1 Cur. 904, Nicholl. And see *Re Oliphant*, under the preceding §.

§ 76. And one who in the last domicile of the deceased represents the persons interested in the beneficial succession, for example as guardian of the deceased's children, is entitled to a grant of administration in England.

Re Bianchi (1862), 3 S. & T. 16, Cresswell.

§ 77. Thirdly, failing any title to the grant under the preceding §§, it will be made to a creditor.

Re Maraver (1828), 1 Hagg. Eccl. 498, Nicholl.

§ 78. Whether a testator died domiciled in England or abroad, administration will not be granted with a will or codicil relating only to foreign property annexed, nor will probate be granted of any such will or codicil unless it be incorporated by reference in some will otherwise entitled to probate in England, in which case not only do the two become virtually one document, but, also, it is necessary for the justification of the English executors that the will or codicil referred to should be included in the probate, in order that it may be seen that they have no concern with the property disposed of by it.

Re Murray, [1896] P. 65, Gorell Barnes; where it is said, p. 71, that on the other hand "the foreign will may incorporate the English will, in which case the foreign will would not be limited in its operation to property abroad, and both would be included in the probate."

Re Coodo (1867), L. R. 1 P. & M. 449, Wilde; overruling *Spratt v. Harris* (1833), 4 Hagg. Eccl. 405, Nicholl, and *Re Winter* (1861), 30 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 56, Cresswell. *Re Harris* (1870), L. R. 2 P. & M. 83,

Penzance; *Re De La Saussaye* (1873), L. R. 3 P. & M. 42, Hannen; *Re Howden* (1874), 43 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 26, Hannen; in all which cases the documents disposing of the foreign property were admitted to probate on the ground of incorporation, and in the last of them the second reason given in the § was assigned by the judge. Where there is no incorporation, an affidavit exhibiting an attested copy is filed, and is referred to in the probate of the will relating to English property: *Re Astor* (1876), 1 P. D. 150, Hannen; *Re Callaway* (1890), 15 P. D. 147, Butt. See too *Re De La Rue* (1890), 15 P. D. 185, Hannen; *Re Seaman*, [1891] P. 253, Jeune, where an affidavit was required showing that the movables mentioned in the Canadian will were in Canada at the time of the testator's death, and that the movables mentioned in the English will were in England; *Re P. A. Fraser*, [1891] P. 285, Jeune; *Re Tamplin*, [1894] P. 39, Gorell Barnes.

In *Re Bolton* (1877), 12 P. D. 202, Jeune, the wills dealing respectively with the English and Belgian property were both admitted to probate although neither was incorporated with the other, the Belgian executor having renounced and consented to the grant.

§ 79. By st. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 121, s. 4, it is enacted that subject to reciprocity being secured by a convention with the foreign state in question, and to the making of an order in council thereupon, "whenever any subject of such foreign state shall die within the dominions of her majesty, and there shall be no person present at the time of such death who shall be rightfully entitled to administer to the estate of such deceased person, it shall be lawful for the consul vice-consul or consular agent of such foreign state within that part of her majesty's dominions where such foreign subject shall die to take possession and have the custody of the personal property of the deceased, and to apply the same in payment of his or her debts and funeral expenses, and to retain the surplus for the benefit of the persons entitled thereto; but such consul, vice-consul or consular agent shall immediately apply for and shall be entitled to obtain from the proper court letters of administration of the effects of such deceased person, limited in such manner and for such time as to such court shall seem fit."

§ 79a. During the Great War the Public Trustee was invested with the custody of property left by will or on intestacy to alien enemies, and was authorised to take out administration for enemy next-of-kin. *Re J. Schiff*, [1915] P. 86, Deane; *Re Grundt and Oetl*, [1915] P. 126, Evans; *In the Goods of Woolf*, [1920]. McCardie, L.J.

After the conclusion of peace, the Public Trustee was also held entitled to a full grant of administration to the property in England of German subjects domiciled in Germany, without reference to the German executors and beneficiaries, the whole of such property being subject to the charge in favour of the Clearing House: *Re von dem Busche*, [1921] W. N. 359, Duke, P.

Validity of Wills of Personal Estate.

§ 80. As to the testamentary character of a document, and its validity as a will or codicil, with respect not only to the forms of execution but also to every circumstance on which the validity of a will may depend, the English court will follow a judgment obtained in the country in which the testator or alleged testator had his last domicile, which must be understood as including the country of his nationality in the case of § 61.

Probate, or administration with document annexed, granted on the strength of a judgment in the domicile. *Hare v. Nasmyth* (1816), 2 Add. 25, Nicholl; *Re Cosnahan* (1866), L. R. 1 P. & M. 183, Wilde; *Miller v. James* (1872), L. R. 3 P. & M. 4, Hannen. In the last case unsound mind and undue influence were objected, but the court held itself bound by the judgment in the domicile in favour of the will, although those objections had not been made there.

Probate, or administration with document annexed, refused or revoked on the strength of a judgment in the domicile. *Hare v. Nasmyth* (1821), 2 Add. 25, Nicholl, probate revoked; *Moore v. Darell* (1832), 4 Hagg. Eccl. 346, Nicholl; *Laneuville v. Anderson* (1860), 2 S. & T. 24, Cresswell.

But the English rule that a will is revoked by marriage, being part of matrimonial and not of testamentary law, will be applied when the matrimonial domicile was English, irrespective of the last domicile. All the judges in *Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan*, [1900] P. 211, seem to have agreed in this—Jeune, Lindley, Rigby, Vaughan Williams. A domiciled Englishwoman, who had made her will while domiciled in England, married a domiciled Scotchman. By Scotch law marriage does not revoke a will. Her will was not revoked: *Westerman v. Schwab*, [1905] 43 Scottish Law Reporter, 161.

§ 81. Yet it is said that where a court of the domicile has pronounced on a document propounded as testamentary, the authority which is allowed to that judgment in accordance with the preceding § rests only on its being conclusive evidence of the law of the domicile, and that it is therefore not sufficient to aver the judgment, but those who propound the document must aver its execution according to the law of the domicile.

Isherwood v. Cheetham (1862), 7 L. T. (N. S.) 250, Cresswell.

§ 82. On the other hand, where the original document is in English, and a translation of it has been established in the court of the domicile, if the doctrine of § 80 be relied on, what will be obtained will be administration with a retranslation of the translation annexed, although the original will be admitted to probate on proof of its validity according to the law of the domicile.

Re De Vigny (1865), 4 S. & T. 13, Wilde; *Re Clarke* (1867), 36 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 72, Wilde; *Re Rule* (1878), 4 P. D. 76, Hannen. It

seems difficult to reconcile this with § 81, for if the foreign judgment operates only as evidence of due execution according to the law of the domicile, it is the original the due execution of which is so testified by it, and therefore it might be argued that probate of the original, or administration with a copy of the original annexed, ought to be granted in England, even on the strength of the foreign judgment.

The original will being in a foreign language, the English court will not grant probate of a translation of it: *Re Petty*, 41 L. T. 529, Hannen.

§ 83. If the testamentary character of a document, or its validity as a will, is being litigated in the testator's last domicile, probate in England will be suspended in order to await the result of those proceedings.

Hare v. Nasmyth (1821), 2 Add. 25, Nicholl; *De Bonneval v. De Bonneval* (1838), 1 Cur. 856, Jenner.

§ 84. The English court will also follow the court of the domicile, on the question whether two papers are to be admitted to probate as a will and codicil, or as containing together the will of the deceased.

Larpent v. Sindry (1828), 1 Hagg. Eccl. 382, Nicholl.

§ 84a. In the case of a testator domiciled in England the English court will determine for itself upon evidence of the foreign law whether a document is a valid will by the law of the place where it was made.

Lyne v. de la Ferté, [1910] 102 L. T. 143, Eve.

§ 85. When the English court is not aided by any judgment in the testator's last domicile, the old rule was that the testamentary character and validity of any document propounded must be tried by the law of that domicile. But now, by section 3 of st. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, commonly called Lord Kingsdown's Act, "no will or other testamentary instrument shall be held to be revoked or to have become invalid, nor shall the construction thereof be altered, by reason of any subsequent change of domicile of the person making the same." And by section 5, "this act shall extend only to wills and other testamentary instruments made by persons who die after the passing of this Act," 6th August, 1861. Consequently, in the case of future testators, or of those who have died since the date just named, the document will be held a valid testamentary one if it satisfies either the law of the testator's last domicile, or that of the place which was his domicile at the date of the document; and it is necessary

that it should satisfy one of those two laws, so far as the case does not fall within the exceptions stated in §§ 87, 88.*

For the old rule, see *Stanley v. Bernes* (1831), 3 Hagg. Eccl. 447, Court of Delegates, Parke, afterwards Lord Wensleydale, apparently being their president; reversing the same case (1830), 3 Hagg. Eccl. 373, Nicholl, who had admitted to probate codicils not executed according to the law of the domicile, on mixed considerations, referring to the testator's political nationality, to the situation of the property bequeathed (money in the British funds), and to a supposed difference between the respect to be paid to the law of the domicile in cases of testacy and of intestacy. Sir John Nicholl had expressed similar views in *Curling v. Thornton* (1823), 2 Add. 6. See also *de Zichy Ferraris v. Hertford* (1843), 3 Cur. 468, Jenner Fust; affirmed (1844), *sub nom. Croken v. Hertford*, 3 Mo. P. C. 339, Lushington; in which the place of execution and the situation of the property disposed of were repudiated as grounds of decision on the form of a will: and *Page v. Donovan* (1857), Deane 278, Dodson, where the *lex loci actus* was not even referred to.

In *Re Prince P. G. Oldenburg* (1884), 9 P. D. 234, Butt, it was determined by the special law of an imperial family what document should be admitted to probate as the will of a member of that family.

S. 3 of Lord Kingsdown's Act is not confined to the wills of British subjects, notwithstanding the mention of such subjects in the title of the act: *Re Groos*, [1904] P. 269, Gorell Barnes.

§ 86 Either the old or the new rule in § 85 is not limited to the forms of execution, but extends to every circumstance on which the validity of a will may depend, except, it is presumed, the testator's capacity, which even under the new rule should certainly continue to be determined by his personal law at the time of his death. Thus, under the new rule, if the testator marries after changing his domicile, and his marriage would revoke his will by the law of his last domicile, but not by that under which he was domiciled at the time when he made his will, the will is not revoked.

Re Reid (1866), L. R. 1 P. & M. 74, Wilde; *Re Groos*, [1904] P. 269, Gorell Barnes; and see *Re Martin*, and *Westerman v. Schwab*, quoted under § 80.

§ 86a. And where the testator changes his domicile after making a will, and by the law of the new domicile his testamentary capacity is enlarged, so that he can dispose of all his personal property, a disposition of all his property with a reservation of the legitimate share to which the relations may be entitled at the time of death will pass the whole of the personalty. *Re Groos*, No. 2, [1915] 1 Ch. 572, Sargant.

* This interpretation of section 3 is criticised by Baty (*Polarized Law*, p. 91). But it would be unreasonable to hold that a will may be invalidated on a question of form owing to a change of domicile if its substance is not to be affected by such change.

The question here was not one of construction of the will, in which case the law of the domicile at the time the will was made would have prevailed (see below, p. 151), but of capacity to dispose by will, which is determined by the personal law at death.

§ 87. "Every will and other testamentary instrument made within the United Kingdom by any British subject, whatever may be the domicile of such person at the time of making the same or at the time of his or her death, shall as regards personal estate be held to be well executed, and shall be admitted in England and Ireland to probate, and in Scotland to confirmation, if the same be executed according to the forms required by the laws for the time being in force in that part of the United Kingdom where the same is made." St. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, s. 2. This enactment, in the cases to which it applies, adds a third alternative, that of the *locus actus*, to those of the rule in § 85, with regard to the forms of execution, but not with regard to any other circumstance on which the validity of a will may depend. For the commencement of its operation see s. 5, quoted in § 85.

§ 88. "Every will and other testamentary instrument made out of the United Kingdom by a British subject, whatever may be the domicile of such person at the time of making the same or at the time of his or her death, shall as regards personal estate be held to be well executed for the purpose of being admitted in England and Ireland to probate, and in Scotland to confirmation, if the same be made according to the forms required either by the law of the place where the same was made, or by the law of the place where such person was domiciled when the same was made, or by the laws then in force in that part of her majesty's dominions where he had his domicile of origin." St. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 114, s. 1. This enactment, in the cases to which it applies, adds two alternatives, that of the *lex loci actus* and that of the law existing in the domicile of origin at the date of the will, to those of the new rule in § 85, with regard to the forms of execution, but not with regard to any other circumstance on which the validity of a will may depend.

The enactments in §§ 87 and 88 were applied to the wills of naturalized British subjects in *Re Gally* (1876), 1 P. D. 438, Hannen (case of § 87), and *Re Lacroix* (1877), 2 P. D. 94, Hannen (case of § 88). The former case however might have been decided on the new rule in § 85, and the latter on the same rule combined with that in § 89. The same enactments were not extended to the wills of aliens by the Naturalization Act, 1870, s. 2: *Bloxam v. Favre* (1883), 8 P. D. 101, Hannen; affirmed (1884),

9 P. D. 130, Selborne, Coleridge, Cotton. Nor, *semble*, by section 17 of the British Nationality Act of 1914, because the right is not expressly conferred, whilst the section of Lord Kingsdown's Act expressly refers to British subjects. Nor do they apply to the wills of persons who have lost the British nationality which they had by birth: *Re von Buseck* (1881), 6 P. D. 211, Hannen. For these persons, therefore, the form of will must still satisfy the law of the domicile, either at the time of the testator's death, or at the time the will was made.

§ 89. In interpreting §§ 85, 87 and 88, the law of any foreign country by which a will may be sustained includes private international law as received in that country, so that if a will would there be held valid because executed according to the forms of any other law, as for example that of the *locus actus* or of the testator's political nationality, an execution according to those forms will be one according to the law of the domicile, though not in accordance with the forms of the domicile.

See the cases quoted above, p. 39. In *Collier v. Rivaz*, *Frere v. Frere*, *Bremer v. Freeman* and *Re Brown-Séguard*, this interpretation was treated as applicable to the old rule in § 85, and in *Re Lacroix*, to § 88.

§ 90. In all cases where alternatives are given by §§ 85, 87 or 88, the court will have regard to the law of one country only at a time, and will not mix up the legal precepts of two countries.

Pechell v. Hilderley (1869), L. R. 1 P. & M. 673, Penzance.

§ 91. Where a document was intended to operate in execution of a power to appoint by will, conferred on its author by some instrument itself operating under English law, it must be admitted to probate, or administration must be granted with the document annexed, in either of two cases, notwithstanding in each case that the author may have had no testamentary capacity otherwise than as donee of the power.

The first case is that where the document complies with the forms which would be required for its validity as a will by the law, or any of the laws, which under the preceding §§ would be applicable in the case of an ordinary testator.

Barnes v. Vincent (1846), 5 Mo. P. C. 201, Brougham, Buccleugh, Cottenham, Campbell, Knight-Bruce. The concurrence of the privy councillors who heard the argument, and of Lyndhurst and Sugden, to whom the judgment had been submitted, is stated by Brougham at p. 218. No question of private international law arose in this case, but it was decided that the will of an English married woman, which satisfied English testamentary forms, should be admitted to probate without inquiring whether it also satisfied the particular formalities imposed by the power in execution of which it was made; and the date of the will prevented the decision being aided by the Wills Act, which now, as a rule of English law, puts the general English testamentary forms in the place of all

particular formalities imposed by powers on their execution by will. The principle of the decision was that probate must not be refused on the ground of the form of the document, in any case in which such form would entitle it to probate if its author were an ordinary testator; and the bearing of the principle on private international law was not allowed by Lord Brougham to pass unnoticed. See p. 217. The international application arose in *D'Huart v. Harkness* (1865), 34 Beav. 324, Romilly, where the will of a married woman, made since the Wills Act under an English power, was not in English form, but was in good form by the law of her last domicile. It had been proved, apparently without objection, and was held to be a good execution of the power. But Lord Cranworth stated the inclination of his opinion to be opposed to this doctrine, in *Dolphin v. Robins* (1859), 7 H. L. 419; where, however, *Barnes v. Vincent* does not seem to have been quoted. "A will, in an instrument creating a power, whether general or special, covers any instrument recognized by the law of England as a will, though not executed according to the law of England" (*Re Wilkinson's Settlement*, [1917] 1 Ch. 620, Sargant). There were *dicta* which suggested that the power, having regard to § 10 of the Wills Act, will not be held to have been well executed unless either the formalities prescribed by the power or those of the Wills Act are satisfied: *Re Kirwan's Trusts* (1883), 25 Ch. D. 373, Kay; *Hummel v. Hummel*, [1898] 1 Ch. 642, Kekewich. But these *dicta* have been doubted in a number of later cases, and may be deemed not to be valid. Where the will is good in form by the law of the last domicile, the principle of *D'Huart v. Harkness* will apply, not merely to the proceedings in the Court of Probate, but also so as to make the document a good execution of a simple power to appoint by will: *Re Price, Tomlin v. Latter*, [1900] 1 Ch. 442, Stirling. It was formerly held that the will was valid as an execution only so far as it can be such without calling in the aid of the Wills Act, s. 27, which makes a general bequest a good execution of a general power: *Re D'Este's Settlement Trusts, Poulter v. D'Este*, [1903] 1 Ch. 898, Buckley; followed in *Re Scholefield, Scholefield v. St. John*, [1905] 2 Ch. 408, Kekewich, in which case, however, terms were agreed on, [1907] 1 Ch. 664. But if in such a case the document creating the power requires special formalities which have not been complied with, the court will aid the defective execution in favour of children of the appointor: *Re Walker, MacColl v. Bruce*, [1908] 1 Ch. 560, Joyce. This limitation, however, no longer holds.

The tendency of the later decisions is to assist, wherever possible, the execution of the power by will. The principle which was laid down in the case of *Re Simpson: Coutts & Co. v. Church Missionary Society*, [1916] 1 Ch. 562, Neville, and was followed in *Re Wilkinson's Settlement*, [1917] 1 Ch. 620, Sargant, is that a gift which, according to the law of the testator's domicile, amounts to a general bequest of personal property, operates as an exercise of a general power of appointment, *unless a contrary intent appears in the will*. Moreover, when a power of disposition by will over property not belonging to the testator is unknown in the foreign law, "the construction which would be applied to an English will must be applied to the construction of a foreign will valid in England so far as regards the power."

Accordingly, section 27 of the Wills Act, 1837, may be invoked for the purpose of making a general bequest in a will valid by the law of the testator's foreign domicile a good execution of a general power: *Re Leval's Settlement Trusts*, [1918] 2 Ch. 391, Peterson. In that case the testatrix, who was an Englishwoman married to a Frenchman domiciled in France, had made

an unattested holograph will at the age of seventeen, appointing her husband her "universal legatee." She had a power of appointment under her marriage settlement, made in England and sanctioned under the Infants' Settlement Act 1855. According to the law of her domicile, the French law, the document was valid as a will; but she was only competent to dispose by will of one-half of her property. The appointment of a universal legatee was held a valid execution of the power, by invoking s. 27 of the Wills Act to interpret the French will; but, inasmuch as by the French law the testatrix was competent to dispose of one-half only of her property, one-half of the fund subject to the power was disposed of by the will and one-half went as in default of appointment. The Court refused to follow the reasoning in *Re D'Este* (u. s.) and *Re Scholefield*.

§ 92. The second case is that where the document complies with English testamentary forms, although it does not comply with any forms which under the preceding §§ would sustain its validity as the will of an ordinary testator.

Tatnall v. Hankey (1838), 2 Mo. P. C. 342, Brougham. The report of this case was supplemented, and the case followed, in *Re Alexander* (1860), 29 L. J. (N. S.) P. & M. 93, and 1 S. & T. 454, note, Cresswell; contrary to the personal opinion of that learned judge, which he had previously expressed in *Crookenden v. Fuller* (1859), 1 S. & T. 441. *Tatnall v. Hankey* was again followed, also with dissent, in *Re Hallyburton* (1866), L. R. 1 P. & M. 90, Wilde, and may now be considered to be the law. It was approved in *Murphy v. Deichler*, [1909] A. C. 446, Loreburn, Ashbourne, Atkinson, Shaw of Dunfermline.

In cases falling under this § the English court grants administration limited to such property as the deceased had power to dispose of and did dispose of by the document: *Re Huber*, [1896] P. 209, Jeune (see [1899] P. 250); *Re Tréfond*, [1899] P. 247, Jeune. Unless the grant can be enlarged with the consent of the parties interested: *Re Vannini*, [1901] P. 330, Jeune.

§ 93. Where the document does not come within either of the above cases, or, coming within them, does not satisfy special forms prescribed by the power, it is not a good execution of the power.

Re Daly (1858), 25 Beav. 456, Romilly; *Barretto v. Young*, [1900] 2 Ch. 339, Byrne.

§ 94. That the document comes within either of the said cases must be established by its being proved in England.

Re Vallance (1883), 24 Ch. D. 177, Pearson; explaining or correcting *Re Tootal's Trusts* (1883), 23 Ch. D. 532, Chitty.

§ 94a. Where an English power of appointment is so executed as to make the fund assets of the appointor, the appointor's capacity for disposing of those assets will be measured by the law

of his domicile at his death and not by the law of the settlor's domicile.

Re Pryce, Lawford v. Pryce, [1911] 2 Ch. 286, Cozens-Hardy, Buckley and Kennedy, overruling Parker; and *Re Lewal's Trusts* (u. s.).

The capacity to dispose of a fund subject to a *special* power of appointment conferred by a marriage settlement is, however, not measured by that of the appointor but by that of the original settlor (see p. 79, above).

It will be understood that nothing in §§ 80-94a applies to the validity of wills of English real estate.

Personal estate, however, includes the proceeds of a settlement fund invested in land, but held on trust for sale, *Re Lyne's Settlement Trusts*, [1919] 1 Ch. 80, C. A., Swinfen Eady, Duke, Eve, reversing Peterson. Such an interest in English land therefore will pass under a will made in France and good by the French law.

What Personal Estate passes by the Grant of Probate or Administration, or must be accounted for by the English Executor or Administrator.

In England and those other countries in which the succession to movable property on death is regulated by the method of English law explained on p. 105, every grant of probate or administration is held to carry such corporeal chattels of the deceased as either are at the date of the grant within the jurisdiction of the court from which it issues, or afterwards come within that jurisdiction without having been previously reduced into possession by lawful authority since the death. Such authority would be that of an administrator under a grant issued by some other court, or that of an heir or universal legatee entitled without grant under the continental system explained on p. 106. The property in all goods falling within this description is vacant, and the jurisdiction in which they are found can confer such property on the executor whom it confirms or the administrator whom it appoints. But if the goods only come into the jurisdiction after they have been reduced into possession by lawful authority since the death, the property in them has not been vacant at any moment at which the domestic grant could operate on them; they must be recognized as being the goods of the foreign heir or legatee, executor or administrator. Let us say, of the foreign heir or administrator, taking the latter term, as is very commonly done, in an extended sense, so as to include executors. If the goods, since the decease of the

testator or intestate, have been within a foreign jurisdiction in which a grant has been made, or an heir entitled to their possession exists, but the administrator under that grant or the heir has not reduced them into possession, that makes no difference: the property is regarded as vacant when they enter the domestic jurisdiction. Thus in a New York case, where there were stage-coaches and stage-horses belonging to a daily line running from one state to another, Chancellor Walworth said: "If administration had been granted to different individuals in the two states, I think the property must have been considered as belonging to that administrator who first reduced it into possession within the limits of his own state." *Orcutt v. Orms*, 1832, 3 Paige 459, 465. And Story says: "According to the common course of commercial business, ships and cargoes and the proceeds thereof, locally situate in a foreign country at the time of the death of the owner, always proceed on their voyages and return to the home port without any suspicion that all the parties concerned are not legally entitled so to act; and they are taken possession of and administered by the administrator of the *forum domicilii*, with the constant persuasion that he may not only rightfully do so, but that he is bound to administer them as part of the funds appropriately in his hands." *Conflict of Laws*, § 520. Hence:

§ 95. The corporeal chattels of a deceased person belong to the heir or administrator who first reduces them into possession within the territory from the law or jurisdiction of which he derives his title or his grant.

"If property came to England after the death, would the foreign administration give a right to it?" Rolfe, In *Whyte v. Rose* (1841), 3 Q. B. 506. "Suppose, after a man's death, his watch be brought to England by a third party, could such party, in answer to an action of trover by an English administrator, plead that the watch was in Ireland at the time of the death?" Parke, *ib.* These questions were evidently meant to be answered in the negative, and to refer to property not reduced into possession before it is brought to England. "It seems to me that your argument goes too far and would show that no administration in England could give a right over goods anywhere out of England. A man may sue here in his own name, naming himself as executor or administrator under a foreign probate or grant; but does a man ever sue here in the character of executor or administrator under such a probate or grant?" Abinger, *ib.* p. 504. Here Lord Abinger appears to have contemplated property which had been reduced into possession under a grant within the jurisdiction from which the grant issued. If England was that jurisdiction, the English administrator would afterwards have a right over the goods out of England: if that jurisdiction was foreign, the goods would afterwards belong in England to the foreign administrator, who might sue

for them in his own right, naming himself administrator under a foreign grant as a mere matter of description. *Currie v. Bircham* (1822), 1 Dow & Ry. 35, King's Bench; where it was held that an English administrator cannot recover from the agent in England of a Bombay administrator the proceeds, remitted to him by the latter, of effects of the intestate reduced into possession under the Bombay administration. It does not appear, and can have made no difference, whether the effects were corporeal chattels or choses in action.

In the case of ships an argument in favour of an exception might be based on the incidence of the probate duty. By st. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56, s. 4, probate duty was charged "in respect of the value of any ship or share of a ship belonging to any deceased person which shall be registered at any port in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding such ship at the time of the death of the testator or intestate may have been at sea or elsewhere out of the United Kingdom."

§ 95*a*. With regard to debts belonging to the deceased, the jurisdiction in which it is necessary or possible to sue for them depends on considerations not connected with administration: the death of the creditor cannot affect that question, except so far as he may have been entitled, and his heir or administrator may not be entitled, to the benefit of some such exceptional legislation as that of Art. 14 of the Code Napoleon, which allows a Frenchman to sue in France on all obligations contracted towards him by foreigners. But in whatever jurisdiction the circumstances of the case point out that a debt ought to be or may be sued for, the administrator who has obtained a grant in that jurisdiction, or the heir who is entitled under its law, and he only, can sue for it therein, or, if the debt is assignable, assign the right of suing for it therein: see § 63.

§ 96. But to the rule in § 95*a* the debts due on negotiable instruments are an exception, because they can be sufficiently reduced into possession by means of the paper which represents them. They are in fact in the nature of corporeal chattels. Hence the negotiable instruments of a deceased person, and his bonds or certificates payable to bearer, belong to the heir or administrator who first obtains possession of them within the territory from the law or jurisdiction of which he derives his title or his grant. He can indorse them if they were payable to the deceased's order, and he or his indorsee can sue on them in any other jurisdiction without any other grant.

Att.-Gen. v. Bowwens (1838), 4 M. & W. 171, Abinger, Parke, and (?). The point decided in this case was that such instruments, when found in England at the date of the death, are liable to probate duty; and the class to which the decision referred was described by Lord Abinger, in delivering the judgment of the court, as that of instruments "of a chattel nature, capable of being transferred by acts done here, and sold for money here."

The same rule applied in respect of liability to estate duty. *Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, [1910] A. C. 27, Loreburn, Atkinson, Gorell, and Shaw of Dunfermline. That an administrator who becomes lawfully possessed in one state of a negotiable note of the deceased need not take out administration in the state where the debtor resides, in order to sue on it, is laid down by Story: *Conflict of Laws*, § 517. The point established by the decision in *Whyte v. Rose* was that the place where an instrument which is not negotiable is found at the death is of no importance to the question under what grant it ought to be sued on: (1842), Tindal, Abinger, Coltman, Maule, Parke, Alderson, Rolfe; reversing Denman, Littledale, Patteson and Coleridge. The doctrine was applied to certificates of shares, not to bearer, but of which the possession is of practical value, by *Stern v. The Queen*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 211, Wright and Kennedy (probate duty); *Re Agnese*, [1900] P. 60, Jeune (grant of probate); *Re Clark, McKecknie v. Clark*, [1904] 1 Ch. 294, Farwell (interpretation of bequest); and to colonial bonds to bearer though containing a charge on property in the colony, by *Att.-Gen. v. Glendining*, [1904] 92 L. T. 87, Phillimore (estate duty). Cf. *Re Steinkopf*, [1922] W. N. 12, Russell, German bearer bonds, part of estate of person domiciled in England held not situate in Germany.

§ 97. Judgment is another means of reducing debts into possession. Therefore when a foreign heir or administrator has obtained judgment abroad on a debt to the deceased, he may sue in England on such judgment, or prove on it in bankruptcy or any other administration of assets (*concursum*), without an English grant.

Vanquelin v. Bouard (1863), 15 C. B. N. S. 341; first count; Erle, Williams, Keating; *Re Macnichol* (1874), L. R. 19 Eq. 81, Malins.

§ 98. If an administrator receives without suit payment of a debt due to the deceased, will his receipt be a sufficient discharge to the debtor, supposing that the jurisdiction from which he holds his grant was not one in which the debt could have been recovered, and another administrator afterwards sues for the debt in the proper court for its recovery? On principle, it should not be a sufficient discharge.

In *Daniel v. Luker* (1571), Dyer 305, Dalison 76, it was held that a release by one administrator was no answer to a suit in another jurisdiction, to the administrator in which the debt was thought more properly to belong; but the question between the two administrators was thought to depend on the locality of the deed at the time of the death, a notion exploded by *Whyte v. Rose*, quoted under § 96. In *Shaw v. Staughton* (1670), 3 Keble 163, it seems to have been thought that the question whether even a recovery by one administrator was an answer to an action by another depended on the determination to which of the two the debt more properly belonged.

Besides the property which under the doctrine thus far developed passes primarily by an English grant, the wide extent which is given in this country to the liability of an administrator

and to judicial administration of the effects of a deceased person may lead to the result that property is ultimately deemed to be comprised in such a grant, although it has been reduced into possession since the death under a foreign title or at least without any assistance from the English title.

§ 99. If a foreign administrator sends or brings to England any personal assets of the deceased, for his administration of which he has not yet accounted in the jurisdiction from which he derives his title, and which he has not caused by any specific appropriation to lose their character as part of the deceased's estate, a creditor or beneficiary may maintain an action here for their judicial administration, and an injunction and receiver will be granted in case of need to prevent their being removed out of the jurisdiction. But in accordance with § 63 an English administrator must be constituted and made a party to the action, the assets administered in which will be deemed to have passed by the grant to him.

Lowe v. Fairlie (1817), 2 Mad. 101, Plumer; *Logan v. Fairlie* (1825), 2 S. & St. 284, Leach; *Sandilands v. Innes* (1829), 3 Sim. 263, Shadwell; *Bond v. Graham* (1842), 1 Hare 482, Wigram; *Hervey v. Fitzpatrick*, first motion (1854), Kay 421, Wood, receiver granted.

In *Anderson v. Caunter* (1833), 2 My. & K. 763, which was a suit by a creditor against the Indian executrix of the debtor's Indian executor, who, it was charged, had possessed assets of the debtor, Leach held that the presence of an English administrator of that executor was unnecessary, saying that his estate could not be administered in the suit. But in *Tyler v. Bell* (1837), 2 My. & Cr. 89, 110, Lord Cottenham pointed out that this was irreconcilable with what the same judge had said in *Logan v. Fairlie*.

In *Arthur v. Hughes* (1841), 4 Beav. 506, Langdale, there had been such a specific appropriation as to take the case out of this §. The principle was thus stated by Wigram in *Bond v. Graham*: "If an executor or administrator has so dealt with the fund that by reason of such dealing it has ceased to bear the character of a legacy or share of a residue, and has assumed the character of a trust fund in a sense different from that in which the executor or administrator held it—if it has been taken out of the estate of the testator and appropriated to or made the property of the cestui que trust—it may not be necessary that the cestui que trust should bring before the court the personal representative of the testator in a suit to recover that part of the estate."

§ 100. So also any personal liability for a breach of trust in dealing with any assets of the deceased, which under the ordinary rules governing the competence of the English court may be enforceable against a foreign administrator in this country, may be enforced by or in the presence of an English administrator of the deceased, the fruits of such action being in fact an asset of the deceased recoverable here.

Anderson v. Caunter, which as to this point is not impugned by *Tyler v. Bell*: see these cases referred to under the preceding §. *Twyfard v. Trail* (1834), 7 Sim. 92, Shadwell; decree against estates of Hall and J. A. Simpson. The last case also shows that the English executor of a foreign executor is not executor of the original testator, as the English executor of an English executor is.

§ 101. But the mere presence in England of a foreign administrator who is accountable in the jurisdiction from which he derives his title for assets received by him, but who has not so dealt with those assets as to make himself personally liable for a breach of trust, will not enable any one to maintain an action against him for judicial administration here, although for that purpose the plaintiff has procured an English grant.

Jauncy v. Sealey (1686), 1 Vern. 397, Jeffreys; *Hervey v. Fitzpatrick*, second motion (1854), Kay 434, Wood.

§ 102. And although a foreign heir who has accepted the succession without benefit of inventory may probably be sued in England on the personal obligation he has thereby assumed towards the creditors of the deceased, and, if so, an English grant of administration is not necessary for that purpose, yet no action can be brought against him here for judicial administration, because his liability is not in respect of assets.

Beavan v. Hastings (1856), 2 K. & J. 724, Wood.

§ 103. If an English administrator, without obtaining a foreign grant of administration, succeeds in reducing assets of the deceased into possession abroad, he will be liable to account for them in a judicial administration in this country, or on an issue upon assets in answer to the action of a creditor independent of judicial administration, just as if they had been received by authority of the English grant.

Dowdale's Case (1604), 6 Coke 46 b; *sub nom. Richardson v. Dowdale*, Cro. Ja. 55; Common Pleas, on an issue upon assets, Walmsley dissenting. *Atkins v. Smith* (1740), 2 Atk. 63, Hardwicke; where it would seem from the obscure note that the doctrine was applied to a case of judicial administration. Story understands that the English executor who in *Dowdale's Case* was made liable for assets received by him in Ireland had received them under an Irish grant of administration, and accordingly treats that decision as irreconcilable with the modern ones: *Conflict of Laws*, § 514 a. If such were the fact, the decision would not be reconcilable with the doctrine of § 101, since it can scarcely be held that any difference ought to be made in the position of a person under a foreign grant by the circumstance of his holding an English grant as well: but I do not find the Irish grant mentioned in either of the reports of *Dowdale's Case*. Story considers that an administrator who obtains assets of the deceased in a country

where he has no grant will be liable in that country as executor *de son tort*: *Conflict of Laws*, § 514. This may well be true, and yet he may be also liable in the country from which he derives his grant.

In *Stirling-Maxwell v. Cartwright* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 522; James, Baggallay, Bramwell; the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of Hall (1878), 9 Ch. D. 173, who had held that if an English probate or letters of administration are not expressly limited to the English assets, no such limitation will be introduced into a judgment for administration founded on them although the deceased was domiciled abroad, unless there has been a decree for judicial administration abroad, as to which case the judge reserved his opinion. James said: "If anything had been done in Scotland, the court would have recognized the right of the Scotch court to deal with the matter. It is not for us to anticipate that there will be any such proceedings in Scotland." In *Orr Ewing v. Orr Ewing* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 456, Jessel, Cotton and Bowen, reversing Manisty; reversal affirmed (1883), *sub nom. Ewing v. Orr Ewing*, 9 App. Ca. 34, Selborne, Blackburn and Watson; it was held that where an order for service in Scotland has been made on one who is executor both in England and in Scotland, no proceedings being then pending in Scotland, and he appears unconditionally, the only judgment that can be pronounced at the trial is the common one for administration of the whole estate. The same matter gave rise to the Scotch appeal, *Ewing v. Orr Ewing* (1885), 10 Ap. Ca. 453, Selborne, Blackburn, Watson, Fitzgerald. In *Sandilands v. Innes* (1829), 3 Sim. 263 (see above, under § 99), Shadwell said that the account of the assets brought to England would incidentally make it necessary to take an account of all the assets possessed under the foreign administration. These authorities can hardly be considered as establishing either that there is no distinction between the case of an English administrator who has received foreign assets under a foreign grant and that of one who has received such assets without a foreign grant, or that the liability of a foreign administrator to account in England for the assets received under his foreign grant can depend on whether he has or has not an English grant also.

Principal and Ancillary Administrations, and Questions arising in Administration prior to the Distribution of the Surplus.

When the estate of a deceased person includes both personalty in England and property elsewhere, so that there are or may be concurrent administrations in different countries, that in the country of the deceased's domicile is called the principal administration and the others are called ancillary. It has been seen at p. 105 that an English administration consists of two parts, first, realizing the personal estate of the deceased and paying his debts, and secondly, distributing the surplus among those who are entitled by will, or by law in case of intestacy. The first part belongs to an ancillary administration as well as to a principal one, for the English courts, maintaining the paramount authority of the *situs* over the assets themselves as distinct from the beneficial interest in their clear surplus, a principle which we have already seen carried out in the necessity for an

English grant in order to confer the possession of the English assets, consistently make it their rule to allow creditors to seek their remedy in England against the English assets, notwithstanding that the administration in this country is ancillary.

§ 104. An English grant of probate or administration renders the executor or administrator liable to account in an English court, to creditors of the deceased, for the assets received under it; so that even if the deceased was domiciled abroad, such executor or administrator cannot be required to hand over, and cannot safely hand over, any part of those assets to the heir or administrator of the domicile, until they have been cleared of debt.

Preston v. Melville (1841), 8 Cl. & F. 1, Cottenham.

But it is much less clear how far the second part of the duty of administration, the distribution of the surplus, is held to be incumbent on an English personal representative when the deceased died domiciled abroad. Since the law of the domicile, and the authority of the court of the domicile where it has been consulted, are admitted to govern the rights in the surplus (§§ 59, 60), much may be said for the expediency of requiring that all questions relating to such rights shall be brought before the court of the domicile. Even in the case of intestacy, the law of succession must be best known to the courts of the country where it is in force; still more where a will is concerned, than which no class of documents is more fertile in legal disputes, ought the courts of that country to be appealed to by the law of which it must be interpreted and the validity of its dispositions ascertained. But there may be special circumstances that make the court of another country better qualified to interpret the will (see *Re Bonnefoi*, p. 132).

§ 105. Where no action for administration is pending in England, and there is in the deceased's domicile either a personal representative in the English sense, charged with the distribution of the property, or an heir or universal legatee holding the property for his own benefit subject to actions by particular legatees, an English executor or administrator who pays over to such person the surplus of the English assets after clearing the estate will be held in England to be discharged by such payment.

In *Pipon v. Pipon* (1744), Amb. 25, Lord Hardwicke refused to entertain a suit by persons claiming as next-of-kin the clear English assets of an

intestate domiciled in Jersey, not merely because the general administrator was not before the court, but also saying "the plaintiffs are wrong in coming into this court for an account of only part, for by the statute [of distributions] an account must be decreed of the whole"; and "if I was to direct an account of the whole, the courts in Jersey would act contrary, which would be to involve people in great difficulties." It is true the reporter makes Lord Hardwicke add, "this case differs from where a specific part consists of chattels here in England"; but that dictum is not reconcilable with the rest of the judgment, and I suspect the real words were "this case differs from a specific legacy of chattels here in England." In *Enohin v. Wyllie* (1862), 10 H. L. 1, it was laid down by Lord Westbury that where the domicile of the deceased was foreign, not only the English executors or administrators, but even the English court, supposing the estate here to be under judicial administration, ought to hand over the surplus of the English assets to the persons who are entrusted with the administration of the estate in the domicile, in order to be distributed by them among the persons entitled by the deceased's will or by law. Lords Cranworth and Chelmsford thought otherwise, and the point did not call for decision. The doctrine stated in the § is covered by the principles laid down by Fry and Jessel in *Eames v. Hacon* (1880), 16 Ch. D. 407, Fry; affirmed (1881), 18 Ch. D. 347, Jessel, Baggallay and Lush; but the decision in that case rested on other grounds as well.

§ 106. But where there is an action for administration in England, it is doubtful whether the court will insist on carrying that action out to its full completion, by distributing the surplus with such light as it can obtain on the law of the deceased's foreign domicile, or will hand over the surplus to a representative of the deceased in the domicile.

In *Weatherby v. St. Giorgio* (1843), 2 Ha. 624, Wigram considered that as soon as the debts are paid the executor in the domicile is a mere trustee of the surplus for the parties beneficially interested, and that therefore to hand over the surplus to him would be contrary to the rule "that if property is given to a trustee for certain cestui que trusts, the court will pay it to the cestui que trusts and not to the trustee"; and this was in a case where the testator had expressly directed his English executors to transmit the surplus to his Italian executors. In *Meiklan v. Campbell* (1857), 24 Beav. 100, the evident leaning of Romilly was towards distributing the surplus himself, only adopting any proceedings in the courts of the domicile. On the same side are the opinions of Lords Cranworth and Chelmsford, cited under the preceding §. On the other side is the opinion of Lord Westbury there cited, and the argument to be drawn from the action of the English court where the domicile is English, for which see the next §. In *Innes v. Mitchell* (1857), 4 Dr. 141; 1 De G. & J. 423, the beneficial interest in the English personal estate of a testatrix domiciled in Scotland was in dispute, and there was a suit pending in Scotland in which the question might have been tried. Kindersley and Knight-Bruce agreed in ordering service of the bill on certain defendants in Scotland, in order that the litigation in England might proceed; but Turner doubted.

In *Re Bonnefoi, Surrey v. Perrin*, [1912] P. 233, C. A., Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ., reversing Evans, P., an Englishman married an Italian woman, and left England and became domiciled in

Italy. He made no will, but signed a letter in England said to be a holograph will according to Italian law. His sister sued in England, as next-of-kin, for letters of administration. Other persons claimed under the holograph document and commenced proceedings in Italy. It was held that (1) an English court had jurisdiction to make an administration order, and therefore to decide any question with regard to the assets in England; and (2) that the question, being one of construction only of English words, should be decided by an English court. See too, *Addenda, Re Lorillard*.

§ 107. On the other hand, if the deceased was domiciled in England where there is an action for administration, and the English executors or administrators do not suggest that in respect of assets received by them under foreign title or authority the English court can give them no valid discharge as against creditors, an injunction will be granted in England to restrain the prosecution of a suit abroad for the administration of the personal estate there situate.

Hope v. Carnegie (1866), L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 320, Knight-Bruce and Turner, affirming Stuart. The discussion was between beneficiaries only. *Baillie v. Baillie* (1867), L. R. 5 Eq. 175, Malins. The plaintiff in the foreign proceedings claimed to be interested in the surplus, and although it was admitted that an account was necessary before it could be known whether there was a surplus, still the executors did not suggest that a foreign discharge as against creditors was necessary for their protection, and one of them, on the contrary, was the party who sought the injunction.

Of course, the § assumes that the person against whom the injunction is sought is subject to the English jurisdiction. "The first question is whether there is any rule or principle of the court of chancery which, after a decree for administering a testator's assets, would induce it to interfere with a foreign creditor resident abroad, suing for his debt in the courts of his own country. Certainly not. Over such a creditor the courts here can exercise no jurisdiction whatever. . . . It must be observed that we are dealing with the case of a foreigner, or rather a foreign corporation, seeking no assistance from the courts of this country. If the appellants had come in under the decree, so as to obtain payment partially from the English assets, a very different question would arise." Lord Cranworth, in *Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren* (1855) 5 H. L. 441, 442. Brougham's view was similar, and St. Leonards' only differed as to whether the corporation in question was foreign. This was followed in *Re Boyse, Crofton v. Crofton* (1880), 15 Ch. D. 591, Malins. In *Graham v. Maxwell* (1849), 1 Mac. & Gor. 71, Cottenham affirming Shadwell, the point of the creditor's being foreign, if he was so, was not considered, and he had come in before the master in the English suit.

§ 108. But if the persons who are in possession of the foreign assets of one who died domiciled in England should object to rely on the discharge which the English court can give them as against the creditors of the deceased, it may be doubted whether that court would restrain by injunction foreign proceedings for administration, further than as such proceedings might be

directed to the distribution of the surplus. To restrain them further would not be consistent with that view of the authority of the *situs* over the assets on which § 104 is based.

§ 109. If the accounts of a foreign administrator have to be taken in the English court, through his submission or otherwise, he will be allowed such commission on his transactions under his foreign grant as would be allowed him in the jurisdiction from which it issued.

The Indian commission of 5 per cent. was allowed in *Chetham v. Audley* (1798), 4 Ves. 72, Arden affirmed by Loughborough, and *Cockerell v. Barber* (1826), 1 Sim. 23, Leach. It was disallowed in *Hovey v. Blakeman* (1799), 4 Ves. 596, Arden, on the facts as to the transactions; and in *Freeman v. Fairlie* (1817), 3 Mer. 24, Grant, because the will gave a legacy to the executor for his trouble, which it must have been considered would defeat his title to the commission even by Indian practice.

§ 110. Every administrator, principal or ancillary, must apply the assets reduced into possession under his grant in paying all the debts of the deceased, whether contracted in the jurisdiction from which the grant issued or out of it, and whether owing to creditors domiciled or resident in that jurisdiction or out of it, in that order of priority which according to the nature of the debts or of the assets is prescribed by the law of the jurisdiction from which the grant issued.

This rule is an immediate consequence of the maxim of private international law that the priorities of creditors in a *concurso* are determined by the *lex fori* or *lex concursus*, which indeed is almost an inevitable maxim, for if two debts were contracted under different laws, and each by the law under which it was contracted would be prior to the other, how shall their order of priority be determined if not by the law of the forum where they meet? Mediate, the rule is a consequence of the authority which English law attributes to the *situs* over the assets themselves, as distinct from the beneficial interest in the clear surplus of them; for it is by reason of that authority that English law first requires the assets to be possessed under a grant in the *situs*, and then establishes a *concurso* in order to clear from debt the assets so possessed before the law of the deceased's domicile can affect their beneficial surplus. If the authority of the domicile or political nationality were admitted to extend over the gross instead of over the net property left by the deceased, which is the general continental view, the succession would be opened, as the phrase is, in the country of the domicile or political nationality, the *concurso* of creditors

would be there, and the law of that country would determine their order of priority, as on the continent it is generally held to do. In fact, in that system, it is not a *concursum* against the assets but against the heir, although his liability may be limited by the benefit of inventory; and the heir is determined for all jurisdictions by the law of the deceased's personal jurisdiction, in which the succession is opened.

This § was cited with approval in *Re Klæbe, Kannreuther v. Geiselbrecht* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 175, Pearson. The learned judge added: "No doubt, in a case in which French assets were distributed so as to give French creditors, as such, priority, in distributing the English assets the court would be astute to equalize the payments, and take care that no French creditors should come in and receive anything till the English creditors had been paid a proportionate amount. But subject to that, which is for the purpose of doing that which is equal and just to all the creditors, I know of no law under which the English creditors are to be preferred to foreigners." See also the authorities quoted under the next §, and *Re Doetsch*, [1896] 2 Ch. 836, Romer: "Speaking generally, English assets have to be distributed according to the English law—according to priorities recognized by courts in this country"; p. 839.

§ 111. If, through the submission of a foreign administrator or otherwise, foreign assets are being judicially administered in England, the court will apply them as the foreign representative should have done, that is, will assign to the creditors as against any particular assets that order of priority which is prescribed by the law under the authority of which those assets were reduced into possession.

In *Hanson v. Walker* (1829), 7 L. J. Ch. 135, Leach, the produce of foreign land belonging to a testator domiciled in England was applied in the order of priority among creditors prescribed by the *lex situs*. In *Cook v. Gregson* (1854), 2 Dr. 286, Kindersley, a creditor claiming on an Irish judgment was allowed priority over simple contract creditors as to property brought from Ireland, but as against the English property he ranked as a simple contract creditor, according to the rule which allows only that rank to foreign judgments, notwithstanding that the testator was domiciled in Ireland. On the contrary, in *Wilson v. Dunsany* (1854), 18 Beav. 293, Romilly, where also the testator was domiciled in Ireland, both the English and the Irish assets were applied on that ground in the Irish order of priority, a creditor on an English judgment being ranked against both as a simple contract creditor. This case was decided before *Cook v. Gregson*, but was not cited in it, and was cited with disapproval in *Re Klæbe, Kannreuther v. Geiselbrecht* (1884), 28 Ch. D. 175, Pearson. In *Pardo v. Bingham* (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 485, Romilly is reported to have expressed the modified view that the law of the deceased's domicile would not determine the priority of creditors as against assets foreign to the domicile, except in favour of a creditor who was domiciled in the same country with the deceased; but he was not required to apply either this doctrine or his former one, the alleged domicile of the deceased out of England not being

proved. Story approves the doctrine which I have adopted in § 110, and says that it is established in the United States: *Conflict of Laws*, §§ 524, 525. See too, *Addenda, Re Lorillard*.

See the decisions in favour of the *lex loci concursus* as the rule for priorities in bankruptcy: *Ex parte Melbourn* (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 64, Mellish and James; *Thurburn v. Steward* (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. 478, Cairns.

§ 112. The rules about death duties belong to this place, as presenting questions which arise in an administration prior to paying over the net surplus.

The old death duties in England were of two kinds. One was the probate duty, in which term we may include that on letters of administration as well as that on grants of probate, further applied by the st. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 15, s. 4, to personalty disposed of by will under a general power of appointment. This might be considered as the price of the protection afforded by the government to movable wealth, from which point of view it followed that the domicile of the deceased was irrelevant to it, but the situation of the property protected relevant. The other was the legacy duty, in which term we may include that on shares of residue of personalty; and as this was a toll taken by the government on the transmission of movable wealth from dead to living hands, it followed that the domicile of the person whose movable wealth was transmitted was relevant to it and the situation of the particulars composing that wealth irrelevant. In 1853 there came the succession duty, which, like the legacy duty, was a toll on beneficial interests received, but, so far as it applied to realty in England on the death of an absolute owner, was prevented by the English doctrines on our subject from having anything to do with domicile. So far as the succession duty applied to property not absolutely owned but settled, its incidence will be explained under § 116. Lastly, for deaths occurring since 1st August, 1894, the probate duty has been abolished and an estate duty created, applying to all property which had been subject to probate duty, to all realty in England and other property subject to succession duty, and to all property situate out of the United Kingdom which passes on a death in such circumstances that under the law in force before 1894 legacy or succession duty would have been payable in respect thereof, or would have been payable but for the relationship of the person to whom it passes. The effect of the last category is to add the domicile of the deceased as a principle of the duty to the protection of property which is the principle of the other

categories, and the effect of the whole is to make the estate duty one on wealth as such, concurrent with the legacy and succession duties representing tolls on beneficial interests received, just as the probate and legacy duties ran concurrently on the personalty to which alone they applied.

The duty on probates and letters of administration was formerly payable, and estate duty is now payable, irrespective of the domicile of the deceased :

On his corporeal chattels, negotiable instruments, and bonds or certificates payable to bearer, so far as at the date of his death they were in England, or, if they were then on the high seas or in other jurisdictions, so far as they are afterwards first reduced into possession by the administrator under the grant ;

And on the debts due to the deceased otherwise than in respect of negotiable instruments or bonds or certificates payable to bearer, and on his shares in companies and other incorporeal chattels, so far as at the date of his death England was the proper jurisdiction in which to recover them or otherwise reduce them into possession :

In other words, on the personal estate which passes primarily by the English grant, pursuant to §§ 63, 95, 96, and not on any other personal estate for which an English administrator may be accountable pursuant to § 103, or which may be recoverable by or in the presence of an English administrator pursuant to §§ 99 or 100.

That probate duty is not payable on the proceeds of foreign property which the administrator could not have recovered or reduced into possession by means of the grant, although having received them he may be accountable for them in England, was treated as certain by Alexander and Bayley in deciding *Re Ewin* (1830), 1 Cr. & J. 151 ; 1 Tyr. 91, and was decided in *Att.-Gen. v. Dimond* (1831), 1 Cr. & J. 356, Lyndhurst, Bayley, and (?). In both these cases foreign government stocks were in question. It was decided again by the Court of Exchequer, and by the House of Lords (Brougham) on appeal, in *Att.-Gen. v. Hope* (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. 530, 8 Bl. N. R. 44, 2 Cl. & F. 84, in which case foreign government stocks, debts due from persons domiciled and resident abroad, and goods which at the time of the death were in foreign countries in the hands of agents for sale, were in question, but the duty had been paid without question on goods which at the time of the death were on the high seas. I think it may be assumed that the goods in the hands of agents for sale were sold by them and not sent home again, and that if there had been any goods in foreign jurisdictions at the time of the death which afterwards arrived in this country and were here reduced into possession by the administrator, duty would have been payable on them as well as on those which were on the high seas at the time of the death : at least the case is no authority to the contrary. In *Att.-Gen. v. Pratt* (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 140, Amphlett reserved

his opinion as to the incidence of probate duty on property on board ship at the date of the death, but Kelly was clear in its favour, and there seems to be no reason for a doubt. As to ships on the high seas registered in the United Kingdom see st. 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56, s. 4, cited under § 95.

Probate duty has been held to be incident on negotiable instruments found in England at the death: *Att.-Gen. v. Bouwens* and other cases cited under § 96. On the shares in railway companies incorporated within the jurisdiction, wherever their business may be carried on: *Att.-Gen. v. Higgins* (1857), 2 H. & N. 339, Pollock, Martin, Watson; *Fernandes' Executor's Case* (1870), L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 314, Giffard reversing same case (1869), Romilly; or in a company incorporated by royal charter with a head office in England, although its business was chiefly carried on in India; *New York Breweries Company v. Att.-Gen.*, [1899] A. C. 62, Halsbury, Watson, Shand, Davey and Ludlow, affirming Smith, Rigby and Collins, [1898] 1 Q. B. 205, who had reversed Wills and Grantham, [1897] 1 Q. B. 738. On specialty debts where the deed was within the jurisdiction at the time of the death; *Commissioner of Stamps v. Hope*, [1891] A. C. 476, Field, on appeal from New South Wales: but without prejudice to the duty being also payable where the debt is one by simple contract; *Payne v. Rex*, [1902] A. C. 552, Macnaghten; and see *Henty v. The Queen*, [1896] A. C. 567, Watson. And on debts due from persons residing in England: *Att.-Gen. v. Pratt* (1874), L. R. 9 Ex. 140, Kelly, Pigott, Amphlett. But not on Indian government securities which at the death had not been converted into debts due from the East India Company in England, although the deceased had declared his option for such conversion: *Pearse v. Pearse* (1838), 9 Sim. 430, Shadwell.

As to where the interest of a deceased partner is situate for probate, see *Laidlay v. Lord Advocate* (1890), 15 A. C. 468, Herschell, Watson, Macnaghten; *Beaver v. Master in Equity of Supreme Court of Victoria*, [1895] A. C. 251, Herschell; followed, *Stamp Duty Commissioners v. Salting*, [1907] A. C. 449, Loreburn, Ashbourne, Macnaghten, Wilson, Wills.

Where an estate not completely administered includes foreign assets, a share of the residue is situate as an asset in the domicile of the deceased: *Lord Sudeley v. Att.-Gen.*, [1897] A. C. 11, Halsbury, Herschell, Macnaghten, Shand and Davey, affirming Lopes and Kay (from whom Esher dissented) [1896] 1 Q. B. 354, who had reversed Russell of Killowen and Charles, [1895] 2 Q. B. 526; *Re Smyth, Leach v. Leach*, [1898] 1 Ch. 89, Romer; *Att.-Gen. v. Johnson*, [1907] 2 K. B. 885, Bray (estate duty).

In *Partington v. Att.-Gen.* (1869), L. R. 4 E. & I. A. 100, administrations had been taken out to the estates of two persons, though by applying the doctrine of § 65 only one would have been necessary, as Lord Westbury pointed out. Westbury held that the duty on the unnecessary grant ought not to be exacted, but Hatherley, Colonsay, and Cairns held that whether that grant was unnecessary or not the duty must be paid on it, since it had been taken out. Chelmsford and Cairns considered it to have been necessary, but they cannot be cited in opposition to the doctrine of § 65, the bearing of which on the case they do not seem to have had clearly in view.

See *Blackwood v. The Queen* (1882), 8 Ap. Ca. 82, Hobhouse; a case on the construction of a statute of the colony of Victoria, imposing a probate duty to which all legatees were to contribute proportionally, instead of its being borne entirely by the residuary legatees as the English probate duty is borne. The judicial committee held that this circumstance did not prevent the statute from being construed as imposing the duty only on property

passing by the grant, and therefore not on personalty out of Victoria. This case was followed in *Woodruff v. Att.-Gen. for Ontario*, [1908] A. C. 508, Robertson, Atkinson, Collins and Wilson, where it was held that the province of Ontario had no power to impose taxation on property situate outside the province. And in *Cotton v. The King*, [1914] A. C. 176, P. C., Haldane, Atkinson, Moulton, and *Burland v. The King*, [1921] W. N. 344, P. C., Haldane, Buckmaster, Cave, Phillimore, Carson, where the same principle was upheld for a Quebec statute; but see *The King v. Lovitt*, [1912] A. C. 212, Haldane, Macnaghten, Shaw, Robson: with regard to a similar statute of the Province of New Brunswick.

All property within the realm is now liable to estate duty whatever may be the domicile of the person on whose death the property passes. Consequently all property formerly liable to probate duty appears to be now liable to estate duty, except possibly certain classes of property actually situate abroad and belonging to persons domiciled abroad which by special statutes were deemed to be situate within the kingdom for the purposes of probate duty, such as ships registered within the kingdom under 27 & 28 Vict. c. 56, s. 4: *Winans v. The King*, [1908] 1 K. B. 1022, Cozens-Hardy, Fletcher-Moulton, Buckley, affirmed *sub nom. Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, [1910] A. C. 27, Loreburn, Atkinson, Gorell, Shaw of Dunfermline; *Re Consuelo Duchess of Manchester*, [1912] 1 Ch. 540, Swinfen Eady.

§ 113. Where the deceased left assets in different jurisdictions, and foreign assets not liable to English probate duty reached the hands of the English administrator, the latter was nevertheless entitled to a return of duty corresponding to the whole amount of the debts paid by him; and it seems that this should now apply to the estate duty.

Reg. v. Commissioners of Stamps and Taxes (1849), 13 Jur. 624, Denman, Patteson, Coleridge.

§ 113a. With regard to property which was not subject to probate duty but is now subject to estate duty, as being such that even previously it was subject to legacy or succession duty notwithstanding its being situate out of the United Kingdom because of the domicile of the deceased, the express words of the Finance Act, 1894, s. 2 (2), preclude any question being raised on the ground of such situation.

In *Lawson v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, [1896] 2 I. R. 418, Weekly Notes, 1896, p. 145, Palles, Andrews, Murphy, the question was raised, partly in consequence of the peculiarity of previous Irish legislation, and the duty was held to apply. In *Att.-Gen. v. Jewish Colonization Association*, [1900] A. C. 123, Smith, Collins and Stirling, affirming Rigby and Darling, the estate duty was applied as of course when it was determined that the succession duty applied. And also in *Re Consuelo Duchess of Manchester, Duncannon (Viscount of) v. Manchester (Duke of)*, [1912] 1 Ch. 540, Swinfen Eady, where the English executors of a testator domiciled in England were held liable, to the extent of assets in their hands, to pay estate duty payable on foreign personalty, though that personalty was expressly bequeathed to foreign executors and remained under their sole

control. So, too, in *Re Scott* (No. 2), [1916] 2 Ch. 268, Cozens-Hardy, Phillimore, Sargant, affirming Neville, it was held that estate duty on chattels abroad specifically bequeathed was payable out of the residuary personal estate by the English executors, because all personal estate, wherever situate, of the testator domiciled in England passed to his executors, as such. Estate duty was payable on property situate abroad which passed on the death of the tenant for life, although legacy duty had been paid on the death of the settlor and was not payable again: *Att.-Gen. v. Burns* (1922), L. J., p. 38, Sankey.

§ 114. The duty on legacies and shares of residue arising out of movable property is payable when and only when the last domicile of the deceased was in the United Kingdom, and is then payable on the entire amount of the deceased's legacies and residue, whether produced or not from assets received under any British grant, and whatever may be the domicile of the legatees or persons interested in the residue.

The old authorities did not make legacy duty depend on domicile, but on the estate being administered in England, including all the cases of §§ 63, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103. *Att.-Gen. v. Cockerell* (1814), 1 Price 165; Thomson, Richards, and (?): *Att.-Gen. v. Beatson* (1819), 7 Price 560; Court of Exchequer: *Logan v. Fairlie* (1825), 2 S. & St. 284, Leach. The domicile of the deceased was introduced as the determining fact in *Re Ewin* (1830), 1 Cr. & J. 151, 1 Tyr. 91, Alexander, Bayley, Garrow, Vaughan. The political nationality of the deceased was taken as the determining fact in a case, however, where that criterion and domicile gave the same result: *Re Bruce* (1832), 2 Cr. & J. 436, Lyndhurst, Bayley. But in the same term the same court again took domicile as the determining fact, and this time in a case where political nationality would not have given the same result: *Jackson v. Forbes* (1832), 2 Cr. & J. 382, 2 Tyr. 354, Lyndhurst, Bayley, Vaughan, Bolland. Lord Brougham acted in the Court of Chancery on the certificate given by the Court of Exchequer in the last case, and this was affirmed by the House of Lords, *sub nom. Att.-Gen. v. Forbes* (1834), 8 Bl. N. R. 15, 2 Cl. & F. 48, Brougham, Plunkett; but in the reasons given the old authorities were expressly saved, so as to leave it possible that the duty might be payable although the domicile was out of the United Kingdom, if the assets were administered in the United Kingdom previous to any such specific appropriation of them as is mentioned in § 99. In *Logan v. Fairlie* (1835), 1 My. & Cr. 59, Pepys and Bosanquet (a further decision on the case before Leach above cited, in which a different view of the facts was taken), and *Arnold v. Arnold* (1836), 2 My. & Cr. 256, Cottenham, the doctrine remained at the point where *Att.-Gen. v. Forbes* had left it. Finally, the doctrine expressed in the § was established by *Thomson v. Advocate-General* (1845), 12 Cl. & F. 1, 13 Sim. 153, Lyndhurst Brougham, Campbell; Tindal delivering the unanimous opinion of the judges to the same effect.

Legacy duty is payable on the interest of the deceased in foreign immovables subject to conversion into money as partnership property or by agreement: *Forbes v. Steven* (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 178, James; *Re Stokes, Stokes v. Ducroz* (1890), 62 L. T. 176, North.

After the passing of the Succession Duty Act it was contended that that Act had imposed legacy duty under a different name on legacies and shares

of residue left by persons dying domiciled abroad, so far as realized out of assets administered in Great Britain. In *Re Wallop* (1864), 1 De G. J. & S. 656, Turner expressed an opinion in favour of this contention, which, however, was not necessary to the decision: see under § 116. In *Re Capdevielle* (1864), 2 H. & C. 985, Martin and Channell followed this opinion, and Pollock was prepared to follow it if he had thought the case turned on the point; but all evidently against their personal opinions, as well as that of Bramwell. The contention was ultimately repelled in *Wallace v. Att.-Gen.* and *Jeves v. Shadwell* (1865), L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 1, Cranworth. See *Harding v. Commissioners of Stamps for Queensland*, [1898] A. C. 769, Hobhouse, and *Lambe v. Manuel*, [1903] A. C. 68, Macnaghten.

§ 115. An administrator under an English grant is liable to account to the crown for the legacy duty on the whole of the clear personal estate of the deceased, to the extent of the clear surplus of all such assets as he has received under any British grant.

Att.-Gen. v. Napier (1851), 6 Exch. 217, Parke and Alderson. It will be observed as to this case that the Acts of Parliament imposing the legacy duty bind all British courts, though they do not impose the duty for all the British dominions. It would be a different thing to hold the administrator liable for the duty to the extent of assets received by him under the grant of a politically foreign jurisdiction, in which he might be accountable for them, and which might ignore the English revenue laws.

§ 116. We now come to the succession duty when it is incident on settled property and not as arising on the death of an absolute owner of English real estate. By our system of settlements personal estate through the intervention of trustees, and real estate either with or without the intervention of trustees, are tied to go to a series of persons in succession one after another, who may be called owners to the extent of their limited interests, beneficiary owners if there are trustees, full owners if there are not. It is from this limited ownership that absolute ownership is distinguished. Thus it continually happens that property, full or only beneficiary, is transmitted on the death of a limited owner and the simultaneous expiration of his ownership, the devolution not being determined by the will of the deceased owner, or by the operation of law as on his property, but by the terms of the settlement under which the property is held. And that settlement may be the will of some former absolute owner, a marriage contract, or a disposition *inter vivos* otherwise than on marriage. Such cases are analogous to the division of the property into the usufruct and the *nuda proprietas* so well known on the continent, although a commoner continental mode of securing the enjoyment of property by a series of persons in succession was by giving to the first taker what was nominally

the absolute property, but charged with the duty of preserving it and passing it on to a third person, which was called a substitution. Under an English settlement the first taker may be also the trustee, and then he has in the one character the terminable enjoyment of what in the other character he must also the trustee, and then he has in the one character the right to the enjoyment with the duty of transmission, which is the essential note of a substitution, does not occur under English law. Since, however, substitutions have been prohibited in many countries—as by the Code Napoleon, Art. 896—authors and courts of justice have made efforts to uphold as usufruct and *nuda proprietas* many dispositions which would formerly have taken effect by way of substitution. Now the duties which have thus far been considered are those levied on the occasion of the death of an absolute owner, and we must now consider those which by the Succession Duty Act, passed in 1853, are imposed on the transmission of personal estate at the death of a limited owner whose ownership expires with his life. These fall within the present chapter, the subject of which is the succession to movables on death, and they may be conveniently noticed immediately after the legacy and old probate duties, although their relation in principle to each of the latter is rather one of contrast than of analogy. Even a contrast however is instructive.

First then the succession duty has no analogy at all to the old probate duty. On the death of a limited owner the property has not to be collected under public authority: it is already massed together in the hands of the trustees, or possesses a visible-separate existence as real estate, though with the latter case we have not now to deal. Nor is there any question of clearing it from the debts of the deceased owner, for he could not burden it with debt beyond the duration of his own limited ownership. Secondly, the succession duty on movable property is, like the legacy duty, a toll taken by the government on transmission from a dead hand to living hands, but the wealth transmitted is not the wealth of the deceased—his interest in it is not transmitted but has terminated—and therefore his domicile would not appear to be relevant to its taxation. The successor derives his title not from him or from the operation of law as on his property, but from the original settlement. It might therefore have been reasonable to adopt as the ground of taxation either the domicile of the successor or the character of the settlement, and the act, as interpreted by the courts, has

done the latter. The duty attaches when the settlement is a British one, in the sense in which that term refers to the United Kingdom and not to other British countries.

When by a will, a marriage contract, or any other disposition *inter vivos*, movable property has been placed in trust for a series of persons in the hands of trustees personally subject to the jurisdiction of a court in the United Kingdom, so that such court by reason of such subjection is the proper forum for deciding on claims to the successive enjoyment of the property, succession duty will be payable on the devolution of the enjoyment from one person to another irrespective of the domicile of either of them or of the settlor. It makes no difference whether the settlement (will, contract, or gift) itself completely determines the line of devolution, or gives to any one the power of determining it, to be exercised in any manner. If the person to whom such a power is given (donee of a power of appointment—see § 91) is domiciled out of the United Kingdom and exercises the power by will, succession duty will nevertheless be payable on the devolution so determined, because it is still the case of a devolution under the settlement and not of a legacy under the will of the donee. If the settlement be made by the will of a person domiciled out of the United Kingdom, the fund, being a legacy left by such will, is not subject to legacy duty on being placed in the hands of the trustees, but succession duty will be payable on the subsequent devolutions of the enjoyment of it.

Succession duty has been held to be payable in the following cases :—

Notwithstanding that the devolution took place through the execution of a power by the will of a person domiciled abroad. *Re Lovelace* (1859), 4 De G. and J. 340, Knight-Bruce and Turner; *Re Wallop* (1864), 1 De G. J. & S. 656, Knight-Bruce and Turner.

Notwithstanding that the settlement was created by the will of a testator domiciled abroad. *Re Smith* (1864), 12 W. R. 933, Stuart; *Re Badart* (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 288, Malins; *Att.-Gen. v. Campbell* (1872), L. R. 5 E. & I. A. 524, Hatherley, Chelmsford, Westbury, Colonsay; though the devolution was to a party domiciled abroad. In *Lyall v. Lyall* (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 1, second point, where a testator domiciled in New South Wales directed his colonial executors to transmit his residuary estate to trustees in England for investment, but no part of that estate had reached the hands of those trustees before a succession took place under the trusts declared of it by the testator, Romilly held that duty in respect of that succession was not payable on the estate which afterwards reached the hands of the trustees. There was therefore a clear distinction on which he might have put the decision, but after a long criticism of the judgment of the House of Lords in *Att.-Gen. v. Campbell*, in connection with the first point in the case before him, all he said on the second point was :

"I hold that no duty is payable on those funds which constitute the residuary estate of the testator."

Notwithstanding that the funds on which the duty is claimed reached the hands of the English trustees after the date when the succession took place, the right to them having however been vested in the trustees previous to that date. *Lyall v. Lyall* (1872), L. R. 15 Eq. 1, first point, Romilly. But consider the second point in this case, cited in the last paragraph.

Notwithstanding that the property vested in the English trustees consists of the stocks of foreign governments and shares in foreign companies. *Re Cigala* (1878), 7 Ch. D. 351, Jessel; *Att.-Gen. v. Felce*, [1894] 10 Times Law Reports, 337, Mathew and Cave; *Att.-Gen. v. Jewish Colonization Association*, [1901] 1 K. B. 123, A. L. Smith, Collins and Stirling. And notwithstanding that the property consists of land situate abroad but subject to a trust for sale vested in the English trustees. *Att.-Gen. v. Johnson*, [1907] 2 K. B. 885, Bray.

Notwithstanding that all the trustees are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of a court in the United Kingdom, so long as it is practically necessary for those who claim as beneficiaries to sue the trustees in the United Kingdom. *Re Badart* and *Att.-Gen. v. Campbell*, cited above. In *Re Cigala* one of the original trustees was an Italian, though at the time of the decision all the trustees were English. It may be noted here that income-tax on the other hand is not payable by trustees domiciled and resident in England in respect of dividends on shares in a foreign company which they hold on behalf of a person domiciled abroad, the dividends being paid direct to the beneficiary abroad. *Williams v. Singer*, [1921] 1 A. C. 65, H. L., and [1919] 2 K. B. 108, C. A., Swinfen Eady, Warrington, Scrutton, affirming Sankey.

In several of the cases the judges refer to the settled money being in the British funds, or in some other way having a kind of local situation in the United Kingdom, as for example by the residence of the debtor from whom the trustees would have to recover it. But in no case has the succession duty been held to be incident on that ground where the trustees or one or more of them were not British, and the principle of *Re Cigala*, in which the duty was held to attach on the devolution of an interest in foreign funds held by British trustees, should apply to prevent its attaching on the devolution of an interest in British funds held by exclusively foreign trustees. In that case Sir G. Jessel said: "This is not real property, but personal property in the hands of English trustees, and you cannot get it from them except by an action in England. That is the true test; in order to recover the property you must come to England."

§ 117. Any duty which must be paid abroad on the assets of a person whose last domicile was in England, will only be paid out of his residue, if provision to that effect is made in the will, so that his particular legatees will not have to contribute to it. Otherwise it will be paid by the particular legatees on whom it is imposed by the law of the country where the property is situate.

Re Scott (No. 1), [1915] 1 Ch. 592, C. A., Cozens-Hardy, Phillimore, Joyce, affirming Warrington, J., where a testator domiciled in England bequeathed chattels abroad, "free of legacy duty," and by

the French law "mutation" duty was payable by the legatee on the chattels; and it was held that the executor was under no obligation to pay the French duty, because the words "legacy duty" were used in the strict sense.

The court distinguished the case from two older decisions: *Peter v. Stirling* (1878) 10 Ch. D. 279, Malins; *Re Maurice, Brown v. Maurice*, [1896] 75 L. T. 415, North, where the words of the will were explicit.

Cf. too, *Re De Saumarez*, [1912] 2 Ch. 622, Parker. When a testator domiciled in England bequeathed certain shares in a foreign company to his trustees on trust to sell and the trustees paid foreign succession duties, it was held that the duty should be borne by the proceeds of the shares sold and not out of the general estate.

Since the beneficial interest in the surplus of the deceased's personal property is governed by the law of his last domicile (§ 59), and therefore by one law no matter in how many jurisdictions the assets may be found, it might seem to be of no importance out of what assets any of the debts are paid. This however is not always so. Let us suppose that the deceased had immovable property in a country foreign to his domicile, and in which the succession to immovables is held to be governed by the *lex situs*; and that a debt of the deceased is paid by the heir of that property, or by a devisee of it taking under a will in which no intention as to the incidence of the debt in question is expressed. Evidently it is only by the *lex situs* that a debt can be charged primarily on immovables in exoneration of the personalty. If therefore by the *lex situs* itself the heir or devisee has recourse against the personalty for the amount of the debt which he has paid, there is no conflict of laws, and it would seem to be clear that he can have his recourse in every jurisdiction in which he can find assets. And so it has been settled in England, after a dispute which it is not easy to understand. But if by the *lex situs* the debt was charged primarily on the immovable, the peculiar succession which the heir or devisee enjoys under that law is limited by that law itself to so much of the immovable as remains after paying the debt. The only law to which he can appeal, because it is the only one by virtue of which he is at all either a beneficial successor or a transferee of the debt, does not enable him to stand against the general succession in the place of the creditor whom he has paid, and there can be no reason for giving him that recourse in any other jurisdiction. This also has been settled in England, and the result is that the right of recourse is in each case determined by the *lex situs*. Hence:

§ 118. The right of the heir of foreign immovables, or of their devisee when no intention on the point is expressed by the will,

to have recourse against the personal estate in England for the amount of debts of the deceased which he has paid, is determined by the *lex situs* of the immovables.

Recourse allowed where it was allowed by the *lex situs*. *Bowman v. Reeve* (1721), Pre. Ch. 577, Macclesfield; apparently the same case as the *Anonymous* one in 9 Mod. 66, there dated as of 1723: *Winchelsea v. Garetty* (1838). 2 Keen 293, Langdale. In the former case the deceased was domiciled in the *situs* of the immovables, and in the latter in England.

Recourse refused where it was refused by the *lex situs* (case of Scotch heritable bonds). *Drummond v. Drummond* (1799), 6 Bro. P. C. 601, 2 Ves. and Be. 132; *Elliott v. Minto* (1821), 6 Madd. 16, Leach. In the former case the deceased was domiciled in England, but in the latter the domicile is not stated.

See *Re Hewit, Lawson v. Duncan*, [1891] 3 Ch. 568, Romer, where there were immovables in various jurisdictions, and the order in which they and the movables were to be applied in payment of debts of various kinds was determined mainly on the construction of the will.

§ 119. The rate of interest with which an executor or administrator will be charged on assets in his hands is not necessarily either that usually given in the forum, or that usually given in the domicile of the deceased, but will be that usually given in the country where the assets have been, supposing of course that there has been no improper removal of them from one country to another, or improper retention of them in any country.

Malcolm v. Martin (1789), 3 Bro. Ch. 50, Arden; *Raymond v. Brodbelt* (1800), 5 Ves. 199, Rosslyn; *Bourke v. Ricketts* (1804), 10 Ves. 330, Grant. The last case shows that, as a consequence of this rule, where there are assets and executors in two or more countries, the interest which a legatee will get may depend on which country he chooses to sue in.

Distribution of the Surplus in an Administration.

The beneficial interests according to which the clear surplus of a deceased person's estate is to be distributed are determined, whether in the case of testacy or in that of intestacy, by the law of his last domicile. This maxim was laid down in § 59, as being necessary to the understanding of much that had to follow, for instance the deference paid to the courts and law of the domicile with regard to the grant of probate or administration, and to the validity of wills; and in the remainder of this chapter we have simply to follow out its consequences, being henceforth free from the complications which, before a clear surplus was realized, arose out of the authority over the assets themselves which is allowed in England to the *situs*. We may notice in passing a question raised by Lord Alvanley, in *Somerville v. Somerville* (1801),

5 Ves. 791: "what would be the case upon two contemporary and equal domiciles, if ever there can be such a case?" It has remained a speculative one, so far as the experience of the English courts is concerned, but Lord Alvanley's answer may be given. "I think," he proceeded, "such a case can hardly happen, but it is possible to suppose it. A man born no one knows where, or having had a domicile that he has completely abandoned, might acquire in the same or different countries two domiciles at the same instant, and occupy both under exactly the same circumstances, both country houses for instance, bought at the same time. It can hardly be said that of which he took possession first is to prevail. Then suppose he should die at one, shall the death have any effect? I think not, even in that case; and then *ex necessitate* the *lex loci rei sitæ* must prevail, for the country in which the property is would not let it go out of that until they know by what rule it is to be distributed. If it was in this country, they would not give it until it was proved that he had a domicile somewhere." Savigny on the other hand says: "On the death of a vagabond who had no domicile, the law of his origin determines; and if this too cannot be ascertained, the law of his last residence, that is, of the place where he died."*

§ 120. The clear surplus of an intestate's personal estate is distributable among the persons, and in the shares, determined by the law of his last domicile.

Pipon v. Pipon (1744), Ambl. 25, Hardwicke; *Thorne v. Watkins* (1750), 2 Ves. 35, Hardwicke. The old Scotch authorities on the subject, which appear to have fluctuated, will be found in *Bruce v. Bruce* (1790), 6 Bro. P. C. 566, and *Balfour v. Scott* (1793), 6 Bro. P. C. 550, the appeals in which cases settled the rule for Scotland in the same sense in which it existed for England. Lord Thurlow's speech in *Bruce v. Bruce* will be found in another report, 2 Bos. & Pul. 229, note.

§ 121. Hence if the intestate leaves immovables in a country foreign to his domicile, the law of which does not admit the application of the *lex domicilii* to the succession to immovables, but confers that succession on a peculiar heir, excluding him at the same time from a share in the movables except on condition of bringing into hotchpot or collating immovables, such heir may nevertheless, under the *lex domicilii*, claim his share of the movables in both countries without collating the immovables.

Balfour v. Scott (1793), 6 Bro. P. C. 550; a Scotch appeal. See also § 125; and see below § 126b.

* Syst. § 375, note (b); Guthrie 223.

§ 121a. But *bona vacantia* situate in this country pass to the Crown, and do not follow the law of the last domicile.

Re Barnett's Trusts, [1902] 1 Ch. 847, Kekewich.

§ 121b. And property which forms the subject matter of a *donatio mortis causâ* is subject to the law applicable to gifts *inter vivos* and not to that applicable to testamentary dispositions, notwithstanding that the subject matter of the *donatio* was liable to the donor's debts upon a deficiency of assets, and also subject to legacy and estate duty.

Re Korvine's Trusts, [1921] 1 Ch. 363, Eve.

§ 122. The operation of his will on the clear surplus of a testator's movables is also determined, so far as concerns questions other than those of construction, by the law of his last domicile. Hence if any of his dispositions are invalid by that law, whether as being in excess of the disposing power allowed by it or for any other reason, they will fail of effect, and the same law will determine the destination of the movables comprised in them. Compare § 86.

Conversely, if the law of the testator's last domicile allows a larger freedom of disposition than the law of the domicile at the time the will was made, it is the former law which prevails: *Re Groos* (No. 2), [1915] 1 Ch. 572 u.s., p. 119.

The right of a widow or child to legitim, and consequently to defeat to that extent any contrary disposition made by the testator, depends on the law of the latter's last domicile, and not on that of the *situs* of the personal estate. *Hog. v. Lashley* (1792), 6 Bro. P. C. 577, 3 Hagg. Eccl. 415, note; House of Lords, on Scotch appeal. See also *Thornton v. Curling* (1824), 8 Sim. 310, Eldon; *Campbell v. Beaufoy* (1859), Johns. 320, Wood. When English immovable property is left on trust for sale, its disposition will be governed by the law of the testator's domicile. *Re De Noailles*, [1916] 114 L. T. R. 1589, Eve, where real property in England was devised by a testator domiciled in France on trust for sale for the purpose of maintaining an orphanage; and as the trusts could not be exactly carried out, the devise failed, the French law having no doctrine of *cy-près* like the English.

The validity of a condition in restraint of marriage attached to a legacy depends on the law of the testator's last domicile. *Ommaney v. Bingham*, or *Sir Charles Douglas's Case* (1796), 3 Ves. 202, in *Bempde v. Johnstone*; 5 Ves. 757, in *Somerville v. Somerville*; 3 Hagg. Eccl. 414, note, 6 Bro. P. C. 550, in head note to *Balfour v. Scott*; *Loughborough and Thurlow* on a Scotch appeal.

The domicile of the testatrix being English, a legacy to a person who predeceased her lapsed under the English rule, though it would not have lapsed by the law of the country where, and in the technical language of which, the will was made. *Anstruther v. Chalmier* (1826), 2 Sim. 1, Leach.

The validity of a legacy bequeathed for charitable uses depends on the law of the domicile, so far as the personal estate is concerned: and if the testator leaves immovables in a country foreign to his domicile, the law of which does not admit the application of the *lex domicilii* to the succession to immovables, and invalidates a charitable legacy under the circumstances of the case, it depends on the law of the domicile whether such legacy will be payable in full so far as the personal estate admits, or will be invalid for the proportion which the testator's property out of which it is not payable bears to that out of which it is payable. *Macdonald v. Macdonald* (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 60, Bacon.

The validity of a legacy bequeathed for superstitious uses also depends on the law of the testator's domicile. *Re Elliott, Elliott v. Johnson*, [1891] 39 W. R. 297, North. In *Re Egan*, [1918] L. J. News. 314, Swinfen Eady, M.R., Warrington, Duke, L.J.J., a bequest for Masses by a testator born in Ireland but domiciled in England was held to be void because of an English statute (1 Edw. VI. c. 14) declaring all bequests for superstitious uses invalid.

Construction of Wills.

The subject of construction may best be introduced by a quotation from Lord Lyndhurst's speech in the Scotch appeal of *Trotter v. Trotter*, cited under § 125. "It was stated at the bar," he said, "and I see by the papers it was also argued below, that in cases of this description it is not unreasonable that when any technical points arise in the construction of a will of this description, the court of session should resort to the opinion of lawyers of the country where the will or instrument was executed, but that this only applies to technical expressions; that where a will is expressed in ordinary language, the judges of the court of Scotland are as competent to put a proper construction upon it as judges or lawyers of the country where the will was executed. But the judges below were not of that opinion; and it is impossible, as it appears to me, that such an opinion can be reasonably entertained. A will must be interpreted according to the law of the country where it was made, and where the party making the will has his domicile. There are certain rules of construction adopted in the courts, and the expressions which are made use of in a will and the language of a will have frequently reference to those rules of construction; and it would be productive therefore of the most mischievous consequences and in many instances defeat the intention of the testator, if those rules were to be altogether disregarded, and the judges of a foreign court, which it may be considered in relation to the will, without reference to that knowledge which it is desirable to obtain of the law of the country in which the will was made, were to interpret the will according to their own rules of construction. That would also

be productive of another inconvenience, namely that the will might have a construction put upon it in the English courts different from that which might be put upon it in the foreign country. It appears to me that there is no solid ground for the objection, but that where a will is executed in a foreign country by a person having his domicile in that country, with respect to that person's property the will must be interpreted according to the law of the country where it is made. It must, if it comes into question in any proceeding, have the same interpretation put upon it as would be put upon it in any tribunal of the country where it was made. It appears to me therefore that the judges were perfectly right in directing the opinion to be taken of English lawyers of eminence with respect to the import and construction of this will according to the law of England."

Lord Lyndhurst here assumed that the will was made in the testator's domicile. If it was made in a different country the English authorities are to the effect that the law of the domicile prevails. And formerly it was the law of the testator's last domicile that was meant. But now, through the provision in Lord Kingsdown's Act that the construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any subsequent change of domicile of the person making the same—see § 85—it has come to be the law of the testator's domicile at the time of making his will which must be referred to for its construction. This I take to be a real improvement, and not to be inconsistent with the general authority of the last domicile of the deceased over the beneficial interest in the clear surplus of his estate. Interpretation being a question of fact, the law which decides on the validity of a bequest when it has been construed may well look beyond itself for aid in construing it.

Further, the question of construction is not always easy to distinguish from that of operation. Thus *Anstruther v. Chalmers*, quoted under § 122, might be treated as turning on a question of construction, namely whether a gift to the representatives of the legatee, which would be valid by English law, ought not to be held as implied by a legacy bequeathed in the technical language of a law under which lapse would not occur through the decease of the legatee in the testator's lifetime. And the clearer it is in any case that the question is one of construction as distinguished from operation, the more open it is to the court to temper the general reference to the law of the domicile by reference to other considerations which the particular circumstances may suggest.

From all this the following rule appears to result.

§ 123. When the English court is called on to construe a will of personal estate, and is not aided by any judgment in the testator's last domicile, as to which see § 60, it will take as its guide the law of the country which was the testator's domicile at the date of the will, giving effect to any stringent rules of construction which there exist, and, so far as no such rules exist there, having a reasonable regard to all the circumstances, including any habits or tendency of the courts of that country in the matter of interpretation which may be proved by the evidence of experts. But this rule will yield to an express or obvious intention on the part of the testator.

The currency in which a legacy is given must in general be interpreted to be that of the testator's domicile, though the context of the will, or the situation of the funds on which the legacy is expressly charged, may make a difference: *Saunders v. Drake* (1742), 2 Atk. 465, Hardwicke; *Pierson v. Garnet* (1786), 2 Bro. Ch. 38, Kenyon, who spoke of the place where the will was made, but that was the same as the domicile; *Malcolm v. Martin* (1789), 3 Bro. Ch. 50, Arden. And if a legacy given in the currency of a foreign domicile has to be paid in England, so much English money must be paid here as if paid in the domicile would there produce the amount in the currency of that country: *Cockerell v. Barber* (1810), 16 Ves. 461, Eldon; *Campbell v. Graham* (1830), 1 Ru. and My. 453, Leach, with whom Brougham concurred in opinion, as he stated on the appeal to the House of Lords, *sub nom. Campbell v. Sandford* (1834), 2 Cl. & F. 450.

A will was construed by the law of the testator's domicile, on the question whether a legacy given by it was in satisfaction of a debt under a foreign matrimonial contract: *Campbell v. Campbell* (1866), L. R. 1 Eq. 383, Wood. And on the question who were comprised in a gift to the next of kin of a legatee: *Re Fergusson*, [1902] 1 Ch. 483, Byrne. Cf. however, *Re Bonnefoi* (u.s., p. 132), where a will was construed by the law of the testator's nationality which was not the law of the domicile; but the circumstances were peculiar.

See a peculiar case of construction, not inconsistent with the doctrine of the present §: *Bernal v. Bernal* (1838), 3 M. & Cr. 559, Cottenham.

A testator bequeathing his "estate," "effects," or "property" in a given country *prima facie* intends to comprise debts due to him from persons residing in that country. *Nisbett v. Murray* (1799), 5 Ves. 149, Arden; *Arnold v. Arnold* (1834), 2 My. & Ke. 365, Pepys; *Tyrone v. Waterford* (1860), 1 D. F. J. 613, Knight Bruce, p. 628, and, less distinctly, *Campbell and Turner*; *Guthrie v. Walrond* (1883), 22 Ch. D. 573, Fry. In *Re Clark*, *M'Kecknie v. Clark*, [1904] 1 Ch. 294, Farwell, bonds were held to pass under a bequest of "personal estate" in the country where they were payable, although they were to bearer and were in another country, and shares to pass under a bequest of "personal estate" in the country where the certificates were and where they were transferable, although the company and its head office were foreign. See the cases on the incidence of probate, and now of estate duty, under § 112.

All that can be collected from *Bradford v. Young* (1884), 26 Ch. D. 666,

Pearson; (1885), 29 Ch. D. 617, Cotton, Lindley and Fry; appears to be that technical terms of a law foreign to the testator's domicile, occurring in a testamentary disposition of movables, may be construed according to the law in which they are technical if there is a sufficient indication of intention to that effect, but that the higher court was not disposed to be easily led to look beyond the law of the domicile.

For an example of a will being construed by another law than that of the testator's domicile, in pursuance of an intention to that effect indicated in it, see *Re Price, Tomlin v. Latter*, [1900] 1 Ch. 442, Stirling, referred to under § 91 with regard to the execution of powers. And so too *Re Simpson*, [1916] 1 Ch. 502, Neville; and *Re Lewal's Trusts* (above, p. 122). And for one in which it was held that there was no intention to oust a rule of interpretation existing in the law of the domicile, see *Baring v. Ashburton* (1886), 54 L. T. 463, Chitty.

Where a will is in a foreign language and a copy of it is deposited in the probate registry, although probate is granted only of an English translation which appears to be inaccurate, a court of construction may and must look at the original: *L'Fit v. L'Batt* (1719), 1 P. W. 526, Jekyll; the report of which case is corrected in *Re Cliff's Trusts*, [1892] 2 Ch. 229, North. In the latter case doubt was expressed whether, if any party had insisted on it, an application must not first have been made to the probate division to correct the translation, but in the former case this was insisted on and the decision was against any such necessity. As to what Lord Cottenham said in *Bernal v. Bernal* (1838), 3 M. & C. 563, note, that "the probate copy must be conclusively considered as the document upon which the court was to act," in that case neither the original nor a copy of it was deposited in the registry.

§ 124. Together with § 123 may have to be taken a qualification arising out of the maxim that the admissibility of evidence is governed by the *lex fori* which had best be expressed in the words of Lord Brougham on a Scotch appeal. "It by no means follows that where a sentence of a foreign court is offered in evidence in court, the probate for example of an English will, it should not be admitted; nor do I think it should be denied its natural and legitimate force. But that it must like all other instruments be received upon such proof as is required by the rules of evidence followed by the court before which it is tendered, I hold to be quite clear. It will follow that though a probate striking out part of a will would be received, and the court of session would have no right to notice the part struck out, for this would be reversing or at least disregarding the very sentence of the court of probate, yet the non-probate of a person's will would not prevent the court from receiving and regarding that will, if its own rules of evidence did not shut it out. So too it is unnecessary to decide here what would be the course in the Scotch courts in the case of an English will of personalty attested by one witness, after an act should have passed requiring two"—as has

since happened. "I think that though it might be admissible in evidence by the rules of evidence which would then govern, yet no effect could be given to its disposition because of the rules of English law requiring two witnesses, that being a requisition not of form, in order to make the paper evidence, but of substance, in order to protect testators on their dying beds."

This was applied, in the case cited, by holding that the Scotch court could look at a will made by a testator domiciled in England, which had not been admitted to probate in England because it had been revoked by a subsequent will there proved, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a trust deed, or third will, which seems to have been operative in Scotland with regard to money in a Scotch bank: *Yates v. Thomson* (1835), 3 Cl. & F. 544. Since the law of England is remarkable for severity in excluding writings as evidence, it is not likely that the English court will be asked to look at a writing excluded by the *lex domicilii*, even if Lord Lyndhurst's doctrine that a will ought to "have the same interpretation put upon it as would be put upon it in any tribunal of the country where it was made," say rather "where the testator was domiciled," should not be thought inconsistent with Lord Brougham's ruling in *Yates v. Thomson*, and of superior authority. Cf. *Re Scholefield*, [1905] 2 Ch. 408, § 348.

§ 125. If a testator leaves immovables situate in a country foreign to his domicile, and his will is inoperative as to them, but it is contended that by reason of an intention to devise them manifested in it the person who is heir to them by the *lex situs* is put to elect between them and money given him by the will, the question whether he is so put to elect, being one of the construction and operation of the will as affecting the disposition of the movable estate, is determined by the law of the testator's domicile.

Brodie v. Barry (1813), 2 V. & B. 127, Grant; *Trotter v. Trotter* (1829), 4 Bl. N. R. 502, 3 Wils. & Sh. 407, Lyndhurst; *Johnson v. Telford* (1830), 1 R. & M. 244, Leach; *Dundas v. Dundas* (1830), 2 D. & C. 349, Brougham; *Allen v. Anderson* (1846), 5 Ha. 163, Wigram; *Dewar v. Maitland* (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 834, Stuart; *Baring v. Ashburton* (1886), 54 L. T. 463, Chitty. See also § 121.

Where a testator domiciled in Scotland made two wills directing that the British will should be construed by Scotch law and that the Australian will should be construed by Australian law, and his widow elected to claim her *jus relictæ* and terce against the Scotch will, it was held that she could not claim benefits under the Australian will, the two wills being treated as one for the purposes of election: *Douglas-Menzies v. Umphelby*, [1908] A. C. 224, Macnaghten, Robertson, Atkinson, Collins and Wilson.

§ 125a. It is immaterial whether the will is inoperative to dispose of the immovables situated in the foreign country because

it is defective in form, or because the testator by the *lex situs* was incapable of disposing of his immovable property away from his legal heirs. In either case the legal heir to whom the testator has bequeathed in the same will personal property will be put to his election, if the last domicile of the testator was English.

Re Ogilvie, [1918] 1 Ch. 492, Younger. "It is against conscience that a foreign heir given a legacy by the same will should take and keep under protection of the foreign law land by the will destined for another, without making to that other out of his English legacy, so far as it will go, compensation for his disappointment, thus effectuating the testator's whole intention. . . . The court will always take this course unless the heir's legacy would, if applied in compensating the devisees of the land, be applied in a way for which the testator could not by the law of the domicile validly by will have applied it."

The English courts have, however, laid down an exception to this principle which can hardly be justified on any logical ground, but which is "too well established to be disputed." When the will by the law of the domicile is inoperative to dispose of immovables *situated in England*, the English heir-at-law is not put to his election, but will take his benefit under the will as well as his part as legal heir (*Hearle v. Greenbank*, 1 Ves. sen. 298, followed in *Re De Virte*; *Vaiani v. Ruglioni de Virte*, [1915] 1 Ch. 920, Joyce). The exception is said to be based on a special favour to the heirs-at-law of English land, but "the distinction between the English heir-at-law and any other heir is not satisfactory" (*per* Younger, J., in *Re Ogilvie*, u.s., at p. 490). The reasoning by which the doctrine of election is supported, in order that the testator's whole intention may be effectuated, applies equally to the case of a testator leaving immovable property in England as to one leaving such property out of England.

§ 125*b*. The rule appears to be otherwise where the law of a foreign country prohibits a system of succession to immovable property, *e.g.*, by devise to trustees on trust for the heirs. The person entitled to succeed to immovable property by the *lex situs* cannot be put to his election if he is also entitled to other land under the will. *Brown v. Gregson*, [1920] A. C. 866, H.L. (Haldane, Finlay, Dunedin, Moulton; Cave dissenting). A testator domiciled in Scotland devised land in the Argentine as well as land in Scotland on trust for his children. By the law of the Argentine no trust is recognized in respect of land, and the children succeeded to the land *ab intestato*. It was held that they were not put to their election between taking the shares of the foreign land and the benefits conferred on them by the will. "It would be contrary to the comity for a foreign court to endeavour by its jurisdiction *in personam* to make the land of another country subject to a system of trusts which its law prohibits" (*per* Finlay, p. 876).

§ 126. In the English statute of distributions, and in a bequest

of personalty by a testator domiciled in England, the word "child," whether qualified or not by the epithet "legitimate," includes a child who has been legitimated *per subsequens matrimonium* in the circumstances deemed necessary in England for the recognition of such a legitimation, as to which see above, pp. 102, 103.

Goodman v. Goodman (1862), 3 Giff. 643, Stuart (bequest); *Re Goodman* (1881), 17 Ch. D. 266, Cotton and James against Lush, reversing Jessel, (1880), 14 Ch. D. 619 (statute); *Re Andros* (1883), 24 Ch. D. 637, Kay (bequest). There is a contrary decision, *Boyes v. Bedale* (1863), 1 H. & M. 798, Wood (bequest); but Cotton and James dissented from it in deciding *Re Goodman*.

The same doctrine will no doubt be held equally to apply to the devise of English land. The principle is that in the will of an Englishman "child" must be interpreted according to English law, which recognizes legitimation by the appropriate foreign law, and this is independent of the peculiar rule that the heir *ab intestato* of English land must have been born in wedlock, as to which see below, § 178.

So held in *Re Grey's Trusts*, *Grey v. Stamford*, [1892] 3 Ch. 88, Stirling.

CHAPTER VI.

BANKRUPTCY.

THE principal remaining case, after those connected with marriage and death, in which property is considered in special connection with a person is that of bankruptcy. In that term I include all the modes in which a concursus or competition of creditors is formed against the property of a living person, or of a firm or company having a legal personality, whether the technical name in the particular instance be bankruptcy, insolvency, sequestration, *cessio bonorum*, winding up, or any other, and whether the persons who administer the property for the creditors are technically called trustees, assignees, curators, liquidators, syndics or any thing else, all which names may be considered as comprised when the term trustees is used. And in the present chapter those questions of private international law shall be discussed which arise out of the collection and distribution of the debtor's property in such competitions, leaving those which concern his discharge, usually but not always connected with such competitions in national law, until we arrive at the modes of extinguishing obligations.

We must note at the outset the existence of two currents of opinion or practice on the subject. One, which maintains the unity of bankruptcy, has always been the favourite of legal science. "As the bankruptcy," said Savigny in 1849, "has in view an adjustment of the claims of a number of creditors, it is possible only at one place, namely at the domicile of the debtor, so that the special forum of the obligation is here displaced by the general personal forum."* And since it is pecuniary interests that are concerned, there has not here been that tendency to replace domicile by nationality, as determining the seat of the general personal forum, which is displayed in matters relating to the person and family relations of an individual. Indeed in those countries in which the bankruptcy laws can be applied only to traders, it is not generally even the domicile but the principal

* Syst. § 574, Guthrie 209.

trade establishment which determines the forum of a bankruptcy. The other current sets in favour of separate bankruptcies for the collection and distribution of the debtor's property in each jurisdiction in which he may happen to possess any, and this current sets most strongly in legislation, which is apt to be influenced as well by the feeling of national distinctness and independence as by the desire of satisfying the needs of the creditors who claim the protection of the respective enacting authority.

The management of a bankruptcy from the first point of view is explained by Savigny in the following passage, written with reference to the then state of Prussian law, of which he approves. "By this law there is always only one bankruptcy, and that at the domicile of common debtor. The judge in bankruptcy procures by requisition the co-operation of the Prussian courts in whose territory parts of the estate are situated. If parts of the estate are abroad, then the judge has to inquire whether there are public treaties. If there are none, he must propose to the foreign judge to co-operate in the bankruptcy in Prussia, in the same way as has already been indicated in regard to Prussian courts. If this fails the curator has to watch the interest of the creditors in this country" [Prussia] "in the special bankruptcy abroad. All treaties concluded subsequently to this law rest on the principle that only one bankruptcy is to take place, and that as a rule at the domicile of the debtor. The goods of the common debtor situated in the other state must be sold, and the proceeds handed over to the court of bankruptcy. In this all the creditors must appear. The marshalling (ranking) of the creditors is determined for the purely personal claims according to the law of the forum, for all real rights according to the laws of the place where the thing is situated. There is a difference only in this respect, that by the modern treaties (since 1839) real rights in things situated out of the country of the bankruptcy can be insisted on also at the place where the thing is situated, before its surrender to the judge of the bankruptcy. If this is done by hypothecary creditors, the things hypothecated are to be sold there, the money paid to the creditors, and only the surplus if any is to be paid into the court of bankruptcy.'"*

There was no doubt a time when among the judges in different European provinces the custom was widely spread of assisting each other's proceedings in bankruptcy as thus indicated by

* Savigny § 374, Guthrie 218.

Savigny, except that there was always a great body of authority against allowing the operation of a foreign bankruptcy to extend to immovables, as Savigny, by no means alone in that matter, would make it do so far as concerns the satisfaction out of them of purely personal claims. But that system has waned under the influences which have been mentioned as leading to the second point of view, which we have now to illustrate. For that purpose we need not dwell on the Prussian law of 1855, which in the absence of treaty gave Prussian creditors a preference against the assets in Prussia, while still directing that the surplus of those assets after satisfying home claims should be transmitted, not to the foreign bankrupt, but to the trustees in his foreign bankruptcy. We may come at once to the bankrupt law of the German empire, that of 10th February, 1877, taking effect in 1879, which contains the following clauses.

§ 4. Foreign creditors stand on the same footing as domestic ones.

It may be determined by an order of the chancellor of the empire, with the consent of the federal council, that measures of retorsion shall be applied to persons belonging to foreign states and their assigns.

§ 5. From the commencement of the bankruptcy [this may be prior to any judicial proceeding, and dates as in England from what we call the act of bankruptcy.—J. W.] the common debtor loses the power of administering and disposing of his estate belonging to the bankruptcy.

The right of administration and disposition is exercised by an administrator in bankruptcy.

§ 39. Those assets which with regard to execution against them belong to the class of immovables are to be applied in separate satisfaction, so far as a real or special right to preferable satisfaction out of them exists.

The laws of the empire and of its component territories determine what is comprised in the immovable estate, as well as the claims to be satisfied out of it and their order.

§ 207. When a debtor whose foreign assets are affected by a bankruptcy possesses assets in the empire, execution may be had against the latter.

Exceptions may be made to this rule by an order of the chancellor of the empire, with the consent of the federal council.

§ 208. Process of bankruptcy may be applied to the assets possessed within the empire by a debtor who has no general personal forum within it [that is, who is not subject to German jurisdiction through political nationality or domicile.—J. W.] when he has in the empire an establishment for manufacture, commerce, or any other mode of earning, at or from which business is immediately concluded.

The same is the case when a debtor who has no general personal forum within the empire works within it, whether as owner, usufructuary, or tenant, any property furnished with buildings for dwelling on and working it.

The process can only be had in that court in the district of which the establishment or the property is situate.

When a bankruptcy has been commenced abroad, no proof of insolvency is necessary for commencing the process in the empire.

Thus the preference of the home creditor, which marked the Prussian law of 1855, has disappeared, except by way of retorsion; but a particular German bankruptcy is instituted on the ground of a business establishment without a general personal forum, and in the absence of any exercise by the imperial chancellor and federal council of the powers reserved to them, by which they can give effect to treaties, a foreign bankruptcy does not prevent execution being obtained in Germany by particular creditors. Thus the unity of bankruptcy is not admitted, and, as a consequence, extraterritorial effect on property is not allowed to bankruptcy.

In France the practice of the courts as contrasted with scientific opinion, though the latter is much divided, may be summed up as adverse to the unity of bankruptcy, which nevertheless is the principle of treaties concluded with Switzerland in 1869, and with Belgium in 1899. But even the practice of the courts secures a considerable measure of effect to foreign bankruptcies by means of the view of the nature of an adjudication which is generally entertained on the continent. This is that it transfers no property of the debtor to the trustee or syndic, but is a judgment in favour of the creditors, operating abroad either by its own force as *chose jugée* or, when execution on it is required, by being declared executory as it is termed, or clothed with an *exequatur*, in the same manner as other foreign judgments. Subject to that condition, the trustee or syndic appointed by it will be in the same position as those acting under domestic adjudications, and, like the German administrator under § 5 of the law of 10th February, 1877, will as the representative of the creditors enjoy the administration of the bankrupt's estate without the latter being dispossessed of the property in it, and will be empowered to bring on behalf of the creditors all the actions which the bankrupt could have brought: *French court of cassation*, 12th January, 1875. Having that position, the foreign trustee, so long as no separate domestic bankruptcy intervenes, can obtain any part of the bankrupt's estate in spite of an attempt by a foreign creditor to attach it; but since Art. 14 of the Code Napoleon gives the French creditor an absolute right to sue his foreign debtor in France, an attachment by him must be allowed to proceed, yet again, since French law itself aims at the equal distribution of a bankrupt's estate, no other effect will be allowed it than that of a security for the dividends to which the French creditor may become entitled in the foreign

bankruptcy: *court of appeal of Paris*, 13th August, 1875. Even previous to the adjudication being declared executory the foreign trustee, at least if the fact of his being such is not disputed, can oppose whatever might prejudice his eventual rights: *court of appeal of Paris*, 7th March, 1878. And he may thus defeat an attachment, though he cannot without the *exequatur* get an order for payment or delivery to himself: *court of appeal of Milan*, 15th December, 1876.

The English courts have always been unable to follow precisely the continental jurisprudence in this matter, because our judges never co-operate with foreign judges in the manner referred to by Savigny in the passage above extracted, nor have we the process of declaring foreign judgments executory. It will be explained in a later chapter that a foreign judgment is never admitted to execution in England, but is sued on as a cause of action: consequently it is not possible for us to recognize a continental adjudication of bankruptcy in the only character which it has in its own country, that of a judgment affecting the administration of the bankrupt's estate but not disseising him of the property in it. Again, our system of bankruptcy has no root in the Roman law as to the appointment of curators; it has not merely been modified but was founded by statute, and it operates by way of statutory assignment of the bankrupt's property to the trustees; so that even were it possible for us to declare a continental adjudication executory, it would not run parallel with our own adjudications. There has however been no want of substantial liberality on our part, a foreign adjudication being allowed to operate in England as to movables through the fiction of its being an assignment in its own country, combined with the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*. Thus it has been classed among what in these islands more especially it is usual to call universal assignments, and indeed much of the British learning on that class is to be found in the cases on bankruptcy. It was in a Scotch case on bankruptcy that Lord Meadowbank gave expression to the often quoted dictum, "the legal assignment of a marriage operates without regard to territory all the world over."* It may be remarked in passing that the notion of assignment is as applicable to the British system of winding up companies as it is to bankruptcies technically so called, for the estate of the company is impressed with a trust which the

* In *Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuthbert* (1813), 1 Rose 481, 17 F. C. 79, 2 Buchanan 836.

liquidator has to administer for the creditors, so that the beneficial interest in the estate is virtually assigned. It might even be contended on a similar ground that it is not quite a fiction to treat a foreign adjudication of bankruptcy as an assignment, but there is a difference between the cases, trusts and the beneficial interests to which they gave rise not being known on the continent as here. The syndic in a continental bankruptcy has a duty, and power with which to perform it; but they do not say there that this is attended by any modification of the property in the things about which his duty is to be performed.

An important consequence followed from the mode in which British lawyers were led to approach the subject. When a foreign bankruptcy received its effect through the friendly co-operation of the domestic judge, that co-operation might as well be accorded in what concerned immovables as in what concerned movables; the only reason why it should not be so accorded lay in the stringency which old opinion on private international law attributed to the real statute. Again, when a foreign judgment is clothed with an *exequatur*, it will naturally affect immovables, as well as movables, subject to any real rights of security which creditors may have obtained in them. But when the efficacy of a foreign bankruptcy is held to depend on its being a universal assignment, and in its turn the efficacy of a universal assignment is held to depend on the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*, it needs no stringency of the real statute to exclude the operation of the bankruptcy on immovables; there is nothing to give it such an operation. Hence British lawyers seem never to have so much as entertained the question whether a foreign bankruptcy can operate on immovables.

With regard to companies having legal personality, either the jurisdiction from the law of which they derive such personality, or that in which they have the principal seat of their operations, which is *semble* their domicile, each furnishing a general forum against them, may each pronounce against them an adjudication which so long as it remains the only one should be satisfactory to the advocates of the unity of bankruptcy. In case of a conflict between those jurisdictions, that of the principal seat of operations is generally preferred on the continent, just as it is for the bankruptcy of an individual trader; although, if the bankruptcy of a company should make its dissolution expedient, the law which gave it its personality is the only one that can withdraw that gift. In France companies having foreign legal

personality are continually made bankrupt, and that, as in the case of individual traders, even although they may have in the country only a secondary place of business. Examples are the cases of the *Crédit Foncier Suisse*, having its principal establishment in France, *tribunal of commerce of the Seine*, 5th March, 1874; a Belgian company for carrying on a foundry in France, *court of appeal of Nancy*, 8th May, 1875, the court at the same time refusing to grant an *exequatur* to a Belgian adjudication of bankruptcy against the same company; and a Spanish company for making railways in Spain, which had an office and a committee at Paris and had negotiated loans there, *court of appeal of Paris*, 17th July, 1877. And where Hoffmann, a London merchant with branch houses at Hamburg, Milan, and Paris, had been adjudicated bankrupt in England, he was declared bankrupt in France in spite of the opposition of the English trustee, who demanded in vain an *exequatur* for the English adjudication; *court of appeal of Paris*, 7th March, 1878. But in the case of the same debtor the *court of appeal of Milan*, 15th December, 1876, declared that it did not hesitate to adopt the principle of the universality of the bankruptcy in the domicile, and at the instance of the English trustee deprived a creditor of the fruits of an execution in Italy: see above, p. 160. The most interesting of these cases is perhaps that of the *Crédit Foncier Suisse*, the French decision in which was strongly grounded in the Franco-Swiss treaty of 1869, which provided that the bankruptcy of a Frenchman having his commercial establishment in Switzerland might be declared by the tribunal of his residence in Switzerland, and *vice versa*. The company had been declared bankrupt at Geneva, its domicile, two days earlier than at Paris; and this was upheld by the *court of appeal of the Canton of Geneva*, but finally reversed by the *Swiss federal council*, 21st January, 1875, on the ground that the treaty had the unity of bankruptcy for its object, and that therefore, though both bankruptcies were lawful under it, only the one in the country where the company had the principal focus of its operations ought to be maintained. The council added: "but that bankruptcy will recognize the competence of the Genevese tribunals for all the actions founded on engagements contracted at Geneva by the said *Crédit Foncier Suisse*." M. Charles Brocher, president of the court of cassation of Geneva, considered the decision arrived at by the federal council to have been equitable and convenient, but not legal: *Clunet, Journal du Droit*

International Privé, t. 2, p. 463. It must therefore be borne in mind that the liberal principles which have been noticed as being applied in France to foreign bankruptcies are there applied only when there is no concurrent French bankruptcy, and that the nationality or domicile of the debtor or company will not prevent the institution of a concurrent French bankruptcy.

The working of concurrent bankruptcies gives rise to difficult questions much discussed by the old writers. Some local statutes provided for bankruptcies not founded on domicile, and there were not wanting those who defended them on the grounds that credit was not given to the person of a foreign merchant so much as to his property, and that the strict rules of jurisdiction ought to be relaxed in favour of commerce. From the former argument some even concluded that preference should be given against the local assets to the creditors whose debts had been contracted in the locality. The reader may refer for the controversy to tit. 2, part 1, c. 5, s. 16 of Rodenburg's treatise *De jure quod oritur e statutorum diversitate*. That author, agreeing with Burgundus, decides in favour of the unity of bankruptcy even when the debtor has equal houses of business in different places, unless he is also domiciled at each—see above, p. 147, as to equality of domiciles—in any other case the order of priority of the creditors should be decided by the law of the domicile, and executions elsewhere should not be allowed. But those old authorities are now quite overshadowed by the mass both of judgments and of theoretical literature which has been piled up, and much of which turns on points of procedure to which the English analogies are not close enough to make it worth while even to summarize the mass.

§ 127. The bankruptcy law of England* may be applied to a debtor either on his own or on a creditor's petition, leading in the first instance to a receiving order, after which, in the circumstances appearing in the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, st. 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, the debtor may be adjudicated a bankrupt. In order to be subject to this process at the hands of a creditor, in addition to certain conditions having no international bearing and which do not restrict the application of the process to traders, a debtor must satisfy one or other of the following conditions. (1) He must be "domiciled in England," which means that he must have there such a full domicile as is required for personal capacity or in testamentary cases. Or, (2), he must ordinarily reside or

* The Statute of 1914 has replaced that of 1883 referred to in earlier editions.

have a dwelling-house or place of business in England; or, (3), he must within a year before the presentation of the petition have "ordinarily resided or had a dwelling-house or place of business in England; or, (4), except in the case of a person domiciled in Scotland or Ireland or a firm or partnership having its principal place of business in Scotland or Ireland, he has carried on business in England, personally or by means of an agent or manager, or, (5) (except as aforesaid), is or within the said period has been a member of a firm or partnership of persons which has carried on business in England by means of a partner or partners, or an agent or manager.* Or again, (6), he may be a judgment debtor who might be committed under the Debtors Act, 1869, s. 5, in which case, instead of his being so committed, a receiving order may be made against him with the consent of the judgment creditor, and thereupon adjudication may follow.† Further, if the proceeding in bankruptcy is introduced by a creditor's petition, that petition must be grounded on an act of bankruptcy committed by the debtor within three months before its presentation. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, it was held that an act of bankruptcy cannot be committed by a firm as such, but must be the personal act or default of the person to be made a bankrupt. *Exp. Blain, re Sawers* (1879), 12 Ch. D. 522, James, Brett and Cotton; quoted with approval by Lord Davey in *Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Company*, [1901] A. C. 113. The provisions of s. 4 (1) *d.* of the new Act expressly reversed the principle laid down in these cases, which was stated as follows in *Cooke v. Charles A. Vogeler Company*, [1901] A. C. 102: "A foreigner, who has never been in this country, and has himself personally done no act within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court of this country, cannot be made bankrupt by reason of his having traded through an agent in this country, and having done an act in his own country which, if he had done it here, would undoubtedly be an act of bankruptcy."

In *Re Pearson, Ex parte Pearson*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263, Esher (Brett), Fry and Lopes, it was held that the court cannot give leave to serve a bankruptcy notice on a foreigner out of the jurisdiction, but the term "foreigner" is presumably to be understood with regard to domicile and

* Bankruptcy Act, 1914. Art. 1 (5).

† The debtor's qualifications (1) to (5) for an English bankruptcy are laid down in the Bankruptcy Act, s. 4 (1), (2) being inferred from or comprised in (3). The qualification (6) appears in the same act, s. 107 (4), and it is not necessary for it that any of the other qualifications should exist: *Re Clark, exp. Clark*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 20, A. L. Smith, Rigby and Collins, followed in *Re Hallman, exp. Ellis and Collier*, [1909] 2 K. B. 430, Phillimore.

not to nationality. A bankruptcy notice may be served in England on a debtor who was out of England when it was issued, subject to the question what it may be worth: *Re Clark, Ex parte Beyer, Peacock & Co., Lim.*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 476, Lindley, Lopes, Rigby. An order for substituted service of a bankruptcy notice or petition may be made if the court is satisfied that the debtor went out of the jurisdiction in order to avoid service: *Re Urquhart, Ex parte Urquhart* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 723, Esher, Fry, Lopes.

If the debtor's English domicile is relied on and disputed, the burden of proving it lies on the petitioning creditor: *Ex parte Cunningham, Re Mitchell* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 418, Baggallay, Cotton, Lindley; *Re Barne* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 522, Esher, Lindley, Lopes.

A dwelling-house abandoned as such is not within the Act, though it still belongs to the debtor: *Re Nordenfelt*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 151, Esher, Lopes, Rigby.

A petition by a creditor for the administration according to the law of bankruptcy of the estate of a deceased insolvent ought, if the debtor was not resident in England, to be presented to the high court of justice: *Re Evans, Ex parte Evans*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 143, Esher, Lopes, Lindley.

Thus the English system rejects the unity of bankruptcy. By granting bankruptcies in cases other than those of full domicile or principal trading establishment, it incurs the chance that English bankruptcies may be concurrent with foreign ones based on principles which it admits for itself.

Where a debtor has carried on business as a member of an English firm and also as a member of a firm carrying on business abroad, and adjudications have been made both in England and abroad, the court has power to sanction a scheme for a concurrent administration: *In re P. Macfadyen & Co., Ex parte Vizianagaram Co., Lim.*, [1908] 1 K. B. 675, Bigham.

§ 128. By the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, s. 6, the presentation of a bankruptcy petition by a debtor is itself an act of bankruptcy; and "debtor" is defined in section 1 (2) to include any person, whether a British subject or not, who, at the time when any act of bankruptcy was done or suffered by him, (a) was personally present in England; or (b) ordinarily resided or had a place of residence in England; or (c) was carrying on business in England, personally, or by means of an agent or manager; or (d) was a member of a firm or partnership which carried on business in England.

This definition of debtor is somewhat wider than the class of debtor against whom a creditor can proceed, as laid down in section 4 (1) *d.*; and a foreigner can be made a bankrupt in England on his own petition, provided only that he was present in England when the act of bankruptcy was done by him.

§ 129. When the petitioner is a creditor it is immaterial where his debt was contracted, and whether he is domiciled,

resides or trades in England; and in any case it is immaterial whether the debtor is subject to bankruptcy by the law of his domicile, if that is not in England, and whether he is in England when the petition is presented.

The ancient cases take a distinction between trading in and trading to England. One who had a house of business in England, or who was in the habit of trading personally there, though only on short visits to the country, was said to trade in England; but one whose house of business was abroad, and who merely sent goods to England for sale and purchased goods there through an agent or by correspondence, was said to trade to England. At that time only traders were subject to the English bankrupt laws, and the act of bankruptcy could only be committed in England; and the result of the decisions was that any one who traded either in or to England could be made bankrupt. *Dodsworth v. Anderson* (1681), T. Jones, 141, King's Bench, personal trading in England on short visits; *Bird v. Sedgwick* (1693), 1 Sal. 110, King's Bench, trading to England; *Ex parte Smith* (1737), cited from P. C. Webb's notes in *Alexander v. Vaughan*, Cowp. 399, &c. The last was also a case of trading to England, and Lord Hardwicke appears to have decided it reluctantly on the authority of *Bird v. Sedgwick*, saying, "if the act of bankruptcy had been committed abroad, to be sure no commission ought to go against him for that act." The wording of this is strange, and probably due to the reporter, for at that time no commission of bankruptcy could go against any one for an act committed abroad; but the meaning clearly is that it was only by reason of the commission of the act of bankruptcy in England that the debtor who traded to England was subject to the bankrupt laws. *Ex parte Williamson* (1751), 2 Ves. Sen. 249; 1 Atk. 82, is another case of the bankruptcy of one who had traded to England, before the same judge. The trader, as also in *Dodsworth v. Anderson*, was domiciled in Ireland, where there were then no bankrupt laws, so that these cases established the immateriality of the debtor's being subject to bankruptcy process by the law of his domicile. In the report in Atkyns Lord Hardwicke is made to mention, as an element, the debtor's having carried on a trade in a kingdom belonging to the Crown of Great Britain; but in the report in Vesey he is more correctly made to say, "where a man residing in one part of the realm or in other countries contracts debts here." In fact the debtor in *Bird v. Sedgwick* resided in Portugal. By "contracting debts here" it was only meant to refer to the debtor's trading to England, not to limit the benefit of the English bankrupt laws, when his subjection to them was established, to creditors whose debts were contracted in England. All these cases were reviewed and recognized by Lord Mansfield in *Alexander v. Vaughan* (1776), Cowp. 398. In *Allen v. Cannon* (1821), 4 B. & A. 418, Abbott and (?), it was decided that the habit of purchasing goods while on short visits in England was sufficient to constitute trading in England without ever selling there.

After the cases above cited the English bankrupt laws were extended to non-traders, with some distinction between the things which were acts of bankruptcy when done by traders and those which were such when done by non-traders; and certain things done abroad were made acts of bankruptcy, but none of them were among those which were such acts only when done by traders. In this state of the law it was decided, in accordance with the principles expressed by Lord Hardwicke in *Ex parte Smith*, that no one who was neither domiciled in England nor traded personally in England

could be made bankrupt on anything done by him abroad; also that any person whatever might be made bankrupt on a non-trader's act of bankruptcy committed by him in England: *Ex parte Crispin* (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 374, Mellish and Selborne. In the same state of the law, *Ex parte Pascal* (1876), 1 Ch. D. 509, James, Mellish and Baggallay, showed that a debtor's summons might be served in England on any one however transiently there, as a foundation for an act of bankruptcy; while that it could not be served out of England was shown by *Ex parte O'Loghlen* (1871), L. R. 6 Ch. App. 406, James and Mellish.

The following cases are still applicable. The same circumstances which in the case of one resident in England, or having a house of business there, would lead to the conclusion that he had committed an act of bankruptcy by departing from that country or remaining out of it with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, may not lead to that conclusion in the case of any other person: *Ex parte Crispin*, as above; *Ex parte Gutierrez* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 298, Jessel, James and Bramwell; *Ex parte Brandon* (1884), 25 Ch. D. 500, Selborne, Cotton and Fry.

Ex parte Crispin further shows the immateriality of the debtor's being in England when the petition for adjudication is presented; and the immateriality of the place where the petitioning creditor's debt was contracted is shown by *Ex parte Pascal*, as above.

§ 130. That bankruptcy proceedings against the same debtor are pending in another country is not a conclusive reason against making an adjudication in England. The English court will adjudicate if it appears that to do so either is or may be for the interest of the creditors; but even after adjudication the proceedings may be stayed if it appears that they are useless, as for instance because all the assets are abroad and in course of distribution by a foreign court.

Adjudication granted on a petition which would overreach a prior Irish adjudication, and might therefore bring in more assets: *Re McCulloch* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 716; Bacon, affirmed by James, Cotton and Thesiger. Adjudication refused where there was a pending sequestration in Scotland, and no debts contracted since its commencement, nor any assets in England: *Re Robinson* (1883), 22 Ch. D. 816; Jessel, Baggallay, Lindley. As to staying the English proceedings, see what was said by James in *Ex parte Pascal* (1876), 1 Ch. D. 512, and in *Re McCulloch*, u.s., p. 723.

It is no ground for staying proceedings in an English bankruptcy that there is a prior adjudication of bankruptcy against the same debtor in a foreign country which is not that of his domicile; if the prior adjudication had been in the domicile, *quære*. *Re Artola Hermanos, Ex parte André Châle* (1890), 24 Q. B. 640, Coleridge and Fry.

§ 131. A company which derives its incorporation or other legal existence from the law of England, or from British law as connected with England rather than with any other part of the empire, is subject to be wound up in England wherever its business may be; and if all its business is abroad, that may be an additional reason for winding it up.

Re Madrid and Valencia Railway Co. (1849), 3 De G. & S. 127, Knight-Bruce; affirmed by Cottenham (1850), 2 M. & G. 169: *Re Factage Parisien, Lim.* (1864), 34 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 140, Romilly: *Re Peruvian Railways Co., Lim.* (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 617, Cairns and Turner affirming Malins: *Re General Company for the Promotion of Land Credit, Lim.* (1870), L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 363, Giffard; affirmed *sub nom. Princess of Reuss v. Bos* (1871), L. R. 5 E. & I. A. 176, Hatherley, Colonsay, Cairns. The last case is the authority for the latter part of the §. Giffard and Hatherley appear to have considered that no business carried on abroad could be taken into account under the provision in the Companies Act, 1862, that a company may be wound up by the court when it "does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation, or suspends its business for the space of a whole year." But this would be going too far, as may be seen from the numerous companies registered in England in order to work foreign undertakings. And where a company was registered in England in order to carry on business both there and abroad, its not having commenced business in England during the first year, while it had done so abroad, was held to be no reason for winding it up under that provision: *Re Capital Fire Insurance Association* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 209, Chitty. In *Princess of Reuss v. Bos*, Cairns considered that, independently of the provision referred to, a company which carried on and intended to carry on business only abroad was one which it was "just and equitable should be wound up," within the spirit of the same act. Malins in that case had refused to make an order for winding up, as a matter of discretion. I presume that business in Scotland or Ireland would satisfy whatever may be necessary under the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7. c. 69; and prevent the doctrine of the latter part of this § applying: see what was said by Jessel, *alio intuitu*, in *Re International Pulp and Paper Co.* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 594.

§ 132. A company which does not derive its incorporation from the law of the United Kingdom may be subjected to winding up proceedings in England if it has an office there, and has carried on business and has assets in England, though those proceedings cannot be carried so far as to dissolve the company.

Section 268 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908.

Re Commercial Bank of India (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 517, Romilly; *Re Matheson Brothers, Lim.* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 225, Kay; *Re Commercial Bank of South Australia* (1886), 33 Ch. D. 174, Pearson and North; *Re Mercantile Bank of Australia*, [1892] 2 Ch. 204, North: *Re English, Scottish, and Australian Chartered Bank*, [1893] 3 Ch. 385, Vaughan Williams, affirmed by Lindley, Lopes, A. L. Smith; *Re Federal Bank of Australia*, [1893] W. N. 46, 77, 68 L. T. 728, 62 L. J. Ch. 561, Vaughan Williams, affirmed by Lindley, Bowen, Kay; *Re Queensland National Bank*, [1893] W. N. 128, Vaughan Williams. The second, third and sixth cases show that the pending of winding-up proceedings in the company's domicile is no objection to an ancillary winding-up here.

If the company were incorporated by registration in Scotland or Ireland, the Companies Act would make such respective part of the United Kingdom the forum for winding it up.

§ 133. A winding up order cannot be made in England against a company incorporated abroad if it has no office in England, though it carries on business there by means of agents.

Re Lloyd Generale Italiano (1885), 29 Ch. D. 219, Pearson. It was not necessary to consider this point in *Re Union Bank of Calcutta* (1850), 3 De G. & S. 253, Knight-Bruce, the winding-up order there being refused as a matter of discretion.

§ 134. Curators, syndics, or others who under the law of a country where a debtor is domiciled, *or, if the debtor has himself been a party to the proceedings, under the law of the country where he is resident*, are entitled to administer his property on behalf of his creditors, are entitled as such to his chattels personal and choses in action in England.

[Note: the words in italics have been added to the former statement of the rule in view of the three cases cited below, which have been decided since the last edition.]

Solomons v. Ross (1764), 1 H. Bl. 131 note, Justice Bathurst sitting for Lord Chancellor Northington; *Jollet v. Deponthieu* (1769), 1 H. Bl. 132 note, Camden. In *Neal v. Cottingham* (1764), 1 H. Bl. 132 note, Bôwes, Lord Chancellor of Ireland, made a corresponding decision in favour of English assignees, with the approval of several of the Irish judges. In all these cases the title of the curators or assignees came into conflict with that of an attaching creditor, judgment in the attachment suit not having been signed till after their appointment. During the argument in *Folliott v. Ogden*, 1 H. Bl. 132, Lord Loughborough said that he was counsel in *Solomons v. Ross*, "which was decided solely on the principle that the assignment of the bankrupts' effects to the curators of desolate estates in Holland was an assignment for a valuable consideration."

In *Alivon v. Furnival* (1834), 1 Cr. M. & R. 277, 4 Tyr. 751, Parke and (?), which was an action by French syndics for a debt due to their bankrupt, the title of the plaintiffs as mandatories without an assignment was recognized; and although three had been appointed two were allowed to recover, on proof that they could sue in France without the third.

The first English case in which the necessity of domicile as a foundation for the foreign title seems to have been considered is *Re Blithman* (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 23, a contest between the assignee in a colonial insolvency and the executrix of the insolvent, where Romilly held that the title of the former depended on whether the insolvent was domiciled in the colony. This was followed in *Re Hayward*, *Hayward v. Hayward*, [1897] 1 Ch. 905, Kekewich, who cited this § with approval. But in *Re Davidson* (1873), L. R. 15 Eq. 383, James decided in favour of the assignee against the debtor whatever might have been the domicile, because the latter had been declared insolvent on his own petition; and this was followed in *Re Lawson's Trusts*, [1896] 1 Ch. 175, North. In *Re Anderson*, [1911] 1 K. B. 896, Phillimore decided that personal property in England passed to the assignee in a colonial bankruptcy which was prior in date to the English bankruptcy, although the debtor was domiciled in England, on the ground that the debtor was a party to the Colonial proceedings. The learned judge apparently treated the earlier doctrine as having been

overruled by *Re Davidson* and *Re Lawson's Trusts*; but this part of the decision at least appears to be in direct conflict with *Re Blithman* and *Re Hayward*. His decision, however, was followed in *Re Craig*, [1916] 86 L. J. Ch. 62, Eve, where it was held that a reversionary interest in a fund in court passed to the trustee in a colonial bankruptcy, though the debtor was not domiciled in the colony. The debtor had submitted himself to the colonial jurisdiction by presenting a petition. So, too, in *Re Burke*, 148 L. T. 175, Astbury, when the assignee was appointed in a foreign proceeding, he was held to be entitled to assets in England though the debtor was not domiciled in England. The debtor had presented a petition to the foreign court asking for judicial liquidation under the foreign law. And this decision again was followed in *Begerem v. Marsh*, [1921] 151 L. T. 264, Bailhache, where a Belgian trustee in bankruptcy was held entitled to all the assets of an Englishman domiciled in England who had been a partner in a firm in Belgium and declared insolvent with his partner in Belgian proceedings. The original decree had been made in the defendant's absence; but he was subsequently notified of it, and appeared unsuccessfully to contest its validity; and this was held to be submission to the jurisdiction. The English practice, as laid down in these later cases, justifies the assertion of a principle that a commercial domicile is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in bankruptcy. In *Dulaney v. Merry and Son*, [1901] 1 K. B. 536, Channell held that the title of the trustees of a Maryland deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors, who had been empowered by the court of that state to administer their trust under its authority, was superior to that of an execution creditor, relying on the doctrine *mobilia sequuntur personam*, the Deeds of Arrangement Act, 1877,* under which the deed had not been registered, not applying to the case.

The Scotch authorities had fluctuated with regard to the doctrine of § 134, but the superior title of the assignees in the English bankruptcy of a person domiciled in England, to that conferred by an arrestment in Scotland not completed by decree before the assignment to them, was established by the court of session in *Strother v. Read* (1803), 13 Fac. De. 253. This was followed by *Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuthbert*, or *v. Stein's assignees* (1813), 17 Fac. De. 72, 1 Rose 462, in which the same court held that the bankruptcy in England of four partners having as such houses of business both in England and in Scotland, but of whom two were domiciled in England and two in Scotland, passed the movable estate of all in Scotland, so as to preclude a subsequent sequestration in the latter country from having any operation not only on the joint estate of the four, but even on the separate estate of the two whose domicile was Scotch, and who carried on a separate business in Scotland. Afterwards the House of Lords in a Scotch appeal; *Selkirk v. Davis* (1814), 2 Rose 291, 2 Dow 230, Eldon; similarly held that an English bankruptcy was paramount to a subsequent Scotch sequestration, where the bankrupt was domiciled in Scotland but traded both in England and in Scotland. It is unfortunately difficult to discover the precise ground for the decision in *Selkirk v. Davis*, or for that part of the decision in *Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuthbert* with which *Selkirk v. Davis* corresponded. It can hardly be doubted that in some way or other the ground was the imperial character of the legislation on which an English bankruptcy depended, and that these cases cannot be quoted as authorities for allowing Scotch movables,

* Now repealed and re-enacted by the Act of 1914.

or therefore English, to pass by a bankruptcy taking place neither in the United Kingdom nor in the debtor's domicile. But since at that time it was agreed that the English bankrupt laws did not design to pass Scotch immovable property, their design to pass Scotch movables could not be inferred from their power to do so; and if it was presumed that they designed to follow the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*, that argument would not apply where the domicile was not English. For the rest, from *Selkirk v. Davis* and *Strother v. Read* it further appears that the intimation of the assignment to the debtor, which by Scotch law is generally necessary in order to complete an assignee's title to a debt, is not required in Scotland from persons deriving title to a debt under a foreign bankruptcy.

Where the order of dates was this: 1. act of bankruptcy, to which the English commission related; 2. application for sequestration, to which the Scotch award related; 3. English commission (now it would be adjudication) of bankruptcy; 4. Scotch award of sequestration: it was held by the House of Lords on a Scotch appeal that the sequestration was prior. *Geddes v. Mowat* (1824), 1 Gl. & J. 414, Gifford.

§ 135. But where a particular form of conveyance is necessary, as in the case of money in the public funds, or in that of a legal chose in action only assignable pursuant to the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25, sub-s. 6, the foreign law under which the curators, syndics or others are entitled cannot supply the want of such conveyance, though it binds the beneficial right.

A Scotch sequestration, though under a British act of parliament, did not enable the trustee to sue for a legal chose in action in his own name. *Jeffery v. McTaggart* (1817), 6 M. & S. 126, Ellenborough and Abbott.

Thus also an English bankruptcy, passing immovable property in a colony where registration is necessary to complete the title, does not supersede the necessity of such registration: *per* Jessel in *Ex parte Rogers* (1881), 16 Ch. D. 666. The bankrupt is compelled by section 22 (2), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, to aid in the realisation of his property, and can therefore be called on to register any transfer necessary.

The words in the Bankruptcy Act, s. 1, that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy if, "in England or elsewhere," he makes a conveyance etc. of his property does not alter the old law that the conveyance must be intended to operate according to English law; and, therefore, a conveyance of property in England must be carried out according to English law, to be an act of bankruptcy.

§ 136. A curator, syndic, or assignee in a foreign bankruptcy is not accountable in the English court merely because he is in England with funds of the bankruptcy in his hands; nor will the English court interfere with him unless it be shown that his absence from the country of the bankruptcy prevents redress being had there.

Smith v. Moffatt (1865), L. R. 1 Eq. 397, Wood.

See as to the parallel cases concerning foreign administrators of the estates of deceased persons, §§ 99—101, above.

§ 137. It was formerly the law that an English bankruptcy, or the winding up of a company incorporated in England, carried all the real or immovable property of the bankrupt or company in any part of the British dominions. This was expressly laid down in the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, s. 142, but that Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Repeal and Insolvent Court Act, 1869; and under the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, s. 44, the doctrine rested on the word "all" as describing the property of the bankrupt dealt with by the statute. For such an interpretation there were two grounds besides the simple meaning of the word, one that the intention of Parliament was to be measured by the extent of its power, the other that a change in the law from that laid down by older legislation *in pari materia* must not be presumed without its distinct expression. But notwithstanding the acquiescence with which the interpretation has generally been received, cause for reflection has been given by what was said by Lord Hobhouse in delivering the judgment of the judicial committee (Lords Watson, Hobhouse and Morris, Sir R. Couch and Lord Shand) in *Callender, Sykes & Co. v. Colonial Secretary of Lagos and Davies and Williams v. Davies*, [1891] A. C. 460, at p. 466. "It is true that the laws of every country must prevail with respect to the land situated there. If the laws of a colony are such as would not admit of a transfer of land by mere vesting order or mere appointment of a trustee, questions may arise which must be settled according to the circumstances of each case. Such questions are specially likely to arise in those colonies to which the imperial legislature has delegated the power of making laws for themselves, and in which laws have been made in reference to bankruptcy." This pregnant remark, which equally applies to the interpretation of the general words in the Companies Acts, suggests that the change of language made by parliament in 1869 may have been intended to leave some latitude to the courts in dealing with the relations between the mother country and the more important colonies, which the then recent establishment of the Dominion of Canada presented from a novel point of view. In the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, "property" is more distinctly defined to include "every description of property *whether real or personal* and whether situate in England or elsewhere" (s. 167). These words would appear to embrace in an English bankruptcy real property abroad. But the idea that land is subject to the local law in a peculiar measure is so deeply seated in the English system of

private international law that it is difficult to suppose that the mother country, while establishing what have been called sister states, intended any longer to affect land in them by her own legislation. No theory of the unity of bankruptcy could be cited in support of such a supposition, because the unity of bankruptcy is not adopted by the English system. It would not be enough to say that where an English bankruptcy or winding up is later in date than a similar proceeding under the law of a self-governing colony, parliament cannot have intended to displace a disposition of the local immovables already made in or by the latter. It would seem scarcely enough to say that even where the English proceeding is the earlier or the only one, parliament cannot intend to withdraw land in such a colony from the future operation of laws which "have been made" in it in reference to bankruptcy: The probable intention of parliament cannot, surely, depend on whether a bankruptcy law has been made in a given colony, but must turn on whether the colony is regarded as having attained the degree of separate existence to which English ideas attach the consequence that land in it shall not be affected by the law of another political unit.* Where that is the case, I now submit that the real or immovable property of the bankrupt or company in the colony in question cannot be deemed to pass by an English bankruptcy or winding up, through the mere force of British legislation, though it may be brought under the proceeding through the view which the courts of the colony take of its international effect. In the case of all other British dominions the local immovables will still be carried by the British legislation.

Where immovables in a British colony or dependency are comprised in an English bankruptcy or similar proceeding, the title to them must be completed in accordance with the local law. This will often be applicable in the case of a winding up, since the Companies Act does not divest the company of the property in any of its assets, but impresses the whole of the assets with a trust for the creditors.

§ 138. An English bankruptcy, or the winding up of a company incorporated in England, carries all the personal or movable property of the bankrupt or company situate or recoverable in any part of the British dominions.

* Dumoulin's doctrine was that the law of the matrimonial domicile is extended to foreign immovables by tacit contract, so that the statement in the text is not affected by the decision of the second case of *De Nicols v. Curlier* in accordance with that doctrine. See above, p. 74.

See *Ex parte Robertson* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 733, Bacon, in which a creditor domiciled in Scotland was ordered to pay over to the trustees in an English liquidation a sum which after its commencement he had received from the liquidating debtor on account. The judge put it on the ground of the creditor's having proved for the residue of his debt, treating proof as a contract that the whole estate should be administered in the liquidation or bankruptcy.

In *Re Oriental Inland Steam Company, Ex parte Scinde Railway Company* (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 557, James and Mellish affirming Malins, and *Re International Pulp and Paper Company* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 594, Jessel, creditors of a company in course of winding up in England were restrained, in the former case from attaching its property in India, and in the latter from suing the company in Ireland. If an Indian or Colonial company were subjected to a winding up process in England under the doctrine of § 132, it is difficult to suppose that either its movable or its immovable property situate out of England could be strictly considered as passing by such winding up, though it might very likely, for convenience, be administered in the English court as long as there was not a concurrent winding up in the company's domicile.

§ 139. But when a debtor to one who is a bankrupt in England has paid his debt since the commencement of the bankruptcy under process of law in any country, British or foreign, the trustees in the bankruptcy cannot make him pay it over again, though the creditor who compelled the payment by process of attachment may be accountable for it to the trustees.

Le Chevalier v. Lynch (1779), 1 Doug. 170, Mansfield.

§ 140. It was formerly held that a bankrupt in England cannot be compelled to make to the trustees an assignment of his immovable property outside the British dominions, or even of his movable property situate or recoverable in any country in which the title of the trustees to such property is not as fully recognized as in England.

Ex parte Blakes (1787), Cox, 398, Thurlow, foreign debts; Eldon, in *Selkirk v. Davis* (1814), 2 Rose 311, 2 Dow 245, property both immovable and movable. And it would be improper to compel the bankrupt indirectly, by withholding his certificate till he had conveyed his foreign immovables: Parke, in *Cockerell v. Dickens* (1840), 3 Mo. P. C. 133.

Section 22 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, however, provides that the debtor shall execute such conveyance deeds and instruments as may be reasonably required by the trustee. This would not, indeed, affect immovable property in a foreign country which by the *lex situs* would not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, but it would affect the assignment of all movables. But now let us suppose that a creditor of one who is a bankrupt in England has since the commencement of the bankruptcy

obtained payment outside the British dominions, either out of immovable property, or out of movable property the title of the English trustees to which was either not put forward or was not recognized in the country where it was situate or recoverable. The doctrine applicable to such cases is laid down in the judgment of the privy council on an appeal from Calcutta with reference to an Indian insolvency, which was confessedly governed by the same principles as an English bankruptcy. "If the real estate in Java did not pass by the assignment under 9 Geo. 4, c. 73, s. 9"—the act for Indian insolvencies—"nor could in any way be got hold of and made available by the assignees for the payment of the general creditors, any individual creditor who could obtain it by due course of law would have a right to hold it; and if he duly proved the debt due to him before he had been paid any part of the debt so proved by means of that estate, he would be entitled to receive the dividends under the insolvent estate until he had been paid altogether twenty shillings in the pound, exactly in the same way as if a creditor had had a security on the real estate or personal credit of a third person. In this case he could neither be compelled to refund the money obtained by means of the real estate or the dividends received on the debt, or be restrained from receiving those hereafter to become due. The principle is that one creditor shall not take a part of the fund which otherwise would have been available for the payment of all the creditors, and at the same time be allowed to come in *pari passu* with the other creditors for satisfaction out of the remainder of that fund: and this principle does not apply where that creditor obtains by his diligence something which did not and could not form a part of that fund." *Cockerell v. Dickens* (1840), 3 Mo. P. C. 132. This extract fully sets out the doctrine relating to a fund which even if not taken by the particular creditor would not have been available for the creditors generally, but it was not necessary to state as fully the doctrine relating to a fund which might have been so available. The particular creditors were aliens resident out of the jurisdiction. They had not only obtained partial payment out of the insolvent's real estate in Java, but had also commenced proceedings, though they had not so far derived any fruits therefrom, against debtors to the insolvents at Bencoolen, another settlement in the Dutch East Indies. The assignees at Calcutta, in accordance with what is said in the passage extracted, succeeded in stopping their dividends in the insolvency there until they should

abandon the proceedings at Bencoolen; but had the particular creditors been subject to the jurisdiction, and obtained fruits from the proceedings at Bencoolen, the question would have arisen whether the assignees might not have asked to have those fruits paid over, as forming part of the fund which might have been available for the general mass, and which therefore creditors who were themselves subject to the law governing the insolvency ought not to keep out of that mass. We have now to develop the doctrine thus introduced.

§ 141. Any creditor, British or alien, may retain any payment which he can obtain out of the non-British immovables of a bankrupt or company being wound up, and if it is only partial may receive dividends in the bankruptcy or winding up on the residue of his debt *pari passu* with the other creditors.

Cockerell v. Dickens (1840), 3 Mo. P. C. 98, Parke. In *Re Central Sugar Factories of Brazil, Fluck's Case*, [1894] 1 Ch. 369, North, a creditor was restrained from proceeding further against the Brazilian immovables of an English company, where his doing so would have interfered with an advantageous sale of that property, but his right to be allowed the amount of his debt out of the proceeds of the sale was reserved for inquiry.

The doctrine is thus broadly stated in the English authorities on the assumption that a foreign bankruptcy would in no country be allowed to operate on immovables: but since this is not quite the fact, the principle laid down in *Cockerell v. Dickens* should lead to the proposition being restricted to payment obtained out of immovables situate in countries where the English trustees would be unable to get the benefit of them.

The doctrine of the § applies also to payment obtained abroad by a judgment *in rem* against movables.

Minna Craig Steamship Company v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India London and China, [1897] 1 Q. B. 55, Collins.

Coming to the general case of movables, let us suppose a country, not where the title to them of the trustees in an English bankruptcy is absolutely unrecognised, for there is perhaps no such country, but where it is postponed to that conferred by an execution or attachment subsequent to the bankruptcy. If a creditor obtains payment by such an execution or attachment, it may be said that he has taken a part of the fund which otherwise would have been available for the payment of all the creditors, because, if no one had intervened, the trustees could have successfully asserted their title to the movables against that of the bankrupt. It may be answered that other creditors might

have intervened, whom the process of the English court could not have reached, and that therefore, if a creditor amenable to the jurisdiction is not allowed to retain the fruits of the pains which he may take in the country supposed, the movables in that country will be enjoyed by those creditors only who are not amenable to the jurisdiction. The sufficiency of the answer might depend on the existence and importance of creditors of the latter class in the particular instance, but the courts have not embarked in such an inquiry, and have rather proceeded on lines which may probably be described as in the next two §§.

§ 142. A British creditor, or one domiciled in England, or one who in his character of creditor must be regarded as English because the debt is owed to a house of business in England of which he is a member, and who after the commencement of an English bankruptcy or winding up, and not by virtue of any charge prior to the bankruptcy or winding up or of a judgment *in rem*, obtains payment out of the bankrupt's or company's movables in a non-British country, must pay over the amount to the trustees in the bankruptcy or the liquidator, whether or not he seeks to receive dividends on the residue if any of his debt, whether or not the payment was obtained by legal proceedings, and whether or not the title of the trustees or liquidator was asserted in such proceedings if any. And such a creditor will be restrained from proceeding abroad to obtain such payment.

Re South-Eastern of Portugal Railway Co. (1869), 17 W. R. 982, Malins; *Re North Carolina Estate Co.* (1889), 5 T. L. R. 328, Chitty; and *Re Belfast Shipowners' Co.*, [1894] 1 I. R. 321, Chatterton, affirmed by Walker, Palles, Fitzgibbon; are authorities for restraining a creditor as mentioned.

§ 143. A creditor not being such as is described in the last §, who after the commencement of an English bankruptcy or winding up, and not by virtue of any charge prior to the bankruptcy or winding up or of a judgment *in rem*, obtains payment out of the bankrupt's or company's movables in a non-British country, must account for such payment if he seeks to receive dividends on the residue if any of his debt, but may otherwise retain it; and this, whether or not the payment was obtained by legal proceedings, and whether or not the title of the trustees or liquidator was asserted in such proceedings if any.

The leading cases are *Hunter v. Potts* (1791), 4 T. R. 182, King's Bench, judgment of court delivered by Kenyon; *Sill v. Worswick* (1791), 1 H. Bl.

665, Common Pleas, judgment of court delivered by Loughborough; and *Philips v. Hunter* (1795), 2 H. Bl. 402, Exchequer Chamber, Macdonald, Hotham, Perryn, Heath, Thompson and Rooke, against Eyre; in all which the assignees in English bankruptcies recovered from creditors the amounts which they had obtained by attachments abroad. In *Hunter v. Potts*, where the attachment was in Rhode Island, and the assignees had not intervened nor was it proved how their title would have been regarded by the law of that state, Lord Kenyon adverted to the residence of the creditor in England and his knowledge of the bankruptcy at the time when he commenced the attachment suit, but mainly rested the judgment on the English domicile of the bankrupts. In *Sill v. Worswick* the attachment was in the British West Indies, so that the title of the assignees must have been regarded as superior had they intervened, and the case might have been put on the proposition expressed in § 138. In fact Lord Loughborough considered the English residence of the creditor, and his swearing in England, with knowledge of the bankruptcy, the affidavit by which the attachment suit was commenced, to be sufficient alone to decide the case. He went, however, more widely into the doctrine than he considered the circumstances to require, and after laying great stress on the bankrupt's domicile he continued: "I do not wish to have it understood that it follows as a consequence from the opinion I am now giving, I rather think that the contrary would be the consequence of the reasoning I am now using, that a creditor in that country"—not the colony but a supposed non-British country—"not subject to the bankruptcy laws nor affected by them, obtaining payment of his debt and afterwards coming over to this country, would be liable to refund that debt. If he had recovered it in an adverse suit with the assignees, he would clearly not be liable. But if the law of that country preferred him to the assignee, though I must suppose that determination wrong, yet I do not think that my holding a contrary opinion would revoke the determination of that country, however I might disapprove of the principle on which that law so decided." In *Philips v. Hunter* the attachment was made in Pennsylvania, and the assignees had not intervened, nor was it proved how their title would have been regarded. The majority of the court adverted in their judgments to the attaching creditor being a British subject though resident in America, and being a partner in a firm whose only house of business was in England, where also the other partners were resident, and where the debt of the bankrupts to the firm was contracted; and they regarded all these circumstances as important. The pith of their opinions is contained in the following sentences. "When the debt therefore was contracted, all the parties were as much subject to the bankrupt laws as to the other laws of England under which they lived . . . and it is on wise principles that sovereign states acknowledge and act according to the different civil relations which subsist between men in their own country." I have ventured in framing the §§ to disregard the place of contracting the bankrupt's debt, and the state of circumstances at the time of contracting it, for those, according to settled maxims of private international law, might affect the substance of an obligation but not the remedy for its breach.

Lord Hardwicke had already held that the assignees in an English bankruptcy had a superior title to that gained by arrestment in Scotland after the bankruptcy, a proposition which may be referred to § 138: *McIntosh v. Ogilvie* (1748), 4 T. R. 193 note, where he prevented a creditor by a *ne exeat* from going to Scotland in order to make such arrest-

ments; and *Captain Wilson's Case*, another stage in which is reported *sub nom. Richardson v. Bradshaw* (1752), 1 Atk. 128, but in which Lord Loughborough's account in *Sill v. Worswick*, 1 H. Bl. 692, shows that both Lord Hardwicke and the court of session held the assignment to be a superior title to the arrestment. Lord Mansfield however afterwards held at *nisi prius* that a creditor resident in England could hold against the assignees in an English bankruptcy the fruits of an execution obtained by him after the bankruptcy at Gibraltar: *Waring v. Knight* (1765), Cooke's Bank. Laws, 300. And the court of sessions fluctuated as mentioned on p. 179: so the whole subject was at sea till the decision of the three leading cases above reviewed.

In *Ex parte Dobree* and *Ex parte Le Mesurier* (1803), 8 Ves. 82, Lord Eldon allowed the hour of the day to be inquired into, for the purpose of determining the priority between an English bankruptcy and attachments in Jersey.

The doctrine of §§ 142 and 143 does not apply between English receivers for debenture-holders and unsecured creditors obtaining or seeking payment abroad. There is no equity in favour of the debenture-holders against the unsecured creditors.

Re Maudslay, Sons and Field, [1900] 1 Ch. 602, Cozens-Hardy.

§ 144. Where the property of the same person, or of a partnership consisting of the same persons though under a different style, is being administered in bankruptcy both in England and abroad, a creditor who has received a dividend in the foreign bankruptcy can receive nothing in the English one until all the creditors have been made equal, notwithstanding that he may have been entitled to priority by the law of the foreign bankruptcy.

Ex parte Wilson (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. 490, James and Mellish; *Ex parte Banco de Portugal* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 317, James, Baggallay and Bramwell; affirmed *sub nom. Banco de Portugal v. Waddell* (1880), 5 Ap. Ca. 161, Cairns, Selborne, Blackburn. It was said in *Ex parte Wilson* that this case was the same in substance as that of a creditor obtaining payment abroad by execution after the commencement of the English bankruptcy; but an English creditor who did so would be subject to the severer rule of § 142, and it does not appear that the creditors in *Ex parte Wilson* were not English.

On the same principle, where a British ship which had been in collision was sold under the decree of a foreign court and the proceeds distributed, and a suit was brought in England for the distribution of the amount paid by the owners under their personal liability, Gorell Barnes, J., provided for the claimants who had not appeared in the foreign proceedings being put on an equality with those who had done so: *The Crathie*, [1897] P. 178. And see the scheme approved by the court in *Re P. Macfadyen & Co.*, [1908] 1 K. B. 675, Bigham.

§ 145. Where a person is a bankrupt in England, and his partners reside abroad, whether in or out of the British

dominions, and are not bankrupt, any creditor, British or alien, may retain any payment which he can obtain from the firm abroad, and if such payment is only partial may receive dividends in the bankruptcy on the residue of his debt *pari passu* with the other creditors.

Brickwood v. Miller (1817), 3 Mer. 279, Grant. "Equality of distribution," the judge said, "cannot possibly be attained."

§ 146. Where one or more persons are bankrupt in England, and the property of a firm in which he or they are partners together with others is also under administration in bankruptcy abroad, whether in or out of the British dominions, the question whether a creditor who proves against the firm abroad can also prove against the partner or the smaller firm in England is to be decided according to the English rules as to double proof.

Ex parte Chevalier de Mello Mattos, Re Vanzeller (1834), 1 M. & A. 345, Brougham affirming court of review; *Ex parte Goldsmid* (1856), 1 D. J. 257, Knight-Bruce and Turner, and 1857, Turner. Knight-Bruce's difference in the latter case was as to the English rules.

§ 147. The law of the bankruptcy, that is of England, governs the mode in which the trustees in an English bankruptcy hold whatever foreign property of the bankrupt, movable or immovable, they obtain. Therefore they hold it subject to all equities against the bankrupt which are not impeachable under the bankrupt laws themselves, and if he had entered into a binding contract to give security on it there will be a good security as against the trustees, though the security has not been completed by the law of the place where the property is situate or recoverable.

Ex parte Holthausen (1874), L. R. 9 Ch. Ap. 722, James and Mellish.

§ 148. The validity of a debt being established by the *lex loci contractus* or other relevant law, the order of priority in which it ranks in bankruptcy administration depends on the law of the bankruptcy, *lex loci concursus* or *lex fori*.

Ex parte Melbourn (1870), L. R. 6 Ch. Ap. 64, Mellish and James; *Thurburn v. Steward* (1871), L. R. 3 P. C. 478, Cairns.

§ 148a. But provisions of the *lex loci concursus*, by which the title of the trustee is made to relate back to some date prior to adjudication, cannot affect securities or priorities in respect of property situate or debts recoverable in another jurisdiction

obtained in accordance with the local law before the date of adjudication.

Galbraith v. Grimshaw, [1910] A. C. 508, Loreburn, Macnaghten, James of Hereford, Dunedin, affirming Farwell, Buckley, Kennedy, and overruling Ridley.

The English doctrines which have thus been passed in review will be found to present much similarity to those prevalent in France. In each country the title of the bankruptcy trustees of the debtor's foreign domicile may be made available as paramount to that of a particular creditor attempting to take by subsequent execution or attachment, and, in the absence of a domestic bankruptcy, as carrying the debtor's property in the respective country, though in England with an exception as to his real estate. But in each country it is a matter of daily occurrence to declare the bankruptcy of a debtor not domiciled in it, and in France the cases where this may be done are not limited by the condition that there shall be no bankruptcy pending in the domicile, though it would seem that in England such a proceeding would leave nothing but the English real estate for a subsequent English adjudication to operate on. Further from either than these systems are from each other, stand on the one side the German law permitting execution notwithstanding the declaration of a foreign bankruptcy, and on the other the efforts made in Italy to maintain the unity of bankruptcy as advocated by Burgundus, Rodenburg, and Savigny. It may be found surprising that the English system should have gone as far as it has in support of the authority of the domicile in this matter, when it is remembered that in the matter of succession on death, in which the continental views were beyond all comparison more uniform in its favour, we have limited the authority of the domicile to the beneficial surplus of the personal estate, and in that part of the matter which alone resembled bankruptcy we have established separate administrations with differing priorities among the creditors of the succession. There were however two reasons: in bankruptcy the ecclesiastical courts were not present to lay hold of *bona notabilia*, and commercial convenience was present to plead in favour of unity of administration. Convenience will probably decide whether that unity should be advanced or restricted, or whether nothing should be done but to regulate within something like the extent which it has in this country. Regulation in any case it certainly

wants, and the extreme divergence of the existing views on the subject must convince all that neither judicial decision nor isolated legislation is likely to afford a remedy, that in fact order can only be established by international treaties and national legislation to give effect to them.

CHAPTER VII.

MOVABLES.

WE have now gone through marriage, death, and bankruptcy, the three principal cases in which the conception of a person's fortune, or at least the movable portion of it, as an entirety, and necessarily therefore as connected with his person, is forced on us by circumstances. We must now consider the rights enjoyed in individual articles of property, movable or immovable, and the title to those rights. The law as to individual movables, as well as that on entire movable fortunes, has been widely considered to depend on the person of their owner, on account of a general connection supposed to exist between them and him, independent of special circumstances. It therefore forms a convenient passage between the cases which we have hitherto examined and that of immovables, for which no such general connection has been asserted except by the more extreme advocates of the influence of nationality on private law.

The general connection which has been supposed to exist between movables and their owner has been expressed in the maxims *nomina creditoris ossibus inharrent*, and *mobilia sequuntur personam*. The former, on the face of it, contemplates only debts, with regard to which, when we speak of the property in them, all that can be meant is the right of action for them, whether vested in the owner by their original creation or by their voluntary or involuntary assignment. Now such rights have always been considered to depend mainly on the *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis*, with perhaps some modification from the *lex fori*. Therefore such a maxim as *nomina creditoris ossibus inharrent* can hardly have been intended to assert any connection between the species of property it deals with and the owner's person, except for the purpose of those cases which suggested dealing with his fortune as an entirety. It amounts to no more than saying that in such cases, which are those of the so-called universal assignments, debts fall under the personal and not under the real statute; and it cannot be quoted in support of any

doctrine as to the law governing particular assignments of movables.

The other maxim, however, *mobilia sequuntur personam*, certainly may apply and has been intended to apply to corporeal chattels, and to assert that the transfer of property in them, individually and not as parts of an entirety, depends on the personal law of the owner. "Some are of opinion," says Story, "that all laws which regard movables are real; but at the same time they maintain that by a fiction of law all movables are supposed to be in the place of the domicile of the owner. Others are of opinion that such laws are personal, because movables have in contemplation of law no *situs*, and are attached to the person of the owner wherever he is; and, being so adherent to his person, they are governed by the same laws which govern his person, that is, by the law of the place of his domicile" (*Conflict of Laws*, § 377). Thus two different views as to the nature of laws and the ground of their international acceptance, each being completed by its appropriate fiction, have been made to lead to the same result. That result was also arrived at by Lord Loughborough in a third mode, treating the doctrine that movables follow the person not as assigning them a fictitious locality, either in the owner's domicile or in the place where he may happen to be, but as denying to them all locality. "It is a clear proposition," he said, "not only of the law of England but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner. With respect to the disposition of it, with respect to the transmission of it either by succession or the act of the party, it follows the law of the person. The owner in any country may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is but the law of the country of which he was a subject that will regulate the succession. For instance, if a foreigner having property in the funds here dies, that property is claimed according to the right of representation given by the law of his own country" (*Sill v. Worswick* (1791), 1 H. Bl. 690). The larger part of these remarks applies to the so-called universal assignments, and the case of succession furnished a very unapt parallel for any operation of the personal law on particular assignments, since the English rules on that case, as we have seen, limit the authority of the personal law to

the beneficial surplus, and are strict in requiring that title to the movable items composing the succession shall be made in accordance with the law which governs in their situation. But in spite of this, it is plain that Lord Loughborough intended to assert the law of the person as the rule for the disposition of particular movables.

A rule which has been reached by such various technical roads may be supposed to be dictated in reality by some strong substantial motives. One ground on which the law of a person may claim to regulate his movable property was stated by the majority of the court in *Philips v. Hunter* (1795) (2 H. Bl. 406). In the summary of their reasons which is given us, after noticing the claim of the *lex situs* founded on the protection which that law affords to the rights of ownership, they are made to observe that "the country where the proprietor resides, in respect to another species of protection afforded to him and his property, has a right to regulate his conduct relating to that property. This protection, afforded to the property of a resident subject which is situated in a foreign country, is not imaginary but real. The executive power of this kingdom protects the trade of its subjects in foreign countries, facilitates the recovery of their debts, and if justice be delayed or denied the king by the intervention of his ambassadors demands and obtains redress." But the occasional protection thus afforded has only to be named, in comparison with the continual protection on which the enjoyment of property depends, to show how little it can weigh in determining the law to be applied. It is moreover a protection, not against the justice of the country to which the proprietor sends his ships or his merchandize, but against the possible failure of that justice, and therefore presupposes its course as the rule.

Again, the doctrine that the law of the alienor should regulate the alienation of his movables appears to have been supported by a feeling thus expressed by Lord Kames: "The will of a proprietor or of a creditor is a good title *jure gentium*, that ought to be effectual everywhere" (*On Equity*, b. 3, c. 8, s. 4). But Lord Kames, although he thus mentions proprietors as distinct from creditors, scarcely applies his view to more than the assignment of debts. And by the *jus gentium* he meant very much what the Roman prætor meant, a selection of elements common to different national laws, so that the reason he gives does not follow the track which is followed in common by all doctrines of

private international law, namely that of selecting a particular law and not common elements out of different laws. No doubt the interests of commerce require that great freedom of disposition should be allowed to proprietors, and this consideration speaks in favour of the validity of an alienation made in the manner prescribed by the law of the alienor's domicile, but not less so in favour of the validity of one made in the manner prescribed by the law of the place of sale. Indeed, notwithstanding the frequent assertions of the *lex domicilii* as governing movables, it is the forms of the place of sale which have been most commonly employed, and on which even the jurists who assert the *lex domicilii* have practically laid the most stress. The point oftenest at issue is whether a title is fully created without delivery. On the one hand, under the Code Napoleon, Art. 1138, the property is transferred by the contract of sale; and by the law of England, followed in many colonies and American States, the purchaser is only bound to take possession within a reasonable time, or, if the goods are at sea at the time of the sale, within a reasonable time after their arrival in port. If he complies with this condition, English law holds his title to be superior to that of subsequent purchasers or creditors who by greater diligence may have anticipated him in taking possession. On the other hand, the Prussian code of 1794 and that of Louisiana, with some other laws which are founded on the Roman, award the property to the one who first gains possession on a lawful title, without regarding the priority of the titles, or whether laches is imputable to the claimant who has been outstripped. Again, a mortgage, by English law, is usually created in the form of a transfer of property, defeasible or redeemable on payment of the debt; but in most other laws mortgage is a proceeding quite different from the transfer of property. Hence it may not only be discussed whether, in countries where delivery is necessary to complete a sale, a foreign sale can be complete without delivery, but also whether, even if that be so, a foreign mortgage can give a good title without delivery through being in the form of a sale. Now Story says that to hold delivery to be necessary on a sale of chattels, because such is the law of the place where they may happen to be, "would most materially impair the confidence which the commercial world have hitherto reposed in the universal validity of the title acquired under a bill of lading" (§ 394). But when bills of lading and dock warrants are regarded as negotiable representatives of the

chattels to which they relate, the *lex situs* is not waived in favour of the *lex domicilii*, but if it is waived at all, it is so in favour of the *lex loci actus*, as governing the transfer of such instruments by indorsement or otherwise.

On the whole, the arguments which have been used in support of the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*, understood as regulating dealings with movables by the personal law of their owner, cannot be pronounced satisfactory: and the reader will be prepared to find that in the nineteenth century the current of authority, out of England, has set strongly towards the application of the *lex situs* to movables as well as to immovables, in all cases except those of the so-called universal assignments. How far the same may be said of the English authorities will be afterwards considered, but it will be convenient to introduce the foreign view by a quotation from Fœlix, on account of the very practical character of that writer. "We have seen," says Fœlix—*Traité du Droit International Privé*, § 62—"that the rule according to which movables are governed by the law of the domicile of the person to whom they belong rests on the intimate relation which exists between movables and the person of their owner, on a fiction of law which deems them to exist in the place of domicile of the latter. Thence it follows that that rule cannot be applied except to those circumstances or acts in which movables only appear as an accessory of the person, for example, to the case of succession *ab intestato*, to that of dispositions made by last will, or to that of such dispositions *inter vivos* as express or tacit marriage contracts. The rule does not apply to any case in which the movables have no intimate relation to the person of the owner, for example, when the property in movables is claimed and disputed, when the maxim that *en fait de meubles possession vaut titre* is invoked, when the question is about a right of pledge, a claim to preferential payment, process of execution, the inalienability of movables, their confiscation, escheat of a movable succession to the public treasury, or lastly a prohibition against exporting movables. In all these cases the law of the place where the movables are actually found must be applied, for the fiction which has been mentioned gives place to the fact (*cesse par le fait*). For example," continues Fœlix in a note, "a contract concluded abroad, by which the owner of a movable actually in France should grant a right of pledge over it (art. 2073 and following ones of the *Code civil*), would have no effect in France if the pledge had not been delivered to the

creditor (art. 2076), although this condition might not be required by the law of the owner's domicile." Thus the distinction is plainly drawn between the cases in which a man's property is considered as an entirety, grouped round his person as a centre, and those in which the articles which compose it are separately considered.

The doctrine of Savigny is similar. After stating that "the capacity of a thing to become subject to private property is to be judged by the law of the place at which the thing is situated," and that "the same rule applies as to the admissibility or restriction of the acquisition by occupation of property in things of many kinds," of which he gives as an example "laws as to the royalty on amber and on many kinds of minerals," he proceeds thus. "In the forms of alienation—*i.e.* of the voluntary transmission of property to another person—very different rules of law occur; and on the principle above considered we must apply the rule of law in force at the place where the thing is situated, without regard to the domicile of the one or of the other person, and without regard to the place where the contract is entered into. Thus, in Roman law, alienation depends on the delivery of the thing; in the Prussian law likewise on delivery. In the French law, on the contrary, the transfer of the property is effected by the mere contract. . . . If a Parisian sells his furniture situated in Berlin to a Parisian in Paris, the property is transferred only by tradition; but if, conversely, a Berliner sells his goods situated in Paris to a Berliner in Berlin, the mere contract transfers the property. . . . It will suffice to bring this rule into operation if the continuance of the things at a place should be only transient and very short; for in every case the transfer of the property depends on a momentary act, and therefore fills no long space of time. It will be different in the exceptional cases in which the present situation of the things is so indeterminate that the persons acting cannot be held to have any certain knowledge of it. In such cases we shall have to regard as the place where the thing is situated that at which it is destined first to remain, which will often be the domicile of the present owner, the seller. . . . The acquisition of property by prescription is essentially different from the acquisition by tradition, in being effected not by a momentary fact but by one extending over a longer period of time. In regard to immovable things, the application of the law of the place where the thing is situated is quite undisputed. On the contrary, opinions are

very much divided in respect to the prescription of movables. But here the question is specially important, because the laws of different countries vary exceedingly. The Roman law requires possession for three years, the Prussian for ten. The French requires no continued possession, but excludes with the very beginning of it the vindication of the former owner,* with an exception in the case of lost and stolen things, the protection of which however ceases with the expiry of three years. By this last rule the French law, in its practical results, approximates to the Roman. It is here precisely that the application of the *lex rei sitæ* appears especially certain, from the circumstance that the foundation of all prescription is continuing possession; but possession, as being essentially a relation of facts, is, with even less doubt than any real right, to be judged by the *lex rei sitæ*. A question may still arise where the situation of the movable things, during the period of prescription, has been within different territories. There can be no doubt that all these periods of possession must be added together. The term of the prescription however, and the complete acquisition of the property, must be judged by the law of the place at which the thing is last found, because it is only at the expiry of the whole period that the change of property takes place; before, it has only been in preparation. When property has been acquired by prescription according to this law, it must be recognized in every other country, although the law of that country should require a longer period.”†

The doctrine of Fœlix and Savigny is also that of both the supreme and the state courts in the United States, as appears from their decisions mentioned by Wharton (*Conflict of Laws*, 1872), who sums up thus. “We may therefore hold it to be law in the United States that an assignment made in one state of personal property situated in another, such property not being in transit or following the owner’s person, passes no title to such property as against attaching creditors of the assignor, such creditors being domiciled in the latter state, when such assignment is invalid by its laws:” § 353. The exception of property in transit or following the owner’s person is not to be found in the cases cited by Wharton, but has been introduced by him in imitation of the exception which we have seen admitted by Savigny, where “the present situation of the things is so indeter-

* En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre. Cod. Nap., Art. 2279.

† Syst. § 367, Guthrie, 138—141.

minate that the persons acting cannot be held to have any certain knowledge of it." Neither do the American judges seem to lay any stress on the domicile of the attaching creditor, though in the reasons which they give for adopting the *lex situs* for movables the protection of the citizens of their own states holds a prominent place. The leading authority is the Louisiana one of *Olivier v. Townes* (1824, 2 Martin, N. S., 92), in which Mr. Justice Porter delivered the opinion of the court. "We have presented," he said, "the case of a creditor attaching property of his debtor before it was transferred by sale and delivery," this being a remedy to which a creditor would in that state of facts be clearly entitled by Louisiana law. "But," continued the judge, "the position assumed in the present case is that by the laws of all civilized countries the alienation of movable property must be determined according to the laws, rules and regulations in force where the owner's domicile is situated: hence it is insisted that as by the law existing in the state where the vendor lived no delivery was necessary to complete the sale, it must be considered as complete here, and that it is a violation of the principle just referred to to apply to the contract rules which are peculiar to our jurisprudence, and different from those contemplated by the parties to the contract. We readily yield an assent to the general doctrine for which the appellee contends. He has supported it by a variety of authorities drawn from different systems of jurisprudence. But some of those very books furnish also the exception on which we think this case must be decided, namely that 'when those laws clash and interfere with the rights of the citizens of the countries where the parties to the contract seek to enforce it, as one or other of them must give way, those prevailing where the relief is sought must have the preference.' Such is the language of the English book to which we have been referred." It is unfortunate that the court did not rather deny the general doctrine contended for by the appellee. In doing so they would have been in harmony with the main current of legal opinion in the world, and their decision in favour of the attaching creditor would probably not have excited the antagonism which has been expressed to it in England and by Story. But it had little chance of escaping that antagonism when under the name of an exception it took away almost all possible application from the rule which it nominally admitted, and this avowedly for the convenience of the citizens of Louisiana. Yet the judgment is not without a

trace of the true distinction between the cases, as those of succession, in which property is grouped round the person of its owner, and those, as of alienation or of special claims against it, in which it is considered independently of its owner. After noticing that "personal property must be distributed according to the law of the state where the testator dies," the learned judge added, "but so far as it concerns creditors it is governed by the law of the country where the property is situated. If an Englishman or Frenchman dies abroad and leaves effects here, we regulate the order in which his debts are paid by our jurisprudence, not that of his domicile."

It will be found that the weight of later English authority is in favour of the doctrine of Fœlix, Savigny, and the United States courts; but before examining the cases from which that conclusion may be drawn, another law or supposed law must be mentioned which in the case of one class of movables, ships, has sometimes been regarded as paramount to all those yet considered, *lex situs*, *lex domicilii*, and *lex loci contractus* or *loci actus*. This is the general law maritime, on which the following case may be cited as a leading one.

"A ship belonging to a British owner at Liverpool, having been taken by alleged pirates, and recaptured by one of her majesty's ships of war after her master had been killed, was placed in charge of a master of the royal navy to bring to Liverpool. Having suffered considerable damage, he put into the island of Fayal, and petitioned the director of the customs for an official survey. Three were made. The report was to the effect that the ship could be repaired for about £300. The master being dissatisfied obtained a private survey, which resulted in a report that the ship was unseaworthy and should be condemned. The director of the customs then, on the petition of the master, decreed the sale of the ship by public auction, and gave official notice thereof according to the custom of the place. She was purchased by a Portuguese merchant, who immediately repaired her and sent her with a cargo to Bristol, where she was arrested by the original owner in a cause of possession. Held, 1. The master had the authority of an ordinary master, and no more. 2. The validity of the sale must be tried by the law maritime. 3. By the law maritime, as well as by the law of England, the sale of a ship by a master, though *bona fide*, can be justified only by urgent necessity. 4. With respect to ships, the *lex loci contractus* cannot prevail if opposed to the law maritime. 5. The circumstances of the case do not show an urgent necessity for the sale; and 6. The sale was invalid, and the ship must be restored to the original owner with costs." [Marginal note, *verbatim*.] *The Segredo, otherwise Eliza Cornish* (1853), Spinks, Eccl. & Adm. 36, Lushington.

The law which Dr. Lushington thus thought himself bound to apply is described by him as follows. "First, it strikes me

that the law which I must seek to administer, if I am able to discover it, is the law maritime: a law which has been often adverted to by Lord Stowell and by others whose lights I seek to guide me, but which has been defined by none. Perhaps it is not possible to define it with great accuracy, because the law of almost every foreign country in some part differs from that of other foreign countries. Still it is an expression in common use, and I apprehend it is intended to convey the meaning that it is the law which generally is practised by maritime nations" (u.s., p. 45). And the learned judge proceeded to distinguish it from the respective laws of England and of the island of Fayal. Further on, he referred to it as "the present maritime law of the civilized world" (u.s., p. 56). The learned judge then asked himself whether he could adopt the law of Fayal "on the principle of the *lex loci contractus*? In what way," said he, "does the *lex loci contractus* in the case of a sale of a ship entitle itself to be so admitted? If such general proposition could be entertained, the law relative to the sale of ships would be a law varying with the law of each individual country wherever the sale happened to take place; in fact there would be no general maritime law at all, but a law to be inquired into in every case where the transfer took place in a foreign country. I should have one law to look for at Fayal, another in our own colonies, another in Demerara, another in Trinidad, another in French colonies, another in England. Now I know of no right which the purchaser of a ship in a foreign country, such ship not belonging to a subject of that country, has to call for the interposition of the *lex loci contractus*, save indeed in one case only, where the title is derived from the decree of a competent court administering the law in its own jurisdiction, and by its decree conferring a title. Now had the ship been purchased under the decree of a court of admiralty, directing her to be sold in a case within its jurisdiction, or the law of a court resembling our own court of exchequer, I should have hesitated long before I disputed that title" (U. S., p. 57).

After enlarging on the last point, Dr. Lushington concluded his argument on it thus: "I wish it to be understood that in the event of a title being given by an admiralty court having jurisdiction, or a court of common law, I do not preclude myself from considering that to be a valuable title. Again, I should consider this: supposing a vessel was sold by decree of the commissioners, or the court of exchequer, for forfeiture, that I

should hold a good title, if such a case should occur. Supposing a vessel sold in a foreign country under the law prevailing in cases of insolvency or bankruptcy, I should hold that also to be a good sale. But I wish it to be understood that I go on the ground that nothing short of that appears capable of justifying a sale and making a good title." And after expressing his consent to the principle "that the *lex loci contractus* generally governs the validity of every contract," he referred for certain exceptions to a note of Mr. Brodie in his edition of Lord Stair's Institutes. "There appear to me," said Lushington, "according to his," Brodie's, "judgment, several reasons why the *lex loci contractus* is not always applicable. He says this: 'A distinction is ever to be attended to between the case of a party casually entering a foreign country and that of one who resides in it, and the distinction is particularly strong in regard to an individual who, as master, has the charge of a vessel in a foreign port.' Then he states he is under these circumstances likely to be ignorant of the law of the country, and not to be too tenaciously bound. Then there is another distinction, and that by far the most important. 'The contract,' says Mr. Brodie, 'in such cases is made with the ship-master, who acts as the implied mandatory of the owner; and the effect of the transaction must greatly depend on the extent of his authority. Now it is true that as a person who has been appointed to an office must be presumed to be invested with the usual powers, so restrictions upon the ordinary authority will not be effectual against another party who has not been apprized of them; yet it will be observed that since it is the duty of those who deal with an agent to make themselves acquainted with the extent of his powers, whether expressed or fairly implied from his office, so the presumed mandate here must be measured either by some general principle of maritime law, or by the law of the country to which the ship belongs. Such a general principle of maritime law would of itself, though in a different way, tend in my apprehension to exclude the *lex loci*; but there is no such universally received principle, and the more positive exclusion of the principle of the *lex loci* is the consequence;' and then he goes on to state what the English law of hypothecation is, and how we should apply it" (u.s., pp. 58, 59).

The opinions expressed by Dr. Lushington in the case of the *Segredo* may therefore be summed up as follows. (1) A decree *in rem* of a court of admiralty or of common law, or a sale made

in a bankruptcy, binds the title to a ship as well as to any other movable, the jurisdiction of the court of bankruptcy, or of the court decreeing *in rem*, being of course assumed to be established.

(2) The authority of an agent to sell or hypothecate a ship cannot be derived from the *lex situs* or *lex loci contractus*, but may be derived not only from his instructions, or from the law of the country to which the ship belongs, but also from the law maritime, contrary to Mr. Brodie's opinion, who held that no such law can be appealed to, as none is universally received.

(3) Except in the cases mentioned under (1), to which the learned judge would no doubt have been ready to add that of a sale under the authority of a court of probate or administration, a sale under public authority in the *situs* leaves it still necessary to examine the authority of the person who assumes to sell. The other parts of these propositions will have to be further considered in due place, but with regard to the notion of a general maritime law as actually in vigour for any purpose, the opinion of Mr. Brodie may at once be accepted. If the idea were admitted, the actual determination of such a law would encounter the difficulty which theologians have found in applying the maxim *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*. In fact, however, the conception which has almost universally been formed of private international law is that of choosing in each case between different national laws, not that of setting up a body of doctrine in the form of a law but without any national legal sanction. When "the general law maritime, as it is administered in England by courts of admiralty," is mentioned, those terms must be taken to describe a certain part of the law of England, not derived from any specially English custom or legislation, but which, so far back as it can be traced in our law, possessed legal sanction over all or most of those tracts which were included within the horizon of our early lawyers. "The general maritime law as administered in England, or to avoid periphrasis the law of England"—said Justice Willes, delivering the judgment of the court of appeal in *Lloyd v. Guibert* (L. R., 1 Q. B. 125).^{*} The subject will be further discussed in the chapter on torts, with reference to collisions at sea.

Coming now to the doctrines received in England on the effect of different judgments and laws on the property in movables,

^{*} The law maritime, or admiralty law, is the same in Scotland as in England: *Currie v. McKnight*, [1897] A. C. 97, Halsbury, Watson, Herschell, Morris, Shand.

the earlier editions began with that of judgments *in rem*, because it then appeared to be better settled than was the case with questions about the effect of laws which in the particular instance have not been embodied in any such judgment, not that the authority of a judgment *in rem* appeared to rest on any principle not involved in that of a law. The practical identification of the two classes of questions, as both resting on the disposing power of the sovereignty of the *situs*, has since received further support; but the order of treatment has not been varied, as well because judgments and laws are equally direct applications of sovereignty as because of the interest which attaches to the historical development of the English doctrines.

§ 149. The property in a movable will be held in England to be such as the judgment *in rem* of a court within the jurisdiction of which the movable was situate has decided it to be. The distinctive mark of a judgment *in rem* on a movable is that it disposes of the thing itself, and not merely of the interests which any parties have in it. It is immaterial whether the judgment does this (1) by vesting the property at once in a party as against all the world, as a condemnation in a revenue cause vests the property in the crown, or the sentence of a court of admiralty in a matter of prize vests the property in the captors; or (2) by decreeing or confirming the sale of the movable in satisfaction of a money demand which it adjudges to have been a lien on the thing itself, and not merely on the interests of any parties in it; or (3) by decreeing or confirming the sale of the movable by way of administration, in matters of bankruptcy or succession on death. The second case is easily distinguished from that of a sale under execution, in which only the interest of the debtor is intended to be disposed of; and the characteristic of the third case is that the court claims to act on one of the so-called universal assignments, and therefore to conclude even those who may not accept the permission to come in and take the benefit of the proceedings.

The leading authority is *Castrique v. Imrie* (1860), 8 C. B. (N. S.) 1, Erle, Williams, Willes, Keating; reversed (1860), 8 C. B. (N. S.) 405, Cockburn, Wightman, Channell, Hill, Blackburn, Martin, Bramwell; reversal affirmed (1870), L. R. 4 E. & I. A. 414, Hatherley, Chelmsford, Colonsay, in accordance with the opinion of Blackburn, Bramwell, Mellor, Brett and Cleasby, and of Keating, who departed from his previous opinion in deference to the judgment on appeal in *Cammell v. Sewell*. The last-named case was decided in 1858, 3 H. & N. 617, by Pollock, Martin and Channell, and affirmed in 1860, 5 H. & N. 728, by Cockburn, Wightman, Williams, Crompton and Keating, Byles dissentient. The

definition given in the § of a judgment *in rem* on a movable is in accordance with all the judicial opinions in *Castrique v. Imrie*, except that the French judgment there in question was held by Williams, Willes and Keating not to be *in rem*, merely from their taking a different view as to the facts of the French proceedings. The third case of judgments *in rem* mentioned in the § was noticed, so far as concerns sales in bankruptcies, by Lushington in *The Segredo*: see above, pp. 191—194. In *Cammell v. Sewell* the question was about the right gained to some deals, the cargo of a vessel wrecked on the coast of Norway, by purchase at a sale in that country held under the authority of the captain, and confirmed in the same country in a suit brought by the agent of the underwriters to have the deals delivered up *in specie*. The case was decided in the lower court on the ground of this Norwegian judgment, Martin, on behalf of Pollock and Channell as well as of himself, describing it as being in the nature of one *in rem* on account of the prayer for specific delivery; but the circumstance that the underwriters, plaintiffs in England, were privy to it was dwelt on as an element in its conclusiveness, notwithstanding that a judgment *in rem* is conclusive against all the world. On the appeal a clearer view was taken of the nature of judgments, and the decision in favour of the purchaser was put on the ground of the sale being a good transfer by the law of Norway, which was the *situs* of the deals. Blackburn, delivering the opinion of the judges in *Castrique v. Imrie*, said: "We may observe that the words as to an action being *in rem* or *in personam*, and the common statement that the one is binding on third persons and the other not, are apt to be used by English lawyers without attaching any very definite meaning to those phrases. We apprehend the true principle to be that indicated in the last few words quoted from Story. We think the inquiry is first, whether the subject matter was so situated as to be within the lawful control of the state under the authority of which the court sits; and secondly, whether the sovereign authority of that state has conferred on the court jurisdiction to decide as to the disposition of the thing, and the court has acted within its jurisdiction. If these conditions are fulfilled, the adjudication is conclusive against all the world" (L. R., 4 E. & I. A. 429). These words are valuable as expressing the principle on which the international validity of a judgment *in rem* rests, as well as the condition for such validity, namely that the movable shall have been within the territorial jurisdiction of the court pronouncing it.

In *Simpson v. Fogo* ((1860), 1 J. & H. 18; (1863), 1 H. & M. 195; Wood) a New Orleans judgment came under consideration in peculiar circumstances. A British ship, belonging to Liverpool, was mortgaged in English form to a Liverpool bank, while she was at sea, and therefore when there was no *lex situs* to compete with the law of the owners' domicile as to the sufficiency of the mortgage. Afterwards unsecured creditors of the mortgagors attached her at New Orleans, where delivery is necessary to perfect a real right in a movable, and she was sold under decree in the suit so commenced, the mortgagee intervening and ineffectually claiming possession. The mortgagee, whose debt exceeded the value of the ship, sued the purchaser in England, whither she had been brought, and recovered her; the purchaser however being allowed a lien for what, in the distribution of the proceeds of sale at New Orleans, had been paid to certain creditors who had a real right under the law of that place by virtue of which they might have arrested the ship. It was admitted by the vice-chancellor that had the ship been sold in a suit commenced by

their arresting it, the property would have passed · 1 H. & M. 248. Full justice was therefore done to the real rights conferred by the *lex situs*, or recognized by the court of the *situs*. The sale under decree in an attachment suit passed only the debtor's interest in the movable, and whatever controversy might be raised as to its validity against the mortgagee on the ground of his intervention, it at least had no validity against him on the footing of a judgment *in rem*. See Blackburn's remarks in *Castrique v. Imrie*, L. R. 4 E. & I. A. 436.

We now come to the effect of laws independent of their embodiment in judgments *in rem*. Having seen Lord Blackburn tracing the respect due to such judgments to the sovereign authority of the state within which the movable is situate, we shall be prepared to find an equal respect paid to the will of the same authority when manifested in the simpler form of a law.

§ 150. Questions as to the transfer or acquisition of property in corporeal movables, or of any less extensive real rights in them, as pledge or lien, are generally to be decided by the *lex situs*.

If the question refers to a ship which was at sea at the moment of the alleged transfer or acquisition, it must be decided by the personal law of the owner, that is, of the person from or against whom the transfer or acquisition is alleged to have taken place: that law will operate either as the *lex situs*, on the ground of the fiction which makes ships a part of the territory ascertained by their flag, or in its own character of the personal law, in obedience to which alone the owner can lose his right when no *lex situs* is applicable against him. It would however be pedantic to apply the general doctrine so as to bring in the law of a casual and temporary *situs*, not contemplated by either party in the dealing under consideration, as in the case of goods which at the moment of the dealing may be on board a ship of a third country, or temporarily warehoused in a port of a third country. See Savigny as to this: above, p. 188.

"A delivery by the consignor of goods on board a ship chartered by the consignee is a delivery to him, and the consignor cannot afterwards stop them *in transitu*. But where the delivery was made on board such a ship in Russia, and by a law of that country the owner of the goods, in case of the bankruptcy of the vendee, may sue out process to retake his goods on board a ship &c. and retain them till payment; and the owners, hearing of the insolvency of the vendee, applied to the captain on board of whose ship the goods had been delivered to sign the bill of lading to their order, which he complied with without the necessity of suing out process: Held that this was a substantial compliance with such law, and that the captain on his arrival here was bound to deliver the goods to the order of the vendors, and not to the assignees of the vendee who had become bankrupt." *Inglis v. Usherwood* (1801), 1 East 515, Kenyon,

Grose, Lawrence, Le Blanc. Kenyon and Lawrence spoke of "the transaction" being in Russia, which might have referred to the contract of sale; but Grose said "the delivery here was made in Russia," thus bearing out the reference to that point in the marginal note which I have copied *verbatim*. No judge alluded to the vendor's domicile. It appears therefore that the question, at what moment the property in the goods was indefeasibly transferred, was decided on the *lex situs*.

"The captain of a ship has no authority to sell the cargo, except in cases of absolute necessity; and therefore, where in the course of a voyage from India the ship was wrecked off the Cape of Good Hope, and some indigo which was part of the cargo was saved, and the same was there sold by public auction, by the authority of the captain acting *bond fide* according to the best of his judgment for the benefit of all persons concerned, but the jury found there was no absolute necessity for the sale: Held that the purchaser at the sale acquired no title, and the indigo having been sent to this country, the original owners were entitled to recover its value." *Freeman v. East India Company* (1822), 5 B. & Ald. 617, Abbott, Bayley, Holroyd, Best. Best said, speaking of the purchaser's knowledge of the circumstances, "Supposing the law of Holland," which was in force at the Cape, "to be, as it is stated to be, the same as the law of England, this knowledge will prevent the purchaser protecting himself under a sale in market overt." On this Mr. Justice Crompton remarked in *Cammell v. Sewell*, "In the case of *Freeman v. The East India Company* the court of king's bench appear to have assented to the proposition that the Dutch law as to market overt might have had the effect of passing the property in such case, if the circumstance of the knowledge of the transaction had not taken the case out of the provisions of such law:" 5 H. & N. 745.

Cammell v. Sewell has already been noticed above, p. 195. In the court below, Pollock said, although his opinion in that respect was not adopted as the ground of the judgment: "If personal property is disposed of in a manner binding according to the law of the country where it is, that disposition is binding everywhere." 3 H. & N. 138. On the appeal Crompton, delivering the opinion of all the court except Byles, said: "Many cases were mentioned in the course of the argument, and more might be collected, in which it might seem hard that the goods of foreigners should be dealt with according to the laws of our own or of other countries. Amongst others our law as to the seizure of a foreigner's goods for rent due from a tenant, or as to the title gained in them, if stolen, by a sale in market overt, might appear harsh. But we cannot think that the goods of foreigners would be protected against such laws, or that if the property once passed by virtue of them it would again be changed by being taken by the new owner into the foreigner's own country." He then quoted with approval Pollock's *dictum* in the court below, and added: "We do not think that it makes any difference that the goods were wrecked, and not intended to be sent to the country where they were sold. We do not think that the goods which were wrecked here would on that account be less liable to our laws as to market overt, or as to the landlord's right of distress, because the owner did not foresee that they would come to England." Byles did not dissent on the ground of the owner's *lex domicilii*, but because the "alleged law of Norway" seemed to him to be "of an alarming nature," "and at variance with the general maritime law of the world, at least as understood in this country." Cockburn added to his concurrence in Crompton's judgment a remark which, as to the last

mentioned law, placed him on the side of Brodie as against Lushington: "The law of nations cannot determine the question, for the 'international law is by no means uniform as to the powers of a master, as abundantly appeared from the various codes which were brought to our notice during the argument.'" 5 H. & N. 744, 5, 7, 50. Pollock's *dictum* was quoted with approval by Bramwell in *Castrique v. Imrie*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 430; and Blackburn, delivering to the House of Lords the opinion of the judges in the same case, adverted to it thus. "In the case of *Cammell v. Sewell*, a more general principle was laid down, namely, that 'if personal property is disposed of in a manner binding according to the law of the country where it is, that disposition is binding everywhere.' This we think as a general rule is correct, though no doubt it may be open to exceptions and qualifications; and it may very well be said that the rule commonly expressed by English lawyers, that a judgment *in rem* is binding everywhere, is in truth but a branch of that more general principle." L. R. 4 E. & I. A. 429.

In *Clydesdale Bank, Lim. v. Schroeder & Co.*, [1913] 2 K. B. 1, Bray, it was held that money paid under the compulsion of process of the court in a foreign country was not recoverable subsequently by a suit in England on the ground that the payment was made by duress. The money was paid under protest to release a ship from arrest by process, and the foreign process *in rem* could not be questioned here. When a *donatio mortis causâ* valid by the English law was made by a foreign subject of property in England, the title of the donee was maintained against the claim of the persons who were the heirs of the donor and who urged that the validity of the gift must be judged by the law of the donor's domicile. *Re Korvine's Trusts*, [1921] 1 Ch. 343, Eve.

In *Coote v. Jecks* (1872), L. R. 13 Eq. 597, Bacon, it was held that the English Bills of Sale Act does not apply to a bill of sale of goods in Scotland, given in England by an English debtor to an English creditor. And this was followed as to goods in Ireland in *Brookes v. Harrison* (1880), 6 L. R. Ir. 85, Morris and Harrison.

In *Liverpool Marine Credit Company v. Hunter* (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 62, Wood; affirmed, (1868), L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 479, Chelmsford; it was decided that domiciled Englishmen will not be restrained from attaching ships at New Orleans because justice will not be done there to domiciled English mortgagees, and that bonds given by such mortgagees at New Orleans for the purpose of obtaining the release of the ships may be sued on in England. It must be observed that according to the allegations made in this case and in *Simpson v. Fogo* (above, p. 196), the courts at New Orleans go so far beyond the doctrine mentioned above, pp. 190, 191, as to disregard transfers and pledges of movables made without delivery, although complete before the arrival of the movables in Louisiana. For the present purpose, attention must be drawn to Wood's expression in respect to foreign statute law, "however harsh and arbitrary it may be," though he "was particularly anxious to draw a distinction between judicial procedure and the statute law of a foreign state:" L. R. 4 Eq. 68. Also to Chelmsford's reassertion of the old doctrine of Loughborough, in these terms: "The transfer of personal property must be regulated by the law of the owner's domicile, and if valid by that law ought to be so regarded by the courts of every other country where it is brought into question:" L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 483. It already seemed impossible, in the face of the other authorities here collected, to accept this rule further than it has been admitted in framing § 150; and the § has since been supported by

City Bank v. Barrow (1880), 5 Ap. Ca. 664, Selborne, Hatherley, Blackburn, Watson. Lord Blackburn said: "The pledge upon which the defendants claim was made in Canada in respect of goods then in Canada. I take it therefore that there is no doubt that the validity of the pledge depends upon the Canadian law." Lindley, as judge of first instance in this case, all the judges in the court of appeal, and all the noble lords went on the law of Canada as they respectively understood it to be, although the owners of the pledged goods were an English house; thus disregarding the law of the owner's domicile. In *Inglis v. Robertson*, [1898] A. C. 616, Halsbury, Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten and Morris, Scotch law was held to determine the validity of a pledge of goods in Scotland by a domiciled Englishman.

But the question whether a pledgee may redeliver the goods to the pledgor for a limited purpose without thereby losing his rights under the contract of pledge, those parties having a common domicile in a country different from the *situs* of the goods, was considered to be determinable by the law of that domicile as belonging to the transaction between them (Herschell), as affecting title to property admittedly belonging to one or other of them (Watson): *North-Western Bank v. Poynter*, [1895] A. C. 56.

Similarly the decree of a foreign government disposing of movable property within its territory will be held to be binding in the English courts, provided the foreign government has received recognition as a sovereign authority; and the courts here will not enquire whether the decree is confiscatory or contrary to principles of natural justice.

Company for Woodwork A. M. Luther v. J. Sagor & Co., [1921] 1 K. B. 456, 474, Bankes, Scrutton, reversing Roche, but only on the question whether the Soviet Government of Russia had been recognized by the British Government.

Similar decisions have been given by the American courts recently in cases arising out of the Mexican Revolutions. *Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.*, [1917] 246 U. S. 297; *Ricaud v. American Metal Co.*, *Ib.*, 304.

§ 151. A distinction may now be noticed which was not adverted to in *The Segredo* (above, p. 191), and possibly may not have arisen on the facts of that case, the law of Fayal having been very imperfectly proved in it. A law by which the owners are not bound cannot confer an authority on an agent as against them; but notwithstanding this the *lex situs* may, if it pleases, confer a title on the purchaser or pledgee of a movable by reason of the agent's acts. The question of an agent's authority belongs to the law of contract; the question of a purchaser's or pledgee's title belongs to the law of property, and must be ultimately decided by the law which governs property, although that law may make the authority of the selling or pledging agent, as determined on principles applicable to contract, an element in its decision.

In *Cammell v. Sewell*, Crompton, delivering the opinion of all the court except Byles on the appeal, said: "The conclusion which we draw from the evidence is that by the law of Norway, the captain, under circumstances such as existed in this case, could not, as between himself and his

owners or the owners of the cargo, justify the sale, but that he remained liable to them for a sale not justified under the circumstances; whilst on the other hand an innocent purchaser would have a good title to the property bought by him from the agent of the owners. It does not appear to us that there is anything so barbarous or monstrous in this state of the law as that we can say that it should not be recognized by us. Our own law as to market overt is analogous; and though it is said that much mischief would be done by upholding sales of this nature, not justified by the necessities of the case, it may well be that the mischief would be greater if the vendee were only to have a title in cases where the master was strictly justified in selling as between himself and the owners. If that were so, purchasers, who can seldom know the facts of the case, would not be inclined to give the value, and on proper and lawful sales by the master the property would be in great danger of being sacrificed." 5 H. & N. 743.

When a foreign ship is sold under such circumstances that the purchaser does not get a good title independent of a personal equity against the vendor, the *lex loci contractus* must determine whether the foreign owner has so acted as to prevent his disputing the purchaser's title. *Hooper v. Gumm*, *M'Lellan v. Gumm* (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 282, Chelmsford and Turner, in the latter case affirming Wood, in the former reversing him on the question of fact. A foreign master of a ship can bind the owners of the vessel by a contract of indemnity given to the English owners of cargo in England: *The Luna*, [1920] P. 22, Hill.

The title to certificates of American railroad shares, those certificates being in England and the title to them depending on dealings in England, must be decided by English law; but the consequences of the title to the certificates, with regard to the title to the shares, must be decided by American law. *Williams v. Colonial Bank*, *Williams v. London Chartered Bank of Australia* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 388, Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen, agreeing so far with Kekewich; (1890), 15 Ap. Ca. 267, Halsbury, Watson, and Herschell, Bramwell and Morris agreeing in the judgment but silent on the choice of law.

§ 152. The *forum* for the recovery of a debt presents much analogy with the *situs* of a corporeal movable, and notice to the debtor of the assignment of a debt presents much analogy with the delivery of a corporeal movable to the transferee of it. As there are laws by which delivery is not necessary to complete the transfer of a corporeal movable, so there are laws, like that of England, by which, although the debtor will be discharged if he pays the assignor of a debt before receiving notice of the assignment, and although the assignee, suing for the debt before such notice has been given, perhaps in a certain form, may have to use the name of the assignor and be exposed to any defence which would be good against the latter, yet the transfer will be so far complete by assignment without notice that notice *pendente lite* will prevent the debt from being recovered by a posterior assignee or attaching creditor. And as there are laws by which delivery is necessary to complete the transfer of a corporeal

movable, so there are laws, like that of Scotland, by which the assignment of a debt without notice to the debtor is so ineffectual that notice *pendente lite* comes too late. Consequently opinions analogous to those on the law which should govern the transfer of a corporeal movable have been entertained on the law which should govern that of a debt. Lord Kames (see above, p. 185) and Story (*Conflict of Laws*, § 397) held that the assignment of a debt, complete without notice by the law of the creditor's domicile, must be held complete everywhere; but it is established in England that the assignee who has acquired a good title by the law of the *forum* for the recovery of the debt must prevail.

This is the effect of *Re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co., Ex parte Australasian Investment Co., Ex parte Union Bank of Australia*, [1891] 1 Ch. 536, North; affirmed, [1892] 1 Ch. 219, Lindley, Bowen, Fry.

The assignment of a reversionary interest in an English trust fund having been notified to the trustees before an earlier assignment of the same interest had been notified to them, the former prevails notwithstanding that the earlier one was made in the assignor's domicile, by the law of which notice to the trustees was unnecessary to complete it: *Kelly v. Selwyn*, [1905] 2 Ch. 117, Warrington. The *ratio decidendi* was "the law of the court which is administering the fund" (p. 122), which is equivalent to "the law of the *forum* for the recovery of the debt" mentioned in the text.

Where a right is claimed by way of real privilege or lien on a chose in action, it seems clear that its existence must depend on the law of the *forum* for the recovery of that chose in action.

A citizen of the United States shipped at San Francisco as second mate on board an American ship bound for England, and became master during the voyage by reason of successive deaths. On his proceeding in the court of admiralty against the freight for wages due to him, it was held that his claim was governed by the *lex fori* and not by the *lex loci contractus* of his engagement as mate, and that the former was to be found in the Merchant Shipping Act and not in the law maritime as previously administered in England. *The Milford* (1858), Swabey 362, Lushington. The same great lawyer expressed his adherence to that judgment in *The Jonathan Goodhue* (1859), Swabey 526; but Phillimore, in *The Halley* (1867), L. R. 2 A. & E. 12, remarked: "I must say that the reasoning of the learned judge which led to the decisions in these cases was never satisfactory to my mind, and I am glad to learn that in a more recent case mentioned to me by Mr. Clarkson the learned judge expressed himself willing to reconsider the principle of these decisions." The opinion of Lushington must, however, be deemed to have remained such as he expressed it, and to have been in favour of the *lex fori* as deciding on the existence of an incorporeal real right. It is true that he based it on the rule "that the remedy must be according to the law of the *forum* in which it is sought:" Swabey 366. But that rule, in its other and more familiar applications, refers to the form of the remedy, or at the utmost to its existence as depending on laws of procedure, which statutes of limita-

tion are generally considered in England to be, not to its existence as depending on that of a right. To apply the rule in the manner in question in *The Milford* was really to attribute to the *forum* for an incorporeal real right a legal weight corresponding to that of the *situs* for corporeal movables. *The Milford* was followed in *The Tagus*, [1903] P. 44, W. Phillimore, who noticed, but did not adopt, the argument to the contrary from the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 265.

In a case where the assignment of an English policy of life insurance to the wife of the assignor was not permitted by the law of the place of assignment, where both the assignor and assignee were domiciled, it was held to be void in England: *Lee v. Abdy* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 309, Day and Wills. See Lord Herschell's opinion in *North-Western Bank v. Poynter*, quoted on p. 200. When a judgment of a foreign court granting maintenance to an illegitimate posthumous child was sued on in England, it was held that it was not enforceable against assets in England, because the cause of action was not recognized in England. The judgment was *in personam* so far as regarded the assignment of the maintenance; and the *lex situs* did not recognize any legal liability in the defendant. *Re Macartney*, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, Astbury.

A garnishee order was refused in case of a debt properly recoverable abroad, on the ground that payment under the order would not have been recognized in the foreign country: *Martin v. Nadel*, [1906] 2 K. B. 26, Vaughan Williams and Stirling overruling Sutton.

The doctrine that a restraint on anticipation annexed to the gift of property by an English settlement is valid whatever may be the personal law of the wife (*Peillon v. Brooking* (1858), 25 Beav. 218, Romilly), taken in connection with the test of a settlement being English (§ 116, p. 141), is an example of the property in movables being governed by the *lex situs*, or what is equivalent thereto in the case of incorporeal rights.

But for the purpose of a duty charged on it a debt is property in the *situs* of a security held for it, although the debtor be domiciled and the debt be recoverable elsewhere; only the value of such property, as depending on that of the security, may be less than the amount of the debt, and, if collateral securities are held elsewhere, it may be right to take them into account in valuing the property for the purpose of the duty.

Walsh v. The Queen, [1894] A. C. 144, Watson, Herschell, Hobhouse, Macnaghten, Shand, Couch.

§ 153. The rule that the *lex situs* governs the property in movables, as developed in the preceding part of this chapter, applies in general to the beneficial interest as well as to the legal property; but in cases falling under the so-called universal assignments the personal law may bind the beneficial interest while the *lex situs* must be complied with as to the legal property, as in the case of § 135. The English rules as to succession on death present a third variety, the personal law not being allowed to govern even the entire beneficial interest

in the movables, but only that in the surplus remaining after the payment of the debts of the deceased.

We now pass to questions concerning the international character of special classes of movables.

§ 154. A British ship is British territory so long as she is sailing on the high seas, or in a foreign tidal river below all bridges, although in the latter case, if she is a private ship, the state to which the river belongs may have concurrent jurisdiction. If she belongs to an English port, the law applicable in consequence of her being British territory is that of England.

Reg. v. Lopez (1858), 1 D. & B. 525; *Reg. v. Sattler* (1858), 1 D. & B. 539; decided together by Campbell, Cockburn, Pollock, Coleridge, Wightman, Erle, Williams, Martin, Crompton, Crowder, Willes, Watson, Channell and Byles. *The Queen v. Anderson* (1868), L. R. 1 C. C. R. 161, Bovill, Channell, Byles, Blackburn, Lush. These were cases of crimes committed on board British ships, and in the last case the ship was sailing in a foreign tidal river. The statement in the § is equally true although the ship is moored to a quay in a foreign river; and not only her crew but all persons coming on board of her in any manner are subject to British criminal jurisdiction: *The Queen v. Carr* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 76, Coleridge, Pollock, Lopes, Stephen, Watkin Williams.

Marshall v. Murgatroyd (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 31, Blackburn and Lush; order of affiliation under English law, against the putative father of a child born at sea on board a British ship belonging to Liverpool, sustained.

See the American case of *United States v. Hamilton* (1816), 1 Mason, 152, Story. "The admiralty," that eminent judge said, "has never held that the waters of havens where the tide ebbs and flows are properly the high seas, unless those waters are without low-water mark. The common law has attempted a still more narrow construction of the terms."

An Italian ship being brought into an English port as a derelict, effect was given to a charge to which she was already subject by Italian law for the expenses incurred by the Italian Government in sending the crew home: *The Liviotta* (1883), 8 P. D. 209, Hannen.

§ 154a. Negotiable instruments are within §§ 149 and 150. Their transfer will affect the beneficial rights in the choses in action secured by them in accordance with the law of their *situs* at the time of the transfer.

Alcock v. Smith, [1892] 1 Ch. 238, Romer, affirmed by Lindley, Lopes, Kay; *Embiricos v. Anglo-Australian Bank*, [1904] 2 K. B. 870, Walton; affirmed, [1905] 1 K. B. 677, Vaughan Williams, Romer, Stirling.

Securities are liable to stamp duty as "marketable securities of a foreign company made or issued in the United Kingdom" if they become marketable by being certified after their arrival in the United Kingdom: *Baring v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 78, A. L. Smith, Rigby and Collins affirming Wright and Ridley; affirmed, *sub nom. Lord Revelstoke v. &c.*, [1898] A. C. 565, Halsbury, Macnaghten, Morris, and Shand.

§ 154*b*. A patent or a share in one, or a licence to use a patent, is not property situate in the country where the patent rights exist—at least, within the meaning of a revenue law.

Smelting Company of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 Q. B. 179, Pollock, Bruce concurring on another ground; affirmed, [1897] 1 Q. B. 175, Esher, Lopes, Rigby.

But in *Rey v. Lecouturier*, [1908] 2 Ch. 715; affirmed, [1910] A. C. 262, the trademark of a foreign association in England was held not to pass under the law of the country in which the association was domiciled, confiscating the property, because a foreign penal law has no effect in England.

But the goodwill of a business, with the benefit of certain contracts as ancillary thereto, is within the meaning of revenue laws property situate in the country where the business premises are.

Muller & Co.'s Margarine Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1900] 1 Q. B. 310, A. L. Smith, Collins and Vaughan Williams, reversing Day and Lawrence; affirmed, [1901] A. C. 217, Macnaghten, Davey, James, Brampton, Robertson and Lindley, Halsbury dissenting.

And shares in a company registered in England for the purpose of acquiring a business carried on abroad, are property situate in England within the meaning of revenue laws.

Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Maple & Co. (Paris), Limited, [1908] A. C. 22, Macnaghten, Ashbourne, James of Hereford, Atkinson, reversing Moulton and Farwell (Collins dissenting on another point) who upheld Walton.

A personal obligation, however, is not within the meaning of revenue laws property in the *forum* for enforcing it.

Danubian Sugar Factories v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1901] 1 Q. B. 245, A. L. Smith, Collins and Stirling, reversing Ridley and Darling.

Book debts included in the assets of a business are a personal obligation for this purpose, and are therefore not property locally situate in the *forum* for enforcing them, and are subject to English duty, payable on the sale in England of foreign business. *Velasquez, Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, [1914] 3 K. B. 458, Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Pickford, L.J., Swinfen-Eady, L.J., affirming Scrutton, J.

§ 154*c*. Receivers of foreign property, movable or immovable, are often appointed by the English court, but until their authority has been established in accordance with the local law no one not a party to the English suit, not even though he is a British subject, becomes guilty of contempt of court by taking proceedings abroad calculated to interfere with the possession of such receivers.

Re Maudslay, Sons & Field, [1900] 1 Ch. 602, Cozens-Hardy.

§ 155. Although a foreign sovereign or state is certainly entitled to protection in England for civil rights, whether of property or of obligation, and whether, in the case of a sovereign, they belong to him in his private or in his public character, it is doubtful how far a foreign sovereign or state is entitled to protection in England for political rights, even though pecuniary profit may be derivable from them. In other words, it is doubtful whether a political right can be considered in England as a chattel or movable, on the ground that pecuniary profit may be derived from it. In *Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth*, 1861, 2 Giff. 628, Stuart; 3 D. F. J. 217, Campbell, Knight-Bruce and Turner; this question arose on the Emperor's seeking an injunction to restrain the infringement of his exclusive right of issuing paper currency to circulate within his dominions. Stuart granted the injunction as in support of a right, without thinking it necessary to found it on the pecuniary value of that right, but all the judges on the appeal differed from him as to this. Campbell and Knight-Bruce sustained the injunction on the ground of the pecuniary value of the right to the plaintiff. Turner thought it not sustainable on that ground, but sustained it on the ground of "the injury to the subjects of the plaintiff by the introduction of a spurious circulation." Lord Campbell noticed as follows another kind of political rights productive of pecuniary profit, which will meet us again when considering the international validity of contracts. "A more specious objection was rested on the class of cases in which it has been held that we take no notice of the 'revenue laws' of foreign countries, so that an injunction would certainly be refused to a foreign sovereign who should apply for one to prevent the smuggling of English manufactures into his dominions to the grievous loss of his fisc. But although from the comity of nations the rule has been to pay respect to the laws of foreign countries, yet, for the general benefit of free trade, 'revenue laws' have always been made the exception; and this may be an example of an exception proving the rule" (u.s., p. 241).

CHAPTER VIII

IMMOVABLES.

EVEN the Italian code, which is the most advanced statutory embodiment of the principle of nationality as applied to private international law, and declares (Preliminary Article 7) that "movables are subject to the law of the proprietor's nation, except so far as the law of the country where they are found may contain contrary dispositions," adds that "immovables are subject to the laws of the place where they are situate." And it has already been noticed, p. 9, that the principle of the *lex situs*, or of the real statute, was eagerly seized on in England in its application to land, and received there its utmost development in that respect. Accordingly, in stating the English doctrines on the subject of immovables, we shall merely have to expand that principle into a series of propositions supported by authorities among which there is little conflict. What doubt there is turns more on the question of jurisdiction than of law. The principle of the *forum situs*, in its application to the land itself, is incontrovertible. Since only the authorities that exist on the spot can employ force to give possession or take it away, it would be idle for any foreign jurisdiction to make a direct attempt to determine the possession of land, or even the property in it, which would be unmeaning if disconnected from all immediate or future right to possession. But an indirect attempt may be made by a foreign jurisdiction to determine the possession or the property in land, by compelling one who is personally subject to its authority to employ those possessory or proprietary rights which he possesses in the *forum situs* in such a manner as to give effect to a determination which in itself would be nugatory. The reasonable principle appears to be that this should not be attempted on the mere ground of the personal jurisdiction, but only when something has been done by which the personal jurisdiction is called into action on the ground of obligation which properly belongs to it, and the determination as to the foreign land is necessarily incident to the determination which

has to be made about the obligation. But it will be easily seen that in the application of this principle there may be some amount of delicacy; and then there are the cases which arise when the immovable right in question is not one to the property or possession of the land itself.

§ 156. All questions concerning the property in immovables, including the forms of conveying them, are decided by the *lex situs*. See above, p. 10, as to the rejection in England of the *lex loci actus* for the form of conveyance.

The necessity of a seal to the conveyance of an immovable right depends on the *lex situs*: *Adams v. Clutterbuck* (1883), 10 Q. B. D. 403, Cave.

§ 157. Interests in land which are limited in duration, whether for terms of years, for life, or otherwise; interests in land which are limited in their nature, as legal (*ex jure Quiritium*—Gaius) or beneficial (*in bonis*—Gaius); servitudes, charges, liens, and all other dismemberments of the property in land; are immovables as well as the land itself.

§ 158. Money substituted for an immovable by the *lex situs* is subject to the same rights as the immovable, but, when an immovable is sold under a disposition made by the owner or in consequence of a dealing with it by the owner, the rights to which it was subject as an immovable do not affect its proceeds unless kept alive against them by the will of parties or by the *lex situs*.

The first part of the § is illustrated by the fact that the compensation awarded under the Act for the abolition of slavery was subject to the same rights to which the slaves were subject. See *Forbes v. Adams* (1839), 9 Sim. 462, Shadwell. In *Re James Rea, Rea v. Rea*, [1902] 1 I. R. 451, Porter, an intestate had died domiciled in Ireland without issue, leaving a widow and an estate of more than £1,000 value, including land in Victoria (Australia), by the law of which country the widow in those circumstances is entitled to a charge of £1,000 on the estate and the residue is divisible between the widow and the next of kin. The Victorian administrator sold the land and remitted the proceeds to the widow, who was the administratrix in Ireland. That she was entitled to the £1,000 out of the proceeds of the Victorian land, subject to debts but before a division of the general estate, followed from the doctrine of the first part of the §; but it was held that the proceeds of the Victorian land, subject to the £1,000, fell into the general estate, for the payment of the debts out of it and, subject thereto, for the purpose of the charge of £500 given to the widow by the British Intestates Act, 1890. The widow might no doubt have claimed her moiety of the proceeds of the Victorian land, subject to debts and to the £1,000, had it been her interest to do so, but she could not claim the £500 without allowing it to be levied out of the whole of the property which the British Parliament intended to be subject to it.

The second part of the § is illustrated by the sale of a foreign immovable for the purpose of winding up a partnership or under a trust for sale in a will. Legacy duty is then payable out of the proceeds: *Forbes v. Steven, Mackenzie v. Forbes* (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 178, James; *Re Stokes, Stokes v. Ducroz* (1890), 62 L. T. 176, North. And the order of succession to the proceeds is governed by the English trust and not by the law of succession of the *situs*: *Re Piercy, Whitwham v. Piercy*, [1895] 1 Ch. 83, North.

A beneficial interest under a settlement, by which real estate in England was held on trust to sell and to divide the proceeds of sale, has been held to be personal property, and therefore to pass by a will in foreign form, which was a valid will for personal property according to Lord Kingsdown's Act. *Re Lyne's Settlement Trusts*, [1919] 1 Ch. 80, Swinfen Eady, M.R., Duke, L.J., Eve, J., reversing Peterson.

But where a testator domiciled in Scotland had a general power of appointment over the proceeds of sale of Irish land, which was settled on trust for sale, and by a will executed in Scotland, which was invalid by Scotch law, but valid according to the Wills Act, gave the residue of his property to his wife, it was held that the disposition was good, because the interest in the proceeds of sale was land, and the disposition was good by the *lex situs*. *Murray v. Champenowne*, [1901] 2 I. R. 232. It is doubtful whether this decision is consistent with that in the case of *Re Lyne's Trusts*. But the will might have been held good under Lord Kingsdown's Act, and therefore effective to pass the property supposing it was deemed to be personalty. The point, however, was not considered by the court, and the actual decision that land on trust for sale passes as land is of doubtful validity.

These three §§ contain the general English doctrine on the subject of the law which must govern immovables. The applications which are made of that doctrine in England to particular questions will be presented in separate §§, on account of their variety and importance.

§ 159. A rent charge issuing out of land in England is an immovable, and when a British statute makes it liable to legacy duty as personal estate it is liable to such duty notwithstanding that the deceased owner was domiciled abroad, and the movables left by him are consequently not liable to such duty.

Chatfield v. Berchtoldt (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. 192, James and Mellish, reversing Bacon (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 464.

§ 160. When security is given on immovables for a debt which is also personally due, the *lex situs* of the immovables decides whether the debt is to be considered an immovable, that is, as an alienation of so much of the value of the immovables on which it is secured, or as a mere debt with collateral security.

In a case of a mortgage debt secured on land in Canada Swinfen Eady cited this § with approval ([1910] 2 Ch. p. 341); and the Court of Appeal (Cozens-Hardy and Farwell, Moulton doubting on grounds which he did not disclose) decided that the mortgage was an immovable; *Re Hoyles, Row*

v. *Jagg*, [1911] 1 Ch. 179: but the *lex situs* which was applied was treated as being the same as English law, in which case the division of property into movable and immovable has no operation: *ub. sup.* at p. 185, Farwell.

The case was presented by a Scotch heritable bond, in which the debt, though personally due as well as secured on the land, descended to the creditor's heir of immovables, and the debtor's heir of immovables could not claim exoneration out of the debtor's movables. Hence: where the creditor was domiciled in England, and made a will which was ineffectual to pass Scotch immovables, the debt descended to his Scotch heir: *Johnstone v. Baker* (1817), 4 Madd. 474 note, Grant; *Jerningham v. Herbert* (1829), 4 Russ. 388, Tam. 103, Leach; *Allen v. Anderson* (1846), 5 Ha. 163, Wigram. And where the debtor was domiciled in England, his Scotch heir was still unable to claim exoneration out of his personal estate: *Drummond v. Drummond* (1799), House of Lords on Scotch appeal, Robertson on Personal Succession, p. 209; *Elliott v. Minto* (1821), 6 Madd. 16, Leach. See above, § 118.

But now, by st. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 101, s. 117, Scotch heritable securities are movable as regards the succession of the creditor, subject to certain exceptions.

§ 161. Only if a separate security be taken in another country for the same debt, the last § will not apply, because the *lex situs* of the immovable security will be unable to affect the entire character of the debt.

Where an English security was taken for a debt secured by a Scotch heritable bond, the debt passed to the creditor's legatee, notwithstanding that the will was ineffectual to pass Scotch immovables: *Buckleugh v. Hoare* (1819), 4 Madd. 467, Leach, who exercised his personal jurisdiction over the creditor's Scotch heir by declaring him a trustee for the legatee; *Cust v. Goring* (1854), 18 Beav. 383, Romilly.

§ 162. No law as to the mode of satisfying debts and legacies which may prevail in the country where the estate of a deceased person is being administered, not even if he was domiciled there, can throw on his immovables a heavier burden in respect of his debts or legacies than is thrown on them by the *lex situs*.

Harrison v. Harrison (1872), Selborne, James and Mellish, and (1873), Selborne and Mellish, reversing Romilly (1872), whose attention had not been called to the point: L. R. 8 Ch. Ap. 342. In *Re Hewit, Lawson v. Duncan*, [1891] 3 Ch. 568, Romer, charitable legacies could not be paid out of English land, although the testator desired that his affairs should be administered according to Scotch law, which differentiated the case from *Harrison v. Harrison* as to the rest of the administration.

§ 163. If a contract is void by the *lex loci contractus*, an immovable security given for it will be void also, notwithstanding that the contract would not have been void by the *lex situs* of the security.

Richards v. Goold (1827), 1 Molloy 22, Hart.

§ 164. Terms of years in land, though personal estate by the English or other personal law of their owner, are recognized in England as being immovables for the purposes of private international law and governed by the *lex situs*.

The Thellusson Act applies to a disposition of leaseholds for years in England by a testator domiciled in Ireland: *Freke v. Carbery* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 461, Selborne. The succession to leaseholds for years in Ireland, on the death of an owner domiciled in Italy, depends on the law of Ireland, and administration will be granted accordingly: *Re Gentili* (1875), Ir. L. R. 9 Eq. 541, Allen. Similarly where the *situs* was the Transvaal: *Re Moses, Moses v. Valentine*, [1908] 2 Ch. 235, Swinfen Eady.

The Mortmain Act applies to leaseholds for years in England, and the property or amount of which the charitable application is defeated by it goes to the next-of-kin by the law of England. *Duncan v. Lawson* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 394, Kay.

But when the executor of one who died domiciled in Scotland has been confirmed in England, he will have the powers of an English executor as to English leaseholds: *Hood v. Lord Barrington* (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 218, Romilly.

§ 165. All questions concerning a restraint on the alienation or disposition of immovables are to be decided by the *lex situs*; whether the restraint be general or special, and, if special, whether directed against alienation or disposition in certain modes, as by will, or in favour of certain persons, as between husband and wife, or for certain purposes, as charitable purposes; and whether the restraint be total, or limited to a certain proportion of the value.

The Mortmain Act applies in restraint of the disposition of English land, even though the charitable purpose is to be executed abroad: *Curtis v. Hutton* (1808), 14 Ves. 537, Grant. The same Act, being part of the law of Canada, applies to money secured by mortgage of land in Canada: *Re Hoyles, Row v. Jagg*, [1911] 1 Ch. 179, Cozens-Hardy, Moulton (doubting) and Farwell, affirming Swinfen Eady.

It may here be mentioned, though not falling strictly under the §, that, in administering the estate of a testator domiciled in Scotland, the English court refused to give effect to a bequest of personalty tending to bring English land under a charitable trust contrary to the Mortmain Act: *Att.-Gen. v. Mill* (1827), 3 Russ. 328, Lyndhurst; affirmed (1831), 2 D. & Cl. 393, Lyndhurst. But the Privy Council has since held, I submit rightly, that a colonial testator can effectually give money for the purpose of bringing English land under a charitable trust; and they argued that in *Att.-Gen. v. Mill* the testator was not regarded as domiciled in Scotland, contrary to the language of the reports and of Lord St. Leonards (*Law of Property*, p. 419), who was a counsel in the case: *Mayor of Canterbury v. Wyburn*, [1895] A. C. 89, judgment of himself and Selborne, Watson, Macnaghten, Morris, Shand and Couch, delivered by Lord Hobhouse.

In a more recent case, however, a charge of charitable legacies on debentures in an Australian company, which possessed certain leasehold property in England, was held to be invalid, because the leasehold interest

under the English Mortmain Act could not be bequeathed for charity. The Australian law, which was the law of the testator's domicile, permitted a charge on land by will for charitable objects, but the letter of the law in the *lex situs* invalidated the whole bequest because of the *scintilla* of real property interest. *Re Dawson*, [1915] 1 Ch. 626, C. A.; Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Phillimore, Joyce.

Foreign immovables are regarded by the English court as pure personalty, for the purposes of the Mortmain Act: *Beaumont v. Oliviera* (1868), L. R. 6 Eq. 534, Stuart; (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. App. 309, Selwyn and Giffard.

In connection with the case last cited it may be mentioned that at a time when English real estate was not in all cases subject to the payment of the debts of its deceased owner, it was said of a foreign immovable: "Note also in this case that though it be an inheritance, yet, being in a foreign country, it is looked upon as a chattel to pay debts and a testamentary thing." *Noell v. Robinson* (1681), 2 Ventris 358, Nottingham.

In a more recent case this doctrine has not been followed for the purpose of paying legacies; it was held that a testamentary charge of legacies on a fund of land and chattels in the Argentine did not put the land and chattels on equal terms for the payment of the legacies, but made the land an auxiliary fund only: *Smith v. Smith*, [1913] 2 Ch. 217, Eve. The judge extended to foreign land the doctrine applicable to English land.

§ 165a. The capacity of a person to contract with regard to immovables is governed by the *lex situs*.

A contract made in England by a married woman domiciled in England relating to land abroad will not be enforced if by the *lex situs* of the land such a contract by a married woman is void: *Bank of Africa Limited v. Cohen*, [1909] 2 Ch. 129, Buckley, Kennedy, Cozens-Hardy, affirming Eve.

§ 165b. As regards the interpretation of a contract relating to land, however, the proper law of the contract and not necessarily the *lex situs* prevails. *British South Africa Company v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.* ([1910] 2 Ch. 502; see later, p. 217).

§ 166. No guardian, curator, committee of the estate, or assignee in bankruptcy, either appointed by a foreign jurisdiction or holding the office by virtue of a foreign law, has any authority with regard to the English real estate of his minor, lunatic or bankrupt.

The proceeds of land belonging to a Chilian lunatic, sold under the Partition Act, 1868, were not payable to his Chilian *curator ad bona*: *Grimwood v. Bartels* (1877), 46 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 788, Hall.

A Victorian Insolvent Act gave authority to order the insolvent to convey his real estate out of the colony for the benefit of his creditors. No application for such an order having been made during the life of the insolvent, the title to his English real estate was unaffected. *Waite v. Bingley* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 674, Hall.

§ 167. Where the law of the matrimonial domicile provides for unity of the matrimonial property, or where there is an

express contract to that effect, the *lex situs* will not govern the rights of either consort in English real estate belonging to them. See *De Nicols v. Curlier* ([1900] 2 Ch. 410; u.s. pp. 74—75). But in other cases the English law alone will apply to English real estate of the spouses, whether acquired before or during marriage.

§ 168. English real estate descends on intestacy according to English law, whatever may have been the personal law of the intestate. See §§ 178, 179.

§ 169. No limited interest, charge, or other dismemberment of the property in English land can be created; nor any English immovable, including a term of years, conveyed *inter vivos*; nor any English real estate devised by will; except in the form required by English law for such respective purpose.

The Land Transfer Act, 1897, makes the executor or administrator a real representative, on whom all English "real estate, vested in any person without a right in any other person to take by survivorship, shall on his death, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition, devolve." Such representative will have to administer the real estate for the payment of debts and legacies, and, subject to that, will hold it in trust "for the persons by law beneficially entitled thereto." The Wills Act of course remains the *lex situs* determining the form of a will that shall govern the beneficial interest in English freeholds: the legal estate of the representative will have been, as it were, intercalated.

As to the transmission on death of terms of years in English land, the legal estate in them passes by, and only by, the probate or grant of administration, so that every question as to the forms necessary for the transmission of such legal estate has been answered in explaining the conditions necessary for obtaining probate or a grant of administration. It is only with the transmission of the beneficial interest that we now have to do, and the form of will necessary for that purpose, according to English views of private international law, must depend on the *lex situs*. Here, however, we encounter a difficulty arising out of the fact that English leaseholds possess the two characters of immovables and personal property, to the former of which a proper *lex situs* belongs and should be independent of all personal considerations, while the English rules for the transmission of leaseholds on death belong to them in the latter character and are consequently mixed up with personal con-

siderations. The Wills Act, the old law of wills before that Act, and the Statute of Distributions have always had an application based on domicile, and there is in fact no such *lex situs* in the matter as there is for English freeholds. A solution as little arbitrary as is possible in the situation is to take either the Wills Act simply, or such a combination as the Wills Act and Lord Kingsdown's Act together may furnish in the given circumstances, as the *lex situs* for the form of a will of English leaseholds, and the Statute of Distributions as the *lex situs* for the beneficial interest in them in case of intestacy. The last has been done; see *Duncan v. Lawson*, quoted under § 164. But the cases as to the other selection must be examined.

In *De Fogasseries v. Duport* (1881), 11 L. R. Ir. 123, Warren, the Statute of Wills was taken as the test which the form of a will of Irish leaseholds (the question for which is the same as for English) must satisfy for the purposes of private international law, and, this being satisfied, administration with the will annexed, limited to chattels real in Ireland, was granted in order that the will might operate on the beneficial interest in them. The testator was a French subject domiciled in France, and his will was not in the form of his domicile either at the date when it was made or at his death, so that it had no claim to probate or grant of administration except under private international law, and Lord Kingsdown's Act, which could give it no help, was not mentioned as entering into the test. In *Pepin v. Bruyère*, [1900] 2 Ch. 504, Kekewich; affirmed, [1902] 1 Ch. 24, Vaughan Williams, Romer, Cozens-Hardy; the will was in the form of the testator's domicile at his death, and letters of administration with it annexed had been granted without the necessity of any help from Lord Kingsdown's Act. Since it did not satisfy the Wills Act, again mentioned simply as the test, the beneficial interest in the English leaseholds bequeathed by it went to the next-of-kin. Conversely, the will of an Englishman, domiciled in Chili, which was good according to Chilian law, was held valid to pass English real estate when it was signed and attested in such way as to be a good execution according to the Wills Act: *Re Nicholls, Hunter v. Nicholls*, [1921] 2 Ch. 112, Eve.

In *Re Grassi, Stubberfield v. Grassi*, [1905] 1 Ch. 584, Buckley, the testator, a British subject, had made his will not in the form of the Wills Act but in that of the place where it was made, and it was admitted to probate under Lord Kingsdown's Act, s. 1. It was held to pass the beneficial interest in English leaseholds, on the ground that "the section says, in effect, that the will shall be valid for the purpose of being admitted to probate, and will then take its place and be effectual for such purposes following on probate as the law of England allows." That reason is scarcely consistent with *Pepin v. Bruyère*, where administration with the will annexed, which is equivalent to probate, was not held to carry the consequences attributed to probate by the learned judge. But his decision may be upheld, consistently with both *Pepin v. Bruyère* and the Irish case, if we take the *lex situs* to be the combination which the Wills Act and Lord Kingsdown's Act together furnish in the given circumstances. That reference to what the law of England would do in the circumstances is not

further removed from a true *lex situs*, and in my judgment not less reasonable, than the reference to what the law of England does in the case of a person dying domiciled in England, which is involved in taking the Wills Act simply as the test of form for a will of English leaseholds.

English real estate only passed by a will with three witnesses, when that was the English form for the purpose, although the will was made beyond sea: *Coppin v. Coppin* (1725), 2 P. W. 291, King.

See also *Adams v. Clutterbuck*, quoted under § 156.

§ 170. No general rule can be laid down for the construction of contracts, wills, or other dispositions concerning immovables. A stringent rule of construction existing by the *lex situs* of the immovables concerned will of course prevent any instrument from affecting the immovables except in accordance with it, but, otherwise, a reasonable regard must be had to all the circumstances, including the *locus contractus* or *actus*, and the national character or domicile of the parties, testator, or other disponent.

Where a Scotchman by will, in Scotch form, devised Scotch and English immovables to his son "and the heirs male of his body," it was held that the words created an estate tail in the English property, though they were not apt to create it over the Scotch property. The stringent rule of construction in the English *lex situs* prevailed, and the incidents of an estate in English land must be determined by that law: *Re Miller*, [1914] 1 Ch. 511, Warrington. But in *Studd v. Cook*, 8 App. Cas. 571, Selborne, Watson, Fitzgerald, when a testator domiciled in England left land both in England and Scotland by a will in English form, it was held that the whole will must be construed according to English law, and a life estate only was created in the Scotch as well as the English immovables.

The following cases have arisen, where not otherwise mentioned, as to the currency or place of payment intended, or the rate of interest due, where a will or settlement has charged money on land situate in a country different from that in which the will or settlement was made, or in which the testator or settlor was domiciled.

Phipps v. Anglesea (1721), 1 P. W. 696, 5 Vin. Abr. 209, Parker; *Wallis v. Brightwell* (1722), 2 P. W. 88, Macclesfield; *Lansdowne v. Lansdowne* (1820), 2 Bl. 60, Eldon and Redesdale. In all these cases the decision was in favour of the currency of the testator's or settlor's domicile, but the payment to be in the *situs* of the land charged. In *Holmes v. Holmes* (1830), 1 Ru. & My. 660, Leach, the testator was domiciled at the date of his will in the same country in which the land he charged with an annuity was situate, and the decision was in favour of the then currency of that country, though both that currency and his domicile were changed before his death. Where money was charged on land in Ireland by a marriage settlement made in England, the parties also being apparently either English or Scotch, it was held that in the absence of expression in the settlement to the contrary the Irish rate of interest must be allowed: *Balfour v. Cooper* (1883), 23 Ch. D. 472, Baggallay and Lindley; cited

with approval by Cozens-Hardy, L.J., in *Re Drax, Savile v. Drax*, [1903] 1 Ch. at p. 796.

The following cases have arisen on the question whether slaves, live stock, and other movables necessary to the enjoyment of an estate passed by a devise in which the testator only mentioned the estate; and it was held that they did so, conformably to the understanding prevailing in the country where the estate was situate.

Lushington v. Sewell (1827), 1 Sim. 435, Hart; *Stewart v. Garnett* (1830), 3 Sim. 398, Shadwell. In the latter case the testator was domiciled in the country where the estate was situate, but not so in the former.

§ 171. The term of prescription with regard to the property in immovables depends on the *lex situs*.

Beckford v. Wade (1805), 17 Ves. 87, judgment of Privy Council delivered by Grant: no exception in favour of absentees, even though they have never been in the *situs*, unless express. In *Re Peat* (1869), L. R. 7 Eq. 302, James, money arising from the sale of land in India, and in *Pitt v. Dacre* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 295, Hall, rents and profits of land in Jamaica happened to be administrable in the English court, and claims on them were determined according to the law of prescription of the *situs* whence they had been produced.

§ 172. A proprietor of foreign immovables, or person interested in such, may be compelled by the English court, if it has personal jurisdiction over him, to dispose of his property or interest in them so as to give effect to any obligation relating to them which arises from, or as from, his own contract or tort; and that obligation will not be measured by the *lex situs* of the foreign immovables to which it relates, but in accordance with the rules of private international law on obligations arising from, or as from, contract or tort. "If indeed the law of the country where the land is situate should not permit, or not enable, the defendant to do what the court might otherwise think it right to decree, it would be useless and unjust to direct him to do the act; but when there is no such impediment the courts of this country, in the exercise of their jurisdiction over contracts made here, or in administering equities between parties residing here, act upon their own rules, and are not influenced by any consideration of what the effect of such contracts might be in the country where the lands are situate, or of the manner in which the courts of such countries might deal with such equities."

The quotation in the § is from Lord Cottenham's judgment in *Ex parte Pollard* (1840), Mont. & Ch. 239 (p. 250), 4 Deacon 27; in which case a

contract for security on land in Scotland, in the form called in England an equitable mortgage, was enforced against the debtor's assignees in bankruptcy, as representing his person, although ineffectual in itself by Scotch law. But note what was said by Lord Macnaghten in *Concha v. Concha*, [1892] A. C. at p. 675: "There is perhaps some danger of doing injustice if the strict rules which the English Court of Chancery has applied to dealings with trust property are applied to a case between foreigners under foreign law, whose relations are not exactly those of trustee and *cestui que trust*."

Arglasse v. Muschamp (1682), 1 Vern. 75, Nottingham; bill to be relieved of a charge on plaintiff's land in Ireland obtained by fraud. *Angus v. Angus* (1737), West's cases temp. Hardwicke, Hardwicke; bill for possession of land in Scotland, on ground of fraud. *Penn v. Baltimore* (1750), 1 Ves. Sen. 444, Hardwicke; specific performance of agreement for settlement of boundaries in the American colonies. *Cranstown v. Johnston* (1796), 3 Ves. 170, Arden; *Jackson v. Petrie* (1804), 10 Ves. 164, Eldon; *White v. Hall* (1806), 12 Ves. 321, Erskine; bills against creditors charged with fraud in obtaining judicial sales, in the *forum situs*, of estates in the West Indies. In the first case, Sir R. P. Arden made the decree declaring the defendant a trustee of the estate he had acquired, "without saying that this sale would have been set aside either in law or equity there," that is, in the *forum situs*; and added, "I will lay down the rule as broad as this: this court will not permit him to avail himself of the law of any other country to do what would be gross injustice:" 3 Ves. 183. *Cood v. Cood* (1863), 9 Jur. (N. S.) 1335, Romilly: a proprietor of land in Chili decreed a trustee, and to do all things necessary for giving effect to a contract of sale which the Chilian courts had adjudged not to exist, and enjoined from further proceedings in those courts. *Mercantile Investment and General Trust Company v. River Plate Trust Loan and Agency Company*, [1892] 2 Ch. 303, North; suit entertained where the defendant company had taken foreign land subject to an equity created by its predecessor in title. *Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor*, [1902] 2 Ch. 132, Byrne; equitable charge on land in Brazil. *British South Africa Company v. De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited*, [1910] 2 Ch. 502, Cozens-Hardy, Farwell and Kennedy affirming Swinfen Eady (overruled on the English law, S. C., [1912] A. C. 52); the English doctrine of a clog on the equity of redemption applied to a charge given in England relating to land abroad. Following this decision, an order for execution of a legal mortgage by executors in England was made in a case where the testator, by English deed, had charged his share in immovable property abroad, to secure repayment of a loan, and had covenanted to execute a mortgage when called on. The law of the foreign country did not treat the charge as a valid encumbrance, but the contract was to be construed by English law, and the death of one of the parties could not operate to change the law by which it was construed: *Re Smith*, [1916] 2 Ch. 206, Eve. So too, where an English agreement for the sale of land in France provided that the vendor's title should be accepted without requisition, and, if desired, the property should remain registered in the vendor's name, and in that case the vendor should execute a declaration of trust for the purchaser, it was held that, though by French law no conveyance was necessary, something remained to be done by English law, and therefore, the court could not entertain an action for the balance of the purchase money: *Halford v. Clarke*, [1915] 56 L. T. 68, Shearman. In *Black Point Syndicate v. Eastern Concessions Limited*, [1898] 79 L. T. 658, Stirling, J.,

said that if there be a jurisdiction to enforce a covenant for quiet enjoyment of foreign land, it ought to be exercised with the greatest caution.

To this § belong also actions against the trustees of settlements or other deeds, to carry the trusts into execution, where foreign immovables are included in them. In such cases, as well as in all others under the § where it may be necessary, receivers will be appointed over the foreign immovables: *Harrison v. Gurney* (1821), 2 Jac. & W. 563, Eldon; *Clarke v. Ormonde* (1821), Jac. 116, 121, Eldon. In *Harrison v. Gurney* the trustees, after decree in England, were restrained from proceeding in the *forum situs* for the execution of the same trusts. Where a testatrix domiciled in Scotland devised immovables in Scotland on certain trusts, the English court held that application must be made to the Scotch Court of Session to authorise a sale of the trust property: *Re Georges*, [1921] W. N. 41, Sargant. Where persons had contracted in New York concerning mineral rights in Ecuador, and it was stipulated in the contract that the agreement should be considered to be made and executed in London, the court held it had jurisdiction, though the defendant had, subsequently to the issue of English writ, commenced proceedings in New York about the contract: *British Controlled Oilfields Limited v. Stagg*, [1921] W. N. 319, Sargant.

In *Jenney v. Mackintosh* (1886), 33 Ch. D. 595, North, leave was given to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction on one of several defendants in whom the legal estate of lands in Trinidad was vested, the beneficial interest in which lands was bound even by the law of Trinidad by a creditors' deed which it was sought to enforce, the other defendants residing in England.

The following cases illustrate the latter part of this §. A covenant in an English marriage settlement to settle after-acquired property was not enforced so far as it related to land in Jersey, where by the *lex situs* a conveyance to the trustees without adequate pecuniary consideration would have been void; *Re Pearce's Settlement*, *Pearse v. Pearce*, [1909] 1 Ch. 304, Eve, and *Bank of Africa Lim. v. Cohen*, [1909] 2 Ch. 129, cited under § 165a.

§ 173. But where the relief which might affect the foreign immovables is not sought on any ground falling under the last §, the English court will decline to make its mere personal jurisdiction over the defendant a ground for determining the right either to the property or the possession of foreign immovables, but may perhaps assume to determine such right on the ground of movable property being mixed up in the same proceedings.

An action will not lie in England for the partition of foreign land: *Carteret v. Petty* (1676), 2 Sw. 323, note, 2 Ch. Ca. 214, Finch. Or to try the validity of a will of foreign land: *Pike v. Hoare* (1763), 2 Eden, 182, Henley. Or to establish a charge on foreign land on the ground of the proprietor having acquired it with notice of a contract or attempted disposition in which he was neither party nor privy: *Norris v. Chambers* (1861), 29 Beav. 246, Romilly; *affirmed* (1861), 3 D. F. & J. 583, Campbell. Or to make one who has sold foreign land to which the plaintiff claims title a trustee of the purchase-money for the plaintiff: *Re Hawthorne*, *Graham v. Massey* (1883), 23 Ch. D. 743, Kay. Or for a declaration of the title to foreign lands, or of the right to their possession: *Companhia de Moçambique v. British South Africa Co.*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 358, judg-

ment of Lawrance and Wright delivered by Wright, and point abandoned on the appeal. *Deschamps v. Miller*, [1908] 1 Ch. 856, Parker. *Prima facie*, an injunction cannot be obtained against proceedings in the *forum situs* with regard to immovables: *Moor v. Anglo-Italian Bank* (1879), 10 Ch. D. 681, Jessel. And see *Norton v. Florence Land and Public Works Co.*, under § 175.

But the doctrine of this § does not seem at one time to have been firmly held. No ground but that of the personal jurisdiction appears for the decrees in *Archer v. Preston*, cited with approval by Nottingham in *Arglasse v. Muschamp* (1682), 1 Vern. 77; *Kildare v. Eustace* (1686), 1 Vern. 419, Jeffreys, Beddingfield and Atkins; and *Lord Anglesey's Case*, mentioned by Hardwicke as a decree of his own settling boundaries in Ireland, in *Penn v. Baltimore*, 1 Ves. Sen. 454. Something may have been due in these decrees to the superior authority which the English courts then exercised over Ireland, to lands in which they all related; but in *Foster v. Vassall* (1747), 3 Atk. 589, Hardwicke put the colonies on the same footing as Ireland; and Nottingham had decided *Carteret v. Petty*, which also related to land in Ireland. The report of *Roberdeau v. Rous* (1738), 1 Atk. 543, Hardwicke, is scarcely intelligible except as to the point mentioned under § 176.

With regard to the last clause of the § in *Bunbury v. Bunbury* (1839), 1 Beav. 318, Langdale affirmed by Cottenham, the defendants were taking proceedings in Demerara to establish there a claim to a certain interest in land there, contending that the land had been brought by the *lex situs* into community between husband and wife. The plaintiff sought that a settlement and will made by the husband, which if the defendants were right could only affect his interest in the land, should be carried into execution with regard both to the land as a whole and to some movable property. And they succeeded in getting the defendants restrained from prosecuting any proceedings in Demerara. In *Hope v. Carnegie* (1886), L. R. 1 Ch. Ap. 320, Turner affirming Stuart, and Knight-Bruce dissenting, where also both movables and foreign immovables were involved (see above, § 107), the proceedings as to the latter in the *forum situs* were restrained, because it was not proved that they could be carried on as to the latter alone.

In *Tulloch v. Hartley* (1841), 1 Y. & C., C. C. 114, Knight-Bruce, a decree appears to have been made for payment of legacies and annuities out of land in Jamaica, and that for that purpose the boundaries of the testatrix's estates in Jamaica might be ascertained, and if necessary settled by commissioners appointed by the English court of chancery.

See also *Grey v. Manitoba and North-Western Railway Co. of Canada*, [1897] A. C. 254, Judicial Committee, and *Re Clinton, Clinton v. Clinton*, [1903] W. N. 20, Joyce, where the English court exercised jurisdiction over so much real property belonging to a partnership in a colony as was subject to a trust made by a deceased partner, but not over such part as devolved directly on testator's heir.

§ 174. The redemption or foreclosure of mortgages of foreign lands deserves separate notice. The fact that a debt is secured by such a mortgage can be no objection to taking the accounts between a debtor and creditor, and decreeing payment by the former of the balance found due from him, in any court having personal jurisdiction over him. Nor would it be inconsistent

with § 173 that on payment by the debtor of the amount found due from him, the creditor should be decreed, by any court having personal jurisdiction over him, to reconvey the land or otherwise clear it of the mortgage. But that foreclosure should be decreed on the debtor's failure to pay would appear to be contrary to § 173, and it can hardly be supposed that the *forum situs* of the security would allow any authority to such a decree, if by the *lex situs* the mortgage was still redeemable, and proceedings were taken to redeem it. Nevertheless, the practice in England is to decree foreclosure of mortgages of foreign lands.

Toller v. Carteret (1705), 2 Vern. 494, Wright; *Paget v. Ede* (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 118, Bacon.

A bill for the redemption of a mortgage of foreign land has not only been entertained, but an injunction granted in support of it against a proceeding to foreclose the mortgage in the *forum situs*, on the ground that the accounts could be more conveniently and satisfactorily taken in England.

Beckford v. Kemble (1822), 1 S. & St. 7, Leach.

And Sir L. Shadwell expressed the opinion that, on a bill for redeeming a mortgage of foreign land, the *lex situs* should be applied.

In *Bent v. Young* (1838), 9 Sim. 180, at p. 190.

This seems to be generally correct, for otherwise the bare personal jurisdiction might take from the defendant immovable property indefeasibly vested in him by the *lex situs*, which would be contrary to § 173: see § 175. But that reason would not apply, and Shadwell would probably not have expressed the same opinion, where the defendant was bound by some special contract, not merely an incident to the security, so as to bring § 172 into play.

§ 175. Where a proprietor of foreign immovables, or person interested in such, is not under any obligation relating to them from, or as from, his own contract or tort, and yet the jurisdiction is entertained, it must be determined according to the *lex situs* whether he is bound to give effect out of his property or interest to any contract relating to them, or attempted disposition of them, of or by third parties, on the ground of his having acquired his property or interest with notice of such contract or attempted disposition, or on any other ground.

In *Martin v. Martin*, *Bell v. Martin* (1831), 2 Ru. & My. 507, Leach, a contract on marriage; in *Waterhouse v. Stansfield* (1851), 9 Ha. 234, and (1852), 10 Ha. 254, Turner, a contract for security; and in *Hicks v. Powell* (1869), L. R. 4 Ch. Ap. 741, Hatherley affirming Giffard, an unregistered conveyance; were held to be not enforceable against third parties, because not enforceable against them by the *lex situs*. And in *Norton v. Florence Land and Public Works Co.* (1877), 7 Ch. D. 332, Jessel, it was not only held that the question whether a contract for security on foreign land was enforceable against third parties depended on the *lex situs*, but also that the pendency of a suit in the *situs* in which the question might be determined was a conclusive objection to entertaining the claim.

In *Nelson v. Bridport* (1846), 8 Beav. 547, Langdale, an attempt had been made to dispose of foreign immovables by will in a line of settlement, through the device of charging the successor named by the will with a trust. He was compellable to execute the trust as far as was possible consistently with the *lex situs*, being bound *quasi ex contractu* by his acceptance of the succession; but having done so, and having thereby acquired a limited interest which by a change in the *lex situs* was made an absolute one, he was not compellable to employ that absolute interest in executing the trusts any further, but might retain it for himself.

§ 176. Where a money demand is made in a court having personal jurisdiction over the defendant, it is no objection to the demand that it is in any way connected with foreign immovables.

Carteret v. Petty (1676), 2 Sw. 323 note, 2 Ch. Ca. 214, Finch; account of waste between tenants in common of Irish land. *Roberdeau v. Rous* (1738), 1 Atk. 543, Hardwicke; account of rents and profits between tenants in common of land in St. Christopher's. *Bayley v. Edwards* (1784), Thurlow, stated in another case of the same name, 3 Sw. 703; account of produce of land in Jamaica during possession under a will. *Batthyany v. Walford* (1886), 33 Ch. D. 624, North; successor in an Austro-Hungarian fidei-commiss allowed to rank against predecessor's estate in an administration action for what he should establish in Austria-Hungary to be his claim on the balance of the deteriorations and improvements.

But this rule does not apply where the demand is a tax or rate or in the nature of such: *Municipal Council of Sydney v. Bull*, [1909] 1 K. B. 7, Grantham. If the remarks of the judge in this case can be taken as supporting the second ground mentioned in the head-note, viz., that an action would not lie against a defendant in England when money was charged on foreign immovables, they are, it is submitted, inconsistent with the authorities cited above.

Lastly, some points which rather belong to English law in the special sense than to private international law, even as forming a part of English law, may be conveniently mentioned in this chapter.

§ 177. The British sovereign or government must be deemed to be present in every part of the British empire, so that the fact of the sovereign or of a department of government being a

necessary party cannot found jurisdiction in England for a suit concerning land in any other part of the empire.

Re Holmes (1861), 2 J. & H. 527, Wood; *Reiner v. Salisbury* (1876), 2 Ch. D. 378, Malins.

§ 178. In order that one may inherit English real estate, he must both be legitimate in accordance with the doctrines of private international law with regard to legitimacy, as to which see above, pp. 99—104, and have been born after an actual marriage between his parents, as distinguished from a marriage antedated by a presumption or fiction of law; that is, he must not have been legitimated *per subsequens matrimonium*, even in a country where such legitimation proceeds on a presumptive or fictitious antedating of the marriage.

Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1826), 5 B. & C. 438, Abbott, Bayley, Holroyd, Littledale; (1830), 2 Cl. & F. 571, 9 Bl. N. R. 32; opinion of judges to same effect delivered to House of Lords by Alexander: (1835), 2 Cl. & F. 582, 9 Bl. (N. S.) 70; opinion of Brougham delivered to the effect that the status of legitimacy is sufficient, Lyndhurst and Denman reserving their opinions, and appeal ordered to be further argued before the judges: (1839), 7 Cl. & F. 895, opinion of Tindal, Vaughan, Bosanquet, Patteson, Williams, Coleridge, Coltman, Maule, Parke and Gurney delivered to House of Lords by Tindal, to effect of §: (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 940, judgment of House of Lords affirming decision moved by Cottenham, Brougham not opposing though not satisfied. In connection with this great case it will be useful to read the Scotch appeal of *Fenton v. Livingstone* (1859), 3 Macq. 497, Brougham, Cranworth, Wensleydale, Chelmsford.

The doctrine is limited to intestacy. see above, p. 155.

The doctrine of § 178 has often been represented as an application of the maxim that the *lex situs* governs immovables. By virtue of that maxim, it is said, he who will inherit English land must prove himself heir by the law of England in the special sense, and therefore legitimate by the law of England in the special sense, which law knows nothing of legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium*. Were succession to personal estate in question, he need only prove himself legitimate by the law of England in the larger sense, which, by virtue of the maxim *mobilia sequuntur personam*, refers legitimacy when movables are concerned to the personal law, and so in that case adopts as a part of itself the legitimation *per subsequens matrimonium* which the personal law confers. This is very plausible, but on examination two serious difficulties will be found in it. First, as already pointed out on p. 99, it is thinking in a circle to refer legitimacy to the personal law, since a decision on the legitimacy of the individual is often necessary in order to

ascertain his national character or domicile, on which his personal law depends. The question of legitimacy always turns on the legal appreciation of various facts, and what alone private international law gives or can give is an appropriate rule for the legal appreciation of each of those facts separately. Next, if it be laid down that when immovable property is under consideration legitimacy is to be referred to the *lex situs*, it follows for the same reason that this can have no other meaning than that all the various facts on which it depends are in that case to be appreciated by the *lex situs*. But then we are led far beyond the question of birth before or after actual marriage. The validity of a marriage even preceding the birth is a necessary element of legitimacy, and this in its turn may depend on the validity of a divorce from an earlier marriage; so we are obliged to ask, where can we stop in applying the *lex situs*? Thus the plausible theory which has been mentioned turns out to be unsatisfactory in its application both to personal and to real estate. Lord Brougham was deeply impressed with the impossibility of stopping at any given point in the application of the *lex situs* to the circumstances on which legitimacy depends, and urged it strongly in *Birtwhistle v. Vardill* as a reason for requiring no other quality of legitimacy in an English heir of real estate than that which forms a part of his purely personal status.

The truth appears to be that there neither is, nor with any convenience can there be, any such thing as legitimacy by the *lex situs* or by any one other law; that what private international law gives is, and unless excessive difficulties are raised must only be, a personal status of legitimacy, depending on the total result obtained by appreciating each fact in the case according to the law appropriate to it. And that therefore it is a misleading contrast, when the question is put as between determining legitimacy by this or that law; that the true contrast is between accepting and rejecting the personal status of legitimacy as sufficient when the inheritance of English land is in dispute. *Birtwhistle v. Vardill* should therefore be considered as being what the judges seem to have considered it as mainly being, a decision that a special rule of English law requires birth after marriage as an additional condition for such inheritance. In this it is most likely that they were historically accurate, and it is remarkable that d'Argentré gives a general character to a very similar rule. *Nullus princeps, says he, legitimat personam*

ad succedendum in bona alterius territorii: Comm. in Patrias Britonum Leges, art. 218, gl. 6, No. 20. The rule is not the same, for the canon law on legitimation was too widely received for a rule intended to meet a conflict of laws arising out of its rejection to be framed in such general terms. The context shows that d'Argentré was thinking of the effect of a foreign judicial sentence of legitimacy, but the case is sufficiently analogous. Supposing, however, that the feudists of all countries were agreed that either a foreign sentence of legitimacy, or a foreign legitimation not arising from any law equally existing in the *situs*, should not entitle any one to succeed to immovables, this, notwithstanding the agreement, would from its nature be only a rule of the special law of each country, and not a rule for choosing between different special laws, or therefore a rule of private international law as we understand it.

The view of the subject here taken furnishes the answer to a question which has been raised in the *Law Quarterly Review*, vol. 5, p. 442. If terms of years in English land are to be treated as immovables for the purposes of private international law (above, § 164), must not legitimacy for the purpose of succession to them be determined by the *lex situs*, and will this be consistent with the rule that for succession to English personalty a child is legitimate who has been legitimated *per subsequens matrimonium* in the country of which the law is held to govern such legitimation (above, § 126)? The answer is that even in the case of English real estate the legitimacy of the heir is not referred to the *lex situs* in the sense intended in the question, but the inheritance is subject to a rule of English law which does not exist for terms of years, so that the latter will go to the legitimated next of kin without violating the rule in § 164.

§ 179. A person who by virtue of § 178 is unable to inherit English real estate is also incapable of transmitting English real estate by inheritance except to his own issue.

Re Don (1857), 4 Drew. 194, Kindersley.

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL NOTIONS ON JURISDICTION.

IN the course by which, commencing with Chapter III, we have hitherto travelled through the English doctrines on private international law, we have first considered the status of persons, then the cases which bring prominently forward the conception of various rights of property and obligation as forming a group with the person of their owner as its centre, and lastly rights of property themselves. In other words, we have covered the proper ground of what in the ancient nomenclature of the science are called the personal and real statutes, and we must presently enter on the subject of obligation. Now a statute which disposes of a man's personal condition by reason of his conduct or that of others, as by declaring him married or legitimate by reason of his or his parents' having gone through a certain ceremony, or which disposes of things, including incorporeal rights, on the occasion of such acts or omissions as those which constitute testacy, intestacy, or conveyance, is essentially different from a statute which imposes a duty on the ground of contract or tort. In the former cases, a condition or a thing is disposed of, and although active duties may arise out of the condition, the duty which arises in relation to the thing is merely the negative one of not disturbing the enjoyment of its property by the person in whose favour the law has disposed of it. In the latter case, there is nothing to be disposed of, but the active duty of giving, doing or furnishing—*dare, facere, præstare*—is imposed on the party. The laws which deal with the former cases proceed on the ground of an authority in relation to the condition or the thing, as being physically within the territorial limits of the laws, or as being connected by widely received traditions or conventions with the regions respectively circumscribed by those limits. The laws which deal with the latter case proceed on the ground of an authority over the agent, including in that term the party who is guilty of an omission to act. But where authority over an agent is concerned, law and jurisdiction are but two aspects of it.

We have seen, p. 17, that international rules of law were often deduced from international rules of jurisdiction by force of the maxim *si ibi forum, ergo et jus*. The justification of that proceeding may be put as follows. First, tradition, convention, or the necessity of the case, points out the jurisdiction in which a determination ought most properly to be had, or can only be had effectively; secondly, the persons who are concerned in the determination have not, in general, any reason for claiming that that jurisdiction should follow any law but its own; thirdly, if the matter arises incidentally in another jurisdiction, the certainty which is so important in law requires that it shall be determined as it would be determined in what may be called the primary jurisdiction. This statement suits all the cases, but the second link may be put more strongly in the case of an obligation than in that of a condition or a thing. In the case of an obligation, the matter about which a determination is sought has no existence independent of the law of that which is the primary jurisdiction for enforcing it. That conclusion is involved in the jurisdiction being the primary one. If the authority to which the defendant is rightfully subject under the circumstances does not consider him to be liable, he is not liable, and there is no more in the case. Of course this must be taken with the qualification that rules for the choice of law on questions of obligation may still survive through the force of tradition, although the rules of jurisdiction out of which they arose may have become obsolete, or that such rules of law may have been adopted in countries which never adopted the rules of jurisdiction out of which they arose. Such consequences flow naturally from the recognition of a juridical community of nations, but do not affect the principles on which such a community is based. And the qualifications, no less than the doctrine which they qualify, prove the necessity that before entering on the rules for the choice of a law with regard to obligations, the student should be introduced to the history of the doctrines which have prevailed in Europe about jurisdiction. In that part of the sketch which concerns the Roman system, I shall follow the authority of Savigny, in the eighth volume of his great work on the modern Roman law.

In the empire of Justinian, obligations of whatever nature or wherever contracted might be put in suit in the *forum rei*, the personal forum of the defendant. This was, for an Italian, either that of the *civitas* or *respublica* of which he was a

municipes,* or that of the place in which he was domiciled. For the whole of Italy was divided into *civitates* having original jurisdiction, of one of which every Italian was a member by municipal citizenship, which involved subjection to the jurisdiction of that community—*forum originis*—although he might be domiciled in another such *civitas* or in a province, and if he were so was subject also to the jurisdiction of his domicile. In principle, the plaintiff had his choice whether to sue in the *forum originis* or the *forum domicilii* of the defendant, but it is likely that by some express provision, now lost, he was precluded from choosing the former except when the defendant was to be found in the territory to which he belonged by *origo*. Even however if this was not so, the plaintiff must generally have preferred the *forum domicilii*, for his own convenience.

But since the provinces, being subject to the imperial governors, did not contain *civitates* with original jurisdiction, at least until in late times something of the kind arose in the authority of the *defensores*, a provincial had no other personal forum than his domicile, except so far as he had a *forum originis* at Rome, through the edict of Caracalla which extended the Roman citizenship to all the free subjects of the empire. The Roman citizenship had long before been enjoyed by all Italians, through the *lex Julia*, so that for such of them as did not belong immediately to Rome, but primarily to some other Italian *respublica*, there existed two citizenships, besides a domicile possibly different from either. As to these Italians, and the provincials after the edict of Caracalla, express texts of the Corpus Juris show that they could not be sued at Rome in virtue of their citizenship unless actually there, and even then with many exceptions, known collectively as the *jus domum revocandi*; which is the ground for presuming, as above mentioned, that a similar protection existed against all drawing of defendants to answer out of their domicile on the ground of citizenship.

Besides the *forum rei*, the Roman law allowed to the plaintiff the option of suing in the proper jurisdiction of the obligation, for which *forum contractus* and *rei gestæ* are modern terms applied more widely than to the particular cases they would seem to indicate. "This jurisdiction," says Savigny, "is to be held as founded in the following cases:—

* *Civis* is only used of a Roman citizen, in opposition to *latinus* and *peregrinus*; but *municipes* is used of every municipal citizen, whether of a *municipium* or of a *colonia*, either being a *respublica*. A *colonia* however is not included in *municipium*.

"I. At the place which is specially fixed for the fulfilment of the obligation by the intention of the parties, whether it be so fixed by the verbal indication of some place or other," as in the famous law *contraxisse unusquisque in eo loco intelligitur in quo ut solveret se obligavit*—Dig. 44, 7, 21—"or because the act which is to be brought about by the obligation can possibly be performed only at a single place," as in a contract for the sale or lease of land or houses, which implies the delivery of or possession.

"II. Failing the appointment of a place of fulfilment, this jurisdiction may be founded by the fact that the obligation arises out of the debtor's course of business, which is fixed at a particular place."* Examples: The *tutela* over persons not *sui juris*, and every kind of *curatela*. The management of another person's affairs: whether of all his affairs, by a general agency or attorneyship, or of a certain class of them, as of a manufacture or commercial undertaking: and whether in consequence of a contract—*operæ locatæ*, or *mandatum* not having for its object a single transient affair; or *quasi ex contractu*, as proceeding from the will of one party only—*negotiorum gestio*, also when not having a single transient affair for its subject. Lastly, one's own regular banking and commission business—*argentaria*. In many cases falling under this second head the jurisdiction founded on the transaction of affairs coincides with that founded on the domicile, but they may be distinct.

"III. The jurisdiction is also fixed by the place where the obligation arises, if that coincides with the domicile of the debtor." That is, the jurisdiction is then founded on two grounds, and if through the debtor's removing or dying the domicile of his heir or his own new domicile becomes the forum on one of those grounds, he or his heir must still submit to the jurisdiction of the old forum on the other ground.

"IV. The place where the obligation arises can also found jurisdiction even if it be away from the domicile of the debtor, if the circumstances create an expectation that its fulfilment shall also be at the same place."

"Such an expectation is created by one who establishes away from his domicile a commercial business of some duration, and in

* Guthrie. It would be not less accurate, and would suit many of the examples better, to say, as I formerly translated it: "The jurisdiction can be founded on the circumstance that the obligation arises from the transaction by the defendant of affairs connected with a determinate spot."

doing so makes arrangements from which it may be inferred that he will deliver the goods which he there sells in the same place. He thus subjects himself to the special forum of the obligation at the place where the contract is entered into. This is laid down minutely by Ulpian, and that, while warning against the unconditional assumption of jurisdiction merely because a contract is concluded at any place. He justifies this warning by mentioning the case of a person who enters into a contract while on a journey, and of whom it certainly will not be asserted that he subjects himself to jurisdiction at the place of the contract.*

"But such a trading relation is to be regarded only as an example, not as the exclusive condition, of a forum of the obligation. For if contracts are concluded during a residence away from the domicile, it is necessary to deduce from the substance of them what notions as to their fulfilment the parties may probably have entertained. If therefore a public officer in consequence of his official duties, or a deputy to a legislative assembly, stays for months at the same place and there contracts debts connected with his daily subsistence, there is no doubt as to the establishment of the special forum of the obligation. So likewise if debts are contracted for similar purposes during a residence at a watering-place. If on the contrary, during such a residence at baths or a watering-place, contracts as to mercantile affairs are entered into of which the further development can be expected only at the domicile, such a jurisdiction at the place where the contract is entered into must be denied. As all here depends on the probable purpose of the parties, a very short residence may in some circumstances suffice to found that jurisdiction. It will be held to exist as against a traveller who refuses to pay his reckoning in a tavern, since in such matters immediate payment is the universal practice, and may therefore be expected by every one. Thus everything depends on the relation in which the nature and length of the residence stand to the substance of the obligation."

"V. If none of these conditions exists, the forum of the obligation is at the domicile of the debtor." Examples: Contracts made by persons travelling, so far as they do not fall under IV. The action for restitution of the *dos*, which must be brought at

*The reference is to Dig. 5, 1, 19, § 2. *Durissimum est quotquot locis quis navigans vel iter faciens delatus est, tot locis se defendi. At si quo constitit, non dico jure domicilii, sed tabernulam, pergulam, horreum, armarium, officinam conduxit, ibique distraxit, egit, defendere se eo loci debet.*

the husband's domicile, and not at the place where the dotal contract was concluded. The case of a manufacturer who sends round an agent to get orders, for the contract is then fulfilled at the seat of the manufacture by despatching the article, as is shown by the fact that from that moment the Roman law put the article at the risk of the buyer, although the property, requiring delivery for its transfer, did not pass till the arrival of the article at its destination.

"All these cases, however various they appear, and however accidental their connection may seem, yet admit of being reduced to a common principle. It is always the place of fulfilment that determines the jurisdiction, either that expressly fixed (No. I), or that which depends upon a tacit expectation (Nos. II—V). In both cases a voluntary submission of the defendant to this jurisdiction is to be assumed, unless an express declaration to the contrary excludes it."*

"The special jurisdiction founded by a delict is unknown to the earlier Roman law, and first arose under the empire. It then found such general acceptance that it was afterwards, even in positive enactments, placed in the same rank as the *forum domicilii, contractus, rei sitæ*. It would be a mistake however to regard this forum as merely a particular form of the forum of the obligation, of the so-called *forum contractus*. For the *forum delicti* does not arise by a presumptive voluntary subjection, and therefore the limitations above laid down for the forum of the obligation do not hold good in respect to this. To found this jurisdiction neither domicile nor any other external accessory circumstance is necessary, but it arises from the commission of the delict itself, even at an accidental and temporary residence. This jurisdiction is thus of a very peculiar character, since it is established not by voluntary but by necessary subjection, which however is an immediate consequence of the violation of right of which the delinquent has been guilty. The jurisdiction of the delict is moreover just as little exclusive as that of the contract, but the plaintiff has always his choice between this special one and the general jurisdiction founded on the domicile of the debtor. . . .

"The question has been raised whether the forum of the obligation extends merely to those actions which arise out of the

* From I., on p. 228, to this point, all is taken or abridged from Savigny, Syst. d. heut. Röm. rechts, § 370. The passages within inverted commas are as in Guthrie's translation, pp. 160—164.

natural development of the obligation, and therefore lead to its fulfilment, or also to those which have the opposite direction, seeking the dissolution of the obligation, or to reverse that which has already taken place towards its fulfilment. As a general rule, and first and more limited application of this jurisdiction can alone be admitted. The second and more extensive application can occur only exceptionally, and in the smaller number of cases in which the dissolution of the obligation has a common origin with its beginning, as when the dissolution of an obligation created by contract is derived from a collateral contract added to it. . . .

“The jurisdiction of the obligation can be made effective only if the debtor is either present in its territory or possesses property there, in which last case the decree against him will be enforced by *missio in possessionem*. By the older Roman law this alternative condition is unquestionable. By the terms of a law of Justinian we might regard it as abolished. But this law is expressed so generally and indefinitely, and mixes up the various jurisdictions so indiscriminately, that the intention to change the former law cannot with any certainty be inferred. Hence too a decretal has paid no regard to it, but adheres to the older Roman law, even to the very phrases. The preponderance of modern practice”—Savigny is not speaking of the practice under modern codes or other legislation; but of that under Roman law where still received—“the preponderance of modern practice has followed this opinion, so that the jurisdiction of the obligation cannot be made effectual against an absent person by the mere requisition of a foreign court. It is not to be denied that by this restrictive condition the forum of the obligation loses a great deal of its importance.”*

Of the opinions opposed to the above system of Savigny, that which has been most influential in practice is the one, commonly diffused in the middle ages, that the place of contracting an obligation—*locus celebrati contractus*, or *ubi verba proferuntur*—and not that destined for its fulfilment, for the most part determined the special jurisdiction in Roman law. In support of that view some words of Ulpian’s were cited: *proinde et si merces vendidit certo loci, vel disposuit, vel comparavit, videtur, nisi alio loci ut defenderet convenit, ibidem se defendere*. Dig. 5, 1, 19, § 2. But this is only the commencement of the passage in

* Savigny, Syst. § 371, Guthrie 171—174.

the course of which Ulpian warns the reader against the unconditional interpretation of those words, and more fully develops his thought as quoted above, p. 229. Another citation made with a similar purpose was a fragment of the work of Gaius on the *edictum provinciale*: *At ubi quisque contraxerit. Contractum autem non utique eo loco intelligitur quo negotium gestum sit, sed quo solvenda est pecunia.* Dig. 42, 5, 3. The latter part of this fragment is identical in effect with the law *contraxisse*, quoted above, p. 228, and it must be taken as a commentary explaining the former part, *at ubi quisque contraxerit*. But the whole came to serve the opinion in favour of the *locus celebrati contractus* through treating the former part as laying down a rule, and the latter part, with the law *contraxisse*, as merely providing an exception to that rule in the case of an express contract to pay money in a certain spot, *locus solutionis*. The general Prussian law of civil procedure was drawn up in accordance with these ideas, and laid down that the *forum contractus* was at the place, when there was any such, determined by the contract for its fulfilment; if there was none so determined, then at the place where the contract acquired its binding force: part 1, tit. 2, § 149. The opinion however has gained ground that the place of fulfilment, whether determined by the contract or only to be inferred from the nature of the case, furnishes the true forum of the obligation; and the law of civil procedure enacted in 1876 for the German empire establishes it without distinction as the proper alternative to the *forum rei*: § 29.

There was on the continent one great exception to the Roman system. The *forum contractus*, whether *loci celebrati contractus* or *loci solutionis*, was not received in France during the middle ages. The seigneurs had patrimonial rights of administering justice, and in the royal courts the emoluments of justice were considered as forming for the judges a kind of property, on account of the venality of their offices. Consequently the trial in the defendant's domicile, being less the right of the defendant than of the judge, could not be waived by the former, either through his submission when sued elsewhere or through his previous consent in contracting; and both the seigneurs and the royal courts were authorized to reclaim their justiciables, even when the tribunal seised of the cause was incompetent on the ground of domicile alone, being by Roman principles competent in respect of the matter. The disregard of the interest of the parties which was thus shown was covered by a maxim of

decorous sound, that since jurisdiction belongs to public law individuals cannot defeat it.* It was only by the ordinance of commerce of 1673 that a *forum contractus* was introduced, and then only in actions within the attributions of the *juges et consuls*, the plaintiff being allowed his choice between the domicile of the debtor, the place where the promise was made and the goods supplied, and that where the payment was to be made: tit. 12, art. 17. Art. 420 of the modern code of civil procedure, which applies only to the tribunals of commerce, is substantially a re-enactment of the article of 1673; but in those matters which in France are called civil the *forum contractus* is still unrecognized by legislation, except so far as an indirect recognition may be found in the power of a party to an act to elect, by a clause of the act, a domicile for all proceedings relating to it in a place other than his true domicile: Code Nap., art. 111. On the other hand, the Code Napoleon, art. 14, authorizes Frenchmen to sue foreigners in France, even though not residing there, and even on obligations contracted abroad; thus introducing the novel conception of a personal forum of the plaintiff, on the ground that a citizen is entitled to demand justice of his state.

In consequence of the state of things in France with regard to the *forum contractus*, Boullenois points out that the maxim of the *lex loci contractus* did not there possess that which elsewhere was its chief base, and, instead of admitting it as a rule, he prefers to consider separately the motives of decision for each of the cases usually included under it. It has already been noticed—above, p. 18—that a tendency existed among the greater French lawyers to regard a custom less as a law than as a clue to the intention of the parties, and to allow the custom of the *situs* to be ousted by the custom of the domicile introduced by the presumed intention. Very naturally, in the circumstances which have now been mentioned, the custom of the domicile tended to prevail also over that of the place of contract. Thus the Digest says, *si fundus venierit, ex consuetudine ejus regionis in qua negotium gestum est pro evictione cavendi oportet*: 21, 2, 6. This was generally understood of the custom of the place of sale, but Dumoulin denied the application of the rule to a vendor and purchaser of one country who happen to contract in another, and considered that the custom of their common domicile, as being that of which they were both aware and which

* Henrion de Pansey, de l'Autorité Judiciaire en France, 3me édition, t. 1, pp. 370, 371

neither can have intended tacitly to reject, should determine the vendor's obligation in the matter.*

Passing now to our own side of the channel, we find ourselves in the midst of quite a different state of things. At the commencement of legal memory the superior courts already possessed an original jurisdiction coextensive with the realm: there were no such local jurisdictions within England as could require any rules by which to distinguish, on the ground of domicile, place of contract or otherwise, the cases which fell under one of them from those which belonged to another. There was indeed room for such considerations in determining what causes the one national or royal jurisdiction would entertain, as contrasted with those which it would hold to belong only to foreign courts, but certain very peculiar doctrines prevented their being much attended to. At common law, it was necessary that the writ by which the action was commenced should be served on the defendant personally and within the realm: hence, if the defendant was out of the realm, there were no means of obtaining a judgment against him on the ground of his domicile or allegiance being English. On the other hand, if the writ was personally served within the realm, a judgment could be obtained against the defendant even though his domicile and permanent allegiance were foreign, probably because the temporary allegiance which even a passing stranger was deemed to owe was regarded as a sufficient foundation for the *forum rei*. Thus domicile, a subject of such importance in the eyes of the Roman, and on the continent of the mediæval lawyer, had no place at all within the purview of the English common lawyer, nor was it taken into account when the processes of distringas and outlawry were applied against defendants on whom personal service could not be effected. And when the writ of subpœna was invented, and the jurisdiction of the court of chancery based on its service within the realm, although the service was allowed to be made either personally or by producing the writ at the defendant's dwelling-house to some one whose duty it would be to communicate the fact to him, it not being necessary in the latter case that the defendant should be within the realm at the time, yet it was not required that such dwelling-house should be his domicile. Thus a suit in chancery was free from the necessity of personal service, which had been found so inconvenient in actions at law,

* See Boullenois, *Traité de la personnalité et de la réalité des Lois*, t. 2, p. 456 et seq.

but the conception of domicile was as far from being entertained as before, either to restrict the power of proceeding against persons casually present or having a dwelling-house in England, or to found a power of proceeding against persons domiciled in England but neither present nor having a dwelling-house there.

Not every action however, for which the writ could be served within the realm, could be tried in England. At common law there were rules of venue, that is, of the locality from which a jury ought to be summoned to try a question of fact; and these rules, though perhaps devised for no other purpose than to portion out the business as to which the competence of the superior courts was undisputed, reacted on that competence by limiting it to actions for which a venue could be assigned. The classification of personal actions was into local and transitory. The former were those, such as trespasses to land, of which the causes could not have occurred elsewhere than where they did occur. The venue for actions of this class was the county (including of course the city of London, though not originally a county) in which the cause occurred: hence for local actions it was necessary, besides personal service on the defendant within the realm, that the cause should have occurred in England. Transitory actions were those of which it was said that the cause might have occurred anywhere, as a personal injury or a breach of promise, and for these the venue was said to be arbitrary, that is, the plaintiff might lay the venue in any county he pleased. The real place of occurrence therefore might have been abroad, quite as well as in a different county from that in which the venue was laid, and, if the writ was personally served in England, there was no further condition to satisfy. In chancery as there was no jury there was no venue, and no formal requisite the necessity of complying with which might restrain the competence as to suits even connected with land; and to this cause it may be attributed that at one time the court was far from holding firmly the doctrine expressed in § 173, that its mere personal jurisdiction over the defendant ought not to be made a ground for determining the right to the property or possession of foreign immovables. See above, pp. 218, 219.

Legal principle applied spontaneously by the courts appears to have modified the original English rules of competence in two ways only. One was the establishment in chancery of the doctrine just referred to: the other was a rule laid down by Mansfield at common law, but never quite established, that to

prevent a failure of justice a person might be compelled to answer for a local cause of action arising abroad.* But the competence both of the court of chancery and of the courts of common law, with regard to matters and defendants in some way connected with the realm, was extended by statute, or by orders made under statutory authority, at various times from the reign of George the second downwards. To trace the steps of this development would be out of place here, because it was not connected with the growth or reception of the maxims of private international law. The ideas which governed it were not very similar to those which on the continent produced the rules of jurisdiction which in their turn gave birth to rules of law; and, had those ideas been different, the statutory development of jurisdiction in England did not begin till the maxims of private international law had to a large extent been imported. English notions on jurisdiction were in the main unsuitable, and the small portion of them which was not unsuitable came too late, for framing in this country rules of law out of rules of jurisdiction by virtue of the principle *si ibi forum ergo et jus*. The general notions on jurisdiction which have been surveyed in the present chapter will illustrate that process as it took place on the continent, and give an insight into the meaning and scope of the rules of law which resulted from it, a meaning and scope which often clings to them as adopted in England, though it did not arise and indeed could not have arisen here.

* See Lord Mansfield's judgment in *Mostyn v. Fabrigas* (1775), Cowp. 161, and the note beginning on p. 255, below.

CHAPTER X.

JURISDICTION IN ENGLAND, AND EXTERRITORIALITY.

INDEED, while the detailed history of jurisdiction in England belongs only to the antiquities of English law and not to the subject of this book, because unconnected with the growth or reception of the maxims of private international law, there is another reason why even the present state of jurisdiction in England may seem to have little concern with my subject. It is very common for the courts of a country to entertain actions under circumstances in which they would not admit that the jurisdiction was sufficiently founded to entitle the judgment of a foreign court, pronounced under similar circumstances, to be recognized as internationally binding. For example, the personal forum of the plaintiff introduced by Art. 14 of the Code Napoleon—see above, p. 233—and copied in other countries whose legislation is based on that code, is not even in France considered to possess any international validity, and no authority is allowed there to a judgment pronounced in one of those other countries on the ground of it. Hence the true question for private international law in the matter of jurisdiction is not what actions are entertained by the courts of a given country, but in what cases those courts will recognize foreign judgments, which with regard to English practice will be considered in another chapter. The former question is as much one of national law in a special sense as is the question whether the law of any country contains peculiar provisions about aliens. It has however interest enough in connection with our subject to make it worth while to present here the leading rules of jurisdiction, such as they exist in England under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1883 as amended from time to time.

§ 180. Nothing in the acts and orders regulating the Supreme Court of Judicature restrains that court from entertaining any action in which the writ has been personally served on the defendant within the realm, and it must be considered to inherit all the power of entertaining such actions which was possessed by the superior courts of common law and equity. On the other

hand, its power of entertaining them has been set free from the restraint of local venue by the provision in R. S. C., 1917, replacing R. S. C., 1883, Order XXXVI., that the order made in the summons for directions shall direct where the cause is to be heard.

But the personal jurisdiction which the English court claims by virtue of the service of the writ within the realm will be restrained in its exercise by the doctrine of § 173. That doctrine, which was gradually elaborated in the court of chancery, is now acknowledged by the Supreme Court, as will be seen from the authorities cited under the § referred to.

And the English court will decline to exercise such jurisdiction in cases where to do so would be unjust to the parties or would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.

If, for instance, a person should be induced by fraud to come within the jurisdiction for the concealed purpose of serving him with a writ. *Watkins v. North American Land and Timber Co., Lim.*, [1904] 20 T. R. 534, Davey, James of Hereford, Robertson.

Where one of four defendants was resident in England and the chief defendant, a company registered in Scotland, was served with the writ at a branch office in England, and the plaintiff was resident in Scotland and the cause of action arose in Scotland, the action was stayed. *Logan v. Bank of Scotland (No. 2)*, [1906] 1 K. B. 141, Gorell Barnes, Collins and Romer. Where the plaintiff was temporarily resident in England and the defendant was personally served with the writ while in England for a short holiday, and the cause of action arose in India, the action was dismissed. *Egbert v. Short*, [1907] 2 Ch. 205, Warrington. In a somewhat similar case the action was stayed: in *Re Norton's Settlement*, *Norton v. Norton*, [1908] 1 Ch. 471, Vaughan Williams, Farwell and Kennedy.

The acceptance of service conferring the jurisdiction of the court does not necessarily make it the duty of the court to decide the case. "The sphere of jurisdiction and the sphere of right . . . are not coterminous." *John Russell & Co. v. Cayzer, Irvine & Co.*, [1916] 2 A. C. 298, Haldane, Sumner, Parmoor, Wrenbury, at p. 302. And where it would be inequitable to exercise its legal jurisdiction, the court will refrain.

§ 181. "(1) No service of writ shall be required when the defendant by his solicitor undertakes in writing to accept service and enters an appearance. (2) When service is required, the writ shall wherever it is practicable be served in the manner in which personal service is now made, but if it be made to appear to the court or a judge that the plaintiff is from any cause unable to effect prompt personal service, the court or judge may make such order for substituted or other service, or for the substitution for service of notice by advertisement or otherwise, as may seem just." Order IX of 1883, rules 1 and 2. Order LXVII, rule 6, is of similar effect to Order IX, rule 2.

The language of Order IX, rule 2, requires some explanation. In §§ 182, 183, 184, we shall see peculiar modes of service given in certain cases of actions against partners and for recovery of land and in admiralty actions *in rem*. The name "substituted service" however is not used for these, which are regarded as exceptions to the maxim of requiring personal service on defendants, but for the modes of service allowed in cases where that maxim is supposed to apply but real personal service is impracticable; such as by letter, by service at the defendant's late dwelling-house, with or without advertisement, by service on some one else thought likely to inform the defendant, and so forth. The cases to which the maxim of requiring personal service on a defendant is supposed to apply, and in which therefore the occasion for substituted service may arise, are, so far as persons are concerned:

(1) Those of all persons within the jurisdiction, in cases not falling under §§ 182, 183, or 184.

Cook v. Dey (1876), 2 Ch. D. 218, Hall. An officer on board a king's ship on the high seas is within the jurisdiction: *Seugrove v. Parks*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 551, Cave and Charles affirming Denman.

During the Great War leave was given to make substituted service of notice of writ on agents of enemy aliens who were carrying on business in England. *Porter v. Freudenberg*, [1915] 1 K. B. 857.

(2) Those of all British subjects out of the jurisdiction, in cases not falling under §§ 182, 183, or 184, but where service out of the jurisdiction is allowed under § 186.

Bramwell, in *Great Australian Gold Mining Co. v. Martin* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 17.

(3) Those of foreigners within the British dominions though not within the jurisdiction.

Substitution of notice for service is used in order to bring the writ to the knowledge of a foreign defendant out of the British dominions, in cases not falling under §§ 182, 183, or 184, but falling under § 186. Service of the writ, instead of notice of the writ, on a foreigner out of the British dominions is a nullity and not an irregularity.

Westman v. Aktiebolaget Ekmans Mekaniska Snickarefabrik (1876), 1 Ex. D. 237, Kelly, Bramwell, Amphlett, decided on the rules of 1875: *Padley v. Camphausen* (1878), 10 Ch. D. 550, Jessel, Baggallay and Thesiger affirming Hall: *Hewitson v. Fabre* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 6, Field and Wills. An order giving leave to issue concurrently a writ and serve it by posting a copy to an address within the jurisdiction was held bad on the face of it because it directed service of the writ on a foreigner out of

the dominions. *Kemp v. Necchi*, W. N. [1913] 62, Farwell and Kennedy reversing Rowlatt.

Where service is not necessary, but notice of a proceeding ought to be given to a foreigner out of the jurisdiction, that which is in form a service cannot be supported as a notice: *Re La Compagnie Générale d'Eaux Minérales et de Bains de Mer*, [1891] 3 Ch. 451, Stirling. Where a writ is issued in the form for service in England but the writ cannot be properly served in England, not only the service but the whole writ is bad: *Sedgwick v. Yedras Mining Co.* (1886), 35 W. R. 780, Huddleston and A. L. Smith. But where the writ is issued for service out of the jurisdiction, it may be served within the jurisdiction: *Ford v. Shephard* (1885), 34 W. R. 63, Day and Smith. And where a concurrent writ has been issued for service out of the jurisdiction, an order may be made for substituted service at several places some of which are within the jurisdiction. *Western Suburban and Notting Hill Permanent Building Society v. Rucklidge*, [1905] 2 Ch. 472, Swinfen Eady.

A foreigner may appoint an agent to receive service for him within the jurisdiction: *Montgomery v. Liehenthal*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 487, A. L. Smith, Chitty and Collins affirming Phillimore.

So far as matters are concerned, the cases in which personal service or notice substituted for service can be allowed out of the jurisdiction are enumerated below in §§ 186, 187, and perhaps 188; the competence of the court as to defendants out of the jurisdiction cannot be extended beyond these cases and those which may fall under §§ 182, 183 or 184, by the aid of the rules as to substituted service.

Field v. Bennett (1886), 56 L. J. Q. B. 89, Coleridge and Denman; approved in *De Bernalles v. New York Herald* (cited below on p. 242).

See, too, *Gibson & Co. v. Gibson*, [1913] 3 K. B. 379, Atkin (below, § 321).

The jurisdiction of the court may be extended by the submission of foreigners to its jurisdiction.

Where the foreign owners of a ship, against which proceedings *in rem* were being taken, entered an appearance, they became personally liable to pay the amount of the judgment: *The Gemma*, [1899] P. 285, A. L. Smith and Vaughan Williams. *The Duplex*, [1912] P. 8, Evans. A foreigner residing abroad and suing in England through an agent cannot be ordered to give discovery, but the court can stay the action until such discovery is given: *Willis & Co. v. Baddeley*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 324, Esher, Bowen and A. L. Smith. A foreign defendant may enter an appearance under protest. He should obtain leave to enter a conditional appearance, and must then apply to set aside the writ within the time fixed by the court. For the practice in such a case, see *Bonnell v. Preston*, [1908] W. N. 155, Moulton and Farwell; *Mayer v. Claretie* (1890); 7 T. R. 40, Mathew and Grantham, where the writ was set aside after a defence had been delivered under protest. The time fixed for the application to set aside the writ may be extended; *Keymer v. Reddy*, [1912] 1 K. B. 215, Moulton and Farwell.

Lastly, personal service, service under §§ 182, 183, or 184, substituted service, and notice substituted for service have all the same effect.

§ 182. "(1) Any two or more persons claiming or being liable as copartners and carrying on business within the jurisdiction may sue or be sued in the name of the respective firms, if any, of which such persons were copartners at the time of the accruing of the cause of action. (3) Where persons are sued as partners in the name of their firm under rule 1, the writ shall be served either upon any one or more of the partners, or at the principal place within the jurisdiction of the business of the partnership, upon any person having at the time of service the control or management of the partnership business there; and, subject to these rules, such service shall be deemed good service upon the firm so sued, whether any of the members thereof are out of the jurisdiction or not, and no leave to issue a writ against them shall be necessary. (11) Any person carrying on business within the jurisdiction in a name or style other than his own name may be sued in such name or style as if it were a firm name; and, so far as the nature of the case will permit, all rules relating to proceedings against firms shall apply." Order XLVIII^A of June 1891, part of rules 1 and 3 and rule 11, replacing Order IX of 1883, rules 6 and 7.

If the partnership has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff, the writ must be served on every person within the jurisdiction sought to be made liable: *ib.* rule 3, and every person served must be informed by notice in writing whether he is sued as a partner or as a person having control of the business: *ib.* rule 4.

Partners domiciled and resident abroad, carrying on business only abroad and being foreigners, cannot be sued under these rules, although a partnership may be a separate person by the foreign law: nor could they be so sued under the old rules 6 or 7: *Russell v. Cambefort* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 526, Cotton, Fry and Lopes, overruling *O'Neil v. Clason* (1876), 46 L. J. Q. B. 191, Coleridge and Pollock affirming *Cleasby*, which was decided on the equivalent rule of 1875, and overruling *Pollexfen v. Sibson* (1886), 16 Q. B. D. 792, Mathew and Smith; but any partner who is within the jurisdiction may be sued as an individual, all the other partners being named separately in the writ. *Western National Bank of City of New York v. Perez, Triana & Co.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 304, Lindley and Bowen outvoting Esher and reversing Pollock and Day; *Indigo Co. v. Ogilvy*, [1891] 2 Ch. 31, North, and on appeal Lindley and Kay; *Grant v. Anderson*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 108, Esher and Kay affirming Coleridge and Wright; *Heinemann & Co. v. Hale & Co.*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 83, Esher and Kay reversing Cave and Charles; *Dobson v. Festi, Rasini & Co.*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 92, Lindley, Lopes and Kay affirming Cave and Grantham. Service of notice of a writ out of the jurisdiction upon a foreign partnership in the name of the firm was held bad, though by the foreign law the firm was a

separate entity and could be properly sued in its firm name. *Von Hellefeld v. Richnitzer*, [1914] 1 Ch. 748, Buckley, Phillimore, Astbury.

Under rule 1 a firm carrying on business within the jurisdiction may be sued in the firm name without leave, though all the partners are foreigners resident abroad: *Worcester City and County Banking Co. v. Firbank, Pauling & Co.*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 784, Mathew and Collins partially affirmed by Esher, Lopes and Davey; *Lysaght Lim. v. Clark & Co.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 552, Cave and Grantham. A foreign firm employing an agent in London to procure orders on commission does not carry on business within the jurisdiction within the meaning of this rule: *Grant v. Anderson* (cited above). *Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka, &c.*, [1914] 1 K. B. 715, Buckley and Phillimore affirming Ridley.

Rule 11 does not apply to a foreigner resident abroad who carries on business within the jurisdiction in a name other than his own name. *St. Gobain, Chaunay and Cirey Co. v. Hoyermann's Agency*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 96, Esher and A. L. Smith; *De Bernales v. New York Herald*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 97, note. Esher, Lindley and A. L. Smith affirming Lopes and Coleridge, who had affirmed Kennedy; and *MacIver v. G. and J. Burns*, [1895] 2 Ch. 630, Lindley, Lopes and Rigby.

§ 182*a*. A rule was issued in 1920, allowing service on an agent residing in the jurisdiction and carrying on business on behalf of a principal outside the jurisdiction.

“Where a contract has been entered into within the jurisdiction by or through an agent residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction on behalf of a principal residing or carrying on business out of the jurisdiction, a writ of summons in an action relating to or arising out of such contract may by leave of the court or a judge given before the determination of such agent's authority or of his business relations with the principal be served on such agent. Notice of the order giving such leave and a copy thereof and of the writ of summons shall forthwith be sent by prepaid registered post letter to the defendant or defendants at his or their address out of the jurisdiction. Provided that nothing in this rule shall invalidate or affect any other mode of service in force at the time this rule comes into operation.”

In a note issued by the Supreme Court explaining the new rule, it is pointed out:—

The power of serving an agent given by this rule is one that must be exercised with great caution. It was not at all intended by the rule to do away with service out of the jurisdiction in ordinary cases. The power to make an order under the rule is discretionary, and except under exceptional circumstances it ought not to be exercised in cases where there is no difficulty in getting an order for and effecting service out of the jurisdiction in the ordinary way. An order should not be made under the rule merely because the defendant has contracted by or through an agent in this country. The application for an order under the rule should in each case be supported by an affidavit going fully into the circumstances relating

to the making of the contract and the difficulties that exist in effecting service out of the jurisdiction in the ordinary way.

§ 183. "Service of a writ of summons in an action to recover land may, in case of vacant possession, when it cannot otherwise be effected, be made by posting a copy of the writ upon the door of the dwellinghouse or other conspicuous part of the property." Order IX of 1883, rule 9.

§ 184. "(12) In admiralty actions *in rem*, service of a writ of summons or warrant against ship freight or cargo on board is to be effected by nailing or affixing the original writ or warrant for a short time on the mainmast or on the single mast of the vessel, and on taking off the process leaving a true copy of it nailed or affixed in its place. (13) If the cargo has been landed or transhipped, service of the writ of summons or warrant to arrest the cargo and freight shall be effected by placing the writ or warrant for a short time on the cargo, and on taking off the process by leaving a true copy upon it. (14) If the cargo be in the custody of a person who will not permit access to it, service of the writ or warrant may be made upon the custodian." Order IX. of 1883, rules 12, 13, 14.

The court has jurisdiction to pronounce judgment, though the ship has been clandestinely removed out of the jurisdiction after service under this rule. *The Nautik*, [1895] P. 121, Bruce; and see *The Lady Blessington*, 34 L. J. Ad. 73.

Where the cargo has been sold by arrangement between the parties, the person in possession of the proceeds of sale cannot be served under this rule, the owners being out of the jurisdiction: *The Fornjot*, [1907] 24 T. R. 26, Bucknill.

A warrant cannot issue against the freight except by arrest of the ship and cargo. *The Kaleten*, [1914] T. L. R. 572, Evans, P.

§ 185. In connection with the last § it may be observed that in actions by seamen, foreign or British, against foreign vessels, though the competence of the British court of admiralty is excluded by the terms of their service, that competence is not thereby ousted, but the court will exercise a discretion as to entertaining the action. It is necessary however before entertaining it that notice be given to the representative of the government of the vessel's country.

The Golubchick (1840), 1 W. Rob. 143, Lushington: *The Nina* (1867), L. R. 2 A. & E. 44, Phillimore; L. R. 2 P. C. 38, Romilly: *The Leon XIII.*, 8 P. D. 121, (1882) Phillimore, (1883) Brett and Bowen.

In *The Annette and Dora*, [1919] P. 105, Hill, the English court accepted jurisdiction in a suit for possession of vessels between foreigners, the representative of the foreign state to which they belonged having requested the

court's intervention. The provisional government of North Russia claimed the vessels to be in the service of the government and thereby immune from arrest: but that government was not formally recognised by the powers, and the plea was not accepted.

§ 186. "1. Service out of the jurisdiction of a writ of summons or notice of a writ of summons may be allowed by the court or a judge whenever:

"(a) The whole subject-matter of the action is land situate within the jurisdiction (with or without rents or profits); or the perpetuation of testimony relating to land within the jurisdiction; or

"(b) Any act, deed, will, contract, obligation or liability, affecting land or hereditaments situate within the jurisdiction, is sought to be construed rectified set aside or enforced in the action; or

"(c) Any relief is sought against any person domiciled or ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction; or

"(d) The action is for the administration of the personal estate of any deceased person who at the time of his death was domiciled within the jurisdiction, or for the execution (as to property situate within the jurisdiction) of the trusts of any written instrument, of which the person to be served is a trustee, which ought to be executed according to the law of England; or

"(e) The action is one brought against a defendant not domiciled or ordinarily resident in Scotland to enforce, rescind, dissolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract or to recover damages or other relief for or in respect of the breach of a contract (i.) made within the jurisdiction, or (ii.) made by or through an agent trading or residing within the jurisdiction on behalf of a principal trading or residing out of the jurisdiction, or (iii.) by its terms or by implication to be governed by English law, or is one brought against a defendant not domiciled or ordinarily resident in Scotland or Ireland, in respect of a breach committed within the jurisdiction of a contract wherever made, even though such breach was preceded or accompanied by a breach out of the jurisdiction which rendered impossible the performance of the part of the contract which ought to have been performed within the jurisdiction." R. S. C., June, 1921, annulling sub-rule (e) of Order XI. rule 1.

"(ee) The action is founded on a tort committed within the jurisdiction" (R. S. C., 1920).

“(f) Any injunction is sought as to anything to be done within the jurisdiction, or any nuisance within the jurisdiction is sought to be prevented or removed, whether damages are or are not also sought in respect thereof; or

“(g) Any person out of the jurisdiction is a necessary or proper party to an action properly brought against some other person duly served within the jurisdiction; or

“(h) The action is by a mortgagee or mortgagor in relation to a mortgage of personal property situate within the jurisdiction and seeks relief of the nature or kind following, that is to say, sale, foreclosure, delivery of possession by the mortgagor, redemption, reconveyance, delivery of possession by the mortgagee; but does not seek (unless and except so far as permissible under sub-head (e) of this rule) any personal judgment or order for payment of any moneys due under the mortgage.”

In this sub-head the expression personal property situate within the jurisdiction means personal property which, on the death of the owner thereof intestate, would form subject-matter for the grant of letters of administration to his estate out of the Principal Probate Registry; the expression mortgage means a mortgage charge or lien of any description; the expression mortgagee means a party for the time being entitled to or interested in a mortgage; and the expression mortgagor means a party for the time being entitled to or interested in property subject to a mortgage. (R. S. C., August, 1916.)

“2. Where leave is asked from the court or a judge to serve a writ under the last preceding rule in Scotland or in Ireland, if it shall appear to the court or judge that there may be a concurrent remedy in Scotland or Ireland (as the case may be), the court or judge shall have regard to the comparative cost and convenience of proceeding in England or in the place of residence of the defendant or person sought to be served, and particularly in cases of small demands to the powers and jurisdiction, under the statutes establishing or regulating them, of the Sheriffs' courts or Small Debts courts in Scotland, and of the Civil Bill courts in Ireland respectively.

“2a. Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 1 of this order, the parties to any contract may agree (a) that the High Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to entertain any action in respect of such contract, and, moreover or in the alternative, (b) that service of any writ of summons in any such action may be effected at any place within or out of the jurisdiction on any party or on any person on behalf of the party or in

any manner specified or indicated in such contract. Service of any such writ of summons at the place (if any) or on the party or on the person (if any) or in the manner (if any) specified or indicated in the contract shall be deemed to be good and effective service wherever the parties are resident, and if no place or mode or person be so specified or indicated, service out of the jurisdiction of such writ may be ordered" (R. S. C., 1920).

"3. In probate actions service of a writ of summons or notice of a writ of summons may by leave of the court or a judge be allowed out of the jurisdiction.

"4. Every application for leave to serve such writ or notice on a defendant out of the jurisdiction shall be supported by affidavit or other evidence, stating that in the belief of the deponent the plaintiff has a good cause of action, and showing in what place or country such defendant is or probably may be found, and whether such defendant is a British subject or not, and the grounds upon which the application is made: and no such leave shall be granted unless it shall be made sufficiently to appear to the court or judge that the case is a proper one for service out of the jurisdiction under this order.

"5. Any order giving leave to effect such service or give such notice shall limit a time after such service or notice within which such defendant is to enter an appearance, such time to depend on the place or country where or within which the writ is to be served or the notice given.

"6. When the defendant is neither a British subject nor in British dominions, notice of the writ and not the writ itself is to be served upon him.

"7. Where leave is given under rules 1 and 6 of this order to serve notice of a writ of summons out of the jurisdiction, such notice shall subject to rule 8 of this order be served in the manner in which writs of summons are served.

"8. Where leave is given to serve notice of a writ of summons in any foreign country to which this rule may by order of the Lord Chancellor from time to time be applied, the following procedure shall be adopted:—

"(1) The notice to be served shall be sealed with the seal of the Supreme Court for use out of the jurisdiction, and shall be transmitted to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the President of the Division, together with a copy thereof translated into the language of the country in

which service is to be effected, and with a request for the further transmission of the same to the government of the country in which leave to serve notice of the writ has been given," &c.

"8a. Service out of the jurisdiction may be allowed by the court or a judge of the following processes or of notice thereof, that is to say:—

"(a) Originating summonses under Order LIVa. or Order LV. rule 3 or 4 in any case where if the proceedings were commenced by writ of summons they would be within rule 1 of this order.

"(b) Any originating summons, petition, notice of motion or other originating proceeding (i.) in relation to any infant or lunatic or person of unsound mind, or (ii.) under any statute, . . . or (iii.) under any rule of court or practice, whereunder proceedings can be commenced otherwise than by writ of summons.

"(c) Without prejudice to the generality of the last foregoing sub-head any summons, order or notice in any interpleader proceedings or for the appointment of an arbitrator or umpire or to remit, set aside or enforce an award in an arbitration held or to be held within the jurisdiction.

"(d) Any summons, order or notice in any proceedings duly instituted, whether by writ of summons or other such originating process as aforesaid.

"Rules 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this order shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to such service.

"Nothing herein contained shall in any way prejudice or affect any practice or power of the court under which, when lands, funds, choses in action, rights or property within the jurisdiction are sought to be dealt with or affected, the court may, without affecting to exercise jurisdiction over any person out of the jurisdiction, cause such person to be informed of the nature or existence of the proceedings with a view to such persons having an opportunity of claiming, opposing or otherwise intervening."

Rule 9 provides the procedure for giving effect to letters of request from foreign tribunals for service of process on persons in England.

Rule 10 authorises orders for substituted service under rule 9.

This is Order XI. of 1883 as amended by the rules of July, 1903, August, 1909, March, 1911, May, 1912, August, 1916, July, 1920, and July, 1921. The following cases relating to its different heads have been decided.

Rule 1. Where a case falls only in part under this rule, unconditional appearance is a submission to the jurisdiction as to the whole claim: *Manitoba and North-West Land Corporation v. Allan*, [1893] 3 Ch. 432, North.

1 (a). An action for expenses caused by excessive use of the public road held not to be within this sub-section or sub-section (e). *Clare County Council v. Wilson*, [1913] 2 I. R. 89.

1 (b). An action for slander of title to land is not within this head: *Casey v. Arnott* (1876), 2 C. P. D. 24, Grove and Denman; decided on the rules of 1875. Nor is an action for rent: *Agnew v. Usher* (1884), 14 Q. B. D. 78, Coleridge, Mathew and Smith. In *Wilson's Practice of the Supreme Court*, 7th ed., p. 151, it is said that the court of appeal affirmed this decision on the ground that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendants were assignees of the lease. An action to recover compensation for tenant right according to the custom of the country is within this head: *Kaye v. Sutherland* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 147, Stephen and Charles. An action on a breach of covenant to repair contained in a lease is within this head: *Tassell v. Hallen*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 321, Coleridge and Collins; and see *Att.-Gen. v. Drapers' Co.*, [1894] 1 I. R. 185, where service in England was allowed by the Irish courts for a breach of trust as to lands in Ireland.

1 (c). As to the domicile or residence of corporations, see below, in the chapter on Corporations and Public Institutions.

The residence of an ambassador's wife at the embassy is not a residence within the jurisdiction under this rule. *Ghikis v. Musurus*, [1909] 25 T. R. 225, Parker.

1 (d). The existence of such property within the jurisdiction is a condition precedent to service under this head: *Winter v. Winter*, [1894] 1 Ch. 421, Stirling. For a curious case where the county court rule was wider than this rule and difficulties consequently arose on a transfer of the case to the High Court, see *Wood v. Middleton*, [1897] 1 Ch. 151.

1 (e). It is not necessary that performance within the jurisdiction be expressly stipulated, but it must result from the contract: *Bell & Co. v. Antwerp, London and Brazil Line*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 103, Esher and Kay affirming Cave and Day. On a contract for the transfer of shares, it was held that the obligation to such performance resulted from the duty of delivering the deed of transfer to the transferee, who was resident within the jurisdiction: *Reynolds v. Coleman* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 453, Kay affirmed by Cotton and Bowen. On a contract by a foreign company to employ the plaintiffs as their sole representatives in England it was held that the contract imported an obligation to refrain from interference within the jurisdiction with the agency: *Mutzenbecher v. La Aseguradora Española*, [1906] 1 K. B. 254, Collins and Gorell Barnes. On a contract for machinery to be erected out of the jurisdiction by plaintiffs resident within it, it was held that the order applied because the defendants were bound to send or bring the price to the plaintiffs: *Robey v. Snæfell Mining Co.* (1887), 20 Q. B. D. 152, Stephen and Charles; *Thompson v. Palmer*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 80, Esher, Lopes and A. L. Smith. Similarly on a consignment of goods to be sold in Germany: *Rein v. Stein*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 753, Lindley and Kay affirming Cave and Vaughan Williams. Similarly, on a contract for sale of champagne by the defendants out of the jurisdiction as agents of the plaintiffs domiciled in England: *Charles Duval & Co., Lim. v. Gans*, [1904] 2 K. B. 685, Stirling and Mathew. In *Drexel v. Drexel*, [1916] 1 Ch. 257, at p. 260, Neville, it was held that non-payment of a

separation allowance to a wife resident in England was a breach within the jurisdiction, though no place of payment was mentioned in the deed. Prior to the issue of the rule in 1921 amending the previous rule, it was held in the House of Lords that where the essential breach of a contract made in England took place out of the jurisdiction, the fact that there was a consequential failure to carry out the terms of the contract in England did not give a basis of jurisdiction to the English court. *Johnson v. Taylor Bros.*, [1920] A. C. 144, Birkenhead, C., Haldane, Dunedin, Atkinson and Buckmaster, overruling *Bankes*, *Warrington* and *Scrutton*, L.JJ. The contract was to ship iron from Sweden to England over a period of years, and the essential breach was failure to ship the goods: the incidental failure to deliver the shipping documents in England was not sufficient to found jurisdiction under the old rule. But the tendency of the British rule-making authority has been continually to enlarge the jurisdiction in contract of the English courts over foreign persons entering into engagements to be performed in England and to derogate from the rule *actor sequitur forum rei* where there is any basis for so doing. It is notable that the case of *Johnson v. Taylor* was distinguished in a later appeal to the Privy Council: *Hemsbryck v. Wm. Lyall Shipping Co.*, [1921] A. C. 698, when it was held that the repudiation by the buyer under a contract for sale of ships to be delivered within the jurisdiction, but to be paid for outside the jurisdiction, was a real and substantial breach which justified an order for service outside the jurisdiction. The wording of the later rule dispels any doubts.

An action to enforce payment on a contract of salvage of a ship on the coast of England is not within this head, if the place of payment is abroad: *The Eider*, [1893] P. 119, Jeune, Esher, Lindley and Bowen. Nor if the payment was not bound to be made in cash within the jurisdiction: *Comber v. Leyland*, [1898] A. C. 524, Halsbury, Herschell, Macnaghten, Morris and Shand overruling Esher, A. L. Smith and Rigby. Nor on a sale of goods under a c.i.f. contract to be shipped from a place not within the jurisdiction: *Crozier, Stephens & Co. v. Auerbach*, [1908] 2 K. B. 161, Vaughan Williams and Farwell overruling *Bigham* and *Barrow v. Myers*, 4 T. R. 441, Manisty and Mathew. But in *Biddell Bros. v. Horst & Co.*, [1912] A. C. 18, it was held that in a c.i.f. contract between a foreign vendor and English purchaser, the place of performance is England unless there are special items in the contract showing a contrary intention, and a claim for the non-delivery of the shipping documents may be made in England. When a judge is in doubt whether there has been a breach of contract within the jurisdiction, he may make an order for service out of the jurisdiction, at the same time imposing on the plaintiff the condition of recovering at the trial only the amount as to which it shall appear that service out of the jurisdiction was proper: *Thomas v. Hamilton* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 592, Day affirmed by Esher, Bowen and Fry. The dismissal of a London correspondent of a foreign newspaper by a letter written abroad is not a breach within the jurisdiction under this head: *Holland v. Bennett*, [1902] 1 K. B. 867, Vaughan Williams and Mathew.

Prior to the addition of sub-section (h) it was held that an action for foreclosure of a mortgage was not an action on a contract under this head: *Deutsche National Bank v. Paul*, [1898] 1 Ch. 283, Stirling; nor action to enforce a charging order against shares in an English company: *Kolchmann v. Meurice*, [1905] 1 K. B. 534, Vaughan Williams, Stirling affirming Joyce. The conditions in the new form of the order on which a writ may be served are disjunctive; and, therefore, when the

contract was made within the jurisdiction, there is power to order service out of the jurisdiction though it was not to be governed by English law. *Wansbrough Paper Co. v. Laughland*, [1920] W. N. 344, Bankes, Scrutton and Atkin. Conversely, when a contract was made in New York between a Canadian company, with an office in London, and a foreign subject, and it was expressly stipulated that it should be considered "to be duly made and executed in London," it was held by its terms to be governed by English law, and therefore leave to serve the writ out of the jurisdiction was rightly ordered. *British Controlled Oilfields, Lim. v. Stagg*, [1921] W. N. 319, Sargant.

There is no power under this head to order service out of the jurisdiction on a defendant domiciled or ordinarily resident in Scotland or Ireland; the express exception in rule 1 (e) is not reduced by rule 2 to a discretionary exception: *Tenders v. Anderson* (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 50, Grove and Huddleston, Field agreeing, and see *Channel Coalin Co. v. Ross*, [1907] 1 K. B. 145, Alverstone and Darling; a similar case under the county court rules. And substituted service cannot be resorted to in such a case: *Hillyard v. Smith* (1887), 36 W. R. 7, Smith and Charles. An express agreement that the writ may be served on an agent in England is valid: *Montgomery Jones & Co. v. Liebenthal & Co.*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 487. But an agreement that the writ may be served on the defendant in Scotland is void: *British Wagon Co., Lim. v. Gray*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 35, Esher, Lopes and Kay. It is doubtful, however, whether this ruling would apply now in view of the express terms of the new rule 2 (a).

1 (f). See *Tozier v. Hawkins* (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 650, Coleridge and Cave; *ib.* 680, Brett, Bagallay and Bowen; and, for a case of infringement of a patent in England by foreigners abroad, *Chemische Fabrik vormals Sandoz in Basel v. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik*, [1904] 20 T. R. 552, Macnaghten, Davey, James and Robertson, affirming Collins, Romer and Cozens-Hardy, who affirmed Joyce. Apparently service under this head would not be allowed if it were shown that there were not, and were never likely to be, any means of enforcing the injunction in England. See *De Bernales v. New York Herald*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 97 (note), Lopes and Coleridge, at p. 98; where leave was refused also on the ground that the claim for an injunction was not made *bonâ fide*, but was added for the purpose of bringing the case within this head. The court has a discretion: *Re De Penny, De Penny v. Christie*, [1891] 2 Ch. 63, Chitty. Leave was refused in the case of an alleged libel published in a Scotch newspaper, only a few copies of which were sold in England; *Watson & Sons v. Daily Record (Glasgow) Lim.*, [1907] 1 K. B. 853, Collins and Cozens-Hardy overruling A. T. Lawrence. Leave was allowed by the Irish courts in an action against a company out of the jurisdiction, for an injunction to restrain the company from publishing in Ireland an advertisement containing pictures of the plaintiff, said to be libellous. The mischief complained of was resented locally, and the remedy must be made effective locally: *Dunlop Rubber Co., Lim. v. Dunlop*, [1921] 1 A. C. 367, H. L., Birkenhead, Moulton, Atkinson, Buckmaster, affirming Irish Court of Appeal. The service was upheld in a *bona fide* case; *Alexander & Co., Lim. v. Valentine & Sons* [1907] *Lim.*, [1908] 25 T. R. 29, Buckley and Kennedy. As to what is a "thing to be done within the jurisdiction" see *The Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Basel Chemical Works, Bindschedler*, [1898] A. C. 200, Halsbury, Herschell, Macnaghten and Davey.

An English court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining

an Englishman from violating the rights accorded to another Englishman in a foreign country by the laws of that country: "*Morocco Bound*" *Syndicate, Lim. v. Harris*, [1895] 1 Ch. 534, Kekewich.

1 (g). The person within the jurisdiction must be served before an order for service out of the jurisdiction is made under this head: *Lightowler v. Lightowler* (1884), W. N. 1884, p. 8, Butt; *Yorkshire Tannery v. Eglinton Chemical Co.* (1884), 54 L. J. Ch. 81, Pearson; and *Tassell v. Hallen* above under 1 (b). A party may be proper under this head without being necessary, and, subject to the discretion of the court, he will be so whenever, if within the jurisdiction, he could have been made a party under Order XVI. of 1883: *Massey v. Haynes* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 330, Wills and Grantham affirmed by Esher, Lindley and Lopes. See *The Elton*, [1891] P. 265, Jeune. *Thanemore Steamship Co. v. Thompson* (1885), 52 L. T. 552. The test is, "Supposing both the defendant firms were resident within the jurisdiction, would they both have been joined in the action?"; *Witted v. Galbraith*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 577, Lindley and Kay reversing Hawkins and Coleridge, followed in *Ross v. Eason*, [1911] 2 I. R. 459, Walker, Palles, Gibson and Boyd. *Oesterreichische Export v. British Indemnity Co.*, [1914] 2 K. B. 747, Kennedy and Swinfen Eady, L.JJ., affirming Coleridge, J., where there were two underwriters on a policy, one in England and one in Scotland, and it was held that the Scotch company were proper parties in the action. The action against both defendants must be substantially the same: *Collins v. North British Mercantile Insurance Co.*, *Pratt v. The Co.*, [1904] 3 Ch. 228, Kekewich. The fact that the cause of action arose out of the jurisdiction is immaterial: *The Duc d'Aumale*, [1903] P. 18, Gorell Barnes; and *Deutsche National Bank v. Paul*, [1898] 1 Ch. 283, Stirling.

See the orders made under this head in support of an action for enforcing a creditors' deed relating to foreign land: *Jenney v. Mackintosh*, above, p. 218, and in support of an action to enforce an equitable charge over foreign land: *Duder v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor*, [1902] 2 Ch. 132, Byrne; and where a person out of the jurisdiction supplied goods to a dealer in Ireland, which infringed Irish patent rights: *Joynt v. McCrum*, [1899] 1 I. R. 217; and in support of an action for the administration of the estate of a person domiciled abroad but who left assets in England: *Re Lane, Lane v. Robin* (1886), 55 L. T. (N. S.) 149, Pearson; and see *McHeane v. Gyles*, below, p. 253. This rule has been held to apply where the plaintiff has an alternative claim against either the person within the jurisdiction or the person out of the jurisdiction: *Witted v. Galbraith*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 431 (but see the same case, at p. 577). The court has a discretion which should be exercised with great care; *The Hagen*, [1908] P. 189, Alverstone, Farwell and Kennedy overruling Bargaive Deane, where an order giving leave to serve the owner of a foreign ship was discharged on the ground that the collision took place abroad and proceedings were commenced without undue delay by the foreign owners in the local courts.

The discretion should not be exercised in a case where plaintiffs in England brought an action against two companies out of the jurisdiction. They had shipped goods in a vessel owned by a company domiciled in Scotland, and the vessel having been requisitioned, the cargo was loaded on another ship without their knowledge or consent, which ship was sunk. The first defendant consented to the jurisdiction of the English court, and the plaintiffs then asked leave to serve writ on second defendants out of the jurisdiction. The consent of the first defendant could not affect the

rights of the other, and the action was not properly brought here against the first defendant: *Russell v. Cayzer*, [1916] A. C. 298, see above, p. 238. This discretion is not limited by Order XI, rule 2: *Lopez v. Chavarri*, [1901] W. N. 115, Farwell. This rule applies to actions on tort: *Croft v. King*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 419, Day and Collins, and *Williams v. Cartwright*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 142, Lopes and Rigby, Esher dissenting.

2. The discretion enjoined by this rule only applies to cases which do not fall within the exception in rule 1 (e): it does not limit that exception: *Lenders v. Anderson*, cited above under rule 1 (e); it does not apply to service within the jurisdiction: *Logan v. Bank of Scotland*, [1904] 2 K. B. at p. 500.

The following cases illustrate the mode in which the discretion enjoined by this rule will be exercised. *Cresswell v. Parker* (1879), 11 Ch. D. 601, James, Baggallay and Bramwell reversing Malins; *Harris v. Fleming* (1879), 13 Ch. D. 208, Hall: two cases on the analogous discretion in the rules of 1875. *Harvey v. Dougherty* (1887), 56 L. T. (N. S.) 322, Kay; *Marshall v. Marshall* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 330, Cotton and Fry affirming North; *Re Burland's Trademark*, *Burland v. Broxburn Oil Co.* (1889), 41 Ch. D. 542, Chitty; *Kinahan v. Kinahan* (1890), 45 Ch. D. 78, Kekewich; *Re De Penny*, [1891] 2 Ch. 63, Chitty; *Witted v. Galbraith*, above. The comparative cost and convenience is that of all parties: *Williams v. Cartwright*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 142, at p. 148, Lopes and Rigby; and see *Joynt v. McCrum*, [1899] 1 I. R. 217, above.

Sufficiency of evidence discussed in *Chemische Fabrik vormals Sandoz in Basel v. Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik*, [1904] 20 Times Law Reports, 552, cited under r. 1 (f).

8. This rule does not apply to service on a British subject in the countries to which it applies. It was applied to the German empire by an order of the Lord Chancellor dated 4th July 1904, but the order was cancelled in November, 1914, and special directions were issued. See *Annual Practice*, 1922, p. 107—to Russia by order dated 21st March 1906, to France, Spain and Belgium by order dated 2nd August 1910, to Portugal by order of 22nd March, 1912, to Japan by order of April, 1912, and Greece, 25th November, 1917. Until this rule is so applied the old practice continues.

8a. This new rule, issued in July 1920, enlarges the powers of the court to grant leave for service out of the jurisdiction of other judicial proceedings besides a writ or notice of a writ. It thus includes within the scope of Order XI an originating summons or any other summons notice or order. But the circumstances which justify the court in granting leave for service out of the jurisdiction of a writ or notice of writ under rule 1 must still be shown before leave will be granted in respect of any summons, order or notice under rule 8a. The latter portion of the rule applies the provisions of rule 8 to any summons order or notice which is to be served on a foreigner in any of the countries to which rule 8 applies. In *Re Aktiebolaget Robertsfors and La Société Anonyme des Papeteries de l'Aa*, [1910] 2 K. B. 727, Alverstone, Pickford, Coleridge.

Under the old rule it was held that service of an originating summons could not be ordered on a party in Scotland, because that rule provided that service should be on a person in a foreign country, and Scotland was not a foreign country. *Re Campbell*, [1920] 1 Ch. 35, Eve. But the words in the present rule are wider and would appear to cover service of any summons on a British subject resident anywhere out of the jurisdiction.

§ 187. "Where a defendant claims to be entitled to contribution or indemnity over against any person not a party to the action, he may, by leave of the court or a judge, issue a notice, hereinafter called the third party notice, to that effect, stamped with the seal with which writs of summons are sealed. A copy of such notice shall be filed with the proper officer and served on such person according to the rules relating to the service of writs of summons." Order XVI of 1883, rule 48.

It seems that wherever the action is one falling under Order XI (above § 186), service out of the jurisdiction of a third party notice may be allowed in it, subject to the exceptions with regard to Scotland and Ireland contained in that order: *Dubout v. Macpherson* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 340, Smith and Day. But the right to indemnity entitling the defendant to issue a third party notice must be under a contract to indemnify: *Speller v. Bristol Steam Navigation Co.* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 96, Brett, Bowen and Fry.

But a third party notice cannot be served under the combined effect of this rule and Order XI, rule 1 (g), unless one of the proposed third parties has been served with the notice within the jurisdiction: *McCheane v. Gyles*, [1902] 1 Ch. 287, Vaughan Williams, Romer and Cozens-Hardy.

§ 187a. "The court or a judge may at any stage in the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court or a judge to be just, order . . . that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter, be added." Order XVI of 1883, rule 11.

The court has a discretion under this rule, and has refused to require a plaintiff to add a defendant where the proposed defendant was a foreigner out of the jurisdiction: *Wilson Sons & Co. v. Balcarres Brook Steamship Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 422, Esher, Bowen and A. L. Smith.

§ 188. Service out of the jurisdiction, whether of a writ or of notice of a writ or of any other proceeding, can now be made only under the rules set out in §§ 186 and 187; no earlier or other practice is applicable. See however the exceptions to this statement which may perhaps result from the cases cited below.

That the court would have been competent so far as the *res* was concerned, if the ship could have been arrested within the jurisdiction, is no reason for allowing service out of the jurisdiction: *Re Smith* (1876), 1 P. D. 300, Phillimore; *The Vivar* (1876), 2 P. D. 29, Phillimore affirmed by James, Baggallay and Bramwell; *Harris v. Owners of Franconia* (1877), 2 C. P. D. 173, Coleridge, Grove and Denman.

Service out of the jurisdiction cannot be ordered because a fact which occurred out of the jurisdiction has caused damage within the jurisdiction:

Shearman v. Findlay (1883), 32 W. R. 122, Grove and Mathew; case of a libel published out of the jurisdiction.

Proceedings relating to funds in court have been ordered to be served out of the jurisdiction on persons alleged to be or to claim to be interested in them, on the ground of necessity: *Colls v. Robins* (1886), 55 L. T. (N. S.) 479, Kay; *Re Ruddiman's Trusts* (1887), 31 Sol. J. 271, Stirling; *Re Gordon's Settlement Trusts*, [1887] W. N., p. 192, Chitty; *Re Baron Liebig's Cocoa &c., Works*, [1888] W. N., 120, North. But in *Re Jellard*, [1888] W. N., pp. 184, 186, where North declined to act on the authority of *Re Gordon's Settlement Trusts*, Cotton, Fry and Lopes found a way out of the difficulty without deciding the point.

Although notice of motion to expunge an English trademark could not be served abroad, the court has made the order in the absence of the registered proprietor who was abroad and to whom actual notice had been given; *Re King & Co.'s Trademark*, [1892] 2 Ch. 462, Lindley, Bowen and Kay affirming Kekewich; and see *La Compagnie Générale d'Eaux Minérales et de Bains de Mer*, [1891] 3 Ch. 451, Stirling.

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37, 2nd schedule, clauses 9 and 14), where the parties are resident within different parts of the United Kingdom, the court of the district within which the accident happened has jurisdiction, and proceedings may be served in other parts of the United Kingdom by registered letter: *Rex v. Owen*, [1902] 2 K. B. 436, Alverstone, Darling and Channell.

§ 189. The rules of 1883 do not "affect the procedure or practice" in certain matters, of which the only one that is important for our subject is described as "proceedings for divorce or other matrimonial causes." Order LXVIII of 1883, rule 1. These continue to be governed by the earlier practice.

Service of the petition can be effected on a co-respondent out of the jurisdiction without leave and independently of his domicile or nationality. *Rayment v. Rayment and Stuart*, [1910] P. 271, Evans. The rules as to service in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, made by the President of the Division in 1914, are set out above at p. 92.

In *Trubner v. Trubner and Cristiani* (1889), 15 P. D. 24, Butt, a citation was allowed to be served on a foreign co-respondent abroad by inclosing it in a registered letter addressed to him, it being proved that service on him of foreign process by a person at the spot would have given him a right of action by the law of the country where he was living.

Similar service was allowed on a co-respondent in Portugal, it being proved that letters of request from England to Portugal would be ineffectual: *Wray v. Wray and D'Almeida*, [1901] P. 132, Gorell Barnes; and also in *Stumpel v. Stumpel and Zeppel*, [1901] 70 L. J. P. 6, Jeune. As to dispensing with service of the petition on a foreigner abroad against whom allegations of adultery are made, see *Boger v. Boger*, [1908] P. 300, Bargaive Deane. *Rush v. Rush and Pimenta*, [1913], above p. 89.

Note on Actions for Trespass to Foreign Soil.

In the case of the *M. Mozham*, commenced in the Court of Admiralty but heard in the Supreme Court after the fusion, a British ship had damaged by collision a pier on the coast of Spain, and the parties had entered into an agreement that the dispute thence arising should be tried

in England; Lord Justice James observed that, but for such agreement, "very grave difficulties indeed might have arisen as to the jurisdiction of this court to entertain any action or proceedings whatever with respect to injury done to foreign soil:" (1876), 1 P. D. 109. We have seen in § 180 that nothing in the acts and orders regulating the Supreme Court is opposed to such an action, when the writ is served in England: on the other hand there is nothing in those acts or orders that expressly gives the jurisdiction, and the question whether it exists must therefore be decided on a consideration of the powers of the courts from which the Supreme Court inherits.

In *Skinner v. East India Co.* (1665), cited to Lord Mansfield in *Mostyn v. Fabrigas* (1774), Cowp. 161, at p. 168, the king in council propounded to the judges the question "whether Mr. Skinner," who claimed in respect of damage done in foreign and uncivilized regions, "could have a full relief in any ordinary court of law." And they answered "that his majesty's ordinary courts of justice at Westminster can give relief for taking away and spoiling his ship, goods and papers, and assaulting and wounding his person, notwithstanding the same was done beyond the seas. But that as to the detaining and possessing of the house and islands in the case mentioned, he is not relievable in any ordinary court of justice." Lord Mansfield, however (p. 180), mentioned a previous action before himself against Captain Gambier, for pulling down houses in British though uncivilized regions, in which an objection founded on the same citation was made, but a case was produced in which Lord Chief Justice Eyre had overruled the objection; continuing, "and I overruled the objection upon this principle, namely that the reparation here was personal and for damages, and that otherwise there would be a failure of justice; for it was upon the coast of Nova Scotia, where there were no regular courts of judicature, but if there had been Captain Gambier might never go there again; and therefore the reason of locality in such an action in England did not hold. I quoted a case of an injury of that sort in the East Indies, where even in a court of equity Lord Hardwicke had directed satisfaction to be made in damages." In *British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moçambique*, [1893] A. C. 602, at p. 633, Lord Halsbury identified the case before Eyre, C.J., with *Shilling v. Farmer* [1738], 1 Strange 646, and pointed out that Lord Mansfield's account of it was erroneous, Eyre having rejected the evidence about trespass to a house in the East Indies and only admitted that about trespass there to the person. It would seem then that in the opinion of Mansfield, though not of Eyre, a local action for a cause arising abroad was admissible; always, I imagine, supposing that the defendant was either a British subject or resident in England, for otherwise the reason would fail, since he might be sued in his own country.

But in *Doulson v. Matthews* (1792), 4 T. R. 503, which was an action for expelling the plaintiff from his dwelling-house in Canada, Kenyon and Buller decided against the plaintiff solely on the ground of the distinction between transitory and local actions, the wisdom or policy of which Buller said it was too late to question. And the Lords in the *British South Africa Co.'s* case held that such decision was not founded merely on the technical difficulty about a local venue. See especially Herschell, at p. 621. That case has finally decided that English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain actions to recover damages for trespass to land situate abroad: *Companhia de Moçambique v. British South Africa Co.*, [1893] A. C. 602, Herschell, Halsbury, Macnaghten and Morris, overruling Fry and Lopes—[1892] 2 Q. B. 358—and supporting Esher, who dissented in the Court of Appeal, Lawrance and Wright.

Exterritoriality.

But to the foregoing rules, which determine the actions that will be entertained by the English court, there is a class of exceptions that it especially belongs to our subject to notice, because they are not only directly connected with international law, but are also admitted in all countries on similar principles and with the same or nearly the same limits. These are the exceptions made in favour of states, of sovereigns, and of ambassadors or other persons charged with diplomatic missions. They are grounded on the independence and dignity of the states or sovereigns and of the diplomatists who represent them, and on the necessity of preventing the public business the latter have to transact from being impeded by the annoyance and loss of time which lawsuits would occasion; and any violation of the immunities which they create would be regarded as a high breach of public international law. In former times they were carried to an extravagant extent. An ambassador's residence was in most countries an asylum even from criminal justice, and sometimes large franchises were enjoyed by the quarter of the city in which it stood. A fiction, the practical scope of which must not be extended beyond what there is positive authority for in each matter, treated such a residence, and that which a sovereign might occupy while abroad, as forming part of the ambassador's or of such sovereign's country, and therefore as being without the territory in which it lay in fact. And the name of *exterritoriality*, derived from that fiction, has become attached to the whole class of exceptions from rules of jurisdiction now in question.

From a general point of view it may be said that so far as a state, or a person within the exception of *exterritoriality*, is liable to be sued at all, there is no *forum rei gestæ*, and the *forum rei* is to be found within the state itself, or in the proper country of the person. But the exception of *exterritoriality* does not extend to the *forum rei sitæ*, for no country can be expected to renounce the determination of the property in its soil. The doctrines established in England are as follows.

§ 190. Foreign states, and those persons in them who are called sovereigns, whether their title be emperor, king, grand-duke, or any other, and whether their power in their states be absolute or limited, cannot be sued in England on their obligations, whether *ex contractu*, *quasi ex contractu*, or *ex delicto*:

Except that possibly a maritime lien may be enforced in an action *in rem* against a ship belonging to a foreign sovereign in his private character and employed exclusively in commerce.*

There may not be the same objection to suing a foreign sovereign in that manner, and in a matter unconnected with his public character, which there would be to serving on him a writ or notice of a writ.†

Maritime liens are not enforceable against foreign ships of war: *The Constitution* (1879), 4 P. D. 39, Phillimore—a case of salvage, and the immunity extended to a cargo with the care and protection of which the foreign government stated that it had charged itself for public purposes.

In the case of *The Charkieh* (1873), L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, which was a claim for damage against a ship belonging to the khedive of Egypt and employed in commerce, Sir R. Phillimore decided in favour of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the khedive was neither sovereign nor semi-sovereign, and that even a sovereign would not have enjoyed immunity under the circumstances. In the case of *The Parlement Belge* (1879), 4 P. D. 129, which was a claim for damage against a public Belgian ship, the same judge decided in favour of the plaintiffs on the ground that she was mainly employed in commerce. But this was reversed by James, Baggalay and Brett, who held that they were precluded from enquiring into the facts of her employment by the declaration of the king of the Belgians that she was in his possession as sovereign and was a public vessel of the State: (1880), 5 P. D. 197. The judgment discusses and condemns the notion that only ships of war, and not all public ships, are exempt from foreign jurisdiction. This was followed in *The Jassy*, [1906] P. 270, Gorell Barnes. The rule received a wide extension during the European war, 1914–1918, when a large part of the mercantile marine was requisitioned by governments for transporting munitions, &c., and there was what Scrutton, L.J., called “a fashion of nationalization.” Vessels so requisitioned were held to enjoy the immunity of public ships, though not employed exclusively for purposes of war. *The Porto Alexandre*, [1920] P. 30, C. A., Bankes, L.J., Warrington, L.J., Scrutton, L.J., affirming Hill. A contrary view taken by the great American judge, Marshall, in *U.S. Bank v. Planters Bank*, (1824), 9 Wheaton 904, was not followed. See too *The Broadmayne*, [1916] P. 64, Evans, affirmed by Swinfen Eady, Pickford, Bankes; *The Messicano*, [1916] 32 T. L. R. 519, Evans; *The Annette and Dora*, [1919] P. 105, Hill; *The Gagara*, [1919] P. 95, Hill.

Vessels chartered or requisitioned by a government only enjoy immunity from arrest while they are subject to the charter or the requisition; and proceedings *in rem* may proceed against them, so that the judgment may be enforced as soon as the charter or requisition is terminated: *The Broadmayne* (u.s.). See also, *The Tervaete, Addenda*, p. xxvii.

The extension of the privileges of public ships to vessels employed by the state for commercial purposes appears to be unjustifiable in principle; and it is noteworthy that a clause has been included in the Treaties of Peace signed at the conclusion of the Great War, providing that if the late

* The wording of previous editions that *probably* a lien may be enforced, has been changed to one more cautious in view of recent decisions which carry a step further the immunity from process of government ships.

† See an article on the whole subject by A. D. McNair in the *British Year-Book of International Law*, 1921-22.

enemy governments engage in international trade they shall not in respect thereof have or be deemed to have any rights, privileges or immunities of sovereignty (see Article 281 of the Treaty of Versailles, Article 368 of the Treaty of Sèvres). Presumably the International Court of Justice would hold that the same rules should be applied to vessels of the Allied States engaged in commercial voyages; and the Articles may be regarded as the introduction of an international rule limiting the immunity of public ships.

The court will take judicial cognizance of the nature and extent of the sovereignty of a foreign prince or state: *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149, cited under § 192; *Foster v. Globe Syndicate, Limited*, [1900] 1 Ch. 811, Farwell. Recognition of a new state or a government or a sovereign need not be absolute, but may be provisional; when certified by the British government, it is conclusive upon the court, which will not examine for itself the official acts and conduct of the state or sovereign so recognized: *The Gagara* and *The Annette and Dora* (u.s.).

The rules as to substituted service cannot be wrested so as to make a British colonial government suable in England: *Sloman v. Governor and Government of New Zealand* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 563, James, Mellish, Baggallay.

A ship owned by the Canadian government is for this purpose owned by the crown: *Young v. S.S. Scotia*, [1903] A. C. 501, Halsbury, Macnaghten, Shand, Davey, Robertson, Lindley and Wilson.

A foreign ruling prince in India cannot be made a co-respondent in a suit for divorce. *Statham v. Statham and the Gaskwar of Baroda*, [1912] P. 92, Bagnall Deane.

§ 191. To the rule laid down in § 190 an exception appears to have existed in the case of a foreign sovereign who was also a British subject. The Duke of Cumberland having become king of Hanover in 1837, an ineffectual attempt was made to sue him in this country for what was held both in the court of chancery and in the House of Lords to be an act of state. But Lord Langdale said "I am of opinion that his majesty the king of Hanover is and ought to be exempt from all liability of being sued in the courts of this country for any acts done by him as king of Hanover, or in his character of sovereign prince, but that, being a subject of the queen, he is and ought to be liable to be sued in the courts of this country in respect of any acts and transactions done by him, or in which he may have been engaged, as such subject": *Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover*, 1844, 6 Beav. 57. On the appeal in the same case Lord Brougham remarked "it is not at all necessary to say that supposing a foreign sovereign, being also a naturalized subject in this country, had a landed estate in this country, and entered into any transactions respecting it, as a contract of sale or mortgage; it is not necessary to say that a court of equity in this country might not compel him specifically to perform his contract": 1848, 2 H. of L. 24. And Lord Campbell added, "if he," the

king-duke, " had been a trustee of a marriage settlement while he resided within this realm, and had become liable in the execution of the trust which he had undertaken and which he was not properly executing, I am by no means prepared to say that the court of chancery would not have had jurisdiction over him " : *ib.*, p. 25. But it is now scarcely possible that a foreign sovereign should be also a British subject, for if a British subject accepted a foreign throne he would surely by such acceptance " voluntarily become naturalized " in the state of which he was sovereign, and thereby lose his British nationality in pursuance of the British Nationality Act, 1914, s. 13. Nor could a foreign sovereign satisfy the conditions necessary for being naturalized in this country without a special act of parliament, which he could have no motive for seeking, since if he desired to hold land in England he could now do so as an alien. If a foreign sovereign received a conveyance of land in England, and entered into possession of it, it cannot be imagined that a plaintiff, claiming such land by a superior title, would be unable to obtain judgment and delivery in England; or that a mortgagee of English land could not have his usual remedies in England because the mortgagor was a foreign sovereign. The exception of exterritoriality, as above remarked, does not apply to the *forum rei sitæ*; and the court would probably request the Foreign Office to give the sovereign such information by diplomatic means as would be equivalent to serving notice of the writ under Order XI of 1883, rule 1 (a) or 1 (b). But however it may have been formerly, in the case of a sovereign holding English land as a natural-born or naturalized British subject, it is clear that a foreign sovereign holding such land as an alien could not be compelled by an English court specifically to perform a contract for the sale or mortgage of it.

§ 192. But a foreign state or person entitled to the privilege of exterritoriality, bringing an action in England, will be bound as a private corporation or person would be bound to do complete justice to the defendant with regard to the matters comprised in the action, and will be subject to all cross actions, counter-claims, defences and steps of procedure which as between private parties would be competent to the defendant for the purpose either of obtaining such complete justice or of defending himself against the plaintiff's claim. It was the old maxim of the court of chancery that he who seeks equity must do equity; and Paulus says *qui non cogitur in aliquo loco iudicium pati, si ipse*

ibi agat, cogitur excipere actiones et ad eundem judicem mitti.
Dig. 5, 1, 22.

In *Hullet v. King of Spain* (1828), 1 D. & Cl. 169, Redesdale and Lyndhurst affirming the latter, it was decided that a foreign sovereign might sue in a court of equity. It had been objected that "by no possibility can process be issued with effect, or equity done, or a decree enforced against him"; but Lyndhurst said, "when he sues here as a plaintiff the court has complete control over him, and may hold him to all proper terms." A cross bill was then filed, and it was decided that the king must answer it personally on oath: *King of Spain v. Hullet* (1833), 1 Cl. & F. 333, Plunket, Wynford and Brougham affirming the latter. In *Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal* (1839), 3 Y. & C. Exch. 594, Alderson, a bill of discovery against a foreign sovereign was allowed in a court of equity, in aid of the defence to an action by her at law. In *Colombian Government v. Rothschild* (1826), 1 Sim. 94, it was held by Leach that a foreign republic must sue in chancery in the name of an official on whom process could be served on the part of the defendant, and who could be called on to answer a cross bill. But it was afterwards established that a republic recognized by the British Government might sue in its own name, and the court would take care that proper means of discovery were afforded: see *Prioleau v. United States of America* (1866), L. R. 2 Eq. 659, Wood; *United States of America v. Wagner* (1867), L. R. 2 Ch. Ap. 582, Chelmsford, Turner and Cairns reversing Wood, L. R. 3 Eq. 724; *Republic of Liberia v. Imperial Bank* (1873), L. R. 16 Eq. 179, Malins; *Republic of Peru v. Weguelin* (1875), L. R. 20 Eq. 140, Hall; *Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger* (1875), 1 Ch. D. 171, James, Mellish and Blackburn reversing Malins. A foreign government plaintiff ordered to give security for costs: *Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 62, James, Mellish and Baggallay agreeing so far with Malins. A foreign sovereign as plaintiff in an action for damage by collision ordered to give security for damages to a defendant bringing a counterclaim, it being impossible to arrest the plaintiff's ship as security: *The Newbattle* (1885), 10 P. D. 33, Brett, Cotton and Lindley affirming Butt.

That an independent action could not be brought against a foreign sovereign is no reason for admitting a counterclaim, which could not be tacked to an action by a private plaintiff: *South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord*, [1897] 2 Ch. 487, Lindley, Ludlow and Chitty affirming North; or which is not necessary for doing justice on his cause of action: same parties, [1898] 1 Ch. 190, North. Submission to the jurisdiction by a foreign sovereign must be made after action brought, and cannot be implied from previous conduct: *Mighell v. Sultan of Johore*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149, Wills and Lawrance affirmed by Esher, Lopes and Kay. A protected sovereign is a sovereign within the rule: *ib.* at p. 162. So also is a reigning prince in India: *Statham v. Statham and Gaekwar of Baroda*, [1912] P. 62; see above, p. 258.

The court will take judicial cognizance whether a foreign state, suing in its own name, is recognized by the British Government: *City of Berne v. Bank of England* (1804), 9 Ves. 347, Eldon. The recognition of a state or sovereign is normally proved by a certificate from the Foreign Office. In several cases which came before the English courts after the Russian empire was in 1918 broken up into various states, the courts accorded the privileges of sovereignty to provisional governments which had been recognized, however provisionally, by the Foreign Office. Thus in the case

of *The Gagara*, the court refused jurisdiction over a vessel which was claimed by the Estonian National Council, on a statement by a representative of the Crown that "His Majesty's Government has, for the time being, provisionally and with all necessary reservations as to the future, recognized the Estonian National Council as a *de facto* independent body."

Similarly the Court of Appeal in the case of *A. O. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.*, [1921] 1 K. B. 456, 474, held that it could not entertain jurisdiction over a stock of wood in England, claimed by the Russian Soviet Government, on a certificate of the Foreign Office being given that the Soviet Administration was recognized as being in possession of the powers of a sovereign in Russia. Roche, J., had decided the case in the opposite sense, because at the time the action was heard before him the Soviet administration was not recognized; and he held that if a foreign government or sovereignty is not recognized by His Majesty's Government, the courts of this country cannot, or at least ought not to, recognize such government or its sovereignty. Between the hearing in first instance and on appeal a commercial agreement was made between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government which implied official recognition, and led the Court of Appeal to reverse the earlier judgment.

Passing now beyond questions of procedure, the liability of a foreign state or sovereign suing in England, to respect all just defences and to do complete justice to the defendant with regard to the matters comprised in the action, is illustrated by *United States of America v. Prioleau* (1865), 2 H. & M. 559, Wood; *United States of America v. Macrae* (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 327, Wood, partly reversed by Chelmsford, L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 79. A government which has succeeded to another must respect all defences which would have been good against that other: *Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus* (1888), 38 Ch. D. 348, Kay. But a conquering state is not subject to all the liabilities of the conquered state: *West Rand Gold Mining Co. v. Rex*, [1905] 2 K. B. 391.

A contract entered into with a minister of a foreign state may be sued upon by his successor in office, if such was the apparent meaning of the contract: *Yzquierdo v. Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co.*, [1902] A. C. 524, Halsbury, Macnaghten, Brampton, Robertson, Lindley. Same parties, [1905] A. C. 6.

If the foreign state or person entitled to the privilege of extraterritoriality has obtained final judgment in his or its action, the doctrine of this § does not allow what would then be an independent action to be brought against it: *Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica* (1880), 29 W. R. 125, Jessel, James, Lush. James said: "if anything has arisen or been discovered since the judgment was obtained which would make it inequitable for the plaintiff to enforce his judgment, the defendant's proper course according to my opinion would be to apply in that action, and not in any fresh action, for the exercise of that jurisdiction which every court always does exercise over its own judgments, to stay any further proceedings upon that judgment on the ground that it is not equitable that proceedings should be taken upon it."

The Japanese Government, plaintiff in the British Consular Court, could not be compelled to submit to a cross claim, though the facts which were alleged to give rise to one might be relied upon as a defence to his claim; but the decision would have been the same if a private Japanese person had been plaintiff, on account of the limited jurisdiction of the court. *Imperial Japanese Government v. P. and O. Steam Navigation Co.*, [1895]

A. C. 644, Herschell, Watson, Hobhouse, Macnaghten, Shand, Davey and Couch.

§ 193. In connection with the rule laid down in § 190, a doctrine must be mentioned which may be best introduced by quoting the words of Lord Langdale with reference to the court of chancery. "There have been cases in which, this court being called upon to distribute a fund in which some foreign sovereign or state may have had an interest, it has been thought expedient and proper in order to a due distribution of the fund to make such sovereign or state a party. The effect has been to make the suit perfect as to parties, but, as to the sovereign or state made a defendant in cases of that kind, the effect has not been to compel or attempt to compel such sovereign or state to come in and submit to judgment in the ordinary course, but to give the sovereign an opportunity to come in to claim his right or establish his interest in the subject matter of the suit. Coming in to make his claim, he would, by doing so, submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court in that matter; refusing to come in, he might perhaps be precluded from establishing any claim to the same interest in another form. So where a defendant in this country is called upon to account for some matter in respect of which he has acted as agent for a foreign sovereign, the suit would not be perfect as to parties unless the foreign sovereign were formally a defendant, and by making him a party an opportunity is afforded him of defending himself instead of leaving the defence to his agent, and he may come in if he pleases. In such a case, if he refuses to come in, he may perhaps be held bound by the decision against his agent." *Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover*, 1844, 6 Beav. 39.

So far as this doctrine is sound, it applies now to the Supreme Court; and it certainly is sound as to the first portion, which deals with cases where the court is called on to distribute a fund. The second portion, however, which deals with cases where persons have acted as agents for foreign sovereigns, ought to have been expressed in a more guarded manner. If the plaintiff can establish a right in the nature of property or hypothecation to the money or things which the agent holds in his hands within the realm, the matter falls under the same principle as the class of cases in which a court has to distribute a fund. There is in fact a fund within the jurisdiction, the rights in which the court cannot refuse to declare and carry into effect, without a denial of justice similar in kind to that

which would take place if the court refused to deliver land to one claiming it by a title superior to that of a foreign sovereign, or to foreclose a mortgage of land against a foreign sovereign. And there would be this further circumstance in favour of exercising the jurisdiction, that it would be unnecessary to sue the foreign sovereign, because the movables could be reached through the agent, who would be protected against his principal by the judgment. But if the plaintiff only claims by virtue of an obligation alleged to exist on the part of the foreign sovereign or state, he can no more pursue that claim indirectly through the agent than he could do so directly; and he is defeated by the refusal or omission of the foreign sovereign or state to appear and consent to be bound.

Attempts were made in the following cases to apply the latter part of Lord Langdale's doctrine, as quoted in § 193; but in none of them was relief ultimately obtained, it being held in all that no right in the nature of property or hypothecation to the money or things in the agent's hands had been established. *Smith v. Wequelin* (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 198, Romilly: *Larivière v. Morgan*, decided in favour of the plaintiff by Malins and on appeal by Hatherley (1872), L. R. 7 Ch. Ap. 550, but reversed on further appeal (1875), L. R. 7 E. & I. A. 423, by Cairns, O'Hagan and Chelmsford. *Twycross v. Dreyfus* (1877), 5 Ch. D. 605, Hall affirmed by Jessel and James. In *Gladstone v. Musurus Bey* (1862), 1 H. & M. 495, Wood, the plaintiffs obtained an interim injunction against the Bank of England as stakeholders, but the case is not traceable further. In *Gladstone v. Ottoman Bank* (1863), 1 H. & M. 505, Wood, the plaintiffs did not rely on any right to money or things in England, but attempted in vain to restrain the Ottoman Bank from enjoying in Turkey the benefit of an act of state of the Turkish sultan, which they alleged was in violation of their rights. They must have equally failed, as the judge pointed out, if they had made a similar complaint of a British act of parliament. In *Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica* (1880), 29 W. R. 125, Jessel and James repeated Lord Langdale's doctrine as to funds in the hands of persons within the jurisdiction, but not further.

In *Vavasour v. Krupp* (1878), 9 Ch. D. 351 (Jessel affirmed by James, Brett and Cotton), a foreign sovereign was allowed to remove certain shells, which were his property, out of the country, notwithstanding that the plaintiff claimed to have them destroyed in protection of his patent, infringed by the sovereign's agent.

§ 194. "All writs and processes that shall at any time hereafter be sued forth or prosecuted, whereby the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any foreign prince or state, authorized and received as such by her majesty her heirs or successors, or the domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or other public minister, may be arrested or imprisoned, or his or their goods or chattels may be distrained seized or attached, shall be deemed and adjudged to be utterly

null and void to all intents constructions and purposes whatsoever." St. 7 Anne, c. 12, s. 3.

" Provided and be it declared that no merchant or other trader whatsoever within the description of any of the statutes against bankrupts, who hath or shall put himself into the service of any such ambassador or public minister, shall have or take any manner of benefit by this act." Ib., s. 5.

This is the statute passed in consequence of the Russian ambassador having been taken from his coach and imprisoned by a private suitor, and its third section, above quoted, has always been deemed to be merely declaratory of the common law. So far indeed as concerns an ambassador or public minister himself, the immunity extends further than is expressed in that section. Not only is his person privileged from arrest, and his goods or chattels from seizure, but he cannot be sued at all, even for the purpose of obtaining against him a judgment which may be enforced by execution after he has ceased to be entitled to the privilege.

Magdalena Steam Navigation Company v. Martin (1859), 2 E. & E. 94, Campbell, Wightman, Erle, Crompton. The privilege belongs to a recalled ambassador remaining a reasonable time in the country to wind up his official business. Where an ex-minister had disappeared for more than six months after his mission had been brought to an end, it was held that there could be no question of his privilege subsisting: *Suarez v. Suarez*, [1918] 1 Ch. 176, C. A., Swinfen Eady, Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ. The statute of limitations does not run until the ex-ambassador can be effectually served, and the power of service out of the jurisdiction does not affect any question relating to the statute: *Musurus Bey v. Gadban*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 352, A. L. Smith and Davey affirming Wright and Lawrance.

Nor can he be made a defendant as representing his sovereign or state, with the view of giving him an opportunity to appear and defend the rights of such sovereign or state when they may be adjudicated on pursuant to Lord Langdale's doctrine quoted in § 193.

Gladstone v. Musurus Bey, (1862), 1 H. & M. 495, Wood.

Nor, when a foreign sovereign or state is made a defendant in such a case as last mentioned, can the writ be served on the ambassador or minister as a means of bringing it to the knowledge of such sovereign or state.

Stewart v. Bank of England, [1876] W. N., p. 263, Jessel.

If the ambassador or minister has submitted to the jurisdiction, he may be too late in applying to have his name struck

out or the proceedings against him stayed, especially if he is being sued jointly with others: but even then the statute will have to be respected as to the execution of any judgment against him, so long as he holds his office.

Taylor v. Best (1854), 14 C. B. 487, Jervis and Maule; *Suarez v. Suarez* (No. 1), [1917] 2 Ch. 131, Eve.

But if he has expressly waived his diplomatic privileges and submitted to the jurisdiction, execution may issue against him subsequently when his diplomatic appointment has terminated, notwithstanding that he endeavours then to set up the privilege as a defence to the execution proceedings: *Suarez v. Suarez* (No. 2), [1918] 1 Ch. 176, C. A., Swinfen Eady, Warrington and Scrutton, L.JJ.

The privilege can be waived by a diplomatic agent with the consent of his government or sovereign or official superior; and when a minister expressly waives his privilege it will be assumed that he has such consent, because the sovereign cannot be asked to authorize the act of his accredited representative. But the waiver must be express and unambiguous.

Bolivia Exploration Syndicate, [1914] 1 Ch. 139, Astbury.

So far as concerns the servants mentioned in the statute, the following quotations illustrate the principles of decision:—

“To constitute a person domestic servant it is not essential to show that he resides in the house, but if you had shown that this party was a chorister, and in such a situation that the Bavarian ambassador required his attendance from time to time in order to assist in the performance of the religious service of the embassy, I should consider that he was on this ground entitled to some of the privileges of a domestic servant”: Bayley, in *Fisher v. Begrez* (1832), 1 C. & M. 117, at p. 124. Bolland spoke to the same effect, adding, what no doubt Bayley also meant, “if such person attends at the chapel”: *ib.*, p. 127. “Although he says that he is liable to be called on at any time he does not show that he has ever actually been called upon by the ambassador to perform any services”: Bayley, in *Fisher v. Begrez* (1833), 2 C. & M. 240, at p. 243. In *Poitier v. Croza* (1749), 1 W. Bl. 48, the alleged service to the Sardinian envoy was not proved.

The servant may live in a separate and suitable house, his goods in which will be privileged; but where he kept a lodging-house, his goods in it were liable to be distrained for poor rates: *Novello v. Toogood* (1823), 1 B. & C. 554, Abbott, Bayley and Holroyd.

By the term “domestic,” which is distinguished in the statute from “domestic servant,” any person belonging to the family or suite of the ambassador or minister must be understood. And it is the doctrine of public international lawyers, though no occasion for applying it seems yet to have arisen in England, that the privilege accorded to the family suite and servants is that of the ambassador or minister, who may waive it for them,

unless indeed they have not been appointed by him but by his sovereign or state, but who cannot waive his own privilege, because it concerns the dignity of his government and the convenient transaction of its affairs.

The privilege applied to secretaries and attachés: *Hopkins v. De Robeck* (1789), 3 T. R. 79, Kenyon, Ashhurst and Grose; *Parkinson v. Potter* (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 152, Mathew and Wills.

Where an ambassador, minister, or member of an embassy or legation is a subject of the country to which the mission is accredited, he enjoys the privilege of extritoriality so far as the government receiving the mission has not expressly excluded it in its reception of the person in question.

Macartney v. Garbutt (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 368, Mathew.

A British subject who has obtained an appointment as member of a legation for the sake of protection against his creditors, and whose appointment has not been recognized by the British Government, will enjoy no protection: *Re Cloete, Ex parte Cloete*, [1891] 65 L. T. 102, Esher, Lopes and Kay.

§ 195. Consuls and their family and servants are not entitled to the benefit of § 194. But it must be remembered that in Eastern countries consuls have a diplomatic character.

Barbuit's Case (1737), Forrester's Cases temp. Talbot, 281, Talbot. See also *Vivash v. Becker* (1814), 3 M. & S. 284, Ellenborough and (?), where to the question whether a consul is entitled to diplomatic immunities there was added the question whether, if so, such immunities extend to subjects of the state in which they are appointed to act.

As to the jurisdiction of consular courts see *Imperial Japanese Government v. P. & O. Navigation Co.*, [1895] A. C. 644, where it was held that the British Consular Court in Japan had no jurisdiction in a counter-claim brought by a British defendant against a Japanese plaintiff, the cognizance of such causes belonging to the Japanese courts.

CHAPTER XI.

TORTS.

WHEN damages are claimed in respect of what is alleged to be a tortious act or omission, the selection of a law by which to decide is free from all question about the voluntary submission of the parties to the law of any country, such as arises in cases of contract, because there has been no dealing in which the parties have concurred. Another contention may be made, suggested by or imitated from what takes place in contract, namely, that the defendant has voluntarily submitted himself to the law of the country in which he has acted or omitted to act, either by the very act or omission, or if he does not belong to that country by having entered it. But such reasoning would prove too much, for it would equally cut all the knots of private international law by referring every question to the special laws of the country where the fact which gave rise to it occurred. The truth is that by entering a country or acting in it you submit yourself to its special laws only so far as legal science selects them as the rule of decision in each case. Or more truly still, you give to its special laws the opportunity of working on you to that extent. The operation of the law depends on the conditions, and where the conditions exist the law operates as well on its born subjects as on those who have brought themselves under it. The international law of torts may therefore best be considered independently of the ideas suggested by contract, and previously to that part of the subject.

Starting from the fact that according to the general notions on jurisdiction the *forum delicti* and the *forum rei* are equally competent in cases of tort, we have to inquire which of them is the primary jurisdiction; not in the historical sense, in which we have seen on p. 230 that the *forum rei* is the older, but in the sense of being the more appropriate, and therefore of not being obliged to take any law but its own into consideration. (See p. 226.) The *forum delicti* appears to be entitled to that rank, because the injured person may fairly desire the quickest and easiest redress without having to follow the wrongdoer to

his own country; also because one of the main objects of law is to maintain the peace within a given territory, and therefore to afford judicial redress for such conduct as in the absence of it would tend to provoke a breach of the peace. But if the plaintiff choose the *forum rei*, can he claim that the decision there shall be the same as it would have been in the *forum delicti*? It will probably be found that to secure certainty is the leading motive for following in other jurisdictions the law which would have been applied in the primary one; but this means certainty in the mutual dealings of men, and the motive has little application to the case of a tort where necessarily there has been no such dealing. A law which gives damages for a wrong must proceed on grounds of justice or public expediency, and if the personal law of the defendant refuses damages which the *lex loci delicti commissi* would give, the former, in adopting the latter, would receive a shock that may well be thought to outweigh in importance the disappointment which a refusal would cause to the plaintiff, even supposing that he has not had an opportunity of suing the defendant with effect where the act complained of was done. On the other hand, if the personal law of the defendant would give damages for what the *lex loci delicti commissi* regards as a justifiable act, the defendant may plead that if his act disturbed the social order of any country it was that of the country where it was committed, the law of which therefore is the best authority on the subject.

This reasoning tends to the conclusion, which we shall see has been adopted in England, that the *lex fori* and *lex loci delicti commissi* must concur in order that an act or an omission may be deemed tortious. On the continent there is no general agreement. Savigny maintains the exclusive authority of the *lex fori*, "both positively and negatively, that is, for and against the application of a law which recognizes an obligation arising out of a delict." * His reason is that all laws relating to delicts have such a close connection with public order as to be entitled to the benefit of what I have called the reservation in favour of a stringent domestic policy: above, p. 51. M. Charles Brocher, on the contrary, maintains the authority of the *lex loci delicti commissi* in terms which would appear to be exclusive, were it not that he goes on to claim for the judge

* Syst. § 374, Guthrie 254.

the right of taking considerations of public order into account; and the result at which he would practically arrive would probably not be very different from that which prevails in England.*

§ 196. No act can be treated in England as a wrong on the part of any defendant in whom it is not a wrong by the law of the country where it was done, whether that law did not regard him as a wrongdoer at the time, or whether he has since been enabled to justify it in that country by the enactment of an indemnity.

For civil purposes the second case put in the §, which carries the first with it *a fortiori*, was decided in an action for damages against a late governor of Jamaica, whose proceedings in time of insurrection had been covered by a colonial act of indemnity: *Phillips v. Eyre* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 225, Cockburn, Lush, Hayes; affirmed (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, Kelly, Martin, Channell, Pigott, Cleasby, Willes, Brett. Cockburn, delivering the judgment of the court below, said: "It appears to us clear that where by the law of another country an act complained of is lawful, such act, though it would have been wrongful by our law if committed here, cannot be made the ground of an action in an English court": u. s., p. 239. And Willes, delivering the judgment of the Appeal Court, said: "The act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place where it was done": u. s., p. 29. In *Hart v. von Gumpach* (1873), L. R. 4 P. C. 439, Montague Smith, an action for damages incurred by an alleged libel in China, which failed because there was a sufficient defence by English law, the question was noticed and reserved, whether proof that the communication was privileged by the law of China would have been a sufficient defence (pp. 464, 5), We must conclude that it would have been so. In *The M. Mozham* (1876), 1 P. D. 107, James, Mellish, Baggallay; reversing *Phillimore* (1875), ib. 43; a British ship by negligent sailing damaged a pier on the coast of Spain, and it was said that by Spanish law the master and mariners were liable but not the ship or her owners. It was held that if that were so the latter would not be liable in England. "Whatever is a justification in the place where the thing is done ought to be a justification where the cause is tried," had already been said incidentally by Lord Mansfield in *Mostyn v. Fabrigas* (1775), Cowp. 175. "In their lordships' opinion the general principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the quality of the act done depends on the law of the place where it is done": Mellish, delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in *Att.-Gen. of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing* (1873), L. R. 5 P. C. 199. That damages cannot be recovered in the *locus delicti commissi* is immaterial if the act was wrongful there: *Machado v. Fontes*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, Lopes and Rigby. Where a man, domiciled in Quebec, while travelling on a railway in Ontario, was killed by the negligence of the railway company's servants, and his widow sued the company in Quebec for damages under the Civil Code of Quebec, it was held that, as there was neither civil nor criminal liability in the company according to the law of Ontario, the *locus delicti*, no action could be maintained in Quebec: *Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Parent*, P. C., [1917] A. C. 195, Haldane, Dunedin, Parker, Parmoor, Wrenbury.

*Nouveau Traité de Droit International Privé, p. 315.

A justification of an act under the sovereign authority of the place where it was committed is equivalent to its justification by the law of that country: *Dobree v. Napier* (1836), 2 Bing. N. C. 781, Tindal and (?); *Regina v. Lesley* (1860), Bell C. C. 220, Erle, Wightman, Williams, Watson, Hill; *Carr v. Francis Times & Co.*, [1902] A. C. 176, Halsbury, Macnaghten, Shand, Brampton, Lindley, reversing A. L. Smith, Vaughan Williams and Romer, who had reversed Grantham.

§ 197. Neither can any act be treated as wrong in England which is not such in the defendant by the principles of English law, notwithstanding that the defendant is liable by the law of the country where the act was done. But "the English court admits the proof of foreign law . . . as one of the facts upon which the existence of the tort, or the right to damages, may depend"—"as in the case of a collision on an ordinary road in a foreign country, where the rule of the road in force at the place of collision may be a necessary ingredient in the determination of the question by whose fault or negligence the alleged tort was committed"—"and it then applies and enforces its own law so far as it is applicable to the case thus established."

The passages which in the § are placed between inverted commas are taken from the judgment of the court in *The Halley* (1868), L. R. 2 P. C. 193, Selwyn (pp. 203, 4). It was there held that the compulsory employment of a pilot was a sufficient answer on the part of the shipowner to a claim for damages occasioned by a collision which, through the pilot's fault, took place in the territorial waters of a country by the law of which compulsory pilotage furnishes no such defence: reversing *Phillimore* (1867), L. R. 2 A. & E. 3. But this does not apply where the captain is compelled to take a pilot, but not to give up the navigation of the ship to him: *The Guy Mannering* (1882), 7 P. D. 132, Coleridge and Cotton, affirming *Phillimore*, 7 P. D. 52; *The Agnes Otto* (1887), 12 P. D. 56, Butt; *The Prins Hendrik*, [1899] P. 177, Gorell Barnes.*

See *Batthyany v. Walford* (1886), 33 Ch. D. 624, North—quoted above under § 176—in which it was treated as an element of the decision that the liability of the successor for waste was sanctioned in principle by the English law in analogous cases.

§ 198. But the last § must be understood without prejudice to this, that an act may be treated as a wrong in England which is not such in the defendant by English law otherwise than as adopting some rule of public international law.

In *The Nostra Signora de los Dolores* (1813), Dodson 290, Scott, a part owner of a privateer was held liable for her acts, although by English law in the narrower sense he would not have been so liable because his name did not appear in her register.

* The law in England has been changed on this matter by the Pilotage Act, 1913, but the principle remains the same.

§ 199. If an act is not justifiable by the law of the country where it was done, and damages can be recovered for it consistently with the principles of English law, it is no answer to a civil action in England that by the *lex loci delicti commissi* civil proceedings are not allowed to be taken for the act in question unless criminal proceedings accompany or have preceded them, for this is a matter which relates to the form of the remedy and is therefore governed by the *lex fori*.

Scott v. Seymour (1862), 1 H. & C. 219, Pollock, Martin, Wilde; affirmed by Wightman, Williams, Crompton, Willes, Blackburn.

§ 200. But what if an act be not justifiable by the law of the country where it was done, and yet damages are not recoverable for it at all by that law, although the principles of English law would grant them? This question is not likely to arise in criminal cases where real pecuniary damage is done, because the law of England is not more liberal than other laws in granting civil remedies as well as criminal ones for such wrongs. But there are countries, as France, in which no damages are allowed to be claimed on the ground of illicit intercourse, the investigation which would arise being thought hurtful to public morality; and there are probably countries in which redress of a penal nature, but not by way of damages, may be obtained for slight assaults or other personal injuries not resulting in real pecuniary loss.

The question was suggested by the pleadings in *Scott v. Seymour*, but was not properly raised by them, and the point was consequently discussed there but not decided. Wightman thought that an action would lie in this country by one British subject against another for an assault committed where the redress that could be obtained was only penal and not by way of damages, but Williams was not prepared to assent. Blackburn doubted whether in such circumstances no damages would be "recoverable for an assault however violent," but was "disposed to think that the fact of the parties being British subjects would make no difference." (1862), 1 H. & C. 234, 5, 7. Lord Mansfield said in *Mostyn v. Fabrigas*: "If two persons fight in France, and both happening to be casually here one should bring an action of assault against the other, it might be a doubt whether such an action could be maintained here, because, though it is not a criminal prosecution, it must be laid to be against the peace of the king; but the breach of the peace is merely local, though the trespass against the person is transitory. Therefore, without giving any opinion, it might perhaps be triable only where both parties at the time were subjects. . . . Can it be doubted that actions may be maintained here not only upon contracts, which follow the persons, but for injuries done by subject to subject?" (1775), Cowp. 176, 179. In a case in which the English Court would entertain an action for divorce by the husband, it can scarcely be supposed that the co-respondent could escape paying damages on the ground that the adultery

was committed in a country where they are not recoverable for it, if at least it was committed at a time when the English domicile on which the jurisdiction for divorce is founded (above, §§ 44, 45, 50) already existed. Such adultery would be an injury to a conjugal relation deemed to be entitled to protection in the English Court. But then the damages in respect of it, being merely an incident in the proceeding for divorce, could scarcely be drawn into precedent in support of a recovery in an independent action for an injury done abroad. It is probably the better opinion that no such independent action would lie where damages were not granted by the *lex loci delicti commissi* whether the parties were British subjects or not, there being no family relation that could claim the protection of English law, and no civil right acquired by the plaintiff in the primary jurisdiction. See however *Machado v. Fontes*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, Lopes and Rigby; and see *Rayment v. Rayment and Stuart*, [1910] P. at p. 286, Evans, and *Phillips v. Batho*, [1913] 3 K. B. 25, where Scrutton, J., was of opinion that an independent action in England would have lain against an English co-respondent in a divorce suit tried in India. The Indian Court had, in fact, awarded damages against the co-respondent in absence; and the *dictum* was therefore only made *obiter*.

§ 200a. The Fatal Accidents Acts 1846 and 1864 apply for the benefit of the representatives of a deceased foreigner, at all events against a British wrongdoer.

Davidsson v. Hill, [1901] 2 K. B. 606, Kennedy and Phillimore, dissenting from *Adam v. British and Foreign Steamship Company*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 430, Darling, and agreeing with *The Explorer* (1870), L. R. 3 A. & E. 289, Sir R. Phillimore. This was followed in a Scotch case, *Convery v. Lanarkshire Tramways Company*, [1905] 8 Sess. Cas. 5th series, Dunedin, Adam, M'Laren, Kinnear, on the ground that if a claim is recognized both by the *lex fori* and by the *lex loci delicti commissi*, it is immaterial that it is not recognized by the personal law of the plaintiff. A foreign subject, however, is not entitled against a foreign employer to the benefit of the Workmen's Compensation Act on account of an accident happening in England or English territorial waters: *Panagotis v. Pontiac*, [1912] 1 K. B. 74, Cozens-Hardy, Moulton, Farwell, L.JJ.

§ 201. So far as the doctrines stated or considered in the previous §§ do not interfere, an action for tort may be brought and an injunction granted even against a foreigner who is in England.

Caldwell v. Vanvliessengen (1851), 9 Hare 415, Turner.

A provision has in modern times been widely adopted in different countries by which, in collisions at sea, the liability of shipowners for damage done by their ships without their actual fault or privity is limited to the value of the ship and freight. After some enactments applicable only to particular cases, this limitation was first fully adopted in the United Kingdom by the st. 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, s. 1, which did not name any class of ships or owners, so that its effect as to foreign ships and owners was

left to legal reasoning; but after our legislation had remained in that state for about half a century the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act 1862, s. 54, expressly limited the liability of "the owners of any ship, whether British or foreign," to a certain pecuniary amount per ton of her tonnage.* English courts will therefore in future have little occasion to reason out the measure of the liability of foreign shipowners on legal principle, but in a treatise on Private International Law the question of principle cannot be ignored. The general law maritime, with which we had to make acquaintance in considering the property in movables (above, pp. 194--196), being the aggregate of those maritime rules which at a remote period were prevalent in most European countries, of course knew nothing of such a limitation as is here referred to, for at that period shipowners were liable without limit by the laws of their respective countries. What view then will be taken by those who are in the habit of appealing to "the general law maritime as it is administered in England"? The subject had best be introduced by the case of *The Carl Johan*, in which the measure of damage where the laws of the colliding ships are different had to be considered by Lord Stowell.

The Carl Johan (1821), Stowell, is not reported, but is cited in *The Dundee*, 1 Hagg. Adm. 113, and in *The Girolamo*, 3 Hagg. Adm. 186. It was a case of collision between a British and a Swedish ship, the latter being at fault, and the limitation of the owner's liability did not exist by Swedish law but had been recently established in British law by the 53 Geo. 3. It was therefore almost a matter of course that the Swede could not defend himself by the British statute, which was neither his personal law nor the *lex loci delicti commissi*. Lord Stowell is stated to have held "that the new rule introduced by the 52 [read 53] Geo. 3 was one of domestic policy, and that with reference to foreign vessels it only applied in cases where the advantages and disadvantages of such a rule were common to them and to British vessels; that if all states adopted the same rule there would be no difficulty, but that no such general mutuality was alleged; that if the law of Sweden adopted such a rule it would apply to both countries, but that Sweden could not claim the protection of that statute without affording a similar protection to British subjects in similar cases": 3 Hagg. Adm. 187, from Dr. Arnold's notes. It will be observed that in the above Lord Stowell, speaking with reference to the actual state of British law, says that Swedish owners would enjoy the benefit of a similar limitation if it existed by their law. He does not expressly say that if there were no limitation by British law, Swedish owners would yet enjoy the benefit of one existing by their law; but he is stated to have held that the statute

* This rule of the English statute is modified by the later rules of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and also by the provisions of the Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, applying the International Conventions about collisions at sea; but the principle is not affected.

"was a law as to British ships, but not as to foreign ships nor for foreign owners" (1 Hagg. Adm. 113), on which footing it is not easy to see how its presence or absence could make any difference to the liability of a Swedish owner. There remains to be considered what we have seen that Lord Stowell said about mutuality, and on the whole his position was probably this, that the presence or absence of a British statute could make no difference to Swedish liability, but that if a country possessing such a limitation for itself did not allow British owners the benefit of it in its courts, he would be justified on a principle of retorsion in not giving that country the benefit of its limitation in his court.

Thus there is nothing in what has been reported from Lord Stowell that, except from the point of view of retorsion, can impugn the § which, on principle, is next submitted.

§ 202. On principle, in cases of collision at sea, the owners of the delinquent ship may plead a limitation of their liability to the value of the ship and freight when it is accorded to them by the law of their flag. This follows either from considering the law of the delinquent ship as the *lex loci delicti commissi*, in accordance with the fiction by which a ship is deemed to be a part of the territory indicated by her flag, or from holding that there is no local law, and that therefore the defendants are subject to no obligation not imposed on them by their personal law. But the owners of the delinquent ship cannot plead a limitation of liability to the value of the ship and freight which is accorded by the law of the plaintiffs' flag but not by that of their own flag.

"If the maritime law, as administered by both nations to which the respective ships belong, be the same in both in respect to any matter of liability or obligation, such law, if shown to the court, should be followed in that matter in respect to which they so agree, though it differ from the maritime law as understood in the country of the former; for, as respects the parties concerned, it is the maritime law which they mutually acknowledge:" from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered by Bradley, J., in *The Belgenland* (1885), 114 U. S. 355, at p. 370, quoting *The Scotland*, 105 U. S. 24, 31. In the cases arising out of the "Titanic" disaster, 1913, the Supreme Court of the United States, however, held that the British shipowners were entitled in the American court to the benefit of a limitation of liability fixed by the American law, though the vessel in question, which had been lost, was British, and the claimants were U. S. citizens: *Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor*, 233 U. S. 718.

§ 202a. But between Lord Stowell's time and that of the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, 1862, the English courts were disposed to adopt the following doctrine:—The owners of a British ship in collision with a foreign ship are liable only as by British statute law, but the foreign owners of a foreign ship in collision with a British one outside territorial jurisdiction,

though liable under their own law only to the same extent as by British statute law, are subject in England to an unlimited liability by virtue of that branch of English law which is called the general maritime law as administered in England. [Of what is so called it was correctly said by the court of appeal in *Lloyd v. Guibert*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 125, that it is, "to avoid periphrasis, the law of England." See also Lord Justice Brett, in *The Gaetano and Maria*, 7 P. D. 143.]

The first case in which this doctrine appears is probably *Cope v. Doherty* (1858), 4 K. & J. 367, Wood; affirmed (1858), 2 D. J. 614, Knight-Bruce and Turner; in which it was held that the British limitation of liability did not apply to a collision between two American ships more than three miles from the British coast, and Wood said that if it had been averred and proved that the American law was the same as ours he would have been competent to apply it as between Americans, but must still have refused the limitation of liability to the delinquent Americans as against any British part-owners of the American ship which was sunk. The judgments of Wood and Turner discuss elaborately and reject the application of the British act of parliament to limit the liability of the foreign owners of foreign ships on the high seas, a point which might have been expected not to cause much difficulty, but the vice-chancellor did not advert to the question what authority would have imposed the liability to British owners in the case which he put. Knight-Bruce declined to say what would have been his opinion "if one only of the two ships had been British in ownership and character, or if the collision had happened in a British river or a British port." The case put by Wood and reserved by Knight-Bruce arose in *The Wild Ranger* (1862), Lush. 553, Lushington, where an American ship had caused damage to a British one by collision on the high seas, and the American limitation of liability was pleaded. Dr. Lushington refused to admit the limitation, founding himself on the general law maritime, his opinion as to which we have seen above in relation to the transfer of the property in movables.

In *General Iron Screw Collier Company v. Schurmanns* (1860), 1 J. & H. 180, Wood, the British limitation of liability was applied in favour of a British ship against a Dutch one, the collision having taken place within three miles from the coast of England. In *The Amalia* (*Cail v. Papayanni*) (1863), 1 Mo. P. C. (N. S.) 471, judgment affirming Lushington pronounced by Chelmsford, the British limitation of liability was applied in favour of a British ship against a Belgian one, the collision having taken place in the Mediterranean. Both these cases are in accordance with § 202.

It is interesting to inquire out of what order of ideas such a doctrine as that of § 202a can have arisen, so strange as it must seem to those who regard the laws administered by courts of justice as based on sovereignty over persons and territories. Some light may be thrown on the question by a remark of Dr. Lushington when delivering judgment in *The Zollverein*, a case on the rule of the road at sea. He said: "As regards the foreign ship, for her owner cannot be supposed to know or

to be bound by the municipal law of this country, the case must be decided by the law maritime, by those rules of navigation which usually prevail among nations navigating the seas where the collision takes place; if the foreigner comes before the tribunals of this country, the remedy and form of proceeding must be according to the *lex fori*:" Swabey's Adm. Rep. 99. By speaking of the law maritime as the *lex fori* he showed himself to be aware that notwithstanding that specious name it was British law he was really applying to foreigners, giving us perhaps at the same time the clue to his reasoning, namely, that as soon as any particular court of admiralty is recognized as competent to entertain the litigation, its law becomes applicable on the ground of the maxim *si ibi forum ergo et jus*. But that maxim only applies in favour of the court to which any litigation most properly belongs: above, p. 17. And to any one penetrated with the idea that all regular authority in the civilized world is either over persons or over places, it would seem to follow that on the high seas the only regular authority, whether for the enactment of law or for the establishment of normal jurisdiction, must be that of sovereigns and states over (1) their subjects or members, (2) foreigners on board ships rightly carrying their respective flags, (3) pirates; that what is done on the high seas can produce legal effects in accordance with this principle alone; and that though the presence of a ship in a port may give to the local court a *forum rei sitæ*, carrying with it the right of applying to the thing the legal effects of what may have taken place beyond the jurisdiction, it cannot carry that of determining those effects by the law of the court. It must however be admitted that the deduction anciently drawn from the non-territorial character of the high seas was not that no state could exercise regular authority on them without special justification, but that every state could. So one cannot help suspecting that the application of the law of a particular country, under the name of the law maritime, to torts committed by foreigners outside its territory was a survival of the view that the high seas are a field for the exercise of universal and indiscriminate jurisdiction. Indeed this is confessed in what was said by Lord Justice Brett in *Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Company*: "Inasmuch as the rule of exclusive jurisdiction cannot apply, it seems to me that if a foreigner in this country can be served with a writ for an act of his servants done on

the high seas, which are as much within the jurisdiction of England as they are within the jurisdiction of any other country, an action can be maintained in a court of common law": 10 Q. B. D. 537.

§ 203. The conflicting principles of §§ 202 and 202a apply to a law by which, in any country, liability for damage wholly occasioned by the negligence of the master or mariners is imposed on them to the exclusion of the owners. If § 202 is adopted as to the measure of the owners' liability, it must follow that the very existence of their liability must also depend on the law of their flag. If § 202a is adopted, the foreign owners will be liable in England, although freed by their own law.

In *The Leon* (1881), 6 P. D. 148, Sir R. Phillimore, Spanish owners, though said to be freed by the law of Spain, were held to be subject to liability in England for damage caused on the high seas wholly by the negligence of the master or mariners.

§ 204. In cases of collision at sea, the compulsory employment of a pilot will exempt the owners in an English court from liability for damage caused by his fault, whatever be the flags and the laws of them. This agrees with the principle that no act can be treated as a wrong in England which is not such in the defendant by the principles of English law: see § 197.

The Christiana (damage done by foreign ship in the Thames, but no distinction as to the liability founded on the place) (1828), 2 Hagg. Adm. 183, Robinson; *The Vernon* (damage done by British ship to foreign one) (1842), 1 W. Rob. 316, Lushington.

In *The Neptune the Second* (1814), 1 Dods. 467, Scott, and *The Girolamo* (1834), 3 Hagg. Adm. 169, Nicholl, the collisions occurred in British territorial waters, and foreign ships were held liable notwithstanding compulsory pilotage. In the latter case the fault was held to be that of the master himself, so that there was no necessity for objecting to the decision in *The Christiana*, as the learned judge does on p. 188. In the former case the compulsory character of the pilotage is not referred to, and it is therefore possible that Sir W. Scott may have doubted whether the pilotage could strictly be called compulsory, which was another point adverted to by Sir J. Nicholl in *The Girolamo*.

§ 205. When two ships are in danger of collision at sea, the rule of the road to be followed by each is that which is common to their flags, or if at the time no rule is common to their flags, then the old rule which was once common to them.

The question about the application of the British statutory rule of the road at sea differs considerably as well from that

about the application of the British statutory limitation of liability to the value of the ship and freight, as from that about the application of the British statutory exemption from liability, on the ground of compulsory pilotage. From the nature of the case, any rule of the road at sea must apply to both or neither of the ships which are approaching each other, while there is no impossibility in the different parties to a collision being bound by different laws with regard to the existence of liability as depending on other considerations than the rule of the road, or with regard to the measure of liability supposing it to exist. See the quotations in § 197 from the judgment of the privy council in *The Halley*. Also it is a fact, and not a hasty generalization, that there was once a rule of the road at sea common to all the maritime populations of Europe. When therefore the legislature either of the United Kingdom or of any other country alters its rule of the road, it must be presumed, in the absence of expression, to intend that the old rule shall be left standing even for its own subjects, under all circumstances in which the other party to a possible collision is not subject to the new rule and the legislature in question could not claim to impose it on him.

In *The Dumfries* (1856), Swabey 63, Lushington held that the old rule, and not the British statutory one, applied as between a British and a Danish ship. The decision was reversed on the facts (1856), Swabey 125, judgment of the Privy Council delivered by Patteson; the *Dumfries* being held to have been in the wrong, even supposing the act of parliament applied, as to which no opinion was given. In *The Zollverein* (1856), Swabey, 96, Lushington, a Russian ship was not allowed to defend herself against a British one by the latter's violation of the British rule. In *The Chancellor* (*Williams v. Gutch*) (1861), 14 Mo. P. C. 202, Romilly, the inapplicability of the British rule as between a British and an American ship was conceded. In *The Repeater v. The Braga or Krageroe* (1865), 14 L. T. (N. S.) 258, Kelly, the Court of Admiralty of Ireland applied the British rule as between a British and a Norwegian ship, the latter being bound by virtue of a convention between the king of Norway and the queen.

In *The Eclipse and the Saxonia* (*Hamburg American Steamship Company v. North of Scotland Banking Company*) (1862), 15 Mo. P. C. 262; judgment affirming Lushington delivered by Romilly; the British statutory rule was held not to apply as between a British and a foreign vessel in collision at sea within three miles from the coast of England, not even in the Solent, between the Isle of Wight and the mainland of Hampshire. In *H.M.S. King Alfred*, [1914] P. 84, Evans, P., where a Spanish steamship collided with British warships, it was held that there was no negligence on the part of the Spanish ship, which had followed a rule of the Sea Regulations, but had not followed the directions of a Board of Trade notice, issued some years before, to warn vessels against passing through a squadron of warships. The foreign vessel could not be required to know the English regulations.

§ 206. Where the defendant has tortiously had the use of the plaintiff's money or property in a given country, interest on the value must be allowed according to the rate of that country, and judgment given for the sum which will produce the amount in that country at the rate of exchange.

Ekins v. East India Company (1718), 1 P. W. 395, Cowper; affirmed (1718), 2 Bro. P. C. 382. See below, §§ 225 and 226.

After the slave trade had been prohibited by British legislation, but while there were still countries which had not prohibited it, a class of cases used to arise out of injuries done at sea by British officers to subjects of those countries, in the course of attempts to suppress slave-trading by them. The actions were held to lie, because the old rule of public international law permitting the slave trade remained in force in favour of such plaintiffs, and was to that extent a rule of English law; so that the case fell under § 198, and was not inconsistent with the doctrine submitted in § 202, that where there is no local law a defendant can only be liable according to his personal law.

Madrazo v. Willes (1820) 3 B. & Al. 353, Abbott, Bayley, Holroyd, Best.

CHAPTER XII.

CONTRACTS.

Formalities of Contracts.

§ 207. SUBJECT to § 208, the formalities required for a contract by the law of the place where it was made, the *lex loci contractus celebrati*, are sufficient for its external validity in England.

Guépratte v. Young (1851), 4 De G. & S. 217, Knight-Bruce. See above, on p. 76, that learned judge's approval, exceptional for England, of the principle of the *lex loci actus*.

§ 208. But a contract, although externally perfect according to the law of the place where it was made, cannot be enforced in England unless evidenced in such manner as English law requires.

This doctrine is based on the maxim that the *lex fori* governs procedure, but it is far from being universally received abroad, the evidence of a contract being often deemed undistinguishable from its form. Indeed to say that a contract may be validly made without writing, but that it cannot be enforced unless evidenced by writing, appears to be a distinction without a difference, at least when the law of only one country is considered. The distinction may begin to have a meaning when two legal systems are considered, as in this §, though even then the truth will be that while the *lex loci contractus celebrati* deems the contract to be both valid and enforceable, the *lex fori* ignores it altogether. The opinion of Boullenois was that the mode of proof, as for example whether by oral testimony or by writing, depended on the law of the place of contract, as being part of the *vinculum obligationis*;* and to the same effect the Italian code, Preliminary Article 10, says that "the means of proving obligations are determined by the laws of the place where the act was made." Savigny says: "The authority of merchants' books as evidence is to be judged according to the law of the place

* *Traité de la personnalité et de la réalité des Loix*, t. 2, p. 459.

where the books are kept. Their probativeness indeed appears to belong to the law of process, and hence to be properly subject to the *lex fori*. But here it is inseparably connected with the form and effect of the juridical act itself, which here must be regarded as the preponderating element. The foreigner who deals with a merchant belonging to a place where mercantile books are probative subjects himself to its local law.”* This reasoning might be admitted so far as to receive the evidence of such books on the strength of the *lex loci contractus*; and to do so would simply amount to regarding the merchant who made the entry in his book as constituted by the *lex loci contractus* the agent of the other party, empowered to reduce the contract for him into writing in a certain way. But it would still remain that if oral evidence were offered which the *lex fori* excluded, such exclusion, being founded on the desire of preventing perjury, might claim to override any contrary rule of the *lex loci contractus*, not only on the ground of its being a question of procedure, but also because of that reservation in favour of any stringent domestic policy which controls all maxims of private international law.

Evidence by writing must be furnished, where required by the 4th section of the statute of frauds, though the *lex loci contractus celebrati* does not require it. *Leroux v. Brown* (1852), 12 C. B. 801, Jervis, Maule, Talfourd.

So, too, parties suing in the English court upon a contract relating to foreign land must comply with section 4 of the statute. *Coombs v. Quiney*, [1917] 142 L. T. 23, C. A.

§ 209. The formalities required for a contract by the law of the place where it was made, the *lex loci contractus celebrati*, are also necessary for its validity in England.

“The plaintiff cannot recover upon a written contract made in Jamaica, which by the laws of that island was void for want of a stamp.” This is the marginal note of *Alves v. Hodgson* (1797), 7 T. R. 241, in which Kenyon said: “Then it is said that we cannot take notice of the revenue laws of a foreign country; but I think we must resort to the laws of the country in which the note was made, and unless it be good there it is not obligatory in a court of law here.” In *Bristow v. Sequeville* (1850), 5 Exch. 275, Pollock, Rolfe, Alderson, Platt, there was no question of proving the contract, but only of proving that the case provided for by the contract had arisen through the fact of a certain payment having been made, and a receipt was allowed to be used as evidence which could not have been so used where it was given for want of the stamp required in that country. The case therefore rested on the maxim that the *lex fori* governs procedure, and did not raise the point of this §. But Rolfe said: “The marginal note of *Alves v. Hodgson* is perfectly correct, although I cannot

*Syst. § 361, Guthrie 322. “The judicial act” means only “the transaction,” which is so called because it is of a nature to produce legal consequences.

help thinking that there must be some mistake in the report of the case. . . . I agree that if for want of a stamp a contract made in a foreign country is void, it cannot be enforced here. But if that case meant to decide that where a stamp is required by the revenue laws of a foreign state before a document can be received in evidence there, it is inadmissible in this country, I entirely disagree." And Alderson said: "If by the law of a foreign country a document is only inadmissible for want of a stamp, it is a valid contract, and receivable in evidence in another country." There need be no doubt about the accuracy of the report of *Alves v. Hodgson*, Lord Kenyon, as above quoted from it, points out so clearly that the question to try was whether there was an obligation by the *lex loci contractus celebrati*, and implies so clearly that such an obligation was equally absent whether the promissory note by which, if at all, it was constituted, was called void or inadmissible by that law. Grant that certain evidence may be read, it misses the mark if it only proves that a certain transaction took place, and not that an obligation arose on that transaction by the appropriate law.

"I should clearly hold that if a stamp was necessary to render this agreement valid in Surinam, it cannot be received in evidence without that stamp here. A contract must be available by the law of the place where it is entered into or it is void all the world over." Ellenborough, in *Clegg v. Levy* (1812), 3 Camp. 167. An annuity granted in England, and secured on land in Ireland, was void in Ireland if it did not comply with the formalities required by the English annuity act: *Richards v. Gould* (1827), 1 Molloy 22, Hart, who said that "a contract void by operation of law in the place where it is made cannot be set up in any other place." I have put into italics the words in these judgments which are inconsistent with limiting the inefficacy in England to those contracts which are expressly declared void by the *lex loci contractus celebrati*.

In *James v. Catherwood* (1823), 3 D. & R. 190, Abbott, Holroyd, Best, receipts given in France, and inadmissible there for want of stamp, were admitted in order to prove the loan of money. The only reason given was that no notice can be taken of the revenue laws of a foreign country, a reason of which Pollock appeared to approve when he quoted the case in *Bristow v. Sequeville*. To impose on the defendant an obligation which he never incurred by the appropriate law of the transaction, on the ground that he would have incurred it if a foreign revenue law had not stood in the way, is something more than not to notice a foreign revenue law. But in the particular circumstances of *James v. Catherwood* proving a contract of loan was perhaps not indispensable. If the defendant detained the plaintiff's money without lawful excuse there might be an obligation on him by the law of England to restore it, no matter where he received it; and so the case, like *Bristow v. Sequeville*, might be reduced to the proof of a fact.

In *Wynne v. Jackson*, 2 Russ. 352, a *dictum* of Leach is reported, "that the circumstance of [certain] bills being drawn [in France], in such a form that the holder could not recover on them in France, was no objection to his recovering on them in an English court." It has been assumed in quoting this *dictum* that the objection of form was the want of a stamp, but it does not appear to have been so, for it is said that the bills were not "in the form required by the French code." The *dictum* is therefore quite indefensible, and the case appears to have been ultimately decided both by the vice-chancellor, and by Eldon on appeal (1826), on the ground of the consideration for which the bills had been given.

See also, in §§ 227, 228, the rules enacted by the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, as to the forms required in bills of exchange, particularly the non-necessity of the foreign stamp, which makes those instruments an exception to the doctrine here contended for, supposing that doctrine to be sound in general.

§ 210. There is an authority to the effect that a formality, which in the place where the contract was made is an accident without consequence, must have in England the effect which English law would give it.

A contract executed under seal in India, where there is no difference between specialty and simple contract debts, is a specialty in England, and the longer period of limitation applies to it. *Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 429, Lopes.

Interpretation of Contracts.

Supposing that a contract satisfies the conditions required with regard to its formalities, it has next to be interpreted, that is, it must be ascertained what the parties meant by the words they have used; then a question may arise whether the meaning of the parties was not prevented by some rule of law from producing a binding obligation, and therefore, in our subject, a question by what national law the legality of a contract is to be determined; and lastly, if the contract is found to be a lawful one, it will often happen that the parties have expressed no meaning about the particular consequences of it which are under discussion, whence arises in our subject the question by what national law the unexpressed consequences of a contract are to be drawn from it.

On interpretation in private international law there is little to be added to what is said above, pp. 80, 81.

§ 211. "Where a written contract is made in a foreign country and in a foreign language, the court, in order to interpret it, must first obtain a translation of the instrument; secondly, an explanation of the terms of art, if it contains any; thirdly, evidence of any foreign law applicable to the case; and fourthly, evidence of any peculiar rules of construction, if any such rules exist by the foreign law. With this assistance, the court must interpret the contract itself on ordinary principles of construction." Lord Cranworth, in *Di Sora v. Phillipps*, 1863, 10 H. of L. 633. It will be observed that in this passage no rule is laid down as to what law is applicable to the case, supposing, for example, that persons belonging to one country contract in a second for the performance of certain

things in a third. It is not pretended by the learned lord that the law of any of those countries, as such, would govern the interpretation. A consideration of all the facts might lead to the conclusion that words had been used by the parties in the technical sense of this or that law, or it might lead to the conclusion that they had not agreed in any meaning on the point under discussion. And in the latter case the result might be either that there was no obligation on the point, or that an obligation on the point followed, by some law as such, from another point on which the parties had agreed in a meaning. But in every case the interpretation of their meaning would be a question of fact, as it is put above, on p. 80. It is true that in the same case, p. 638, Lord Chelmsford is reported to have said: "It is difficult to understand how the construction of a contract can be a question of fact." But he only desired to say that it was not a question to which a witness could be allowed to depose; that the witnesses could only depose to the more elementary facts which were to guide the court in interpreting the contract for itself. The words which immediately follow in the report—"the construction of a contract is nothing more than the gathering of the intention of the parties to it from the words they have used"—are equivalent to stating that the question is one of fact in the sense here meant. And although Lord Chelmsford added—"if the law applicable to the case has ascribed a peculiar meaning to particular words, the parties using them must be bound by that meaning"—the value of that rule can scarcely extend beyond the case in which the whole transaction, and the persons and things concerned in it, belong to a single territory. To apply it further would require the possession of a rule for the selection of a law on interpretation, which it would be a bold undertaking to furnish.

In *Duncan v. Campbell* (1842), 12 Sim. 616, Shadwell, a deed executed in Scotland, and in Scotch form, was under the circumstances interpreted according to the technical sense of the words in English law. In *Crosland v. Wrigley*, [1895] 73 L. T. 60, Kekewich, and 327, Lindley, Lopes and Rigby, directions to pay money to members of a family were interpreted according to the law of the domicile of the family. Cf. *Re Miller*, [1914] 1 Ch. 511, and *Studd v. Cook*, 8 App. Cas. 571 (above p. 215). See *Addenda*.

There are two important cases in which the facts pointed to the conclusion that in drawing up a contract the parties had at any rate no law except that of England in their mind, and in which, by the simple interpretation of the contract irrespective of any question of the law to be applied to it, no action

was to be brought under it except on an award in an arbitration which was provided for by it, but in both of which cases an attempt to entertain an action under the contract not on such an award was made and defeated. These are *Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery*, [1894] A. C. 202, Herschell, Watson, Ashbourne, Macnaghten, Morris and Shand; in which the attempt was made by the Court of Session, on the ground that the law of Scotland requires that the arbitrators shall be named in an arbitration clause; and *Spurrer v. La Cloche*, [1902] A. C. 446, judgment of himself and Macnaghten, Davey, Robertson and North, delivered by Lindley; in which the attempt was made by the Royal Court of Jersey, on the ground, as was suggested, of some invalidity of the arbitration clause by Jersey law. The language of their lordships in each case did not distinguish between the interpretation of a contract on the one hand, and its legality and unexpressed consequences or intrinsic validity and effects on the other hand, as has here been done and as it has been usual to do in private international law; although in the second case the judicial committee in fact treated the question as one of interpretation, by saying that "the contract is one on which no cause of action could accrue until the amount to be paid had been determined by arbitration, and by arbitration as provided by the contract." Dealing without distinction with the topics that can arise on this branch of our subject, they assumed that some law must have been contemplated by the parties, and, concluding in each case that this was English law, they gave as their *ratio decidendi* what the judicial committee thus express in the second case: "that the intention of the parties to a contract is the true criterion by which to determine by what law it is to be governed is too clear for controversy; see *Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery*; and the intention is here unmistakable."

Intrinsic Validity and Effects of Contracts.

Supposing that a contract satisfies the conditions required with regard to its formalities, and that it has been interpreted so far as the meaning of the parties has been expressed in it, there remain the questions which are usually described as those of its legality and unexpressed consequences, or those of its intrinsic validity and effects. Another term which is sometimes used, the obligation of a contract, will include them all.

At this point begins the competition between the *lex loci contractus celebrati* and the law of the place of fulfilment, intending by the latter the law of that jurisdiction which would be the *forum contractus* according to true Roman principles. The dicta of the English judges are mainly on the side of the former, which at the time when the maxims of private international law were imported into this country was almost universally preferred on the continent, under the influence of mistaken views as to the *forum contractus* in Roman law. Also the *locus contractus celebrati* and the *locus actus* being the same, our judges, who were little acquainted with the principle of the *lex loci actus*, were led to refer to the *lex loci contractus celebrati* that operation with regard to the formalities of contracts, and even with regard to their interpretation, so far as any one might be disposed to attribute a binding authority to the technical sense of words, which elsewhere was perhaps more often referred to the *lex loci actus*; and they were thereby confirmed in their adherence to the *lex loci contractus celebrati* where it no longer ran parallel to the *lex loci actus*, but competed with the law of the place of fulfilment. But the reasons which plead for the law of the place of fulfilment as in general determining the obligation of a contract are so substantial, resting as they do on the general probability that it is there such obligation will be discussed and enforced, that the English judges have often abstained from actually giving to the place of contracting that paramount influence which their dicta ascribe to it.

Thus no dictum in favour of the place of contract can be stronger than that of Lord Justice Turner, in delivering the judgment of the privy council in *The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company v. Shand*, 1865, 3 Moo. P. C., N. S. 290. "The general rule is that the law of the country where a contract is made governs as to the nature, the obligation, and the interpretation of it. The parties to a contract are either the subjects of the power there ruling, or as temporary residents owe it a temporary allegiance: in either case equally they must be understood to submit to the law there prevailing, and to agree to its action upon their contract. It is of course immaterial that such agreement is not expressed in terms; it is equally an agreement in fact, presumed *de jure*, and a foreign court interpreting or enforcing it on any contrary rule defeats the intention of the parties, as well as neglects to observe the recognized

comity of nations." Yet the same judge immediately proceeded as follows: "Their lordships are speaking of the general rule; there are no doubt exceptions and limitations on its applicability, but the present case is not affected by these, and seems perfectly clear as to the actual intention of the contracting parties. This is a contract made between British subjects in England, substantially for safe carriage from Southampton to Mauritius. The performance is to commence in an English vessel, in an English port; to be continued in vessels which for this purpose carry their country with them; to be fully completed in Mauritius; but liable to breach, partial or entire, in several other countries in which the vessels might be in the course of the voyage. Into this contract, which the appellants frame and issue, they have introduced for their own protection a stipulation, professing in its terms to limit the liability which according to the English law the contract would otherwise have cast upon them." According to the French law, in force at Mauritius, a stipulation so limiting the company's liability would be ineffectual; but the privy council held, reversing the judgment pronounced at Mauritius, that it was effectual in the case. "The actual intention of the parties," said Turner, "must be taken clearly to have been to treat this as an English contract, to be interpreted according to the rules of English law; and as there is no rule of general law or policy setting up a contrary presumption, their lordships will hold that the court below was wrong in not governing itself according to those rules."

Now let us consider what was involved in the case, and in the judgment as above cited. When a contract was entered into which expressly purported to limit the liability of the company, there could be no serious question but that the parties intended to limit the liability of the company. The real question was whether that intention was lawful, and therefore effectual, and this depended on whether the law of England or of Mauritius was to govern: nor was any step really gained by pointing out that the parties, so far as they thought of either law, must have intended to adopt the one which would make their contract good, because the lawfulness of this second intention would remain as open to question as that of the intention to limit the liability of the company. The court at Mauritius held that the law of that island governed because it was the place where the carriage contracted for was to end, and in that sense the place of

fulfilment. The privy council decided in favour of the law of England, but neither substantially nor nominally on the bare ground of its being that of the place of contract, notwithstanding the strong dictum with which they commence. Substantially, they point out that the fulfilment of the contract was to be the whole carriage, and not merely its termination, and they refer to the English character of the company by calling the contract one made between British subjects: nominally, they build on the presumed intention of the parties to adopt English law. Now if the reader will turn to Savigny's examination of the *forum contractus* above, pp. 231, 232, he will see that the case did not fall under I, because among all the places over which the fulfilment was to extend none was specially fixed, but that it fell under II, by reason of the obligation arising out of the company's course of business in England, and also under III, by reason of the English character of the company; and that therefore, for reasons agreeing with the substantial grounds of the privy council, England was the Roman *forum contractus*. And as to the nominal ground, it may be confidently believed that if it had been the English law which prohibited the limitation of the company's liability, and the French which allowed it, the decision of the privy council would still have been in favour of the English law, and nothing would have been said about the intention of the parties to adopt the law which made their contract good.

And dicta of English judges are not wholly wanting on the side of the place of fulfilment, as against that where the contract was made. In *Robinson v. Bland*, 1760, Lord Mansfield said, "the law of the place can never be the rule where the transaction is entered into with an express view to the law of another country as the rule by which it is to be governed:" Burr. 1078. The question was about the lawfulness of the consideration for a bill of exchange drawn by a person in one country on himself in another; and as the law of the latter country was opposed to a recovery on the bill, and there was nothing but the place the bill was drawn on from which to infer a view to that law, Lord Mansfield can have meant by "an express view" to it nothing special to the case, but merely that tacit expectation which may always be said to be directed to the place of fulfilment, even when the result of appealing to that place is to defeat the specific intentions of the parties.

§ 212. In these circumstances it may probably be said with

truth that the law by which to determine the intrinsic validity and effects of a contract will be selected in England on substantial considerations, the preference being given to the country with which the transaction has the most real connection, and not to the law of the place of contract as such.

This principle was illustrated in *Jacobs v. Crédit Lyonnais*, 12 Q. B. D. 589; (1883), Denman and Manisty; (1884), Brett and Bowen; and *Re Missouri Steamship Co.*, 42 Ch. D. 321; (1888), Chitty, affirmed in 1889 by Halsbury, Cotton and Fry. In both cases the law chosen was in fact that of the Roman *forum contractus* as explained by Savigny. But in both cases a stress was laid by the learned judges on the intention of the parties, as the governing element in the choice of a law.

In the last edition, however, Westlake justified the rule laid down in the § thus:—When a case shall arise in which the nature and circumstances of a contract shall point to judging its validity by a law unfavourable to it, and the court shall be asked to judge its validity by another law because the parties must be presumed to have intended, or may even have said that they intended, to contract with reference to a law by which their contract would be upheld, the judges may be confidently expected to decline such a request. See *Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation v. Sjöforsakrings Aktiebolaget Vega*, [1902] 2 K. B. 384, Collins, Mathew, Cozens-Hardy, affirming Bigham, [1901] 2 K. B. 562. Two more recent decisions may be noted here; and the second may be said to have affirmed his principle. *Income and General Investment Trust, Lim. v. Borax Consolidated, Lim.*, [1920] 1 K. B. 539, Sankey and Ralli Bros. v. *Companhia Naviera Sota Y Aznar*, [1920] 1 K. B. 614, Bailhache, affirmed by C. A. Sterndale, M.R., Warrington, Scrutton, L.J.J., [1920] 2 K. B. 257. In the first case a railway company incorporated in the United States issued bonds to the plaintiff company and undertook to pay the principal and interest in England, and the defendant company, which was a party to the deed of trust, guaranteed payment if the plaintiffs made default. Both plaintiff and defendant companies were English, and the plaintiff company agreed to be sued in England. Subsequently, an income tax was imposed by the American Government on income derived by a foreign corporation, and the railway company claimed to deduct the income tax in making the payment of interest due. It was held that the claim was not good, that by English law there was no right to consider payment of foreign tax as a discharge of the English contract, and no implied stipulation could be read in the contract that tax laws of the United States were enforceable against the plaintiffs in England. There was no illegality in performing the contract strictly, and it was not the duty of the English court to enforce the taxation laws of a foreign country. In the other case, the question at issue was whether the court in determining the rights under an English charterparty by which part of the contract was to be performed in Spain should have regard to a Spanish law which limited the amount of freight to be charged. It was held that as regards the part of the contract to be executed in Spain the Spanish law must be considered and the illegality imposed by that law made the terms of the contract invalid and unenforceable. Cf. also, *Trinidad Shipping Co. v. Alston*, [1920] A. C. 888, Parmoor, Haldane and Moulton, where an agreement made in English territory to allow rebates on freights paid for carriage of goods to a foreign country was held enforceable, though payment

of rebates would make the shipowner liable to penalties in accordance with the foreign law.

In *British South Africa Company v. De Beers Consolidated Mines*, [1910] 1 Ch. 354, [1910] 2 Ch. 502, Swinfen Eady and the Court of Appeal, Cozens-Hardy, Farwell and Kennedy, applied English law as the proper law of a contract relating to a charge on immovables abroad and consequently held one of the most vital terms of the contract to be void, although by the *lex situs* of a large part of the immovables this term would have been valid. Swinfen Eady, while referring the determination of the proper law of the contract to the intention of the parties, declined to presume an intention based on the legality of the term in the *lex situs*. Kennedy also referred the question to the intention of the parties; but Cozens-Hardy and Farwell decided the point in accordance with § 212 without any reference to presumed intention. The real determining factor in *Hansen v. Dixon*, [1906] 23 T. R. 56, Bray, cited under § 224, in which the intention of the parties was referred to, was the place of intended performance of the contract, a promise of marriage.

Even where the supposed intention of the parties has nominally been relied on, it has been in fact nothing more than a fictitious intention presumed from following the doctrine of this §, and has been in itself no substantial guide to the choice of law.

The following cases have been decided in accordance with § 212: *Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 79, Esher, Lindley and Lopes affirming Day; a case in which the questions of interpretation and effect are so clearly distinguished that it is worth while to quote from the marginal note: "Held that the intention of the plaintiff was to be ascertained by evidence of competent translators and experts, including if necessary Brazilian lawyers, and that if according to such evidence the intention appeared to be that the authority should be acted on in England, the extent of the authority, so far as transactions in England were concerned, must be determined by English law." *The Mary Thomas*, [1894] P. 108, Gorell Barnes, affirmed by Lindley, A. L. Smith, and Davey; *South African Breweries v. King*, [1899] 2 Ch. 173, Kekewich, quoting § 212 with approval; affirmed, [1900] 1 Ch. 273, Lindley, Vaughan Williams, Romer. Followed in *Hicks v. Maxton*, 1 W. C. C. 150, a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where it was held that a servant living in England who was taken over to France to do work and there suffered injury was not entitled to recover compensation, because, in the absence of evidence that the *lex loci contractus* was to govern the agreement, the law of the place of fulfilment applied.

See what has been said about marriage settlements or contracts, above, § 39.

Before coming in detail to the cases in which some other country may compete with the place where the contract was made as the truest seat of the transaction in question, and therefore as the country giving to the contract its proper law, it will be convenient to take the cases in which the *lex fori* competes with the law prevailing in the unquestioned seat of the transaction.

§ 213. A contract which is illegal by its proper law cannot be enforced. This follows from the consideration that no obligation can be imposed by the *lex fori* as such, that is, when the forum is not the proper forum of the transaction. And if any part of a contract is illegal by the law of the place of performance that part is invalidated.

Heriz v. Riera (1840), 11 Sim. 318, Shadwell. *Ralli Bros. v. Companhia Naviera, etc.* (u.s.), and see *Ford v. Cotesworth*, 5 Q. B. 544, Kelly, Maule, and (?), *Cunningham v. Down*, 3 C. P. D. 443.

A number of cases have decided that the law of England does not regard it as wrong to violate the laws of a foreign country concerning revenue or trade, and that therefore a contract of which the proper law is that of England may be enforced notwithstanding that it contemplated such a violation. *Planché v. Fletcher* (1779), 1 Doug. 251, Mansfield and (?); *Lever v. Fletcher* (1780), Park on Marine Insurances, 8th ed., p. 506, Mansfield; *Simeon v. Bazett* (1813), 2 M. & S. 94, Ellenborough and (?); affirmed (1814), *sub nom. Bazett v. Meyer*, 5 Taunt. 824, Thomson and (?); *Sharp v. Taylor* (1849), 2 Ph. 801, see p. 816, Cottenham. The justice of this doctrine need not here be considered, because even if admitted it would not lead to the conclusion that a contract can be enforced here which produced no obligation by its proper law, when the cause of such invalidity was the violation of the trade or revenue laws of the country concerned. This however was done in *Boucher v. Lawson* (1735), Cases temp. Hardwicke 85, Hardwicke, Page and Lee; unless that case can be supported on the ground that a contract to carry from one country to another properly belongs to the latter country. See § 222.

It may here be mentioned that a contract having for its object to revolutionize a friendly country, or to supply funds to an insurgent government not recognized by the sovereign of these realms, will not be enforced in England. *Jones v. Garcia del Rio* (1823), T. & R. 297, Eldon; *Biré v. Thompson*, mentioned by Shadwell in *Taylor v. Barclay*, 2 Sim. 222, Eldon; *Macnamara v. D'Evreux* (1824), 3 L. J. Ch. 156, Leach; *De Witz v. Hendricks* (1824), 9 Moore 586, 2 Bing. 314, Best; *Thompson v. Powles* (1828), 2 Sim. 194—*sub nom. Thompson v. Barclay*, 6 L. J. Ch. 93—Shadwell; *Taylor v. Barclay* (1828), 2 Sim. 213, Shadwell. The last case shows that the court will take judicial notice of the fact that the insurgent government had not been recognized, notwithstanding that the contrary is averred in the pleadings. When in any pleadings a state is mentioned which has not been recognized by the sovereign of these realms, and it may possibly be not an insurgent one but a new state in a region previously uncivilized, the party averring its existence must prove it: *Macgregor v. Lowe* (1824), 1 C. & P. 200, Ry. & Mo. 57, Abbott.

§ 213a. But the fact that the performance of a contract in England has been made impossible by some act of a foreign government or by *force majeure* at the place of fulfilment does not make it invalid or prevent damages being awarded for its breach according to its proper law.

Blackburn Bobbin Co. v. Williams & Sons, [1918] 1 K. B. 540, McCardie. Defendants sold to plaintiffs timber to be imported from

Finland and to be delivered to plaintiffs in England. They could not carry out the contract owing to the impossibility of obtaining the timber in Finland, and it was held that they were liable in damages, the non-performance not being excused on account of inevitable necessity abroad.

§ 214. Where a contract contemplated the violation of English law, it cannot be enforced here notwithstanding that it may have been valid by its proper law.

Biggs v. Lawrence (1789), 3 T. R. 454, Kenyon, Ashhurst, Buller, Grose, all however grounding their opinion on the fact that three of the partners who sued lived in England at the time the contract was made; *Clugas v. Penaluna* (1791), 4 T. R. 466, where there was a sole plaintiff, resident in the country of the contract, but a British subject, on which fact Kenyon grounded his opinion, and possibly Grose, while Ashhurst and Buller took the broad ground expressed in the §; *Waymell v. Read* (1794), 5 T. R. 599, Kenyon, Buller, and Grose, where the plaintiff was not a British subject, and the doctrine of the § was finally adopted. It had been laid down by Lord Mansfield in *Holman v. Johnson* (1775), Comp. 341, but could not be applied either there or in *Pellectat v. Angell* (1835), 2 Cr. M. & R. 311, Abinger, Bolland, Alderson, Gurney, because the delivery of the goods sold was complete abroad, and nothing was done by the seller to assist in smuggling them into England, though he knew the buyer's intention to do so. In the cases before Lord Kenyon the seller packed the goods in a peculiar manner, for the purpose of smuggling.

In *Santos v. Illidge* (1859), 6 C. B. (N. S.) 841; and on appeal (1860), 8 C. B. (N. S.) 861; the action was by a Brazilian against British subjects, for non-delivery of slaves sold by them in Brazil, and the question was whether they had been prohibited from selling them by a British act of parliament. If they had, the contract did not contemplate the violation of British law, but was in actual violation of it, and there could of course be no recovery on it in England. It was held incidentally by Bramwell and Blackburn that a right of property acquired in Brazil to slaves there, through a purchase made there and lawful there, must be recognized in England as a valid Brazilian right, capable of existing and being transferred in that country, even though the purchaser, being a British subject, should be held to have committed felony under a British act of parliament in acquiring it: 8 C. B. (N. S.) 873, 876. Blackburn however thought the point would be questionable "if the vendor was a domiciled British subject." The doctrine, perhaps even without this limitation, seems plain enough; but the contrary was held by Willes, Williams and Byles in the lower court, and by Wightman and Pollock in the higher court. In a number of cases arising during the war out of the contractual relations between Englishmen and enemy subjects it was held that, whatever the law under which the contract was made, the war put an end to all executory contracts which for their further performance required intercourse between a subject of the King and an alien enemy or any person voluntarily residing in the enemy country. *Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co.*, [1918] A. C. 260, Parker, Dunedin and Atkinson. *Naylor Benzon & Co. v. Krainische*, I. G., [1918] 1 K. B. 331, McCardie: affirmed by C. A. [1918] 2 K. B. 486. The contracts were for delivery over a long period of metals to German firms, in which it was provided that in case of war the delivery of the instalments should be suspended; and it was held that this condition

could not stand because contrary to English law, and the whole contract was abrogated.

§ 215. Where a contract conflicts with what are deemed in England to be essential public or moral interests, it cannot be enforced here notwithstanding that it may have been valid by its proper law.

The plaintiff in such a case encounters that reservation in favour of any stringent domestic policy, with which alone any maxims for giving effect to foreign laws can be received: see above, pp. 51, 52. The difficulty in every particular instance cannot be with regard to the principle, but merely whether the public or moral interests concerned are essential enough to call it into operation; and where a breach of English law is not contemplated, this is necessarily a question on which there is room for much difference of opinion among judges.

This § was cited with approval in *Kaufman v. Gerson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 591, Collins, Romer and Mathew, reversing Wright, [1903] 2 K. B. 114, in which the court refused to enforce a contract between persons domiciled in France, there obtained by moral coercion, and said by an expert to be nevertheless valid there. It was applied again in *Société des Hôtels Réunis v. Hawker*, [1913] 29 T. L. R. 878, Scrutton, where the court held payment of a cheque obtained in France from an Englishman under duress for the purpose of paying a gambling debt of another could not be enforced in England, though the transaction was lawful in France. See *Re Fitzgerald, Surman v. Fitzgerald*, quoted above, p. 79, where two learned judges out of four held that a strictly alimentary provision for an adult male is contrary to public policy in England.

Suppose an action to be brought here for money won at play, or lent for the purpose of play, where the *lex loci contractus* gives a right of action. In *Robinson v. Bland* (1760), Burr. 1077, Mansfield gave no opinion on the point, no difference between the law of England and the *lex loci contractus* being established; but Denison and Wilmot thought the law of England would in any case prevent the recovery. In *Quarrier v. Colston* (1842), 1 Ph. 147, Lyndhurst held that the law of England would not prevent the recovery. And this was followed in *Saxby v. Fulton*, [1909] 2 K. B. 208, Bray, affirmed by Vaughan Williams, Buckley, Kennedy, on the ground that the enforcement of a loan for the purpose of gaming in a foreign country, where such gaming is legal, is not contrary to the policy of English law.

In *Wynne v. Callender* (1826), 1 Russ. 293, Gifford, bills accepted abroad for money lost at play in England were held not to be enforceable here, but it does not appear whether this was on the ground of the domestic policy of the *lex fori*, or on the ground of the *lex loci contractus* of the consideration for the bills. In *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746, Collins and Cozens-Hardy (Moulton dissenting, on a special view of the English law), a cheque drawn in France on an English bank for money lost at play in France was held not to be enforceable here, although valid by the law of France, on the ground that the law applicable to the cheque was the place of payment, and also that the Gaming Acts, 1845

and 1892, which declare that no action shall be brought, make the *lex fori* apply as introducing a rule of procedure, and Cozens-Hardy expressly declined to consider the question of public policy (p. 756). See, too, *Société des Hôtels v. Hawker*, (u.s.).

The English court will not enforce an agreement between husband and wife which contained a stipulation for facilitating proceedings in England for divorce, or, where the parties are British subjects though domiciled abroad, a stipulation as to the custody of the children which they could not have entered into by English law, even though the objectionable stipulations have been carried into effect: *Hope v. Hope* (1857), 8 D. M. G. 731, Knight-Bruce and Turner; in which case (1856), 22 Beav. 351, Romilly had held that the rest of the agreement might be enforced if the objectionable stipulations had been carried into effect. The English court likewise will not enforce, as being contrary to public policy, an agreement to pay perpetual alimony to a woman who was the mother of an illegitimate child. *Re Macartney*, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, Astbury. The court refused on this ground to override the title to property lying in Russia which a subject of that country, being the owner by the law of his state, had sold for export to England, and would not allow the principles on which the foreign government had acted to be examined. *Luther v. Sagor & Co.*, [1921] 1 K. B. 456, Roche.

A contract relating to an English litigation being impeached on the ground of champerty, the law of England condemning it prevails over the *lex loci contractus* supporting it. *Grell v. Levy* (1864), 16 C. B. (N. S.) 73; Erle, Williams, Willes.

If a contract, so far as it affects trade in England, is open to the objection which lies by English law against contracts in undue restraint of trade, it cannot be enforced here notwithstanding that it is valid by the *lex loci contractus*: *per Fry*, in *Rousillon v. Rousillon* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 351, at p. 369. See also § 341 below.

Conversely an agreement made in Italy to pay a debt to an Italian on account of a moral obligation without valuable consideration was held enforceable here, because the principle that there must be such consideration to support an English contract is not a ground of public policy, *Re Bonacina*, [1912] 2 Ch. 394 C. A., Cozens-Hardy, Farwell, Kennedy.

We now come to the cases in which the competition is not between the *lex fori* and the law prevailing in a place which is the unquestioned seat of the transaction.

§ 216. Contracts relating to immovables are governed by their proper law as contracts, so far as the *lex situs* of the immovables does not prevent their being carried into execution.

Campbell v. Dent (1838), 2 Mo. P. C. 292, Lushington. *Bank of Africa Lim. v. Cohen*, [1909] 2 Ch. 129, Eve, Cozens-Hardy, Buckley, Kennedy, where the contract could not be carried into execution owing to the incapacity of a married woman by the *lex situs*. *British South Africa Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Lim.* (cited under § 212), where this § was cited with approval, [1910] 2 Ch., at p. 514. See also above, § 163. *Halford v. Clark*, [1915] 50 L. T. 68. See above, p. 217.

§ 217. Contracts impeached as violating monopolies.

Pattison v. Mills (1828), 1 D. & Cl. 342 (and *sub nom. Albion Insurance Co. v. Mills*, 3 W. & Sh. 218), Lyndhurst: contract made by a company sustained on ground of *lex loci contractus*, notwithstanding that in the company's country the contract would have been illegal because of a monopoly enjoyed there by others.

§ 218. Contracts for service.

A contract for service belongs, so far as the liability of the hirer is concerned, to the country where it is made and in which the hirer lives, and not to that in which the service is to be rendered.

This was Best's opinion, at *nisi prius*, on the question of liability to interest: *Arnott v. Redfern* (1825), 2 C. & P. 88. And see *South African Breweries v. King*, [1899] 2 Ch. 173, [1900] 1 Ch. 273. *Re Anglo-Austrian Bank*, [1920] 1 Ch. 69, Younger.

A barrister's right to sue and recover payment for his services depends on the law affecting his bar, and not on that of the place where he is retained or of that where his services are to be performed; and the same principle applies in the case of any other skilled practitioner.

Queen v. Doutré (1884), 9 Ap. Ca. 745, Watson.

As to service at sea, the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, s. 265, enacts that "where in any matter relating to a ship or to a person belonging to a ship there appears to be a conflict of laws, then, if there is in this part of the act" [part 2, Masters and Seamen, sects. 92—266] "any provision on the subject which is hereby expressly made to extend to that ship, the case shall be governed by that provision; but if there is no such provision, the case shall be governed by the law of the port at which the ship is registered."

§ 219. The operation of a contract of affreightment depends on the law of the flag, that is, on the personal law of the ship-owner. If the owner finds it convenient to register his ship in another country, it is still his law, and not that of the material flag, which is intended by the expression: see what was said by Lord Justice Brett, in *Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands India Steam Navigation Company*, 1882, 10 Q. B. D., at pp. 534—536.

In *Lloyd v. Guibert* a French ship was chartered by her master to a British subject, in a Danish port, for a voyage from a Haytian port to England; and the question was as to the owner's liability to indemnify the charterer against a bottomry bond on ship, freight and cargo, made during that voyage in a Portuguese port. It was decided in 1864, 33 L. J.

Q. B. 241, by Blackburn, Cockburn and Mellor—Compton is added in the report in 6 B. & S. 100—that the master's authority to bind the owner towards the charterer depended on the law of his flag; which was in accordance with the decision of Story, as a United States judge, in *Pope v. Nickerson* (1844), 3 Story 465. On appeal (1865), L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, and 6 B. & S. 100, it was decided by Willes, Erle, Pollock, Martin, Keating and Pigott, not only that this was so, but also that the owner could equally have defended himself by the law of his flag if he had been present in the foreign port and made the contract of affreightment himself.

The master's authority to bind the cargo by a contract of bottomry may also be considered as a result of the contract of affreightment, by virtue of which he receives the cargo on board; and that this authority depends on the law of the flag has been accordingly held in *Droege v. Suart*, or *The Karnak* (1869), L. R. 2 P. C. 505, Erle, and in *The Gaetano and Maria* (1882), 7 P. D. 137, Brett, Cotton and Coleridge, reversing Phillimore (1881), 7 P. D. 1. In *The Equator*, [1921] 10 C. C. Rep. 76, Duke, Hill, it was held that the rule whereby an agent contracting for a foreign principal is presumed to contract for himself has no application to a contract to supply necessaries to a ship made by the owners' agents in a foreign port.

The master's authority to bind the ship and freight by a contract of bottomry depends on the same principle as the narrower of the two decisions in *Lloyd v. Guibert*, for he can have no other authority to bind the owner towards the lender than towards the charterer. It has been seen in § 150 that the acquisition of real rights, as those of pledge or lien, even in movables, is generally to be decided by the *lex situs*. But if a question of agency arises, the *lex situs*, as remarked on p. 200, cannot confer an authority as against a person who is not subject to it.

The master's authority to sell the cargo depends on the law of the flag: *The August*, [1891] P. 328, Hannon. And so does the right to freight on the cargo sold by the master: *The Industrie*, [1894] P. 58, Gorell Barnes; unless the contract otherwise expresses: S. C., ib., Esher, Lopes and Kay, differing from Gorell Barnes as to the interpretation of the contract. But see above, pp. 198, 199, for the title to the cargo sold.

Whether the master has duly delivered the cargo depends on the law of the flag: *The Stettin* (1889), 14 P. D. 142, Brett.

In *Re Missouri Steamship Company* (1888), 42 Ch. D., at p. 327, it is said by Chitty that the law of the flag "ought to be applied not merely to questions of construction and the rights incidental to or arising out of the contract of affreightment, but to questions as to the validity of stipulations in the contract itself."

The law of the flag however is of no authority as against an insurer: *Greer v. Poole* (1880), 5 Q. P. D. 272, Lush and Cockburn.

Laydays run from what by the custom of the port of discharge is considered to be arrival. *Norden Steamship Co. v. Dempsey* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 654, Coleridge, Brett, Lindley. This however belongs rather to the interpretation than to the operation of the contract.

See on the subject of this § *The Patria* (1871), L. R. 3 A. & E. 436, Phillimore, and *The Express* (1872), L. R. 3 A. & E. 597, Phillimore.

§ 220. General average.

Owners are bound by a general average adjustment made at the port of destination according to the law of that port; and so are insurers, so

far as the loss incurred by the insured, or to which the insured is obliged to contribute, arose from a peril insured against or its consequences, or from proper endeavours made in order to avert a peril insured against or its consequences; *Harris v. Scaramanga* (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 481, Bovill, Keating, Brett; *The Mary Thomas*, [1894] P. 108, Gorell Barnes, affirmed by Lindley, A. L. Smith, Davey. This, so far as concerns the liability of insurers, agrees with *Walpole v. Ewer* (1789), Park on Marine Insurances, 8th ed., p. 898, Kenyon, and with the result in *Newman v. Cazalet*, ib., p. 899, Buller, though there it was put on usage and not on law; but it overrules *Power v. Whitmore* (1815), 4 M. & S. 141, Ellenborough, Le Blanc and Bayley, in which no usage was proved, and the law was held to be that an insurer is only bound by a general average stated according to his *lex loci contractus*.

See *De Hart v. Compañia Anonima de Seguros "Aurora,"* [1903] 1 K. B. 109, Kennedy; [1903] 2 K. B. 503, Vaughan Williams, Romer, Stirling; and Gorell Barnes in *The Brigella*, [1893] P., at p. 201.

§ 221. Marine insurance.

Whether the insured is accountable to the insurer who has paid him, for money received *aliunde* in respect of the loss, depends on the law governing the contract of insurance: *Burnand v. Rodocanachi* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 424, Coleridge; see end of judgment, where there can be little doubt that the law of the contract was intended to be referred to though the *lex fori* is mentioned. Also see § 220, and *Greer v. Poole*, quoted under § 219.

§ 222. The contract of a carrier to carry passengers or goods from one country to another.

As to illegality of charge on the ground of inequality. Erle, and perhaps also Keating, seem to have considered that this would depend on the *lex loci contractus*, and not on the law of the carrier's country, in *Branley v. South Eastern Railway Co.* (1862), 12 C. B. (N. S.) 63; but it was not necessary to decide the point.

As to legality of stipulation limiting liability. *Lex loci contractus*, where the contract is made in the proper country of the company which is the carrier: *Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Shand* (1865), 3 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 272, Turner. See above, p. 286. In *Cohen v. South Eastern Railway Co.* (1877), 2 Ex. D. 253, the company made the contract abroad, in a country the law of which was held to be the same on the point as that of the company's country; but had it been necessary to choose between them, Baggallay leant to the *lex loci contractus*, and Mellish to the law of the company's country, taking into account that the other party belonged to the same country, while Brett leant to the latter law without referring to that circumstance.

A regulation concerning carriage of goods at sea was drawn up at the International Law Association's Conference at the Hague in 1921, and is being adopted by the Chambers of Commerce in many countries, including England, but at present the rules have no binding force as law.*

§ 223. Agency.

The right of an undisclosed principal to sue on a contract made by the agent with a third party, and the consequences of

* See an article in the *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, 1922, p. 24.

that contract if so sued on, depend on the law which governs that contract, and not on the law which governs the contract between the undisclosed principal and the agent.

Maspons v. Mildred (1882), 9 Q. B. D. 530, Lindley, Jessel and Bowen.

§ 223a. The contract between the preference and ordinary stockholders of a company is governed by the law of the company, that is, by the law of the country where the company is domiciled.

Spiller v. Turner, [1897] 1 Ch. 911, Kekewich.

§ 223b. A contract under the Sale of Goods Act for the supply of goods which are to the knowledge of the vendor to be exported to a foreign country will not be invalid, though the goods are not legally saleable in that country. There is no implied warranty that the goods will be merchantable in the place of ultimate destination. *Sumner, Permain & Co. v. Webb & Co.*, [1921] W. N. p. 306, C. A., Bankes; Scrutton, Atkins, reversing Bailhache.

§ 223c. A contract for the performing rights in England of French plays was held to be governed by French principles of interpretation. *Serra v. Famous Lasky Film Service, Ltd.*, [1921] W. N. 347, Eve; affirmed C. A., [1922] W. N. 44.

§ 224. Place of contracting in the case of contracts *inter absentes*.

When a contract is made by an interchange of letters or telegrams, it is held to have been made, so far as that may be important, at the place from which the reply concluding the contract is despatched.

Cowan v. O'Connor (1888), 20 Q. B. D. 640, Manisty and Hawkins. The contract arising from an offer of marriage contained in a letter sent from England and accepted by letter despatched from Denmark was held to be governed by English law, but this was chiefly on the ground that the contemplated place of performance was England: *Hansen v. Dixon*, [1906] 23 T. R. 56, Bray.

Posting a parcel from one country to another, in response to an order directing it to be sent by post, is an act done only in the former country, and not in the latter, although its consequence is a transit of the parcel within the latter: *Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Henry Johnson & Co. and Basle Chemical Works, Bindschedler*, [1897] 2 Ch. 322, Lindley and A. L. Smith, reversing North, Rigby dissenting; reversal affirmed, [1898] A. C. 200, Halsbury, Herschell, Macnaghten, Shand, Davey.

A power of attorney intended to be acted on in a given country will operate according to the law of that country: *Chatenay v. Brazilian Submarine Telegraph Co.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 79, Esher and Lindley, affirming Day.

§ 225. Interest will be given by the court according to the law of that country in which the principal ought to have been paid.

Champant v. Ranelagh (1700), Pre. Ch. 128, 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 289, wrongly reported in 2 Vern. 395, Wright; *Ellis v. Loyd* (1701), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 289; *Dungannon v. Hackett* (1702), 1 Eq. Ca. Abr. 288; *Stapleton v. Conway* (1750), 1 Ves. Sen. 427, Hardwicke (in *Connor v. Bellamont* (1742), 2 Atk. 382, Hardwicke, it probably appeared that the sum secured by the bond was to be paid in Ireland); *Bodily v. Bellamy* (1760), Burr. 1094, Mansfield, where the distinction is drawn between the interest to be incorporated in the judgment and that which the judgment bears, the latter being governed by the *lex fori*. In the above cases the question was as to the rate of interest, but the rule is the same when the question is whether compound interest is payable: *Fergusson v. Fyffe* (1841), 8 C. & F. 121, Cottenham. It must be observed that the *lex loci solutionis* is not expressly made the ground of decision in all the cases cited in this paragraph, but none of them are inconsistent with its being the ground.

See also *Cooper v. Waldegrave*, under § 229; and above, § 206.

As all usury laws have been repealed in England, it will be sufficient to refer to the cases in which, while they existed, their operation with regard to contracts connected in some way with other countries was considered, without attempting to extract general rules from them. If the validity of a contract as affected by a foreign usury law had to be considered, much might depend on the precise character of the law. *Dewar v. Span* (1789), 3 T. R. 425, Kenyon, Ashhurst, Buller, Grose; *Harvey v. Archbold* (1825), 3 B. & C. 626, Abbott, Bayley, Littledale; *Anonymous* (1825), 3 Bing. 193, opinion of judges delivered to House of Lords by Best; *Thompson v. Powles* (1828), 2 Sim. 194, Shadwell; *Ex parte Guillebert* (1837), 2 Dea. 509, Erskine, Rose, Cross.

§ 226. Damages for breach of contract abroad, or a debt payable abroad, being recovered in England, the judgment must be for so much English money as, if remitted to the country where the payment ought to have been made at the rate of exchange current at the time the breach of contract occurred or payment should have been made or the debt was incurred, will there produce the amount of the judgment or debt, with any interest or damages included in the judgment.

In the former edition the rule appeared as "the rate of exchange current at the time the judgment is recovered"; but in a number of decisions given by the English Courts in cases arising out of the extraordinary fluctuation of exchange which followed on the Armistice in 1918, the principle has been re-examined and modified, and in cases of breach of contract for carriage of goods or sale of goods is as above: *Di Ferdinando v. Simon Smits & Co.*, [1920] 3 K. B. 409, C. A., Bankes, Scrutton, Eve, affirming Roche; *Barry v. Van den Hurk*, [1920] 2 K. B. 709, Bailhache; *Ralli Bros. v. Companhia Naviera, &c.*, [1920] 1 K. B. 614, see p. 289. Where, however, a person, after action was brought in England, paid a debt due abroad in the currency in which it was due, to the person to whom, and at the place at which, it was payable, the Court of Appeal have held that the Court had not to consider the rate of exchange at which the liquidated debt incurred abroad is to be calculated in English

money, because the debt was discharged: *Société des Hôtels, &c. v. Cumming*, [1921] W. N. 260, Avory; reversed on appeal, Bankes, Scrutton, Atkin, [1922] W. N. 18. See, too, *Addenda*.

The rule has been amplified in special cases of tort and actions of account. Where the damages for a tort are properly assessed in a foreign currency they must be converted, for the purpose of the English judgment, at the rate of exchange ruling at the date with reference to which the damages in the foreign currency have in law to be assessed. *The Volturno*, [1921] 2 A. C. 544, and [1920] P. 447, H. L., Buckmaster, Sumner, Parker, Wrenbury; Carson dissenting. The action arose in this case out of a collision between a British and an Italian ship which were both held to be in fault; and the question was as to the date at which the rate of exchange for the amount allowed to the owners of the Italian ship for loss by the detention of their vessel during repairs should be taken. It was held that the rate should be as at the dates when the losses by reason of detention were incurred.

Where an account of transactions made in a foreign currency is claimed and delivered by order of the Court, the rate for conversion must be that ruling on the day when the account is delivered, and not that ruling when the particular items in the account became due: *Manners v. Pearson & Co.*, [1898] 1 Ch. 581, Lindley and Rigby, affirming Kekewich; Vaughan Williams dissenting. In the dissenting judgment, Vaughan Williams proposed the rule adopted in the cases mentioned above, that the date at which the value is ascertained is the date of the breach and not the date of the judgment.

In certain earlier decisions given by the English Court where the question at issue was as to the amount of the judgment given by a Court in another part of the British Dominions, it was held that the rate of exchange should be fixed as at the time judgment was recovered.

Scott v. Bevan (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 78, Tenterden, Parke and (?). In *Cash v. Kennion* (1804) and (1805), 11 Ves. 314, Lord Eldon dwelt on the duty of a person who is bound to pay a certain sum at a certain place on a certain day to have it there on that day; and added, "If he fails in that contract, wherever the creditor sues him, the law of that country ought to give him just as much as he would have had if the contract had been performed." From this the conclusion has been drawn that where the time and place of payment are fixed by contract, the rate of exchange ought to be taken as at the time so fixed: *Bertram v. Duhamel* (1838), 2 Mo. P. C. 212, Erskine.

Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes.

The subject of bills of exchange and promissory notes furnishes a large and interesting field for the application of the doctrines of this chapter. It must be introduced by the English legislation. But in 1912 an international conference held at The Hague drew up an international law concerning bills of exchange and cheques containing some notable provisions on the choice of law. England, however, though a party to the conference, has not signed the convention, and most of the Powers which signed it have not yet ratified it, so that its provisions are not operative.

Conflict of Laws.

§ 227.

“72. Where a bill drawn in one country is negotiated, accepted, or payable in another, the rights, duties and liabilities of the parties thereto are determined as follows:—

“(1) The validity of a bill as regards requisites in form is determined by the law of the place of issue, and the validity as regards requisites in form of the supervening contracts, such as acceptance or indorsement or acceptance *supra* protest, is determined by the law of the place where such contract ” (*sic*) “ was made.

“ Provided that—

“(a) Where a bill is issued out of the United Kingdom, it is not invalid by reason only that it is not stamped in accordance with the law of the place of issue:

“(b) Where a bill, issued out of the United Kingdom, conforms as regards requisites in form to the law of the United Kingdom, it may, for the purpose of enforcing payment thereof, be treated as valid as between all persons who negotiate, hold, or become parties to it in the United Kingdom.

“(2) Subject to the provisions of this act, the interpretation of the drawing, indorsement, acceptance, or acceptance *supra* protest of a bill is determined by the law of the place where such contract is made.

“ Provided that, where an inland bill is indorsed in a foreign country, the indorsement shall, as regards the payer, be interpreted according to the law of the United Kingdom.

“(3) The duties of the holder with respect to presentment for acceptance or payment, and the necessity for or sufficiency of a protest or notice of dishonour, or otherwise, are determined by the law of the place where the act is done or the bill is dishonoured.

“(4) Where a bill is drawn out of but payable in the United Kingdom, and the sum payable is not expressed in the currency of the United Kingdom, the amount shall, in the absence of some express stipulation, be calculated according to the rate of exchange for sight drafts at the place of payment on the day the bill is payable.

“(5) Where a bill is drawn in one country and is payable in another, the due date thereof is determined according to the law of the place where it is payable.”

Bills of Exchange Act, 1882; st. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 72.

Two important cases must be mentioned here, as having been decided not so much, if at all, on the enactments just quoted or on any view of the rights of parties to bills, as on the general principles with regard to the authority of the *lex situs* of movables on their transfer.

An English inland bill indorsed in blank in Norway, by the law of which country as well as that of England such an indorsement is good, was sold when overdue under an execution in Norway; and that sale by Norwegian law, which knows no special rule as to overdue bills, passed the bill and the right to obtain payment of it to the purchaser; the purchaser was held entitled to obtain payment of it in England free from the equities attaching by English law to an overdue bill: *Alcock v. Smith*, [1892] 1 Ch. 238, Romer, affirmed by Lindley, Lopes and Kay. A cheque drawn abroad on a London bank received a forged indorsement, and was then taken for value, in good faith and without negligence, by a bank at Vienna, which obtained thereby a good title to it by Austrian law; that bank was held entitled to obtain payment of it in England: *Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank*, [1904] 2 K. B. 870, Walton; affirmed [1905] 1 K. B. 677, Vaughan Williams, Romer, Stirling.

§ 227*a*. It is the law of the place of issue which determines whether an instrument is to be treated as an unconditional bill of exchange. *Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co.* (No. 2), [1918] 1 K. B. 43, Bailhache, J.; reversed on appeal, [1918] 2 K. B. 623, but on a different point.

In this case the defendants carrying on business in England purchased cotton from dealers in America, who drew a bill of exchange on them for the price and issued the bill in the United States. The plaintiffs, who were dealers in bills in New York, purchased in good faith the bill of exchange with the bill of lading of the cotton attached, and sent the documents to England to the defendants who accepted the bill and paid it at maturity. The bill of lading was actually a forgery and no cotton was shipped under it. The defendants upon the discovery of fraud claimed that the bill was conditional on the genuineness of the bill of lading, and brought an action in the United States to recover the amount of the bill so paid by them. The American Court of Appeal held that the matter should be decided according to the law of England. The plaintiffs thereupon brought an action in England claiming a declaration that they did not, by presenting the bill for acceptance with the bill of lading attached, warrant that the bill of lading was genuine. The Court held that whether the bill was conditional was a question relating to "requisites of form" within the meaning of section 72; and, therefore, to be determined by the American law (the law of the place of issue); and the bill being conditional by that law, the defendants were entitled to recover back their money. On appeal in England, however, it was held that, whether the bill was construed by English or American law, the order was unconditional, and, therefore, the defendants could not recover the money paid.

The question whether the Court should have accepted the *renvoi* from the American Court has been considered above, p. 38.

§ 228. Par. 1 of s. 72 (above, § 227) determines a question about which the English authorities gave no clear result, namely, do parties to a bill or note, so far as their liability depends on an indorsement made by a third party, contract to pay one who takes by an indorsement-valid according to its own law, or one who takes by an indorsement valid according to the law of their contract? The question arises on instruments indorsed in blank in France, where such an indorsement does not transfer the property in a bill or note, though it does so by English law.

In *Trimbey v. Vignier* (1834), 1 Bing. N. C. 151, 4 Mo. & Sc. 695, Tindal and (?), which was an action against the maker of a promissory note payable in France and indorsed there in blank, the judgment was for the defendant, but it does not appear with certainty whether the French law was adopted on the ground of the place of indorsement or on that of the place of payment. In *Lebel v. Tucker* (1867), L. R. 3 Q. B. 77, Mellor and Lush, which was an action against the acceptor of a bill payable in England and indorsed in France in blank, the judgment was for the plaintiff. In *Bradlaugh v. De Rin* (1868), L. R. 3 C. P. 538, which was also an action against the acceptor of a bill payable in England and indorsed in France in blank, Montague Smith delivered an opinion in favour of the plaintiff, but Bovill and Willes decided against him on grounds which pointed to the place of indorsement, although they distinguished the case from *Lebel v. Tucker* on the ground of the place of drawing, on which neither Mellor nor Lush had relied.

The enactment now under consideration has decided the special question in favour of the forms required by the *lex actus* of the indorsement, which is in agreement with the usual principles of our subject and with the opinion of Story (*Conflict of Laws*, § 316 a). Convenience points to the same conclusion, for an indorser cannot be expected to know or to follow the forms required in any place foreign to that in which he acts. But it will be observed that to the general solution an exception is made by the proviso (b), which allows a bill to be issued in British form out of the United Kingdom for circulation and payment in the United Kingdom.

What however if such a bill as contemplated in the exception is indorsed before reaching the United Kingdom, in a form valid by British law but not by the *lex loci actus*? This case arose in *Re Marseilles Extension Railway and Land Company, Smallpage's and Brandon's Cases* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 598, Pearson. The bills were older than the enactment of 1882, but the learned judge held on principle that they were to be regarded as English for all purposes, and therefore sustained the indorsements.

The proviso (a) enacts the non-necessity of the stamp of the place of issue, so deciding for this case a question discussed under § 209.

§ 229. The obligation incurred by accepting a bill of exchange or making a promissory note is measured by the law of the place where it is payable. It is a familiar example that the allowance of days of *grace* is regulated by the law of the place of payment.

An acceptance having been vacated by a judgment in the place where the bill was accepted and payable, the acceptor cannot be sued in England *Burrows v. Jaminéau* (1726), King; Moseley, 1 Sel Ca in Ch 69, 2 Eq Ca. Abr 524, Strange 733 On default of payment by the acceptor, he is liable to pay interest at the rate fixed by the law of the place where the bill was payable *Cooper v Waldegrave* (1840), 2 Beav 282, Langdale. See above, § 225 The validity of a cheque drawn in France on an English bank in payment of money lost at play in France is governed by English law *Moulis v Owen*, [1907] 1 K B 746. Cited under § 215

In *Chapman v Cottrell* (1865), 3 H & C 865, a promissory note was made at Florence, but dated in London, and delivered in London to the payee by the maker's agent For the purpose of jurisdiction, under an enactment now superseded, Martin, Bramwell and Channell held that the contract was made in London by the delivery there.

§ 230. Since the drawer or indorser of a bill of exchange, and the indorser of a promissory note, are sureties for the due performance of the obligation incurred by accepting or making it, the law of the place where the bill or note is payable according to the terms in which it is drawn or made, as regulating such due performance, indirectly affects their obligation by affecting that of the acceptor or maker.

This proposition is probably not set aside by No. 2 of s. 72 (above, p. 301), because, by whatever law the drawing or indorsement be interpreted, it cannot in accordance with mercantile usage be otherwise interpreted than as constituting the drawer or indorser a surety as above expressed.

During the war of 1870—1 between France and Germany, and the subsequent troubles in France, French laws enlarged the time for the payment and protest of bills Everything being rightly done after the expiration of the enlarged time, those who had drawn and indorsed in England bills payable in France remained liable on them. *Rouquette v. Overmann* (1875), L. R 10 Q B. 525, Cockburn, Lush and Quain.

Where a bill of exchange was drawn on and accepted by a person in England, payable to the order of a German subject, who indorsed it "Für mich," to order of another; it was held that evidence was admissible to prove that by German law the indorsement was not restrictive but open. *Haarbleicher v Barselman*, [1914] 137 L. T. 564.

Where bills accepted payable in an enemy country after the outbreak of war in 1918 had been drawn by an enemy firm carrying on business in England, and purchased from that firm before the war by an English bank in whose hands they remained unpaid, it was held on a claim by the English bank against the assets in the winding up of the business of the enemy firm that the due date for payment, being determinable by

the law of the enemy country where the bills were payable, was affected by emergency legislation in the enemy country which postponed the maturity of bills till further notice, and, therefore, had not yet arrived, so that the claim failed. *Re Franke and Rasche*, [1918] 1 Ch. 470, Younger "It is the law of the country where a bill is payable which *sans phrase* must, if the holder relies on his contract with the maker, fix as between them for all purposes the due date of the bill" (Ib. 480). It was noted, however, by the Court that the legislation of the foreign country may be so confiscatory that the English holder may claim to have the contract with an enemy firm rescinded on the ground that the consideration has wholly failed, but in this case the Court did not take that view as regards the enemy war legislation.

In *Allen v Kemble* (1848), 6 Mo. P. C. 314, Pemberton Leigh, where the acceptor had a right of set-off by the law of the country in which the bill was payable, the same right was allowed to the drawer and indorser on the ground of the law of the country in which they had respectively drawn the bill and indorsed it, which so far as concerned their obligation was contrasted in the judgment with the law determining an acceptor's obligation. But set-off is not a modification of the defendant's obligation but a matter incident to the enforcement of it, and therefore belongs to the *lex fori*; so that if the acceptor had been himself the defendant he could only have enjoyed it on the ground of the *lex fori*, not on that of the law of the place where the bill was payable. The decision was however right, because the drawer and indorser were sued where they became parties to the bill, so that the law of that place was in fact the *lex fori*.

In *Allen v Kemble*, u s., the bill was addressed by the drawer to the acceptor at his residence in one country, and made payable by the acceptor in another country. It is no doubt true, as noticed in the judgment, that such an alteration could not affect the obligation either of the drawer or of any one who had indorsed the bill before it was made.

§ 231. In case of failure by the drawee to accept a bill of exchange, or of failure in payment by the acceptor of a bill of exchange or the maker of a promissory note, the necessity and sufficiency of demand, protest or notice of dishonour, by the last holder, in order to charge any other party to the bill or note, is determined by the law of the place where it was payable.

This is a consequence of the principle of the *lex loci actus*. Under whatever law the drawer or indorser became a party to the bill or note, so far as his liability depended on acts to be performed at the place where it was payable, he was bound to expect that those acts would be performed in accordance with the law of that place and not otherwise. A snare would be laid for the last holder of the instrument, if he had to follow the directions of any other law with regard to what he has to do there in order to preserve his recourse against previous parties.

No. 3 of s. 72 (above, p. 301) appears to agree with the §, notwithstanding the strange wording by which parliament is made to say that the necessity of an act is to be determined by the law

of the place where it is done, while it is just when an act has not been done that the question of its necessity arises.

The case of § 231 arose, and was decided in accordance with the §, in *Rothschild v. Currie* (1841), 1 Q. B. 43, 4 P. & D. 737, Denman, Little-dale, Williams, Coleridge; *Hirschfeld v. Smith* (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 340, Erle, Byles, Keating, Smith; and *Horne v. Rouquette* (1878), 3 Q. B. D. 514, Brett, Bramwell, Cotton. In *Rouquette v. Overmann*, mentioned above under § 230, the discussion did not turn only on the substantial question of the enlargement of time for payment, but also on the formal question of the sufficiency of the demand, protest and notice, as not having been made and given within the original time; and so far as the case turned on that point it is another authority for § 231.

§ 232. But when an indorser has been made duly liable on a bill or note, the notice which he must give to his indorser, or to the drawer if there be no intermediate party, depends on the law governing the contract made by the indorsement to him or by the drawing.

The drawer of the bill, and each indorser of the bill or note, contracts with the next following party to pay him on due notice of the liability being given; and such notice must be measured by the law of the contract, whenever no question arises about the formalities to be observed in a particular place.

No. 3 of s. 72 appears to say that the sufficiency of a notice of dishonour by *any* holder is to be determined by the law of the place where the bill is dishonoured, for the words "the place where the act is done," with the supplement "or is not done" which it is necessary to understand, appear to refer only to protests. The doctrine which would thus be arrived at conflicts with that laid down in the §, which nevertheless was distinctly asserted by each of the judges in *Horne v. Rouquette*, quoted under § 231, and seems to be unassailable in principle. I cannot believe that the enactment will be allowed to displace a doctrine possessing such authority, and probably the easiest way of preventing that result will be to interpret No. 3 as applying only to the last holder, which would not be a greater violence than that to which it is sometimes necessary to subject the language of acts of parliament. To apply the words "where the act is done" to the notice of dishonour, even were it possible, would not be a remedy, because an indorsee who is not the last holder may have to give that notice to his indorser in a country which is not that of the indorsement.

In *Horne v. Rouquette* a further question which did not then arise was noticed, and the decision of it reserved. When an

indorser has been made duly liable on a bill or note, and the indorsement to him was governed by a different law from that governing a still earlier indorsement, or from that governing the drawing of the bill, and he seeks to charge such earlier indorser or the drawer, passing over his immediate indorser, by what law must the sufficiency of the notice he is to give be measured? This question involves that of the interpretation of the contracts made by drawing a bill and putting it in circulation and by indorsing a bill or note.

§ 233. The law governing the drawing and putting in circulation of a bill, or the indorsement of a bill or note will in general be the law of the place where the bill or note was signed by the drawer or indorser; but if the instrument after being so signed is sent to the taker in another country, the contract, being only completed by the taking, is one of the latter country.

Horne v. Rouquette (1878), 3 Q. B. D., point as to the indorsement to Montforte; Brett, p. 515; Bramwell, p. 521; Cotton, pp. 523, 524. See also *Chapman v. Cottrell*, quoted under § 229.

§ 234. On the dishonour of a bill of exchange either by non-acceptance or by non-payment at maturity after acceptance, the holder is entitled, as damages due in the latter case from the acceptor and in both cases from the other parties to the bill as guarantors, to the amount of the bill, with interest from the time and at the rate of the place when and where it was payable or would have been so if accepted, and with his costs. He may have recourse to re-exchange: that is, he may draw a new bill at sight, on the drawer or any indorser of the original bill, for such a sum that, if sold at the place where the original bill was payable, it will produce the above amount. The drawee of the new bill, receiving it with the original bill, will become entitled to the latter on paying the former; and will then be able to recover what he has so paid from the acceptor, if any, of the original bill, as damages which he in his turn has incurred by its dishonour. If no new bill be drawn, still the theory of re-exchange determines the amount which the holder can recover from the drawer or an indorser, and which the drawer or an indorser can recover over from the acceptor, if any, supposing that he has himself paid it or that it has been demanded of him and he is liable to pay it. If the contract of the drawer, or of the indorser to whom the holder has recourse, is governed by a law—see § 233 as to this—which fixes a certain percentage on the amount of the original bill in lieu of what would be the actual amount of the

redraft on the theory of re-exchange, or in lieu of any ingredient entering into that amount, then, whether a new bill be drawn or not, such law will determine the liability of the drawer or of such indorser, and that of the acceptor in recovery over.

Francis v Rucker (1768), Ambler 672, Camden; *Auriol v Thomas*, (1787), 2 T. R. 52, Buller and Grose; *Walker v Hamilton* (1860), 1 D. F. & J. 602, Campbell, Knight-Bruce and Turner; *Suse v Pompe* (1860), 8 C. B. (N S) 538, Byles, Erle and (?); *Re General South American Company* (1877, 7 Ch. D. 637, Malins. The party who sues the acceptor need not have paid the re-exchange, if it has been demanded of him and he is liable for it. *De Tastet v. Baring* (1809), 11 East 265, Ellenborough and (?). *Napier v. Schneider* (1810), 12 East 420 (?), may be treated as a mere action against the acceptor by a holder to whom recourse had not been had, and *Woolsey v. Crawford* (1810), 2 Camp. 445, Ellenborough, are not law.

Where the bills dishonoured had been drawn by a firm in one country on itself in another country, and remained in the hands of parties to whom they had been given by that firm in the first country in connection with transactions which did not contemplate their payment in the other country, the holders were not entitled to damages in the nature of re-exchange from the firm as drawers, but could only treat the bills as promissory notes, or resort to the rights which had been suspended by taking them. *Willans v Ayers* (1877), 3 Ap. Ca. 13, Colvile.

In *Gibbs v. Fremont* (1853), 9 Exch. 25, Alderson, Martin and (?), it was held that the drawer of a bill dishonoured by non-acceptance is liable to pay interest to the holder only at the rate of the place of drawing. No attempt was made to distinguish the case of non-acceptance from that of dishonour by non-payment, or to deny that interest at the rate of the place of payment is the true measure of the damages incurred in either. But for the usual doctrine that the drawer guarantees the acceptance and payment, there was substituted the doctrine that he gives an order for payment, and contracts that if such order should not produce the desired effect he will pay the amount of the bill in the place of drawing. Such a doctrine is inconsistent with the whole theory of re-exchange, and not merely with that part of it which relates to the rate of interest; and it is inconsistent with the first of the two grounds on which *Rouquette v. Overmann* was decided, § 230. The court, in deciding *Gibbs v. Fremont*, was influenced by the dicta in *Allen v. Kemble*, as to which see above, under § 230. In *Auriol v. Thomas*, u. s., Buller observed that the interest covered by a fixed rate for re-exchange would be that allowed where the bill was payable.

The doctrine of § 234 has not been affected by s. 57 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882. *Re Gillespie, Ex parte Robartes* (1885), 16 Q. B. D. 702, Cave; (1886), 18 Q. B. D. 286, Esher, Lindley and Lopes. See also *Re Commercial Bank of South Australia* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 522, North.

Obligations quasi ex contractu.

§ 235. An obligation *quasi ex contractu*, like one arising from tort, is occasioned by the act of one party; but it resembles obligations by contract in that the act which occasions it is a lawful one. We have seen that in Roman law the special forum of an

obligation *quasi ex contractu* is at the place with which the act that occasions it has the most real connection, and there can be little doubt that the proper law of such an obligation ought generally to be drawn from the same place. For example, any liability under which a husband may lie for the antenuptial debts of his wife is an obligation *quasi ex contractu*. The act which occasions it is the marriage, and this has the most real connection with the matrimonial domicile, as well otherwise as because the law of that place determines the effect of the marriage at least on the wife's movable property, and a liability for her antenuptial debts cannot fairly be imposed on the husband except in return for an interest which the law may give him in her property. But the same way of thinking which upon the obligation of contracts set up the *lex loci celebrati contractus* against the *lex loci solutionis* here sets up the place of celebrating the marriage, as that where the act occasioning the obligation *quasi ex contractu* happened to occur, instead of the domicile with which that act has the most real connection.

See *De Greuchy v. Wills* (1879), 4 C. P. D. 362, Grove and Lopes, where a man domiciled in England was also married there after the passing of the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, he was held not liable, beyond the assets derived through his wife as mentioned in the Act, for antenuptial debts contracted by his wife in Jersey; but Lopes thought that notwithstanding his English domicile he would have been further liable if the marriage had taken place in Jersey, and Grove thought that perhaps he would have been.

CHAPTER XIII.

TRANSFER AND EXTINCTION OF OBLIGATIONS.

THE maxim *unumquodque dissolvitur eodem modo quo colligatur* has always caused a feeling that the questions what law governs the creation of an obligation, and what law governs its extinction, must be in some way related to one another: but various and even confused opinions have been held as to the nature and extent of the relationship. One source of perplexity has been the attempt to distinguish between an obligation and the right of action on it, as if the obligation or *vinculum juris* which arises on the occasion of a contract or a tort was anything else than the right of action. In the case of a proprietary right a distinction more or less similar may be understood. Wherever physical possession is possible, the law has to deal with an enjoyment which can exist independently of it, and it must choose to whom it will appropriate that enjoyment by maintaining or putting him in possession. Then, the enjoyment of the preferred claimant being protected against disturbance by any one whatever, the right which he is said to have is distinguishable from his power of suing the actual disturber, if any, and that power is a true remedy given for the protection of the right. Often a proprietary right is disconnected from the right of immediate possession, but if the ideas involved in it are thoroughly followed out, possession will always be found to lie at the bottom of them, so long as a corporeal thing, movable or immovable, is concerned. Hence a law which ordains a term of prescription with regard to the property in such a thing is correctly expressed if it purports to bar the right, and when the right is gone there can be no longer a remedy. But in a claim of contract or tort, expectation may exist independently of the law but not enjoyment. The law has not to choose to whom it will give the right, but whether it will give the right. And the right when given is good only against the contractor or tortfeasor. The right of action against him is not distinguishable from any larger right existing in the case, nor is it a remedy

given for the protection of any larger right, but it is the whole of the right. Hence a law which ordains a term of prescription with regard to claims on contract or tort is usually and correctly expressed as barring the action: when the action is gone there is no obligation left.

A right being once given on the occasion of a contract or tort, such right may partake of the nature of property as forming part of the wealth of the person in whose favour it exists: thus it may, if the law permits, be transferred, or transmitted on death to successors. But in whatever degree it resembles property in relation to third parties, it remains obligation as between the person clothed with the right on the one hand and the contractor or tortfeasor and his representatives on the other hand. Even in such cases as those of patents and copyrights, where the law creates in one party a property, often of considerable value, by enacting that certain conduct in other parties shall be deemed a tort, the first party's right of action against those others is the subject of the property and not a remedy for the protection of it. Between corporeal and incorporeal things there is this inevitable difference, that while property in the former is the legal regulation of an enjoyment existing independently of the law, property in the case of the latter presupposes the creation by law of the thing of which it is the regulated enjoyment, and that thing is a right but not property.

From the principle that in cases of contract and tort the right of action is itself the *vinculum juris*, the consequence follows that when an obligation is spoken of as governed by the *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis*, or by the *lex loci delicti commissi*, this can only be understood as meaning that its existence at any moment is referred to such respective law. The nature of an obligation would be ignored if we supposed that its original creation could be separately referred to its proper law, so that it might thenceforward have an independent existence on which another law might seize, and transfer it or enforce it. If the *lex fori* professes to allow the transfer of an obligation the existence of which it refers, say for example to the *lex loci contractus*, when that law does not permit such transfer, what it really does is to create a new obligation between one of the contractors and the transferee. Or if the *lex fori* professes to enforce an obligation the existence of which it refers to the *lex loci contractus*, after it has ceased to be enforceable by that law, what it really does is to create a new obligation between the plaintiff and the

defendant. Whether or not the proceeding is justifiable is a question which may not be concluded by such an analysis, but it is also a question which cannot be intelligently discussed unless the true nature of the proceeding be disclosed by such an analysis. And the true answer appears to be that there is no justification for creating such new obligations, while on the other hand the *lex fori* may have good reasons for declining to enforce an obligation which in the *forum contractus* or *delicti commissi* may be still enforceable. For instance, a statute of limitations may be based on a danger of perjury, which has a better chance of success when the antiquity of the claim renders the preservation of the evidences relating to it less probable; and in such a case the principle which permits the assertion of any stringent policy of the *lex fori* might fairly be applied.

Transfer of Obligations.

§ 236. When an obligation is assignable by its proper law, *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis* or *lex loci delicti commissi*, the assignee may sue on it in England.

Innes v. Dunlop (1800), 8 T. R. 595, (?); action of assumpsit, the consideration being the assignment of a Scotch bond *O'Callaghan v. Thomond* (1810), 3 Taunt. 82, (?); action on an Irish judgment assigned in accordance with Irish law.

An English promissory note payable to bearer is transferable for English purposes by delivery in a foreign country, no matter whether by the law of that country it is transferable or not. *De la Chaumette v. Bank of England* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 385, Tenterden, Littledale, Park, Patteson.

§ 237. When an obligation is not assignable by its proper law, *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis* or *lex loci delicti commissi*, an assignee cannot sue on it in England, at least except subject to all the defences which might have been made to a suit by the original party. To that extent it may be said that there is no real assignment, but merely a question of the name in which the suit is brought.

It has been decided that the English act of parliament, by virtue of which promissory notes made payable to bearer or to order are transferable, applies to foreign notes: *Milne v. Graham* (1823), 1 B. & C. 192, (?); *Bentley v. Nonthouse* (1827), Mo. & Ma. 66, Tenterden. But it did not appear in these cases that the notes were not transferable by the laws of the countries where they were payable. The § is therefore submitted on the ground of principle unopposed by authority. It has been held in Louisiana that the indorsee of a promissory note, by the proper law of which the maker can use against an indorsee all the defences he could use against the payee, must submit to the same defences though by the law of

Louisiana such a note is negotiable. *Ory v. Winter* (1826), 4 Mar. (N S.) 277, opinion of court delivered by Porter.

Extinction of Obligations.

§ 238. An obligation cannot be enforced in England after it has been barred by the English statute of limitations, notwithstanding that it has not been barred according to its proper law.

British Linen Company v Drummond (1830), 10 B. & C 903, Tenterden *Pardo v. Bingham* (1868), L R 6 Eq 485, Romilly; and (1869), L R 4 Ch Ap. 735, Hatherley. The same principle was involved in *Ruckmaboye v Mottichund* (1853), 8 Mo P C 4, 5 Mo I A. C. 234; where it was decided that a British court of justice established in India, by applying the English statute of limitations to actions on contracts between Gentoos, did not violate the provisions of a charter requiring that the Gentoo laws of contract should be observed between Gentoos.

A corresponding determination to that of the § was made for Scotland in *Don v Lippmann* (1837), 5 C. & F 1, Brougham. In the Scotch case of *Campbell v. Stein* (1818), 6 Dow, 116, Eldon, it had been recognized as law "that where the merchant creditor resides in England and his debtor in Scotland, the latter may plead" the Scotch prescription p 134. In *Don v. Lippman*, Brougham, referring to this, said "Why is it that the law of the domicile of the debtor was there allowed to prevent the plaintiff from recovering? It was because the creditor must follow the debtor and must sue him where he resides, and by the necessity of that case was obliged to sue him in Scotland. In that respect therefore there was in that case no difference between the *lex loci solutionis* and the *lex fori*". u s., p 19. But somewhat inconsistently Lord Brougham is made in the same page to say of *Campbell v. Stein*, "That case cannot be reconciled with the principle that the *locus solutionis* is to prescribe the law." If it be true, as it is, that in the case of a general account, with no particular *locus solutionis* other than the debtor's domicile, the *locus solutionis* and that domicile agree, it must surely follow that a decision based on the one is at least reconcilable with the other.

But where a judgment, obtained in Scotland on an obligation already barred in England, has been registered in England under the Judgments Extension Act, 1868, the bar of the original obligation does not prevent the enforcement of the judgment in England. *Re Low, Bland v. Low*, [1894] 1 Ch 147, Lindley, Davey and A L Smith reversing North.

In *Taylor v. Holland*, [1902] 1 K B. 676, Jelf, it was held that a partial recovery under a foreign judgment is not such a payment on account as to stop the running of the English statute of limitations against an English judgment.

The last § may very well be justified on the principle stated above, p. 311, that although the *lex fori* cannot properly create a new obligation after the one which arose by the contract or tort has ceased to exist, it may yet regard its statute of limitations as a stringent rule of domestic policy, in obedience to which it may decline to give effect to that obligation even while existing. But the English and Scotch decisions cited in support of the § do not

place it on that ground, but on the extremely questionable one that the term of prescription of an obligation always depends on the *lex fori*. Accordingly the following §, which is justifiable on that ground alone, if at all, rests on authority as yet uncontradicted in England.

§ 239. An action can be brought in England on a contract or tort so long as an obligation resulting from such contract or tort would not have been barred by the English statute of limitations, notwithstanding that the obligation which in fact resulted from it has been barred according to its proper law, *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis* or *lex loci delicti commissi*.

Huber v. Steiner (1835), 2 Bing. N. C. 202, 2 Scott 304, Tindal and (?); *Harris v. Quine* (1869), L. R. 4 Q. B. 653, Cockburn, Blackburn, Lush, Hayes. See *Alliance Bank of Simla v. Carey* (1880), 5 C. P. D. 429, Lopes, quoted above under § 210.

A corresponding doctrine to that of the § was laid down for Scotland by Cottenham in *Fergusson v. Fyffe* (1841), 8 C. & F. 121: "The English statute of limitations is irrelevant"; p. 140.

The old continental authorities were very much divided between the law of the forum and the special law of the obligation, as determining the time of prescription; and some who admitted the authority of the latter law in the matter of prescription, when it resulted from the fact that the parties to a contract had named a place for its performance, did not allow any authority in that matter to the *lex loci contractus* as such. There was afterwards a time when the courts of cassation or appeal in the principal Continental countries so generally agreed in referring the prescription of obligations to their special law, in every case, and whether the term thence arising was longer or shorter than that of the forum, that that doctrine, which had also the great authority of Savigny in its favour, might be called the usual European one. But the later Continental decisions are again discordant. Story pronounces for the *lex fori* with a positiveness which he does not always show where the writers who preceded him are so divided, but he mentions with apparent approval a distinction which must be noticed here, because Tindal quoted it from him, also with approval, in *Huber v. Steiner*. "Suppose," says Story, "the statutes of limitation or prescription of a particular country do not only extinguish the right of action, but the claim or title itself, *ipso facto*, and declare it a nullity after the lapse of the prescribed period, and the parties are resident within the jurisdiction during the whole

of that period, so that it has actually and fully operated upon the case; under such circumstances the question might properly arise whether such statutes of limitation or prescription may not afterwards be set up in any other country to which the parties may remove, by way of extinguishment or transfer of the claim or title." (*Conflict of Laws*, § 582). It has been shown in the introductory paragraphs of this chapter that the distinction between the title and the right of action belongs to property and not to obligation; and the case before the Supreme Court of the United States which Story quotes as an authority that "the bar of a statute extinguishment of a debt, *lege loci*, ought equally to be held a peremptory exception in every other country"—*Shelby v. Grey*, 11 Wheaton 361—was one concerning the property in a slave.

Coming now to the extinction of obligations by discharges under bankruptcy laws, similar arguments to those which have been used on the subject of prescription would seem to show that an obligation which has been discharged under the bankrupt law of its special forum, or in other words under its special law, ought to be regarded everywhere as discharged, and that there may be reasons why an obligation ought no longer to be enforced after its discharge has been pronounced even by some other law than its special one. For example, a discharge under the bankrupt law of the forum will be analogous to the expiration of the term allowed by the *lex fori* for bringing an action. If the discharge or the limitation be expressly extended by the *lex fori* to all debts, the court will in either case be positively bound to apply such law: if it be a matter of inference whether the law was meant to extend to foreign claims, the reasons for presuming such an intention will be about equally strong in the case of bankruptcy as in that of prescription. A system of bankruptcy which draws the debtor's foreign property within its administration so far as it is able, and admits foreign claims to proof, cannot in fairness refuse to the debtor its protection against the further prosecution of foreign claims. But what if the discharge be under the bankrupt law of the debtor's domicile, such being neither the forum in which it is pleaded, nor the special forum of the obligation? If an international system were established by which a bankruptcy in the debtor's domicile drew with it the administration of all his property, wherever situate, and the equal distribution of the mass among all his creditors, and by which a bankruptcy taking place in any other forum was not

permitted to have any operation as to property situate out of its territory, it would be reasonable to allow a universal efficacy to the discharge of a debtor under the bankrupt law of his domicile. We have seen in Chapter VI how widely the actual state of things differs from this ideal; but just as a rather vague feeling exists in favour of the unity of administration by a bankruptcy in the domicile, so also a rather vague feeling has existed in favour of the universality of a discharge by a bankruptcy in the domicile.

§ 240. The discharge of an obligation under a bankruptcy of the debtor in its special forum—*locus contractus* or *solutionis*, or *locus delicti commissi*—will be deemed to discharge him from it in England.

Ballantine v Golding (1783), 1 Cooke's Bankrupt Laws, 8th edn, p. 487, Mansfield; *Potter v Brown* (1804), 5 East 124, Ellenborough, Lawrence, Grose, Le Blanc; *Quelin v Moisson* (1828), 1 Knapp 266, (?); *Gardiner v Houghton* (1862), 2 B. & S. 743, Cockburn, Wightman, Crompton, Blackburn Lord Ellenborough, in the second of these cases, reported Lord Mansfield as having laid down in the first "that what is a discharge of a debt in the country where it was contracted is a discharge of it everywhere" Cooke had reported him as saying that "where there is a discharge by the law of one country it will be a discharge in another," which being cited to the Court of King's Bench in *Pedder v Macmaster* (1800), 8 T. R. 609, Le Blanc and ?, they were naturally at a loss to know on what principle Lord Mansfield had really proceeded, and gave a decision inconsistent with the §

§ 241. But the discharge of an obligation under a bankruptcy of the debtor in a country which was not its special forum will not be deemed to discharge him from it in England, unless the bankruptcy took place under the provisions of an act of the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland.

Quin v. Keefe (1795), 2 H. Bl. 553, Eyre and Buller; *Smith v. Buchanan* (1800), 1 East 6, Kenyon, Lawrence, Grose, Le Blanc; *Lewis v. Owen* (1821), 4 B. & Al. 654, (?); *Phillips v. Allan* (1828), 8 B. & C. 477, Bayley, Holroyd, Littledale—all however agreeing that it might have made a difference if the plaintiff had sought to share in the distribution of the defendant's estate under the foreign bankruptcy; *Bartley v. Hodges* (1861), 1 B. & S. 375, Wightman and Blackburn. In all of these cases the bankruptcy appears to have been founded on a real connection of the debtor with the country where it took place, but in none of them did it appear that the debtor was domiciled in that country; and in *Bartley v. Hodges* Blackburn said of the colonial law granting the discharge in question, "It does not bind here in a case where neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is domiciled in the colony." The bankrupt's domicile is unimportant. *Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 399, Esher, Lindley and Lopes.

§ 242. Where a bankruptcy takes place in any part of the British dominions under the provisions of an act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, it will be presumed that parliament intended to give to discharges under such bankruptcy an operation co-extensive with its authority, and such discharges will therefore operate in every British court, irrespective of the special forum of the obligation discharged.*

Cases on the extent of a discharge under the bankrupt law of England. *Odwin v. Forbes* (1817), Buck 57, Privy Council on appeal from Demerara; *Edwards v. Ronald* (1830), 1 Knapp 259, Privy Council on appeal from Calcutta, judgment delivered by Lyndhurst; *Ellis v. McHenry* (1871), L. R. 6 C P 118, Bovill, Willes, Keating, Brett, where it was held that a composition deed operating under the bankrupt law of England might have been pleaded in Canada to an action for a Canadian debt. But a discharge in an English bankruptcy does not take away the jurisdiction already acquired by a colonial court to punish the debtor for offences committed against the insolvent law of the colony. *Gill v. Barron* (1868), L. R. 2 P. C 157, Kelly.

Cases on the extent of discharges under the bankrupt laws enacted for other British countries by the Imperial Parliament. *Philpotts v. Reed* (1819), 1 Br. & Bi 294, Dallas and ?; law enacted for Newfoundland, and expressly discharging from debts contracted in Great Britain or Ireland. In *Sidaway v. Hay* (1824), 3 B. & C. 12, Abbott, Bayley and Holroyd; law enacted for Scotland, and in *Ferguson v. Spencer* (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 987, Tindal, Bosanquet, and (?); law enacted for Ireland; the operation for the discharge was arrived at by inference, and the result was in accordance with the section.

§ 242a. But an arrangement between an English company and its creditors under the Companies Act does not, in a colonial court, bind a creditor, the special forum of whose debt was not England: *New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Company v. Morrison*, [1898] A. C. 349, judgment of Watson, Hobhouse, Couch and himself pronounced by Davey. Their lordships said: "It is impossible to contend that the Companies Acts as a whole extend to the colonies, or are intended to bind the colonial courts. The colonies possess and have exercised the power of legislating on these subjects for themselves, and there is every reason why legislation of the United Kingdom should not unnecessarily be held to extend to the colonies, and thereby overrule, qualify, or add to their own legislation on the same subject." And they quoted with approval the observation made by Holroyd, J., in *Victoria*, that the construction of the Arrangement Act of 1870

*Section 28 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1914, provides that, with certain exceptions, a discharge shall release the debtor from all debts provable; and section 122 that British Courts in all parts of the Empire must act in aid of each other.

contended for by the appellant company "imposes a new law, and one in derogation of the legislative powers possessed by those colonies which enjoy self-government." This must be read in connection with the quotation made above, p. 172, from the judgment delivered by Lord Hobhouse in *Callender, Sykes & Co. v. Colonial Secretary of Lagos and Davies*, with regard to the operation of English bankruptcies on colonial land; and indeed the reasoning thus far quoted from the judgment in *New Zealand Loan and Mercantile Agency Company v. Morrison* applies equally to the effect in the self-governing colonies of discharges under the bankrupt law of England. But the judicial committee in the latter case guarded itself from expressing any qualification of the doctrine of my § 242, by saying: "There is a material distinction between the effect of bankruptcy and that of winding up. In the former case the whole property of the bankrupt is taken out of him, whilst in the latter case the property remains vested in title and in fact in the company, subject only to its being administered for the purposes of the winding up under the direction of the English courts. Their lordships are not called upon to criticise the decision in *Ellis v. McHenry*, which in their opinion does not apply to the present case."

§ 242*b*. So, too, an arrangement with creditors made in Ireland under the Irish Act of 1857 does not afford a defence to proceedings brought in England subsequently by English creditors for a debt incurred and payable here.

Re Nelson, [1918] 1 K. B. 459, C. A. Swinfen Eady, M.R., Bankes, L.J., Eve, J.

While a foreign bankruptcy divests the debtor of the whole of his property wherever situate, and vests it in an assignee for the benefit of all his creditors, wherever situate, and the Court in England will therefore give the same effect to an order discharging the debtor in bankruptcy as is given to it in the country where the bankruptcy occurred, the same rule does not apply to a composition by arrangement, which only affects the assenting creditors.

§ 242*c*. A discharge in bankruptcy of a foreign subject in England may not be a bar to proceedings for payment of a debt incurred prior to the insolvency, and not disclosed in the proceedings in bankruptcy, if by the foreign law governing the obligation the debt remained due despite the discharge, and the debtor has subsequently agreed to pay.

Re Bonacina, [1912] 2 Ch. 394, C. A., Cozens-Hardy, Farwell, Kennedy, reversing Eve, J. *Ib.*, p. 68.

CHAPTER XIV.

DOMICILE.

*Connection of domicile with law: Anglo-Indian,
Anglo-Egyptian, and such-like domiciles.*

WE have seen that in the Roman empire every one might be sued in his domicile for all personal matters, and no one could be sued elsewhere for any such matter except in its special forum or in the place to which he belonged by citizenship, the power of suing him in the latter places being further restricted by the condition of his being actually in them, or, in the case of the special forum of an obligation, possessing property there. Thus the notion of domicile did not originate in the *jus civile*, to which men became subject by enjoying Roman citizenship. On the contrary it was a notion strongly contrasted with that of citizenship, and as its legal importance was derived from the natural equity of not drawing defendants away from their homes to answer suits, it was referred to the *jus gentium*. Hence as much as possible of fact and as little as possible of technicality was allowed to enter into the determination of domicile, a mode of viewing the subject which was strongly reinforced by its connection with the liability to municipal burdens; *domicilium re et facto transfertur, non nuda contestatione, sicut in his exigitur qui negant se posse ad munera ut incolas vocari*: Dig. 50, 1, 20. Hence also it was admitted that a man might have more than one domicile: Dig. 50, 1; l. 5, l. 6 § 2, and l. 27 § 2. And we should perhaps best mark the difference between the ancient Roman and modern English notions if in the Corpus Juris we translated *domicilium* by residence, rather than by a word which in English is exclusively technical.

We have seen too that, down to the commencement of the modern movement for attaching importance in private matters to political nationality, domicile did not cease on the continent of Europe to be the chief criterion of the territorial jurisdiction to which a man was personally subject, and therefore also, after citizenship ceased to be the test of law (see above, p. 13), the

chief criterion of the territorial law to which he was personally subject. But the last circumstance reacted on the legal notion of domicile. The certainty of a man's capacities, rights and duties is not necessarily impaired by his being liable to suit, or to bear municipal burdens, in each of several jurisdictions, but it would be destroyed if more than one law could be applied to determine his capacities, rights and duties. Hence the diversity of territorial laws which arose in the middle ages engendered the personal statute, and this tended to establish a more technical and exclusive notion of domicile than had previously been entertained. Lastly we have seen that domicile was unknown in old English law as the foundation of jurisdiction, and has not even now been made the regular foundation of English jurisdiction on obligations; that its notion was imported into this country from the continent after it had there become a determining element in questions of law, and was so imported because some inter-communion with the continent in questions of law had become a necessity. As a matter of historical fact, we only know domicile because, when and so far as we borrowed the personal statute, we found that it was established as the criterion of the latter; and to this day there is a great preponderance of law over jurisdiction in the purposes for which an English lawyer has to do with domicile. Hence in England we have chiefly to do with the most technical and exclusive aspect of domicile.

In eo loco singulos habere domicilium non ambigitur, ubi quis larem ac fortunarum suarum summam constituit, unde rursus non sit discessurus si nihil avocet, unde cum profectus est peregrinari videtur, quo si rediit peregrinari jam destitit Code 10, 39, 7. This is a time-honoured quotation, beautifully expressing the common notion of home or residence, but hardly to be called a definition, though not the less suited on that account to the Roman notion of domicile.

"Residence and domicile are two perfectly distinct things. It is necessary in the determination of the law that the idea of domicile should exist, and that the fact of domicile should be ascertained, in order to determine which of two municipal laws may be invoked for the purpose of regulating the rights of parties. We know very well that succession and distribution depend upon the law of the domicile. Domicile therefore is an idea of law. It is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country. To every adult person the law ascribes a domicile, and that domicile remains his fixed attribute until a new and different attribute usurps its place." Lord Westbury, in *Bell v. Kennedy* (1868), L. R. 1 S. & D. A. 320. See, too, *Gout v. Cimitian*, [1922] 1 A. C. 105.

This being so, the notion which an English lawyer must form of domicile is very much as follows. Certain questions are decided according to laws chosen with reference to the persons,

and not to the other circumstances, involved in them. This method of proceeding has come to us in the course of events, and is recommended by various solid motives, such as the welfare of the civil society with which a person is most intimately connected, the wishes or intentions which from his connection with a certain civil society he may be presumed to entertain, and the necessity of choosing some general rule for numerous particulars which are closely concerned with one another. Every person is therefore treated as a member of some one civil society, governed by one body of civil law, which is adopted when a law having reference to his person is sought. These civil societies are not necessarily territorial. They were not such when, after the fall of the Roman empire, Romans, Franks, Burgundians and so forth were governed by their respective laws within the same territory; and they are not now such in the East, where, whether the soil be subject to Turkish, British, Chinese or any other rule, we generally find persons of different races, political nationalities and religions, living together under different laws, protected by consular capitulations or by a tolerant sovereignty. But in Christendom each civil society is now primarily a territorial one, whether its territory be coincident with that of a political society, as in the case of France, or be included with others in that of a political society, as England and Scotland are included in the British empire.* And the tie by which a person is attached to a civil society is or includes domicile. Within Christendom, every person is a member of that civil society in the territory of which he is domiciled; in the East, every person is a member of that civil society, existing in the territory in which he is domiciled, which his race, political nationality or religion determines. The former case is exemplified in an English, Scotch, or French domicile; the latter in an Anglo-Indian, Anglo-Egyptian, or Anglo-Turkish domicile.

The House of Lords (Haldane, Finlay, Dunedin, Atkinson, and Phillimore) have recently held in the case of *Casdagli v. Casdagli* (L. R. [1919] A. C. 145) that a British subject who has made his permanent residence in Egypt *sine animo revertendi* acquires a legal domicile in Egypt, and therefore the English courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit by his wife for dissolution of marriage. The House overruled the

* Questions of marriage and succession were determined in the former Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires according to the law, and to an extent by special courts, of the religious communities.

decisions in the same case of the Court of Appeal (L. R. [1918] P. 103—Swinfen Eady, M.R., and Warrington, L.J.; Scrutton, L.J., dissenting) and of Horridge, J., and also the decision of Chitty in *Re Tootal's Trusts* (see below). The principle of the judgment is that the same considerations apply to the acquisition of a domicile by a British subject in an Eastern non-Christian country as in a Western country, and that, while the intention of a native-born Englishman to acquire a domicile in the Orient may require to be very completely made out, there is no legal impossibility about it. The contrary proposition was suggested in the decisions that were overruled. It was said by Lord Finlay at p. 157: "The question of the presumption of the acquisition of an Egyptian domicile by a British subject is one to be tried by the ordinary principles applicable to such questions of fact." And again by Lord Haldane (at p. 172): "It is clear to-day that there is no reason for hesitating to hold that a man who has shaken the dust of England off his shoes, and has gone to reside in a foreign civilized country with the intention of making a new and permanent home there, gets rid of his English domicile of origin."

In the case before the House the respondent in a suit for divorce, which was brought in England by his wife, was born in England, and went out to Egypt at the age of twenty-three. He was married there ten years later at an orthodox church and the British consulate, had continued to live there permanently, and had made a will in which he declared that he was domiciled in Egypt. On these facts the Lords held he had acquired a domicile in Egypt. He was registered at the British consulate, and was subject to the jurisdiction of the British consular court, but that court had no jurisdiction in divorce. "The fact, however, that the acquisition of a British domicile (in an Oriental country) by a British subject would make it impossible to get relief by way of divorce has no bearing on the question whether such a domicile can be obtained by him in point of law" (pp. 156-7).

It had been held by the Court of Appeal, following the decision of *Re Tootal's Trusts*, that British subjects resident in non-Christian countries with which capitulations existed were to be considered as extra-territorial, and therefore unable to acquire a domicile attaching them to the law of the country. But while jurisdiction exercised under the capitulations by His Majesty in Egypt was extra-territorial, it was exercised with the

consent of the Egyptian Government, and was, therefore, really part of the law of Egypt affecting foreigners there resident.

The position of the foreign subject is not extra-territorial, and if he resides there permanently he is subject to the law applicable to persons of his nationality. "He acquires an Egyptian domicile because he has made Egypt his permanent home, and you have then to consider by what code of law he and his estate are governed according to the law in force in Egypt" (pp. 157-160).

British protection, as distinct from British citizenship, does not indeed attach a person domiciled in an Eastern country to the British civil society and the personal law that applies to that society. A protected British subject retains, therefore, the personal law which applied to him before he obtained protection. Thus in *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra*, 1888, 13 App. Ca. 431—judgment of Lords Watson and Hobhouse, Sir Barnes Peacock and Sir James Hannen, delivered by the first-named—the judicial committee rejected the contention that the succession to the movable property of a Chaldean Catholic, an Ottoman subject and settled during all his life in the Ottoman empire, ought to be regulated by English law because he had enjoyed British protection, and held that it was to be regulated by the laws which govern the successions of Chaldean Catholics in Turkey. The *de cuius* was a member of the civil society of Chaldean Catholics existing in the Ottoman territory in which he was domiciled. So also in *Parapano v. Happaz*, [1894] A. C. 165—judgment of Lords Watson, Hobhouse, Macnaghten and Shand and Sir R. Couch, delivered by the second named—where the *de cuius* was a member of the civil society of Roman Catholics existing in Cyprus, in which he was domiciled, it was held that the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church applied to his succession. See, too, *Tano v. Tano* (9 Cyprus L. R. 94). The judgment in *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra* then proceeds to speak of Anglo-Indian domicile in a passage which the Indian experience of Lord Hobhouse and Sir Barnes Peacock will probably render classical. "The latter"—that is an Anglo-Indian domicile, which their lordships had just mentioned *eo nomine*—they say "is altogether independent of political status; it arises from residence in India, and has always been held to carry with it the territorial law of that country, whether under the empire of the Queen or under the previous rule of the East India Company, which the courts of England treated in questions

of domicile as an independent government. By the law established in India the members of certain castes and creeds are in many important respects governed by their own peculiar rules and customs, so that an Indian domicile of succession may involve the application of Hindu or Mahomedan law; but these rules and customs are an integral part of the municipal law administered by the territorial tribunals." The picture here drawn of British India is no doubt correct for the present time. That region is governed by a general law to which exceptions are made in certain respects in favour of certain castes and creeds, but both the general law and the exceptions are territorial in the sense that they exist by the will of the territorial sovereign, not in the sense of being universally applied within the territory, which *ex hypothesi* they are not. As matter of history I should doubt whether anything that could properly be called a general law for British India existed before the commencement of that great series of British Indian legislation which was inaugurated by Macaulay. Previous to that time I can only discover the laws of the castes and creeds, and, alongside of them and standing on the same footing with them, for the community or society formed by the Europeans, English law, more or less modified by special enactments. But even if I am right in this, the English law and the laws of the castes and creeds were then territorial in the same sense in which the general law and the exceptions now are so, and the remark leads to no difference with regard to the subject in hand. The position described by their lordships and undoubtedly now existing, that of a European, domiciled in British India and subject to the general law, to him not modified, alongside of a native also domiciled in British India and subject to the general law modified for his caste or creed, is exactly the same as that which I conceive to have once existed for a European domiciled in British India and subject to English law, possibly modified by special enactments, alongside of a native also domiciled in British India and subject to the law of his caste or creed. That position has usually been known by the name of an Anglo-Indian domicile, and I do not gather from the passage which I have quoted that the learned members of the judicial committee objected to that name.

The question of Anglo-Turkish domicile will be better understood after the foregoing examination of an Anglo-Indian one. The question is really under what law British subjects settled

in Turkey are living. Is it English law in every case, or is it the law of that part of the British dominions, be it in England, Scotland, or any colony or dependency, in which they or their ancestors were last previously domiciled? The reference to their ancestors is far from being idle, because there are numerous British families in the Levant who have been settled there for generations. In other words, do the British subjects living at Constantinople, Smyrna, or Alexandria, form a society or community whose personal law is English, or are they a number of isolated units, one deriving his British character from England, his neighbour on one side from Scotland, and his neighbour on the other side from (say) Australia, so that they may differ in their capacity to marry their deceased wives' sisters, in the distribution which will be made of their movable property in the case of their intestacy, in the liability of their movable property to the legacy duty of the United Kingdom, and in various other particulars? The assertion that there is such a thing as an Anglo-Turkish domicile is an implied adoption of the first of the two answers here contrasted: in strict analogy to the term Anglo-Indian, it is the assertion of domicile in Turkey, combined with membership of a community whose personal law, though in Turkey, is English. Correspondingly, the second of the contrasted answers implies the assertion that domicile, apart from any improbability of the necessary *animus*, is not in law transferred to Turkey—or to any other Eastern and non-British country—by establishing a residence in such country with an *animus manendi*. This doctrine was expressly rejected by the decision in *Casdagli v. Casdagli* which has overruled both the decision and the *ratio decidendi* in *Re Tootal's Trusts* (1883), 23 C. D. 532, Chitty). There it was held that “a British subject cannot acquire by residence in China a new domicile so as to exempt his personal estate on death from the operation of the British Legacy Duty Acts.” The deceased in the case was a British subject who had his domicile of origin in England but had emigrated to Shanghai and had lived there with an intention of permanence, as was admitted. And the reasoning of the decision, which was approved in the case of *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra*, was that domicile, apart from any improbability of the necessary *animus*, cannot in law be transferred to an Eastern non-Christian country by establishing a residence there with an *animus manendi*. As it was said by Lord Watson in *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra*: “Residence in a foreign state, as a privileged

member of an extraterritorial community, though it may be effectual to *destroy* a *residential* domicile acquired elsewhere, is ineffectual to create a new domicile of choice." These doctrines were repudiated in an American case (*Mather v. Cunningham*, 105 Maine, 326) where it was held that a citizen of the United States could obtain a domicile in China; and prior to the decision of the House of Lords they were doubted by Evans, P., in a Prize Court case in England (*The Eumæus*, [1915] 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 605, at p. 615), as well as in a Prize Court case tried in Egypt by Cator, J. (*The Derfflinger* (No. 1), *Ibid.*, p. 389).

The question still remains whether a British subject who obtains a domicile of choice in an Eastern country, in which extraterritorial jurisdiction is exercised, should have his personal rights determined under such jurisdiction by English law or by the law of his domicile of origin to which, according to its general principles, English law would defer. In other words, does the reference to the law of England in the Capitulations which are sanctioned by the territorial law as governing the personal rights imply the internal English law, or, by a species of *renvoi* does it embrace the law of any part of the British Empire by which an English Court judging the case in England would decide the particular matter?

There is no decision on the point, though there are a number of *dicta*. Thus, in the case of *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra*, Lord Watson, in rejecting the contention that an Anglo-Egyptian domicile had been obtained, stated *obiter* that the *civil status* of a British subject was not affected by the consular jurisdiction, and that the reference to English law in the order concerning that jurisdiction includes any law to which an English court would pay regard. It is submitted, as the more reasonable principle, that "English law" should be understood in this wider sense. As in the case of *Re Johnson*, where the law of a foreign domicile referred to the national (English) law of the deceased to determine the succession, the English Court interpreted the *renvoi* to mean that law of the domicile of origin which by English principles would apply; so, it is submitted, in the case of a Scotchman or a Hindu found to be domiciled in an Eastern country, the Consular Court, seised of the succession by the submission of the territorial law, should apply not the English internal law of succession, but the Scotch or Hindu law which would be applicable by an English Court having regard to the character and origin of the *De Cujus*.

It is true that in the case of *Maltass v. Maltass* (1844) 1 Rob. Eccl. 67) Dr. Lushington, dealing with a will made by a British subject who had lived all his life at Smyrna but whose father had been domiciled in England, was of opinion that the provision of the Capitulations contemplated the law of England, in the narrower sense, as that applying to the succession of British subjects dying in the Ottoman Empire. Art. 26 of the Dardanelles Treaty of 1809 providing "that in case any Englishman, or other person subject to that nation or navigating under its flag, shall happen to die in our sacred dominions, our fiscal and other officers shall not, upon pretence of its not being known to whom the property belongs, interpose any opposition or violence by taking or seizing the effects that may be found at his death, but they shall be delivered up to such Englishman, whoever he may be, to whom the deceased may have left them by will; and if he shall have died intestate the property shall be delivered up to the English consul, or, if there be no consul, in that case the property shall be sent over to England in the next ship." There was a clear agreement that Turkish law should not apply to the successions of Christian British subjects even though domiciled in Turkey, and Dr. Lushington added his conviction that the law which must take its place was that of England. On the word "will" in Art. 26 he remarked, "This, in my opinion, it is perfectly clear must refer to a will made according to the law of England"; and on the word "intestate" in the same article he remarked, "This means intestate by the law of England." The doctrine so laid down is the foundation of that of Anglo-Turkish domicile. No advocate of the latter doctrine has imagined that the application of English law to persons domiciled in Turkey could exist without the consent, express or tacit, of the territorial sovereign, any more than a particular law can be applied in India without such sanction. But the sanction of the Sultan to the exclusion of Turkish law was given by the treaties, and the sanction of the British government to the law which was to take its place was given by the same treaties, which Dr. Lushington judicially interpreted as referring to the law of England, though he had quoted the words "any Englishman or other person subject to that nation."

But though Dr. Lushington laid down in *Maltass v. Maltass* the doctrine which is the foundation of Anglo-Turkish domicile, it has not always been sufficiently noticed that he did not assert that very domicile. He contemplates the possibility that

Mr. Maltass's domicile was not in Turkey but in England. The supposition that a domicile in England had been retained by absentees and handed down from father to son during a period of eighty years (see 3 Curteis 233, 234), and this in spite of the great appearance that the son was out of business while he continued to reside at Smyrna (see 1 Rob. Eccl. 71), would imply that when domicile is said to be changed *animo et facto*, the *animus* meant is something more than an intention of residing in the territory to which the change is made, and involves some kind or degree of identification with the inhabitants of that territory or with some particular class of them. "I give no opinion," Dr. Lushington said, "whether a British subject can or cannot acquire a Turkish domicile, but this I must say, I think every presumption is against the intention of British Christian subjects voluntarily becoming domiciled in the dominions of the Porte." *

While it has only recently been laid down that a British subject can acquire an Egyptian or a Chinese domicile, it has for a long time been a well-established rule that a British subject can obtain a legal domicile in India. The domicile thus obtained is also of a special kind, and does not subject the person to a territorial law which applies to the whole society in India, but to that personal law which is applicable to European subjects resident in India. It is referred to as an Anglo-Indian domicile, and was described in the case of *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra* (see above) as "altogether independent of political status."

The position is, therefore, in some respects the converse of the Egyptian domicile acquired by a British subject. The latter involves the application of English law by consent of the territorial sovereign to the rights of British subjects, while an Anglo-Indian domicile attaches the general law of the territory which, however, is not applied to the personal rights of the most numerous communities in the country, these being governed in respect of their personal rights by their religious rules and customs. It would appear too that, if an Englishwoman marries an Indian Moslem or Hindu, she does not become thereby subject to his special personal law, unless, of course, she expressly adopts his religion; but she retains her personal law of origin. Thus, in the case of *Ex parte Mir Anwureddin*

* These *dicta* are disposed of by the express doctrine in the contrary sense laid down in the *Casdagli* case.

(u.s., p. 87) it was said (per Reading, C.J.): "An Englishwoman acquires by status of marriage the domicile of her husband and is subject to the law of that domicile, but she does not acquire his religion or become subject to the law of his religion, except in so far as they are the law of his domicile, and then to that extent only." —

The rules as to Anglo-Indian domicile, which were established by the middle of the nineteenth century, are not directly affected by the more recent cases about Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Chinese domicile. By those rules any officer or civilian in the Indian service, or any British subject who has taken up permanent residence in India, obtains a domicile under which English law determines his personal rights, unless and until he resumes his domicile of origin (*Att.-Gen. v. Fitzgerald*, 25 L. J. Ch. 643, and *Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Gordon's Executors*, 12 Sess. Cases, 657).

It is doubtful whether these decisions would be followed now when the circumstances in British India are so changed, and when the principle of applying the law of the part of the British dominions to which the *de cuius* belonged has been adopted in all other cases of succession determined by British courts. But the point has not yet come up for definite decision.

The critical analysis which Westlake included, in the last edition, of the decisions in *Tootal's Trusts* and *Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra*, directed to show how those decisions were not in accord with the fundamental English exceptions of domicile, has been omitted, because the cogent argument he directed is now replaced by the decision of the highest English Court in *Casdagli's Case*, which affirms his standpoint against that of the judges in the two earlier cases. It is possible therefore now to proceed at once to the enunciation of the rules about domicile.

§ 243. Domicile, being necessarily connected either with law or with jurisdiction or with both, must always be in a territory, though it need not be at any particular spot in the territory. It may be in England, but need not be at York or the like: it may be in India, but need not be at Calcutta or the like. If it be in India, where there are different communities or societies living under different laws, the domicile is not completely stated unless the statement of it include that of the community or society to which the person belongs. Thus it may be described as an Anglo-Indian domicile, or the Indian domicile of a Hindoo or Mussulman. Where a British subject is domiciled in an Eastern non-British country, then the

description of such a domicile may be stated as Anglo-Egyptian, Anglo-Turkish, Anglo-Chinese, or as the case may be.

Westlake's criticism of the earlier decisions and his views about Eastern domicile are supported by Sir F. Pigott, late Chief Justice of Hong Kong, in his work on *Exterritoriality*, 2nd edition, 1907, p. 232, and were also supported in the *Law Quarterly Review*, vol. 24, by Mr. Huberich of Stanford University, California, who quotes, as the only American case on the subject, *Re Allen's Will*, U. S. Court for China, Shanghai term, 1907 (pamphlet). The testator's domicile of origin was in Georgia, and the question was whether the law of Georgia was to be applied in the administration of his estate, or "the law which Congress has extended to Americans in China, which is the common law." Judge Wilfley decided for the latter, saying that "we can see no good reason for holding that a citizen of the United States cannot be domiciled in China."

Domicile of Origin and of persons not sui juris.

I have contrasted domicile as the foundation of jurisdiction (for which purpose a sufficient practical result is obtainable if it be treated as equivalent to residence and it be consequently admitted that a person may have more than one domicile), and domicile as the criterion of personal law, for which purpose it must be single and therefore something more than residence. The English conception of domicile is of the latter kind, but the singleness which results from it is not therefore limited by us to the occasions when law is in question. When in England we use the term with reference to jurisdiction, if we wish to express that a domicile strictly understood is not necessary, we say that the jurisdiction may be founded either on domicile or on residence, not that there may be more than one domicile. At least I think that this is now acknowledged to be the accurate mode of speaking, though it may not be always observed. In order to the ascertainment for each person of so highly technical an attribute, it is necessary that it should be made to start from an origin imposed by law, such as the domicile of the person's father, after which his own movements may be investigated, but the assumption of which will prevent his ever being without a domicile, even though he should be without any really fixed residence. Therefore the subject branches from the beginning into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The rules concerning the former are as follows:—

§ 244. To every person the law of England attributes at his birth a domicile which is called that of origin, or the original or native domicile.

§ 245. The original domicile of a child born in wedlock to a living father is the domicile of its father at the time of its birth.

§ 246. The original domicile of a child born out of wedlock is the domicile of its mother at the time of its birth.

Westbury, in *Udny v. Udny* (1869), L R. 1 S. & D A 457; *Urquhart v. Butterfield* (1887), 37 Ch. D. 357, 377, Cotton, Lindley, Lopes.

§ 247. If and as soon as a child born out of wedlock is legitimated, being a minor, the domicile of its father at the time of such legitimation becomes its domicile.

§ 248. The original domicile of a child both whose parents are unknown is the place of its birth, or, if that too be unknown, the place where it is found.

The place thus indicated is that on which the duty of maintaining and educating the child is incumbent, and since his personal ties must be formed by such maintenance and education his personal law will naturally follow.

Intermediate to the foregoing rules and those concerning domicile of choice are certain rules concerning the changes of domicile of persons not *sui juris*, as determined by the action of the persons on whom they depend. So far as a domicile is so determined for a person under age there would be no great impropriety in calling it one of origin, since, like that imposed at birth, it becomes, if retained to majority, the origin from which his domicile is to be traced through the phases of his subsequent choice. And it is sometimes included under that name, though that of native domicile would be inappropriate to it.

See *Re Craignish, Craignish v. Hewitt*, [1892] 3 Ch 180, Chitty, at p 184 It is really rather a question of law than of nomenclature see § 261.

* But the case of an infant is not the only one comprised in the class. For the rest, with regard to the name, it must be borne in mind that domicile of origin, however extended or limited, has nothing to do with the *origo* of Roman law, which was citizenship: see above, p. 12.

§ 249. The domicile of a legitimate or legitimated unmarried and unemancipated minor follows that of his or her father, and the domicile of an unmarried and unemancipated minor born out of wedlock and not legitimated follows that of his or her mother, through all the changes of such respective domicile. "In order to constitute emancipation, the party ought to be

wholly and permanently free from the parental control": *The King v. The Inhabitants of Rotherfield Greys*, 1823, 1 B. & Cr. 345, Bayley, Holroyd, Best. This was a case of pauper settlement, sufficiently analogous to domicile. The pauper had enlisted in the marines while a minor, "and if he had remained in the army to the age of 21 years, his emancipation would undoubtedly relate back to the time of his enlistment"; but "the relation between him and the crown ceased," and he "again became subject to the parental control," thereby acquiring his father's parochial settlement.*

§ 250. The law or jurisdiction of the father's last domicile provides for the guardianship, after his death, of his legitimate or legitimated unmarried and unemancipated minor children. No guardian except the mother, whether appointed by the father under that law or by that law or jurisdiction itself, can change his ward's domicile except so far as he may be permitted to do so by the terms of his appointment, or by the law or the public authority under which he holds his office. But if the mother is the guardian, and the appointment or law under which she holds that office expresses nothing contrary, then, whether or not she remarries, she may either cause an unmarried minor's domicile to follow the changes of hers, so long as she does not change her domicile with a fraudulent view to his succession (which fraud will be presumed, if no reasonable motive can be assigned for the change of her domicile), or, acting for the welfare of the minor, she may arrange for his continuance in a domicile which she abandons. And where the mother's nominal guardianship is controlled by a court which regards itself as being the real guardian, like the English High Court in the Chancery Division, she will not have even this limited power of changing her children's domicile. These principles regulate the domicile of a posthumous child, as well as that of a child whose father died after its birth or legitimation.

It is believed that the § is in accordance, so far as those authorities go, with the net result of *Pottinger v. Wightman* (1817), 3 Mer. 67, Grant; Lyndhurst in *Johnstone v. Beattie* (1843), 10 C. & F. 66; Campbell in the same case, *ib.*, pp. 138—140; Wilde in *Sharpe v. Crispin* (1869), L. R. 1 P. & M. 617; and *Re Beaumont*, [1893] 3 Ch. 490, Stirling. In *Crompton's Judicial Factor v. Finch-Noyes*, [1918] S. C. 378, where a minor, aged 11, had been brought by his mother, after his father's death, from his domicile of origin and lived with his mother six years in Scotland, where she married an Englishman, and subsequently

* It is pointed out by Baty (*op. cit.*) that there is no reported authority for the powers of a minor to change his domicile by his own act.

he married in London, but returned to Scotland and lived there till he was certified insane, it was held that he had received his mother's domicile in Scotland, when a minor, and died domiciled in Scotland. The rule goes strictly beyond the authorities in treating the case of the mother as a special one of guardianship, in taking the law of the father's last domicile as the governing principle for the whole, and in connecting posthumous children with the rest of the §.

§ 251. The domicile of a lunatic who has become such after attaining his majority is not changed by a change in that of the person who has his legal custody. It remains that which it was at the commencement of his lunacy.

In *Bempde v. Johnstone* (1796), 3 Ves. 198, Loughborough doubted whether residence in a country as a lunatic might not be added to previous residence in the same country for the purpose of fixing the domicile there. In *Sharpe v. Crispin* (1869), Wilde appeared to be distinctly inclined towards the doctrine of the §; L. R. 1 P. & M. 618. In *Hepburn v. Skirving* (1861), 9 W. R. 764, Stuart, the point scarcely arose. Dicey maintains the doctrine of the §; Conflict of Laws, pp. 142, 143; 3rd edition, pp. 152, 153.

§ 252. But the domicile of a son who has never been of sound mind since attaining his majority continues to follow the changes of his father's domicile. The incapacity of lunacy is in this case a mere prolongation of the incapacity of minority.

Sharpe v. Crispin (1869), L. R. 1 P. & M. 611, Wilde. ✓

§ 253. The domicile of a wife, not judicially separated *a mensa et toro*, is that of her husband.

The only serious doubt as to this is whether even a judicial separation *a mensa et toro* enables her to establish a separate domicile. The point, which is involved in the case of the Princess Bibesco, on which a whole literature has arisen on the continent, did not occur in *Dolphin v. Robins*, but Cranworth appeared to think that the wife is so enabled, and Kingsdown distinctly thought the contrary: 1859, 7 H. of L. 416, 420. Cranworth even suggested that the wife might be entitled to establish a separate domicile "where the husband has abjured the realm, has deserted the wife and established himself permanently in a foreign country, or has committed felony and been transported": *ib.*, p. 419. And a possible exception to that extent was reserved by Swinfen Eady, J., from his concurrence in the general doctrine of the §: *Re Mackenzie, Mackenzie v. Edwards-Moss*, [1911] 1 Ch. 594. Phillimore inclined towards the separate domicile of a wife either judicially separated or entitled to a judicial separation or divorce, but on grounds which appear to confound domicile with residence: in *Le Sueur v. Le Sueur* (1876), 1 P. D. 141; as to which case see above, p. 89. His *dicta* are expressly overruled by a later decision of the House of Lords, where it was held that in the absence of a decree for judicial separation, the conduct of the husband, which would have enabled the wife to obtain a decree, if she had applied for it, cannot after his death be deemed sufficient to establish that she had a separate domicile: *Lord-Advocate v. Jaffrey*, [1921] 1 A. C. 146, H. L., Haldane, Finlay, Cave, Dunedin, Shaw; affirming Scotch Court of Sessions.

In a case decided during the war with Germany, an Englishwoman married to an Austrian, and judicially separated from him, was held to have a separate domicile from her husband for the purpose of being able to receive money: *Re Grimthorpe's Settlement*, [1918] W N. 16, Eve.

An Englishwoman married to a foreign husband and deserted by him has been held to be able to regain her English domicile of origin, so as to be qualified to sue for an English divorce. See *Stathatos v Stathatos*, [1913] P. 46, above, p. 88.

From *Williams v. Dormer* (1851), Fust, and (1852), Dobson, 2 Robertson 505, it appears that a wife judicially separated *a mensa et toro* will not be deemed to be legally resident in the same place as her husband, for the purpose of founding jurisdiction against her in a suit of nullity of marriage afterwards brought by him.

Domicile of Choice.

We now come to that action by a person *sui juris* which results in the establishment for himself of a domicile of choice. And having regard to the fact that in many continental countries political nationality has been substituted for domicile as the criterion of the personal statute—in other words, civil societies have been identified with political ones—it will be desirable to begin by examining how the view which is retained in England as to the legal bearing of domicile is affected when a country comes into consideration in which that legal bearing is assigned to political nationality, or in which it makes a difference whether a foreigner has had the authority of the government for establishing a domicile.

§ 254. If an establishment be made in any country in such manner that by English law it would fix the domicile there, still no effect which the law of that country does not allow to it can be allowed to it in the character of domicile in England. In other words, no one can acquire a personal law in the teeth of that law itself.

Collier v. Rivaz (1841), 2 Cur. 855, Jenner; *Bremer v. Freeman* (1856), Deane 192, Dobson; in which cases it was held that according to English principles on domicile a testator had acquired a domicile in a foreign country, and that the effect of applying English principles on wills to that state of his domicile would have been to invalidate his will, contrary to the law of that country, which the court refused to do. See above, § 89. *Bremer v. Freeman* was reversed on appeal (1857), 10 Mo. P. C. 306, Wensleydale; it being held that to invalidate the will was not contrary to the law of France, in which country the testatrix, without authority from the French government, had acquired a domicile according to English principles. In *Hamilton v. Dallas* (1875), 1 Ch. D. 257, Bacon, where also a domicile according to English principles had been acquired in France without government authority, it was similarly held that there was no difference between the laws of England and France as to the effect of such domicile in the particular case.

Now see especially *Re Johnson*, [1903] 1 Ch. 821, Farwell, and *Re Bowes*, stated and discussed above, p. 38.

§ 255. But if an establishment be made in England in such manner as by English law to fix the domicile there, its full effect according to English law will be allowed to it in England, notwithstanding that the country which the person has abandoned may claim to determine his personal law according to his continuing political nationality.

I submit this § on the ground of principle. There seems to be no reason why a person *sui juris* should not acquire a new personal law, with the consent of that law and in its country, although his former personal law may object to the change.

In *Brunel v. Brunel* (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 298, Bacon, the circumstance that the deceased had satisfied the conditions under which the French code declares the French character to be lost, without foreign naturalization, was treated as an argument in favour of his having acquired an English domicile.

§ 256. It was the Roman law that a person *sui juris* can establish for himself a domicile of choice *animo et facto*, by establishing for himself in fact a residence in the territory in question, combined with an *animus manendi* in that territory. The English law is the same, subject to the condition that the residence which is to create domicile must have a character that was not always required when the establishment of a new domicile did not necessarily imply the abandonment of the former one. It must be more permanent in intention, and more decisively preponderant over all other residences while it lasts. The *animus* referred to in the rule is not exactly the same. By what tests the preponderance and permanence required by English law are to be measured will be considered in §§ 264, &c.

Some doubt about the principle may still exist arising from the doctrine which may be called that of *Moorhouse v. Lord*—(1863) 10 H. of L. 272—from the pointed manner in which it was laid down in that case by Lords Cranworth and Kingsdown, though it did not then make its first appearance. According to that doctrine a domicile of choice, even in a Christian country, is not acquired by any residence, however preponderant and however permanent, unless the person in question has the intention of subjecting himself and his movable succession to the law of that country, or at least, if he does not think expressly of the law, the intention of so incorporating himself with the population

of that country that the application of its law to him and to his movable succession must be considered to be in accordance with his feelings. There was at the time an impression that in *Moorhouse v. Lord*—and in *Whicker v. Hume* (1858), 7 H. of L. 124—it was designed to substitute political nationality for domicile as the ground of personal law, or at any rate to negative a domicile of choice as the ground of personal law unless accompanied by such circumstances as to infer a preference for the political nationality of the adopted territory. But a careful study of the speeches of the noble lords will show that it was the civil and not the political society of the adopted territory with which they required that the person who established a domicile of choice should desire to incorporate himself. The doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord*, moreover, has not been followed in the majority of the more recent decisions, and more particularly in the decisions of the House of Lords in *Winans v. Attorney-General* (see below, p. 340), and *Casdagli v. Casdagli* (u.s. p. 321), and the Scottish case of *Corbridge v. Somerville* (51 Sc. L. R. 406), and it can no longer be regarded as modifying the older principle.

That principle attaches most importance to the authority and welfare of the society to which a person belongs by residence, a welfare which it cannot be denied may in some cases suffer, if the reluctance or hesitation of a resident to identify himself with that society is allowed to except him from subjection to its laws. Consider for example domicile as the basis of jurisdiction for divorce, as well as the test of the prohibited degrees in marriage: the country with which a person was most intimately connected by residence might well object to its laws on those subjects not being applied to him, because he came there from a country with which he desired to retain his civil connection. The other doctrine attaches most importance to preserving the liberty and giving effect to the wishes of persons. Indeed it may be said to supplement the liberty of living abroad by liberty in living abroad. Let us suppose "the case of a person wishing to settle permanently in a country different from that of his domicile, but to retain as regards testamentary and matrimonial matters, and as regards civil status generally, the law of the country that he leaves": Wickens, in *Douglas v. Douglas*, 1871, L. R. 12 Eq. 644. If any one wished to settle in a country in the sense of establishing himself there with all his belongings, so as to become a member of its society, and found a family there

if anywhere, and at the same time to retain the law of another country, he would, like many men, be wishing for incompatible things, and the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord* would certainly not help him. But if Sir J. Wickéns be understood as putting the case of a man who merely wished to establish his own personal residence in a country different from that of his domicile, and that permanently, at the same time deprecating any severance of his family relations from his domicile, then so to live abroad, while preserving the law of his old country as that by which, on his intestacy, his movable property shall be distributed among his kindred, very likely still resident there, is just what the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord* would permit, the older doctrine refusing it.

With regard to the historical connections of the two doctrines, it scarcely needs to be remarked that that of *Moorhouse v. Lord* neither arose nor could have arisen on the ancient footing of domicile being residence viewed with no more technicality than is necessary for the purpose of jurisdiction. And with regard to the other ancient significance of domicile, namely, its relation to municipal burdens, the notion that these could be escaped in a new actual residence, by protestations of clinging morally to the old one, is condemned *q. converso* in a passage of the Digest quoted above on p. 319. But since law has come to be determined among us by domicile, and two other conditions have been combined with this, a vast increase in the habitual displacement of persons, and a growing reluctance to defeat their reasonable wishes by technical rules, it appears to me worthy of serious consideration whether it would not be wise in England either to adopt the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord* or to remove the basis of personal law from domicile to political nationality. And that views with regard to the change of domicile like those expressed in *Moorhouse v. Lord* have not arisen on the continent appears to me to be due to the movement which is taking place there in favour of political nationality as the test of personal law. That system, so far as it permits a man to live abroad while retaining his old law through not procuring himself to be naturalized, operates as another mode of satisfying those requirements of the age which are now in question.

It is unnecessary to quote the English authorities which supported the doctrine of § 256. One of them however may be given as being very express, and at the same time one of the last before the newer doctrine was announced. In *Hoskins v. Matthews* (1856), 8 D. M. G. 13, Turner said: "In this case I find nothing in the evidence to show that Mr. Matthews,

when he left England, was in any immediate danger or apprehension. He was no doubt out of health, and he went abroad for the purpose of trying the effect of other remedies and other climates. That he would have preferred settling in England I have little doubt, but I think he was not driven to settle in Italy by any urgent necessity. I think that in settling there he was exercising a preference and not acting upon a necessity, and I cannot venture to hold that in such a case the domicile cannot be changed. If domicile is to remain unchanged upon the ground of climate being more suitable to health, I hardly know how one could stop short of holding that it ought to remain unchanged also upon the ground of habits being more suitable to fortune. There is in both cases a degree of moral compulsion." Knight-Bruce dissented, but without giving detailed reasons. He said however: "The whole of the evidence being considered, it does not appear to me to be proved that at any time after the year 1838 Mr. Matthews acquired a Tuscan domicile, or relinquished or lost his English domicile, or intended to acquire a Tuscan domicile, or to relinquish or lose his English domicile." The intention to transfer one's domicile is without importance, if its transfer is effected by law on the residence being transferred both in intention and in fact.

Then, in 1858, Cranworth said in *Whicker v. Hume*: "I think it is not inexpedient on questions of this sort to say that I think that all courts ought to look with the greatest suspicion and jealousy at any of these questions as to change of domicile into a foreign country. You may much more easily suppose that a person having originally been living in Scotland, a Scotchman, means permanently to quit it and come to England, or *vice versa*, than that he is quitting the United Kingdom in order to make his permanent home where he must for ever be a foreigner, and in a country where there must always be those difficulties which arise from the complication that exists, and the conflict between the duties that you owe to one country and the duties which you owe to the other. Circumstances may be so strong as to lead irresistibly to the inference that a person does mean *quatenus in illo exuere patriam*. But that is not a presumption at which we ought easily to arrive, more especially in modern times, when the facilities for travelling and the various inducements for pleasure, for curiosity or for economy, so frequently lead persons to make temporary residences out of their native country." 7 H. of L. 159.

The new doctrine, thus preluded to, was distinctly announced in *Moorhouse v. Lord* (1863), 10 H. of L. 272. Cranworth said that Mr. Cochrane "eventually established himself in a house or apartments which he took unfurnished, and for which he got expensive furniture, meaning if you please to live there always. But then that does not change the domicile. In order to acquire a new domicile, according to an expression which I believe I used on a former occasion, and which I shall not shrink on that account from repeating, because I think it is a correct statement of the law, a man must intend *quatenus in illo exuere patriam*. It is not enough that you merely mean to take another house in some other place, and that on account of your health or for some other reason you think it tolerably certain that you had better remain there all the days of your life. That does not signify. You do not lose your domicile of origin or your resumed domicile merely because you go to some other place that suits your health better, unless indeed you mean either on account of your health or for some other motive to cease to be a Scotchman, and become an Englishman or a Frenchman or a German. In that case, if you give up everything you left behind you and establish yourself elsewhere, you

may change your domicile. But it would be a most dangerous thing in this age, when persons are so much in the habit of going to a better climate on account of health, or to another country for a variety of reasons, for the education of their children, or from caprice or for enjoyment, to say that by going and living elsewhere, still retaining all your possessions here, and keeping up your house in the country as this gentleman kept up his house at Clippens, you make yourself a foreigner instead of a native. It is quite clear that that is quite inconsistent with all the modern improved views of domicile." And Kingsdown said: "Upon the question of domicile I would only wish to say this, that I apprehend that change of residence alone, however long and continued, does not effect a change of domicile as regulating the testamentary acts of the individual. It may be and it is a necessary ingredient. It may be and it is strong evidence of an intention to change the domicile, but unless in addition to residence there is intention to change the domicile, in my opinion no change of domicile is made. . . .

In *Sharpe v. Crispin* (1869), Wilde (Penzance) said: "It was ably and forcibly argued that George said nothing and did nothing in the course of his life from which the court could infer a deliberate resolve on his part to surrender his Portuguese domicile and replace it by an English one. That such an inference could alone in the eye of the law destroy his domicile of origin is apparent from the numerous authorities which exist on this subject, confirmed as they are by the decision of the House of Lords in the case of *Moorhouse v. Lord*." L. R. 1 P. & M. 616. On the other hand, in the same year, Westbury said in *Udny v. Udny*: "Domicile of choice is a conclusion or inference which the law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time." L. R. 1 S. & D. A. 458. In the same case Westbury corrected the impression that by the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord* it had been intended to substitute political nationality for domicile, as an element in private law.

In *Douglas v. Douglas* (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 617, Wickens contrasted the two doctrines, and was unable to satisfy himself that that of *Moorhouse v. Lord* is the law of England, though he would have liked to do so. He appears however to have considered that that doctrine refuses to admit a change of domicile without the person having distinctly contemplated a change of law, which is not how I understand it. The distinction may be fine, but I submit that it is real. For example, of two Englishmen who establish their residences in Portugal, the one may cling to the English society he can find there, and may strive to maintain an English feeling in his children, by having them educated in England and otherwise; the other may by preference cultivate Portuguese society for himself and his family, and bring up his children as Portuguese. Neither may have thought of law till the occasion arrived, but when it came to the marriage of his children, the one would probably expect his authority with regard to it to be measured by English law, the other by Portuguese. And the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord*, as I understand it, would not refuse to admit the change of domicile in the latter case.

The doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord* was implicitly repudiated by the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in *Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, [1904] A. C. 287, in which he repelled an asserted change of domicile from the United States to England, in circumstances

so strong that the change had been maintained in the courts below by Kennedy and Phillimore, JJ., and by Collins, Stirling and Mathew, L.JJ., and was maintained by Lord Lindley on the final appeal, Lord Halsbury declaring himself not satisfied, and giving his deciding vote against the change only because the burden of proof lay on the party asserting it.¶ The important point is that, although it would have been easy to overrule all the adverse facts by observing that Mr. Winans had never shown a disposition *quatenus in illo exuere patriam* in any sense, Lord Macnaghten does not allude to that as a test, and does not even mention the famous case, but refers for what he has to say about Lord Cranworth's views to a part of what that learned lord said in the previous case of *Whicker v. Hume*, and lays down his own test in the following words: "The question which your lordships have to consider must, I think, be this: Has it been proved with perfect clearness and satisfaction to yourselves that Mr. Winans had at the time of his death formed a fixed and settled purpose, a determination, a final and deliberate intention, to abandon his American domicile and settle in England?" This view of the question his lordship based on language which he quoted from Lords Cottenham,* Chelmsford,† Westbury‡ and Cairns.§ He approved and applied a passage from the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wickens: "What has here to be considered is whether the testator ever actually declared a final and deliberate intention of settling in England, *or whether his conduct and declarations lead to the belief that he would have declared such an intention if the necessity of making the election between the countries had arisen.*" || This then is the present result of the English cases. The *animus* required for acquiring a domicile of choice must be an intention, either formed by the *de cujus* or which it may be believed that he would have formed if his thoughts had been crystallised by a question put to him, to reside in the fullest and most permanent way, and in that sense to acquire a new

¶ It is only fair to say that Westlake's inference from the judgment is not shared by several leading jurists who, on the contrary, regard the decision as a step towards reviving the doctrine which Westlake said was "dismissed" by it. I have changed the wording "must be considered to have been dismissed," which appeared in the last edition, to "was implicitly repudiated": I do not think the inference can be put higher than that.

* In *Munro v. Munro* (1840), 7 Cl. & F. 876.

† In *Udny v. Udny* (1869), L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 455.

‡ In *Bell v. Kennedy* (1868), L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 321.

§ *Ib.*, p. 311

|| In *Douglas v. Douglas* (1871), L. R. 12 Eq. 645.

domicile, but it need not be an intention to subject himself to another system of law, or to identify himself with the social ideas and habits of another country. If therefore it be described as an intention *quatenus in illo exuere patriam*, that can only be in the most external sense, from which all the moral considerations that go to make up a *patria* are excluded.

In a recent Scotch case it was held that a Scotsman had obtained a domicile of choice in England by his continuous residence, though he had made a will in which he was described as "a domiciled Scotchman."

Corbridge v. Somerville, 51 Sc. L. R. 406, [1913] S. C. 858, Cullen, Strathclyde, Johnston, Mackenzie, Skerrington. Skerrington regretted that he could not hold that a domicile of origin cannot be lost unless a person has knowingly and deliberately abandoned it "in the sense that he has intentionally changed his civil status from that of a Scotchman to that of an Englishman, or of a foreigner, as the case may be."

This decision is a more emphatic repudiation of Cranworth's doctrine than the judgment in *Winans v. Att.-Gen.* and the judgment of the House of Lords about Oriental domicile in the *Casdagli Case* emphasises the principle that there may be a change of civil status without any consideration of change of political nationality.

The case of *Marchioness of Huntly v. Gaskell*, [1906] A. C. 56, Halsbury, Robertson, Lindley, seems to have been correctly described by Lord Robertson as a hopeless attempt to turn a strenuous English banker and great landed proprietor into a Scotchman, p. 71.

Rules as to Change of Domicile.

§ 257. Men, unmarried women, widows, divorced women, and possibly wives judicially separated *a mensa et toro*—see § 253—being of full age and of sound mind, change their domicile by a combination of intention and fact, *animo et facto* as it is said.

If it is asked whether the condition of full age is necessary in the case of those who have once been emancipated by marriage, the answer will be that this must depend on the personal law. A minor who on marriage is relieved by the law of his country from all incapacity will, of course, be as capable for the purpose of changing his domicile as for any other purpose. Marriage does not by the law of England relieve a minor from all incapacity, or therefore give him the power of changing his domicile.

Forbes v. Forbes (1854), Kay 341, at p. 355, Wood.

§ 258. For a change of domicile, the intention of establishment in the new country which is in general necessary is that described in commenting on the case of *Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, above—a settled purpose and determination to abandon one residence and settle in another. This however is subject to the

remark that when the domicile which is abandoned was itself acquired by choice, the intention may be limited to that of abandoning it, since if no intention be directed towards any other country, the domicile of origin will be reacquired by reverter on the occurrence of the necessary fact, which it will presently be seen consists merely in leaving the country in which a domicile had been acquired.

From the necessity of intention it follows that domicile cannot be changed by any residence not resulting either from a choice immediately applied to the residence, or from a duty freely undertaken, as in the case of § 275.

Not by lying in prison: *Burton v. Fisher* (1828), Milward 183, Radcliff. Not by 22 years' actual residence in another country, in lodgings, hotels and boarding houses in different places, with no clear intention of making a home there: *Patience v. Main* (1885), 29 Ch. D. 976, Chitty. And see a remarkable case of protracted actual residence not changing the domicile, *Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, [1904] A. C. 287. See a recent case, *Re Lassalle*, "The Times," March 28, 1920, Astbury, where a Scotch domicile of origin was held to be maintained despite twenty-three years' residence in India and a wandering life thereafter, the next-of-kin failing to prove any domicile of choice. The person in question was born in France, but his mother was Scotch and brought him up in Scotland during his minority.

But where the intention is proved, the motive for it is of no importance.

Turner, as quoted above on p. 338, is in accordance with the current of authority in rejecting as irrelevant all inquiry into "moral compulsion."

Where an American subject who had obtained a matrimonial domicile in England left England and lived in Paris and applied for a decree of naturalization there in order to take divorce proceedings in France, it was held that the English domicile of choice was lost. *Drexel v. Drexel*, [1915] 140 L. T. J. 155, Neville.

§ 259. The fact necessary for a change of domicile is in general merely that of leaving the old country, but if the domicile in the old country was one of origin, there must be the further fact of arriving in the new country. The actual duration of residence in the new country may be important as evidence of intention, but is never important as a legal condition of the change of domicile.

An ineffectual attempt to leave a country is not a sufficient fact: *Re Raffanel* (1863), 3 S. & T. 49, Cresswell. It is not enough to intend leaving the country: *Re Marrett, Chalmers v. Wingfield* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 400, Cotton, Bowen and Fry, affirming Stirling.

§ 260. The combination of §§ 258 and 259 leads to the following rules for different cases.

(1) Change from domicile of origin to one of choice. If the person dies at sea, or otherwise *in itinere* between the old country and the new, his last domicile is that of origin.

I do not know that the case has arisen, but I have incorporated the point in § 259 because the general tenour of the authorities convinces me that it would be so decided.

(2) Intentional resumption of the domicile of origin, after possessing a domicile of choice. In the event of death *in itinere*, the last domicile is that of origin.

Re Bianchi (1852), 3 S. & T. 16, Cresswell.

(3) Abandonment of a domicile of choice without a sufficient intention being directed towards any other country, and consequent commencement of an unsettled life. The domicile of origin reverts on the abandonment of the domicile of choice and continues during the unsettled life.

Udny v. Udny (1869), L. R. 1 S. & D. A. 441, Hatherley, Chelmsford, Westbury, Colonsay. This case overruled *Munroe v. Douglas* (1820), 5 Madd. 379, Leach; and was followed in *King v. Foxwell* (1876), 3 Ch. D. 518, Jessel. See *Re Lassalle* (u.s.).

(4) Change from one domicile of choice to another. In the event of death *in itinere*, the last domicile is the one towards which the person is journeying. Such is the doctrine of Sir John Leach in *Munroe v. Douglas* (1820), 5 Madd. 405, approved by Wood in *Forbes v. Forbes* (1854), Kay 354; and this part of Leach's doctrine does not seem to have been censured in *Udny v. Udny*. But the case, as distinguished from (3), would not often happen, and if it happened would probably now be decided as a case of (3), the leaning to the domicile of origin, where doubt is possible, having become so strong.

§ 261. Where a person's domicile has been changed under §§ 247, 249, 250, 252 or 253, between the date of his birth and that when he first acquired the power of changing his domicile for himself, it is the domicile attributed to him by law at the latter date which must be understood as his domicile of origin, in applying §§ 258, 259 and 260:

Whenever the domicile of origin is expressly defined, no larger meaning is given to it than that of the domicile attributed by law at birth, as in § 244. But the principles on which the doctrines of §§ 258 and 259 have been founded by the authorities for them appear to require this extension of the meaning of the term "domicile of origin," as employed in those authorities. It

is discussed, but without arriving at a conclusion, in *Re Craignish*, referred to under § 248.

§ 262. Since there is always a domicile to start from when the domicile of a person *sui juris* is in dispute, the burden of proof lies on the party asserting the change of domicile.

See Lord Halsbury in *Winans v. Att.-Gen.*, as mentioned above, p. 340.

§ 263. And this burden will be less easily satisfied where the new domicile alleged is politically foreign to the old one, than when the contest lies between two countries equally British.

Cranworth, in *Whicker v. Hume*, as quoted above, p. 338. This, as suggested on the same page, is scarcely true in theory except on the footing of the doctrine of *Moorhouse v. Lord*, but it will probably still be true in practice

§ 264. The intention necessary for acquiring a domicile of choice excludes all contemplation of any event on the occurrence of which the residence would cease. The old English doctrine was that all desire or intention of return to the old country was not excluded, if only the event on which the return depended was highly uncertain and regarded as remote. Thus the domicile might be changed by residence abroad for the sake of health, if such recovery as to permit return was very improbable, notwithstanding the desire to return in case of recovery. Or it might be changed by residence abroad as a merchant, with the intention of remaining till a fortune should be made and then returning.

Thurlow in *Bruce v. Bruce* (1790), 2 Bos. & Pul. 230, note; Lushington in *Anderson v. Laneville* (1854), 9 Mo. P. C. 334; Campbell in *Aikman v. Aikman* (1861), 3 Macq. 858. But in modern times the tendency has been to treat an expressed intention of returning to a domicile of origin as negating the *animus manendi*. *James v. James*, 98 L. T. 438, Eve, where a testator who had a domicile of origin in Wales and lived there forty years, and then migrated to South Africa under medical advice and died there, was held to have retained his domicile of origin because in letters he continually referred to "going home." In *Doucet v. Geoghegan*, 9 Ch. D. 441, Malins, 1877; affirmed in 1878 by Jessel, James and Brett; a Frenchman was held to have acquired an English domicile, notwithstanding "some declarations in casual conversations of an intention to return to France when he had made money enough." But the case rather proves that such declarations cannot "outweigh all the acts of a man's life and every document executed by him," than that an intention to return after making a fortune, if sufficiently proved, will be still held not to prevent a change of domicile. See also *Corbridge v. Somerville* (above p. 341), where a declaration in the testator's will that he was to be deemed a domiciled Scotchman was held not to affect the legal domicile of choice he had acquired by continuous residence in England.

§ 265. Nevertheless a residence in India for mercantile purposes, not having a prefixed duration, still produces an Anglo-Indian domicile, although the intention in such cases is almost always to remain only till a fortune is made and then to return to Europe. This rule was originally established on the footing of the old doctrine mentioned under the last §, and it has survived as an exception to the new doctrine. The notion that the question, whether India is governed directly by the highest British political authority or indirectly through the East India Company, could have anything to do with Anglo-Indian domicile is incompatible with any clear conception of domicile.

Cranworth and Chelmsford themselves, in *Moorhouse v. Lord*, admitted the Anglo-Indian domicile of a Scotchman who had gone out to India in the civil service of the East India Company; 10 H. L. 281, 284; though his correspondence "showed that he never had any intention of remaining in India longer than to make his fortune, when he would return to Scotland," as Kindersley, V.-C., said of that person in *Allardice v. Onslow* (1864), 10 Jur. (N. S.) 352, at p. 353.

It must be admitted that there are strong reasons of convenience in favour of the Anglo-Indian domicile in these cases. Since the Anglo-Indian law is nearly the same as that of England or Ireland, the decision in its favour makes little or no difference if the domicile of origin was in England or Ireland, except so far as to exempt the person's succession from the home legacy duty. And where the domicile of origin was Scotch, the merchant, if he should ever return to Europe, is just as likely to settle in England as in Scotland; while if attributing a Scotch domicile to him should make it necessary to apply Scotch law in India, that would be even more inconvenient than it is found to be to apply it in London, there being so much less opportunity there of obtaining accurate information about it.

§ 266. Where a question of domicile turns on disputed intention, the declarations of the person in question are admissible as evidence, whether they were made orally or are contained in private writings or legal documents. If living, he may testify as a witness to his intentions. But it will be permitted to question the sincerity of such declarations or testimony, or the accuracy of the deponent's memory as to his intentions at a former time. And it must always be carefully considered whether the intentions which the declarations or testimony tend to prove are such as are really important. Thus a sincere and

express declaration of an intention to retain an old domicile, whatever that may have meant to the declarant, may be overruled by evidence of his intention to pass the rest of his days in another country.

The case just put occurred in *Re Steer* (1858), 3 H. & N. 594, Pollock, Bramwell, Watson. See declarations of intention dealt with in *Crookenden v. Fuller* (1859), 1 S. & T. 441, Cresswell; and in *Doucet v. Geoghegan*, quoted above, p. 344. *Corbridge v. Somerville*, above p. 341, and *Casdagli v. Casdagli*, above p. 321. The person whose domicile was in question was examined as a witness to his intentions in *Maxwell v. McClure* (1860), 3 Macq. 852, 6 Jur. (N. S.) 407; in *Re Craignish, Craignish v. Hewitt*, [1892] 3 Ch 180, Chitty; and in *Wilson v. Wilson* (1872), L. R. 2 P. & M. 435, in which case Wilde avowed that, on the strength of the party's testimony, he had come to a different conclusion as to his domicile from that to which he should have come in its absence. "The question is here not so much whether the circumstances of his English residence tend to prove English domicile as whether, the man swearing to his intention to create an English domicile, there are such circumstances on the other side as warrant the court in throwing over his oath and disbelieving him" *ib.*, p. 445. In *Spurway v. Spurway*, [1894] 1 I. R. 385, Porter, M.R., and Walker, C., treated an official declaration of a desire to establish a residence in France as strong evidence of the establishment of a domicile there.

§ 267. Acts implying a choice of domicile stand on the same footing as oral or written declarations; for example, marrying or making a will in such manner that the validity of the marriage or the will depends on the domicile being in a certain country.

Doucet v. Geoghegan (1878), 9 Ch. D. 441, Jessel and James.

We now come to the criteria that are commonly referred to as between two residences, in order to determine, or aid in determining, towards which residence such intention as is deemed to be important in a case of domicile was directed. They ought all to be taken as subject to the inherent difficulty of proving a change of domicile, especially where the domicile alleged to have been changed was that of origin.

§ 268. The residence of a man's wife and family is the most important among the external criteria of his domicile, but is not always decisive.

Forbes v. Forbes (1854), Kay 341, Wood; *Platt v. Att.-Gen. of New South Wales* (1878), 3 Ap. Ca. 336, Peacock; *D'Etchegoyen v. D'Etchegoyen* (1888), 13 P. D. 132, Hannen. And this criterion is not the less important because the residence may have been chosen at the wife's wish, and he supported by her fortune: *Aitchison v. Dixon* (1870), L. R. 10 Eq. 589, James.

§ 269. A merchant's town house is a more weighty criterion than his country house, but the country house of a landed proprietor not engaged in trade is a more weighty criterion than his town house.

Arden (Alvanley) in *Somerville v. Somerville* (1801), 5 Ves. 789.

§ 270. If a person exercises political or municipal functions in a certain place, this furnishes an important argument as against a place where he does not possess or neglects to exercise them.

Kindersley in *Drevon v. Drevon* (1864), 34 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 137. In *Maxwell v. McClure* (1860), Campbell referred to this argument as one of those for affirming a decision of the Court of Session, by which the domicile was determined adversely to the criterion in § 268: 6 Jur. (N. S.) 408, and 3 Macq. 859.

§ 271. No great weight is attached to the circumstance of a person's residing in lodgings or in a house of his own.

Langdale in *Whicker v. Hume* (1851), 13 Beav. 395; Cranworth in the same case (1858), 7 H. L. 157.

§ 272. Importance has been attached to the following criteria.
Length and continuity of residence.

Lushington in *Hodgson v. De Beauchesne* (1858), 12 Mo. P. C. 328, 330.

Naturalization in the new country.

This was probably the circumstance which chiefly outweighed the evidence of an intention to return in *Stanley v. Bernes* (1830), 3 Hagg. Eccl. 370, Nicholl, and (1831), ib. p. 447, before the delegates. *Drexel v. Drexel* (above p. 342) and *Horngold v. Horngold*, L. J. Newsp. 1914, p. 2.

In which country a person has his children educated, in his absence of special reasons for his choice.

Kindersley in *Drevon v. Drevon* (1864), 34 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 139.

Marrying a daughter, apprenticing a son, and buying a partnership for him in the new country.

Stevenson v. Masson (1873), L. R. 17 Eq. 78, Bacon.

Removal of the remains of deceased children to the new country.

James in *Haldane v. Eckford* (1869), L. R. 8 Eq. 642.

In which country a testator directs his property to be invested, and from which country he chooses the trustees of his will and the guardians of his children.

Kindersley in *Drevon v. Drevon* (1864), 34 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 136. "By her will she left her property to English trustees, and to be administered according to English law". Pollock in *Att.-Gen. v. Wahlstatt* (1864), 3 H. & C. 387.

§ 272a. The circumstance that a man is a fugitive from justice is or may be important. Lord Lindley in *Re Martin, Loustalan v. Loustalan*, [1900] P. 211, at p. 232, held that, if he could safely return to his old country after the expiration of a term of prescription, an inference cannot be drawn from his character as a fugitive that he had abandoned all intention to return, and that his domicile must therefore be held to have been unchanged unless such an inference can be drawn from other circumstances. "I should not," he added, "arrive at the same conclusion if he had fled from his country for life unless pardoned, as an English criminal fugitive would have done to escape from the operation of the laws of his own country. The definite period after which he could safely return is to my mind all-important." In the case at issue, Jeune, President of the Probate Division, and Lindley, M.R., held that a fugitive the sentence against whom was subject to prescription had not changed his domicile, and Rigby and Vaughan Williams, L.JJ., held that he had changed it.

§ 273. A domicile in any part of the British dominions is not changed by employment in the service of the British crown, whether military, naval or civil, even though such employment involve residence elsewhere, with the exception however as to India expressed in § 275. On the other hand, such service is no obstacle to the acquisition of any domicile not inconsistent with its duties.

So far as the question of domicile lies between two British places, these rules follow from the circumstance that the service of the crown involves no lasting tie to one part of the British dominions rather than to another.

A British domicile was retained notwithstanding employment elsewhere in the military service of the crown, in *Dalhousie v. McDouall* (1840), 7 C. & F. 817, Cottenham and Brougham; *Re Macreight, Paxton v. Macreight* (1885), 30 Ch. D. 165, Pearson; *Lauderdale Peerage* (1885), 10 Ap. Ca. 692, 738, Selborne, Blackburn, Watson, Bramwell, Fitzgerald. And that such would be the case was also laid down in *Ex parte Cunningham, Re Mitchell* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 418, Baggallay, Cotton, Lindley.

A British domicile was retained notwithstanding employment elsewhere in the naval service of the Crown, in *Brown v. Smith* (1852), 15 Beav. 444, Romilly, and *Re Patten* (1860), 6 Jur. (N. S.) 151, Cresswell; and in *Att.-Gen. v. Rowe* (1862), 1 H. & C. 31, Pollock, Bramwell and Wilde, notwithstanding employment elsewhere in its civil service.

One British domicile was exchanged for another during employment in the service of the crown, in *Tovey v. Lindsay* (1813), 1 Dow. 133, Eldon, military; and *Re Smith* (1850), 2 Robertson 332, Fust, civil.

And when one of the places in question is politically foreign, the person residing there in the diplomatic or consular service of the British crown, the rule that a previous British domicile is not necessarily lost by such residence still applies. If the service be diplomatic, it might perhaps be deemed incompatible with its duties to acquire the foreign domicile; see § 277; but there would seem to be nothing to prevent a person in the consular service from acquiring a domicile, if so minded, in the country where he is employed, it being of frequent occurrence that foreigners are chosen for such employment in their respective countries.

"I take it to be clear that a person domiciled in England, and going abroad either as an ambassador or consul, would not in any way by the fact of his residence in a foreign country alter his domicile. . . . But if already there domiciled and resident, the acceptance of an office in the consular service of another country does nothing to destroy the domicile." Wilde, in *Sharpe v. Crispin* (1869), L. R. 1 P. & M. 613, 617. See also Lushington in *Maltass v. Maltass* (1844), 1 Robertson 79; Fust in *Gout v. Zimmermann* (1847), 5 N. of C. 445.

§ 274. Neither is a domicile, previously enjoyed in any part of the British dominions, necessarily affected by diplomatic or consular employment in the British dominions on behalf of a foreign state.

Heath v. Samson (1851), 14 Beav. 441, Romilly; *Att.-Gen. v. Kent* (1862), 1 H. & C. 12, Pollock, Martin, Bramwell, Wilde; both cases of diplomatic employment, and the last establishing that its acceptance did not prevent the person's movable property from being subject to legacy duty on his death, as in any other case of a person dying domiciled in England.

§ 275. But residence in India in the special Indian service of the crown, as formerly in the service of the East India Company, whether military, naval, or such civil service as is usually entered on as a profession, produces an Anglo-Indian domicile.

This exception to the general rule in § 273 is parallel to the exception made by § 265 to the general rule in § 264. Both are survivals of the old doctrine that the domicile was changed by

a residence abroad of indefinite and presumably long duration, notwithstanding the distinct contemplation of return; and both have in their favour the reasons of convenience mentioned on p. 345. An Anglo-Indian domicile was never acquired by employment in the mercantile marine of the East India Company, in which the engagement involved no permanent obligation to serve in the East Indies, but usually terminated with the voyage.

Aikman v. Aikman (1861), 3 Macq. 855, Campbell, and 880, Wensleydale.

Nor by the acceptance of high office in India comparatively late in life.

Att.-Gen. v. Rowe (1862), 1 H. & C. 31, Pollock, Bramwell and Wilde.

§ 276. An officer who has acquired an Anglo-Indian domicile pursuant to § 275, but has attained a rank at which he is permitted to reside where he pleases, is not prevented from changing his domicile, at least to another British territory, by the liability to be ordered back to India under which he lies as long as he retains his commission.

Wood in *Forbes v. Forbes* (1854), Kay 359; *Att.-Gen. v. Pottinger* (1861), 6 H. & N. 733, Pollock, Martin, Bramwell.

But if he is absent from India only on furlough he cannot change his domicile, notwithstanding that he hopes to attain before the expiration of his furlough a rank at which he will be permitted to reside where he pleases.

Craigie v. Lewin (1843), 3 Curteis 435, Fust.

§ 277. The point reserved in § 276, whether the domicile of a country politically foreign to England can be acquired by an Anglo-Indian officer who is permitted to reside where he pleases, equally arises in the case of other persons in British service whose duties are not such as to preclude their in fact residing abroad. In all these cases the question whether the residence is accompanied with a sufficient intention of permanence for the acquisition of domicile must be the same for a foreign as for a British country, and will include considerations as to the probability of the person being recalled to the active performance of his duties, and as to the conduct he would pursue in such an event, as for example by giving up his service rather than obey the call, by obeying it but leaving his family in his adopted country in the hope of his speedy return, and so forth. The

negative can be grounded as a general proposition only on the assumption that the intention necessary for the acquisition of domicile implies such feelings towards the adopted country that, by a presumption *juris et de jure*, holding them towards a foreign country cannot be imputed to a person still remaining in British service. What has been said under § 273 about the diplomatic and consular services may here be compared. Certainly the diplomatic service presents a much stronger case than any other against the acquisition of a foreign domicile. The fiction that the hotel of an embassy is a part of the soil of the ambassador's country would formerly, no doubt, have been used as an argument against the existence of the fact which is no less necessary than the intention; but if the question should now arise, it will probably be discussed on real and not on fictitious grounds.

In *Hodgson v. De Beauchesne* (1858), 12 Mo. P. C. 319, Lushington said: "We do not think it necessary for the decision of this case that we should lay down as an absolute rule that no person, being colonel of a regiment in the service of the East India Company and a general in the service of her majesty, can legally acquire a domicile in a foreign country. It is not necessary for the decision of this case to go so far; but we do say that there is a strong presumption of law against a person so circumstanced abandoning an English domicile and becoming the domiciled subject of a foreign power."

A peer of the United Kingdom is not prevented by his parliamentary or other political duties from acquiring a domicile in a country politically foreign: *Hamilton v. Dallas* (1875), 1 Ch. D. 257, Bacon.

§ 278. When a person whose domicile is non-British enters the service of the British crown, he does not thereby necessarily change his domicile, but he may acquire a domicile in that part of the British dominions in which his duties oblige him to reside, if he displays the intention which is necessary for that purpose. This will be the case if the service is likely to be permanent, and he displays the intention of remaining in it.

Urquhart v. Butterfield (1887), 37 Ch. D. 357, 377, Cotton, Lindley, Lopes.

As to the case of military or naval service, in *Ex parte Cunningham, Re Mitchell* (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 418, Cotton cautiously said: "No doubt, if a foreigner enters the British army and resides in England his domicile will be in England": p. 423, which does not conflict with the doctrine laid down in the §. In the same case Baggallay delivered as a "rule of law," that "a subject of her majesty entering into the military or naval service of a foreign power acquires a domicile in the country of that power": p. 421. No authority was cited for this, and to apply to converse would require a rule as to the particular British domicile which a foreigner entering British military or naval service would acquire inde-

pendent of intention. It would be difficult to say that that domicile was in England, if his duties called him to another part of the British dominions. In *President of the United States of America v. Drummond* (1864), 33 Beav. 449, Romilly said with reference to a person about whose origin and antecedents nothing was known: "He obtained a commission in the English army, which would give him an English domicile" This may be admitted in the circumstances, and probably was not meant to be applied further.

§ 279. A political refugee retains his domicile, unless he settles in a new country abandoning the hope of return.

De Bonneval v. De Bonneval (1838), 1 Curt. 856, Jenner; *Re D'Orléans* (1859), 1 S. & T. 253, Cresswell. And see § 272a.

Trade domicile in Time of War.

The student must be cautioned against confounding the trade domicile, by which the belligerent, or neutral character of property is determined for the purposes of war, with the subject of this chapter. The two are distinguished by Dr. Lushington in *Hodgson v. De Beauchesne* (1858), 12 Mo. P. C. 313. As illustrations of the difference it may be mentioned that "a man may have mercantile concerns in two countries, and if he acts as a merchant of both he must be liable to be considered as a subject of both, with regard to the transactions originating respectively in those countries": Sir W. Scott, in *The Jonge Klassina* (1804), 5 C. Rob. 302. Also that "the party becomes clothed with a new character from the period when he first takes steps *animo removendi* to abandon his former domicile, and *animo manendi* to acquire a new one": Lushington in *The Baltica* (1855), Spinks, Adm. 267. The distinction was recognized by Lord Lindley in *Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines*, [1902] A. C., at pp. 505, 506. "The subject," he said, "of a state at war with this country, but who is carrying on business here or in a foreign neutral country, is not treated as an alien enemy; the validity of his contracts does not depend on his nationality, nor even on what is his real domicile, but on the place or places in which he carries on his business or businesses." And for this he referred to *Wells v. Williams*, 1 Raym. 282, 1 Salk. 46. The same rule was affirmed in a number of decisions upon enemy character given at the outbreak of the war with Germany, 1914-1918. See especially *Porter v. Freudenberg*, [1915] 1 K. B. 857, C. A. (Reading, C. J., Cozens-Hardy, Buckley, Kennedy, Swinfen Eady, Phillimore, Pickford), and *The Hypatia*, [1916] 116 L. T. R. 25.

The subject of this kind of domicile will not be pursued further here, because it belongs to public international law, and enough has been shown to enforce the impropriety of arguing from the one domicile to the other on any point.

CHAPTER XV.

BRITISH NATIONALITY.

ALTHOUGH political nationality is of little importance to private international law as professed and applied in England, the rules on which it depends are of interest in connection with our subject, in view of the growing tendency on the continent to substitute it for domicile as the criterion of the personal statute and jurisdiction.

Unfortunately those rules are far from being the same in all countries. They result almost everywhere from a conflict between the feudal principle of allegiance determined by birth on the soil, and the Roman principle of citizenship determined by descent; but the respective proportions in which those principles are combined, and the methods used for combining them, differ widely. All that will be done here will be to exhibit the rules now in force as to the British character and its loss. It will be superfluous constantly to repeat the word "political": if "nationality" or "character" could leave a doubt, "British" would prevent it, since the civil character may be English Scotch or other, but not British, the empire having no common civil law.

The law concerning British nationality has been greatly modified by two Statutes that came into operation during the war: (1) the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914 (4 & 5 George V., c. 17); and (2) an Act to amend that Statute passed in 1918 (8 & 9 George V., c. 38). The principal Act professes to be a consolidating statute, and repeals a number of former enactments, including the British Nationality Acts of 1730 and 1772 and the Naturalization Acts of 1870 and 1895, which modified the fundamental principle of the Common Law that every person who was born within the King's dominions was a British subject. The new Statute, however, does not embody altogether or expressly eliminate the rules of the Common Law, nor does the section defining natural-born subjects affect the status of any person born before January 1st, 1915; so that rights of British

nationality acquired before that date under the old law still hold good. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the question of nationality not only under the more recent statutes but also under the Common Law and former statutes.

Natural-born Subjects at Common Law.

§ 280. British nationality results from birth in the British dominions, except in the case of a child born to an enemy father at a place in the British dominions then in hostile occupation, or a child born to a foreign sovereign or foreign ambassador or diplomatic agent.

At common law the British character was imposed, and not merely offered for acceptance *Aeneas Macdonald's Case* (1747), 18 State Trials 857, Lee; where the prisoner, who was carried to France in his early infancy, and had resided there till he came over and took part in the rebellion of 1745 under a French commission, the two countries being then at war, was convicted of high treason but pardoned on conditions.

"But if enemies should come into any of the king's dominions, and surprise any castle or fort, and possess the same by hostility and have issue there, that issue is no subject to the king though he was born within his dominions, for that he was not born under the king's ligeance or obedience." In *Calvin's Case*, 7 Coke 18 a

§ 281. "If any of the king's ambassadors in foreign nations have children there of their wives, being Englishwomen, by the common laws of England they are natural-born subjects:" in *Calvin's Case*, 7 Coke 18 a. The condition that the wives are to be Englishwomen is certainly now superfluous: see § 294. And it is doubtful whether it was necessary even in Coke's time: *Bacon v. Bacon* (1641), Cro. Car. 601, Brampton, Croke and Berkley. The principle does not extend at common law to children born abroad to soldiers or sailors on service: *De Geer v. Stone* (1882), 22 Ch. D. 243, Kay.

It is stated by Dyer, in a note on p 224a of his Reports, that it was adjudged in Tr 7 E. 3 that children of subjects born beyond the sea in the service of the king shall be inheritable. But this is a mistake. I searched the roll with the kind assistance of Mr. Selby, and we found that Dyer misread or misunderstood the words *predicto Johanne filio ipsius Edwardi antenato in partibus marinis tunc existente*, which mean that a certain John le Botiller, an elder son of Edward, was then living beyond sea, not that he had been born beyond sea.

Natural-born Subjects by Statute.

§ 282. Section 1 of the Act of 1914, as amended by the provisions of the Act of 1918, attempts to give a comprehensive definition of the class of natural-born British subjects as follows:

"(1) (a) Any person born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance; and

"(b) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions, whose father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth and either was born within His Majesty's allegiance or was a person to whom a certificate of naturalization had been granted, *or had become a British subject by reason of any annexation of territory, or was at the time of that person's birth in the service of the Crown*;"* and "(c) Any person born on board a British ship whether in foreign territorial waters or not:

"Provided that the child of a British subject, whether the child was born before or after the passing of this Act, shall be deemed to have been born within His Majesty's allegiance if born in a place where by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over British subjects."

The section continues:—

"(2) A person born on board a foreign ship shall not be deemed to be a British subject by reason only that the ship was in British territorial waters at the time of his birth.

"(3) Nothing in this section shall, except as otherwise expressly provided, affect the status of any person born before the commencement of this Act" (*i.e.* January 1st, 1915).

The effect of sub.-s. 1 (b) is to limit to one generation the power of passing British nationality to a person born in a foreign country of British parents. In accordance with a statute of 1772, 13 George III., c. 21, a child born out of the British dominions whose father *or whose grandfather* was born within those dominions was a natural-born British subject, provided that his father at the time of his birth had not ceased to be a British subject. By the new enactment, all children born after January 1st, 1915, outside the British dominions, whose father was not a British-born subject, will not be British subjects, unless they are born in a place where by treaty, capitulation, etc., His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over British subjects. This proviso would cover the case of British children born in British protectorates and in countries subject to a British mandate such as Palestine and Mesopotamia, and also countries in which the system of capitulations is still in force, such as Turkey and Egypt. The children, however, born of a British father in a foreign country,

*The words in italics were added to the original clause by the Act of 1918.

e.g. a South American state, will no longer be natural-born British subjects unless their father was himself born on British soil. The change in the law has, however, been considerably criticized; and it is likely that a further amendment restoring the previous law with some modification will be proposed to the Imperial Parliament and the parliaments of the dominions. Nor does the statute of 1914 affect the national status of any person born before 1915, so that children born abroad before that date of a grandfather who was a natural-born British subject will remain British subjects.

On the other hand clause 1 (b) enables a naturalized British subject in the future to pass his British nationality to his children born abroad after his naturalization in the same way as if he had been a British-born subject.

It was considered doubtful whether under the Naturalization Act of 1870 a naturalized person could transmit his nationality to his children born abroad before or after naturalization; *Re Bourgeoisie* (1889), 41 C. D. 310, Kay, Cotton, Lindley and Bowen. In the case of *Rex v The Albany St. Police Station Superintendent (Carlebach's Case)*, [1915] 3 K. B. 716, the Divisional Court held that a naturalized subject had not that power, and, therefore, his child born abroad was an alien. The court relied on the argument that no statute explicitly conferred British nationality in such cases and, therefore, the common law principles of the *jus soli* applied. The new provision applies only to children born abroad of a naturalized British subject after 1915, and the decision in this case will then apply to children born abroad of such subjects before 1915, so that in the absence of separate naturalization they will remain aliens.

The words at the end of section 1 (b) "or had become a British subject by reason of any annexation of territory, or was at the time of that person's birth in the service of the Crown," enlarge the provisions of the common law, and secure British nationality for the children, wherever born, of persons who become British subjects by annexation, *e.g.* the Boers in South Africa, or who, although aliens, were serving in the British Army at the time of the child's birth, *e.g.* the Russians who formed part of the British Forces during the Great War.

§ 283. No children, neither whose fathers nor whose paternal grandfathers were born within the British dominions, have been made British subjects by act of parliament.

In 1795 Frederick Christian Rynhart, great-grandson of Godert de Ginkel first earl of Athlone, was admitted to his seat in the Irish House of Lords although no one of the family had been born in the United Kingdom; but it does not appear that there had been any report on his case by the attorney-general. Journals of Irish House of Lords, March 10, 1795; evidence of Rt. Hon. C. W. W. Wynn before Commons' select com-

mittee on laws affecting aliens, 1843, p. 69; 2 Lodge's Peerage of Ireland 157. This precedent, for what it was worth, was opposed to § 283; and in the report of the committee just named, p. x, it is stated that, on a case raising the question in connection with the title to land, five of the most eminent lawyers in the country advised one way and five the other. The doctrine of § 283 has now been established by *De Geer v. Stone* (1882) 22 Ch. D. 243, Kay.

Naturalization, Denization, and Resumption of British Nationality.

§ 284. British nationality is acquired either by naturalization, and this either through a special act of parliament or under the Nationality Acts, 1914 and 1918, or the Naturalization Act, 1870, or by denization.

"A person to whom a certificate of naturalization is granted by a secretary of state shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be entitled to all political and other rights powers and privileges, and be subject to all obligations duties and liabilities to which a natural-born British subject is entitled or subject, and as from the date of his naturalization, have to all intents and purposes the status of a natural-born British subject."

"Section 3 of the Act of Settlement (which disqualifies naturalized aliens from holding certain offices) shall have effect as if the words 'naturalized or' were omitted therefrom" (Brit. Nat. Act, 1914, s. 3).

The words in the recent Act are more express and definite than those in the Act of 1870, which stopped short of saying that the naturalized alien shall be deemed a natural-born subject. Nevertheless, it was argued in *R. v. Speyer*, [1916] 2 K. B. 858, Swinfen Eady, Phillimore, Bankes, affirming Reading, Avory, Lush, [1916] 1 K. B. 595, that the reference to the Act of Settlement in the later Act had revived the disqualification imposed by that Act on a naturalized alien from being a member of the Privy Council. But the court held that, though the wording of the statute was not very happy, such an interpretation would be directly contrary to the express provision of the preceding sub-section, which conferred on a naturalized alien all the political and other rights and privileges of a natural-born British subject, and therefore rejected the argument.

While, however, the status of a naturalized person is on one side definitely raised to equality with that of natural-born subjects by the new act, yet on the other side the conditions of British naturalization are substantially modified to his disadvantage by the act of 1914 (as amended by the act of 1918), from those laid down in the Naturalization Act of 1870. One fundamental change which has been made is that the certificate of naturalization is now revocable in case the person naturalized

subsequently shows a want of loyalty, or bad character or disregard of his new nationality, indicated by "his continuous absence from His Majesty's dominions for a period of seven years or more, without maintaining substantial connection during that time with His Majesty's dominions" (B.N.A., 1914, s. 7, and B.N.A., 1918, s. 1).

The powers of revocation are large and somewhat vague; and the idea of a nationality conditional on good behaviour and on keeping in close touch with the British dominions is one new in English law. Experience alone will show whether it will be desirable to keep it as a permanent variety of citizenship.

§ 285. Letters of denization may be granted by the crown. The difference between their effect and that of naturalization is that a denizen becomes a British subject from the date of the letters but not as from that of his birth, while a naturalized person is placed in the United Kingdom in a position equivalent to that of a natural-born subject, as has been seen in the last §. This difference was important so long as aliens could not take or hold land, for a denizen, the defect of heritable blood not being cured in him, could not inherit land, nor could his issue born before his denization inherit it from him. The only practical difference now remaining appears to be that no person born out of the British dominions, though "made a denizen, except such as are born of English parents, shall be capable to be of the privy council, or a member of either house of parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust either civil or military, or to have any grant of lands tenements or hereditaments from the crown to himself or to any other or others in trust for him": st. 12 & 13 W. 3, c. 2, s. 3. The Act of 1914, s. 25, expressly preserves the right to grant letters of denization. .

§ 286. The conditions for naturalization under the Act of 1914 are that the alien has either resided in His Majesty's dominions for a term of not less than five years in the manner prescribed, or has been in the service of the crown for a term of not less than five years, within the last eight years before the application, and intends when naturalized either to reside in His Majesty's dominions, or to enter or continue in the service of the crown; and that he is of good character and has an adequate knowledge of the English language. The residence prescribed is residence in the United Kingdom for not less than one year immediately preceding the application, and previous residence either in the United Kingdom or in some other part of His Majesty's

dominions for a period of four years within the last eight years before the application (B.N.A., 1914, s. 2 (1), (2)).

§ 287. A widow who was a natural-born British subject before marriage and who has become an alien under § 294 may be re-admitted to British nationality under the same conditions as are required for naturalization, except that the requirements as to residence do not apply. The secretary of state may in any other special case grant a certificate of naturalization, although the four years' residence or five years' service has not been within the last eight years preceding the application (s. 2 (5)).

§ 288. The legislature or government of any British possession has the same power to grant a certificate of naturalization as the secretary of state has under the act; and the provisions of the act as to the grant and revocation of the certificate of naturalization apply, with the substitution of any language recognized in a possession as on an equality with the English language for the English language. The certificate of naturalization granted in a British possession will have the same effect as one granted in England. The part of the Act dealing with naturalization is not to apply in any of the self-governing dominions until the legislature has adopted such part (B.N.A., 1914, ss. 8 & 9). The Dominion of Canada, Newfoundland, and Australia have adopted this part of the Imperial Act.

These new provisions take the place of section 16 of the Naturalization Act of 1870, by which the Legislature of any British possession, including what are now the dominions, was empowered "to make laws for imparting to any person the privileges or any of the privileges of naturalization to be enjoyed by such person within the limits of such possession." Under this section it was held in a case tried during the war that a naturalization certificate granted in Australia to a German resident there did not affect the position or status of the naturalized person within the United Kingdom. The German-born subject, though naturalized in Australia, was treated as an alien in England. He had taken the oath of allegiance in Australia; but it was held that that involved local allegiance only. *Markwald v. Att.-Gen.*, [1920] 1 K. B., C. A., Sterndale, Warrington, Younger, affirming *Darling, Lawrence, Bray*, [1918] 1 K. B. 617. "A man may become the liege subject of the King in some parts of his dominions yet not in all; and wherever he is not a subject he is an alien" (*per Darling, J.*, [1918] 1 K. B., at p. 622).

The Act of 1914 seeks to sweep away this half allegiance and this partial British citizenship by enabling a certificate of naturalization granted in any part of the British empire to have its effect throughout the empire. On the other hand it impairs the fulness of an imperial certificate of citizenship by its provisions for revocation.

Generally, the question of a person's being a British subject or an alien must be decided by the law of the United Kingdom; but if he thus prove to be an alien, his rights and those of others will be affected by that fact to the extent and in the manner determined by the law of that part of the British dominions which is concerned. *Donegani v. Donegani* (1835), 3 Knapp 63, Shadwell; *Re Adam* (1837), 1 Mo. P. C. 460, Erskine.

Declaration of Alienage and Expatriation.

§ 289. "Any person who by reason of his having been born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance, or on board a British ship, is a natural-born subject, but who also at the time of his birth or during his minority became under the law of any foreign state a subject of such state, and is still such subject"; also "any person who though born out of His Majesty's dominions is a natural-born British subject"; "may, if of full age, and not [a minor, lunatic, idiot or married woman], make a declaration of alienage, and from and after the making of such declaration shall cease to be a British subject." B.N.A., s. 14, the words in brackets from s. 27.

§ 289a. A person with double nationality, however, cannot make a declaration of alienage during war so as to divest himself of his obligations as a British subject, whether the other nationality for which he desires to opt is that of a neutral or that of an enemy country.

Geschwind v. Huntington, [1918] 2 K. B. 420, Avory and Shearman; *Ex parte Freyberger*, [1917] 2 K. B. 129, Swinfen Eady and Bray; *Vecht v. Taylor*, [1917] 116 L. T. 444, Reading, Ridley, Rowlatt. The Courts followed the decision given during the Boer War (*Rex v. Lynch*, [1903] 1 K. B. 444), where it was held that a British subject cannot, when Great Britain is at war, divest himself of his British nationality and become a subject of an enemy state.

In times of war a man is liable to any obligations which he incurs under both his nationalities, and cannot divest himself of them by renouncing one of the two sources of obligation. On the other hand, where a person who was a British-born subject obtained a certificate of German naturalization during the war, the English court held that he was a German subject for the purposes of the execution of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, and his property in England was subject to attachment under that treaty—*Re Chamberlain's Settlement*, 1921 (1 K. B. 173, P. O. Lawrence, J.). The leaning of the court has been to give a man the worst of both worlds when it is a question of his seeking in the stress of war to throw off obligations of loyalty acquired by birth or residence.

§ 290. British nationality acquired by naturalization is also lost by making a declaration of alienage, where this country has a convention with the country of origin permitting the subjects of that country who have been naturalized as British subjects to divest themselves of the status. B.N.A., 1914, s. 15.

§ 291. Any person not an infant, lunatic, idiot or married woman, loses his British nationality by voluntarily becoming naturalized in a foreign state, while in that state. B.N.A., 1914, s. 13.

§ 291a. He cannot however discard his obligations of British nationality by becoming naturalized in an enemy country while Great Britain is at war—*Rex v. Lynch*, u.s.

§ 292. If a person entitled to both British and foreign nationality proves by his conduct that he chooses the latter, though without having made a declaration of alienage, supposing that he was entitled to make one; and if the foreign country in question accepts him as its subject, but without naturalizing him, so that § 291 does not apply; it may be proper to treat him as an alien for the purposes of public international law.

Drummond's Case, on the award of the commissioners for liquidating the claims of British subjects in France (1834), 2 Knapp 295, Shadwell. See the *Countess de Conway's Case*, on the same award (1834), 2 Knapp 364, Parke, as to the circumstances under which the protection due to a British subject may be claimed by one not strictly such

But he must still be considered as a British subject for the purpose of transmitting that character to his children under the acts quoted in § 282.

Fitch v. Weber (1847), 6 Ha. 51, Wigram.

§ 293. The loss of British nationality does not discharge from any liability in respect of any act done before such loss. B.N.A., 1914, s. 16.

Effect of Family Relations on Nationality.

§ 294. "The wife of a British subject shall be deemed to be a British subject, and the wife of an alien shall be deemed to be an alien: Provided that where a man ceases during the continuance of his marriage to be a British subject it shall be lawful for his wife to make a declaration that she desires to retain British nationality, and thereupon she shall be deemed to remain a British subject." B.N.A., 1914, s. 10.

A provision in the act of 1918 declares that the wife who was a British-born subject and became an alien on marriage may make a declaration that she desires to resume British nationality if her husband is a subject of a state at war with His Majesty, and she may thereupon be granted a certificate of naturalization.

§ 294*a*. A widow who acquired her husband's nationality on marriage does not resume her original nationality by reason only of the death of her husband. B.N.A., 1914, s. 11.

The disability of a British subject to change his nationality during war does not apply to the case of a British-born woman marrying an alien, even though the alien be an enemy subject. It has recently been held that when, after the Armistice but before the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, a British-born woman married a German, she became a German subject from the date of her marriage; and her property, therefore, became subject to attachment as that of a German *Fashender v. Att-Gen*, [1921] W. N. 346, Russell.

§ 295. "Where an alien obtains a certificate of naturalization, the secretary of state may, if he thinks fit, on the application of that alien, include in the certificate the name of any child of the alien born before the date of the certificate and being a minor, and that child shall thereupon, if not already a British subject, become a British subject; but any such child may, within one year after attaining his majority, make a declaration of alienage, and shall thereupon cease to be a British subject." B.N.A., 1914, s. 5 (1).

The Naturalization Act of 1870 contained a clause providing that the child of a person obtaining a certificate of naturalization, who during infancy has become resident in the British dominions with its parent, shall be deemed to be a naturalized subject. It was held that the child of a person naturalized in England before birth of the child was nevertheless not to be deemed a naturalized subject in a case where he had resided abroad till his father's death and was only brought to England by his mother. He was then still a minor, but the mother had not herself obtained a certificate of naturalization and, therefore, the child did not fall within the terms of the Act. (*Jaffe v. Keel*, [1916] 1 K. B. 476, Darling, Avory and Horridge)

§ 296. "Where a person being a British subject ceases to be a British subject, whether by declaration of alienage or otherwise, every child of that person, being a minor, shall thereupon cease to be a British subject, unless such child, on that person ceasing to be a British subject, does not become by the law of any other country naturalized in that country:

"Provided that, where a widow who is a British subject marries an alien, any child of hers by her former husband shall

not, by reason only of her marriage, cease to be a British subject, whether he is residing outside His Majesty's dominions or not.

§ 297. "Any child who has so ceased to be a British subject may, within one year after attaining his majority, make a declaration that he wishes to resume British nationality, and shall thereupon again become a British subject." B.N.A., s. 12.

The child of a British subject naturalized in the United States was held not to have acquired American citizenship, when he resided in England for some years after his father's naturalization: because, by the law of the United States, naturalization of the father only confers citizenship on the minor children from the time when those children begin to reside permanently in the United States, and the Court held that the children must reside permanently after the parent's naturalization.

Atkinson v. Recruiting Officer, Bury St. Edmunds, [1917] 116 L. T. R. 305, Reading, Ridley, Coleridge.

Transfer of Nationality in Cases of Cession.

§ 298. The cession of a British territory, or the acknowledgment of its independence, causes the loss of their British nationality by all persons domiciled within it at the date of the cession or acknowledgment.

Doe v. Acklam (1824), 2 B. & C. 779, Abbott and (?).

§ 299. Unless they transfer their domicile to some territory which remains British, either within the time limited for that purpose by the treaty, or immediately if no such time be limited.

Doe v. Mulcaster (1826), 5 B. & C. 771, Abbott, Bayley and Holroyd; *Doe v. Arkwright* (1833), 5 C. & P. 575, Parke; *Jephson v. Riera* (1835), 3 Kn. 130, Erskine.

The judgment in *Re Bruce* (1832), 2 C. & J. 436, 2 Tyr. 475, Bayley and Lyndhurst, is expressed as if the court thought that a youth, who was nineteen at the date of the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, could elect his nationality either then or on attaining his majority two years afterwards, the treaty limiting no time. But this can scarcely be so, and the question in the case did not require such a decision.

Nationality in the case of a Personal Union between two Kingdoms, and in that of the Dissolution of such a Union.

§ 300. "While the crowns of two countries are held by the same person, the inhabitants of the two countries are not aliens in the two countries respectively," but on the dissolution of the personal union between Hanover and England the Hanoverians already born became aliens in England.

Isaacson v. Durant (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 54; Coleridge, delivering the judgment of himself, Hawkins and Mathew. The quotation is from the judgment, p. 59, but ought to have been qualified by expressing the condition, clearly understood by the learned judges, that the inhabitants referred to were born after the personal union of the crowns. That was the decision in the famous case of the *post nati*, *Calvin's Case*, Coke's Rep., Part 7, p. 1.

Conflicts of Nationality and Statelessness.

Nationality is always in principle single, and where a person is claimed by two states, either from a conflict between the *jus soli* and the *jus sanguinis* or for any other reason, we are in presence of jarring claims to his entire allegiance. So far as in either state its claim has to be dealt with by its courts of law, it will be enforced in accordance with the law of that state on its national character. But so far as the claim has to be dealt with by the executive, as in the question whether legal treason shall be pardoned in deference to the culprit's justification of his conduct by his tie to another state, or in that whether protection shall be extended to a legal subject abroad, the executive is free to act with due consideration of the circumstances. Thus there is a pretty general acceptance of the rule that no state shall protect its nationals residing in the territory of another state which claims them as its own nationals, whether by *jus soli*, *jus sanguinis*, naturalization, or any other title. Hence it follows that the qualification expressed in the Naturalization Act 1870, s. 7, does not really limit the naturalization, but only expresses what certainly in British practice would be the consequence of the most complete naturalization that could be granted. And it is noteworthy that this qualification is not preserved in the British Nationality Act of 1914, while naturalization is in that Act declared more expressly to give all the rights of British nationality, including that of transmitting the British character to children born abroad in the same way as a natural-born subject may transmit it. ↙

The European War brought into prominence the question of persons possessing no nationality, for example, German-born subjects living in England who had thrown off their German allegiance so far as they could, but had not acquired British citizenship by naturalization. In accordance with the German Nationality Law passed in 1914, the German State claimed to retain certain rights over German subjects abroad, even though they had made a declaration of alienage of German citizenship;

and on this ground the English Court held in several cases that persons of German origin residing in England who had not become British subjects should be treated as Germans—doubting whether the condition of statelessness was recognized in English law. In *Re Weber*, [1916] 1 K. B. 183, Swinfen-Eady, Phillimore, Bankes, affirmed, [1916] 1 A. C. 421, Buckmaster, Loreburn, Atkinson, where it was said (*per* Buckmaster, p. 426): Until a man has divested himself of his nationality of birth by assuming another nationality it may be that that nationality of birth remains. *R. v. Supt. Vine Street Police Station: Laebmann's Case*, [1916] 1 K. B. 268. The question has been reconsidered since the making of peace, and the court in the case of *Stoeck v. Public Trustee*, [1921] 2 Ch. 67, Russell laid down that a status of statelessness could exist in English law. The *dicta*, therefore, given during the war cannot be regarded as having validity; and the revival implicit in them of the discarded doctrine, *nemo potest exuere patriam*, may be attributed to the intensification of national feeling caused by the crisis of the war which a more deliberate reflection will not uphold.

CHAPTER XVI.

CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS.

BESIDES the natural persons with whom we have hitherto been chiefly concerned, private international law has to do with those artificial persons to which the law of every country gives a technical existence. One class of these is composed of corporations, in which natural persons called corporators or members, and their successors, are united as a body having legal personality and perpetual succession. The general rule of Roman law appears to have been that three members were required for a corporation; *Neratius Priscus tres facere existimat collegium, et hoc magis sequendum est*: Dig. 50, 16, 85. But a corporation was not dissolved by being reduced to a single member; *sed si universitas ad unum redit, magis admittitur posse eum convenire et conveniri, cum jus omnium in unum reciderit et stet nomen universitatis*: Dig. 4, 4, 7, 2. In England however we are familiar with corporations never having more than one member, corporations sole as distinguished from corporations aggregate. Another class of artificial persons was presented in Roman law, and is presented now in that of many countries, by institutions for public purposes, as colleges or hospitals, enjoying legal personality without so much as a single corporator, and therefore said *personæ vice fungi*. In England we do not possess this kind of artificial person, the property of such institutions being always vested either in corporations or in unincorporated trustees. With regard to both classes the same international principles rule. The regulation of any artificial person, in matters concerning only itself or the relations of its members, if any, to it and to one another must depend on the law from which it derives its existence. If in other countries it enters into relations with outside parties, the first question to be asked is whether by the laws of those countries it is permitted to do so in its artificial character. In case of the affirmative, its dealings with outside parties must stand on the same footing as those of a natural person domiciled abroad. If its artificial personality

is not recognized for the purpose in question, no natural person can be liable on the dealing except on the ground of agency or of holding out; and in discussing any such ground it must be borne in mind that the corporators, if any, associated together on the footing of no other law than that of the domicile of the corporation.

A company whose registered office is in Scotland is domiciled and ordinarily resident there, within the meaning of Order XI. of 1883, rule 1, (c) and (e): *Jones v. Scottish Accident Insurance Co., Lim* (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 421, Day, Pollock, Cave; *Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.* (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 285, Stephen, Mathew, Grantham.

The desirableness of treating in one place the questions which arise out of administration in bankruptcy has led us to consider certain applications of these principles, in §§ 131—133. No more direct consequence can be drawn from the principles than that a company which derives its incorporation or other legal existence from another law than that of England cannot be dissolved in an English winding up, though the previous stages of such a winding up may be employed for the purpose of making its English property available for the payment of its debts.

The war brought about a reconsideration in England and also in foreign countries of the principles on which the nationality and domicile of trading corporations should be determined. It had previously been accepted in England that the corporation must be treated as an altogether distinct person from its members, and as deriving its national status from the law of its incorporation. In many European countries indeed that idea was not accepted, and the law which governed the corporation was commonly held to be that of the country where it had its principal administrative centre, or *siège social*. If it had obtained juristic personality under some other law, it was liable to have that character disregarded in the country where it carried on business, and its members could be made there personally liable. In other countries, while the law of its incorporation was regarded as conferring its national status and as such sovereign over its formation and dissolution, the law of the country where it had its centre of affairs was held to govern its civil capacity which, unlike the capacity of a natural person, was not determined by the law of its nationality. In England, the question of the seat of the company's business had become important for the question of its liability to pay income tax, and

to be served with legal process. But for purposes of quasi-personal status, such as liquidation, its character as British or foreign was held to be determined by the law of its incorporation.

The matter, however, was investigated afresh during the war, and in the leading case of the *Continental Tyre Company v. Daimler*, [1915] 1 K. B. 893 was considered by the full Court of Appeal, Reading, C.J., Cozens-Hardy, Kennedy, Phillimore, Pickford; Buckley dissenting; and finally by the full judicial strength of the House of Lords, [1916] 2 A. C. 307, Halsbury, Mersey, Kinnear, Atkinson, Shaw, Parker, Sumner and Parmoor. By a majority there it was held that a corporate body must be deemed to be domiciled in the place of its administrative centre, being the place at which the persons directing its policy habitually meet: and this domicile prevailed over the national character it acquired by the law of its incorporation to determine its capacity or incapacity to trade during the war.

All the members of the full Court of Appeal, save Buckley, L.J., and Lords Shaw and Parmoor in the House of Lords, were of the opinion that enemy character could only be attributed to a juristic person if it was incorporated in an enemy country; that is to say, that the nationality or domicile of a corporation depended upon the country of its incorporation. But the majority of the House of Lords, Parker, Atkinson, Mersey, Sumner and Kinnear, held that a company incorporated in England assumes enemy character if its agents or the persons *de facto* in control of its affairs are resident in an enemy country or adhering to the enemy wherever they may be resident. The character of the individual shareholders cannot of itself affect the character of the company, but it is material on the question whether the company's agents are adhering to the enemy. And Lord Halsbury, following Buckley, held that a company is domiciled in the place of its administrative centre, being the place at which the persons directing its policy habitually meet.

The same criterion was laid down in the case of *The Polzeath*, [1916] P. 117, *Bargrave Deane*, affirmed by Swinfen Eady, Phillimore, Banks, *ib.* 241, which turned on the question of the ownership of a British ship by a company incorporated in England, but controlled by a German board of directors. It was held in that case that the company should not be deemed British, and a ship so owned was forfeited to the Crown.

The full effects of the decision of the House of Lords have not yet been drawn; and it is not certain whether the same principle

would be applied to decide the other questions in which the nationality or domicile of a company may be important, *e.g.* the question of the law governing its capacity to make a contract or to succeed to property. But the decision makes it probable that in future the English Courts will look to the essential facts of the control of a company in determining what is its domicile, and will apply the principle of domicile so determined to the status of a corporate person in the same way as to the status of a natural person. It would be strange if English law, which lays stress on domicile for the personal law of a natural person, should not accept the same test for a juristic person, when foreign countries that lay stress on the national law in determining the status of a natural person have felt the desirability of determining the rights of a company in accordance with the principles of domicile. It is noteworthy, too, that the trend of recent decisions of the English courts, as regards the liability of companies to income-tax, has been to make the actual place of business and not the place of incorporation the determining factor, looking to the facts rather than the legal appearance.

The French tribunals during the war similarly reconsidered the doctrine hitherto applied in France that the domicile of a trading corporation depended on the place where it had its *siège social*. They held in the same way as the supreme English court that the domicile of a company must be determined according to its origin, its sources of capital, its personnel, and the real object of its activities. The departure from the old principle was based on the doctrine that in the circumstances of war the principles of public law prevailed over those of private law.

“Il ne saurait être fait état, à l'égard des sociétés, de leur nationalité d'apparence. Les formes juridiques dont la société est revêtue, le lieu de son principal établissement, la nationalité des associés, gérants ou membres du conseil de surveillance, tous les indices auxquels s'attache le Droit Privé pour déterminer la nationalité d'une société sont inopérants alors qu'il s'agit de fixer au point de vue du Droit Public, le caractère réel de cette société.*

In pursuing further the subject of artificial persons, we will commence with a § relating to those public institutions which in most countries are organized as or by means of such persons, and the rest of the chapter will relate chiefly to corporations.

§ 301. Where the English court, in administering a will, finds

* See article in the “Journal of Comparative Legislation on the Nationality of Companies,” 3rd series, vol. iii., October, 1921.

that money is given for a charitable purpose intended to be domiciled abroad, it must first be assured that the purpose can be lawfully accomplished in the country in question, and then it will hand over the money to the trustees or other parties indicated by the testator, to be applied by them subject to the law and jurisdiction of that country. The court will not settle a scheme for the government of the foreign charity.

Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubery (1754), Ambler 256, Hardwicke; *Oliphant v. Hendrie* (1784), 1 Bro. C. C. 571, Thurlow; *Att.-Gen. v. Lepine* (1818), 2 Sw. 181, 1 Wils. Ch. 465, Eldon, reversing Grant, who in 1815 had settled a scheme, 19 Ves. 309; *Minet v. Vulliamy* (1819), 1 Russ. 113, note, Plumer; *Emery v. Hull* (1826), 1 Russ. 112, Gifford; *Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company* (1836), 1 Mo. P. C. 175, 1 Mo. I. A. C. 175, Brougham; *Att.-Gen. v. Sturge* (1854), 19 Beav. 597, Romilly; *New v. Bonaker* (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 655, Malins. In *Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company* Brougham said "the court has gone further of late years than Lord Hardwicke thought he could in *Provost of Edinburgh v. Aubery*, for he then held that he could give no directions as to the distribution": 1 Mo. P. C. 295, 1 Mo. I. A. C. 293. But this was founded on a misapprehension as to *Oliphant v. Hendrie*, and as to a certain case of *Cadell v. Grant* referred to in the argument of *Att.-Gen. v. Lepine* before the Master of the Rolls; and on a strange and peculiar case of *Att.-Gen. v. City of London* (1790), 3 Bro. C. C. 171, 1 Ves. Jun. 243, Thurlow. Brougham, in the course of the same judgment, thus gave the reason of the general rule. "The objection in the ordinary case to administering a foreign charity under the superintendence of the court is this: those who are engaged in the actual execution of it are beyond the court's control, and those who are within the jurisdiction are answerable to the court for the acts of persons as to whom they can derive no aid from the court. Such an office will not easily be undertaken by any one, and its duties cannot be satisfactorily performed; at least the party must rely more on the local, that is the foreign, authorities for help, than on the court to which he is accountable." 1 Mo. P. C. 297, 1 Mo. I. A. C. 295.

The Attorney-General may be given liberty to apply to the foreign court for the settlement of a scheme: *Yeates v. Fraser* (1883), 22 Ch. D. 827, Fry.

§ 302. The English court will not interfere in the internal disputes of foreign corporations.

Sudlow v. Dutch Rhenish Railway Company (1855), 21 Beav. 43, Romilly, who pointed out that all the court could do for the plaintiff would be to make a declaration in his favour, which would be inoperative in the country where the company was established.

In *Lewis v. Baldwin* (1848), 11 Beav. 153, Langdale, the bill appears to have proceeded also on matters not internal to the Irish railway company, and it was open to the court in the further progress of the suit to abstain from deciding the internal matters. In *Pickering v. Stephenson* (1872), L. R. 14 Eq. 322, Wickens, the company, though Turkish, was managed in England, and it does not seem to have been strenuously argued that the Turkish courts had exclusive jurisdiction. For the credit of the company it may not have been desirable to take such a line; and it was at least held that Turkish law governed.

§ 303. A company incorporated abroad is not liable to income-tax as a "person residing within the United Kingdom" (a), merely because it has a branch house of business in London, or (b) because the regular meetings of its shareholders are held in London; (c) but it is so if what is really its head office, whether so described by it or not, is in the United Kingdom; and in any case it is liable to income-tax on the profits arising from the business carried on by it in the United Kingdom, as a natural person residing abroad would be. (d) And it will be considered to be carrying on business if contracts are habitually made at a fixed place within the jurisdiction by a firm or person there without referring to the foreign corporation each time for instructions.

(a) *Att.-Gen. v. Alexander* (1874), L. R. 10 Exch. 20, Kelly, Cleasby, Amphlett. (b) *Goerz & Co. v. Bell*, [1904] 2 K. B. 136, Channell. (c) *Erichsen v. Last* (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 12, Lindley, Watkin Williams, Mathew; affirmed (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 414, Jessel, Brett, Cotton; *De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited v. Howe*, [1905] 2 K. B. 612, Phillimore, affirmed by Collins, Mathew and Cozens-Hardy; [1906] A. C. 455, Loreburn, Macnaghten, James of Hereford, Robertson, Atkinson. *Yokohama Specie Bank, Limited v. Williams*, [1915] 139 L. T. 861, Rowlatt; *Weiss, Biehler and Brooks, Limited v. Farmer*, [1918] 2 K. B. 725. See *Gilbertson v. Fergusson* (1879), 5 Ex. D. 57, Huddleston and Pollock, Kelly dissenting; substantially affirmed (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 562, by Bramwell, Brett and Cotton; a peculiar case with regard to income-tax on dividends paid in the United Kingdom on shares in a foreign company. See also *James Wingate & Co. v. Inland Revenue*, [1897] 24 Rettie 939, Robertson (president) and Kinnear.

Where a company, incorporated abroad, was controlled by a board of directors who resided in England and all the ordinary stock was held in England, it was held to be resident in England, though it did not trade and had no banking account there: *American Thread Company v. Joyce*, [1913] 108 L. T. 303, H. L., Haldane, Halsbury, Atkinson, Kinnear, Mersey; affirming Cozens-Hardy, Moulton, Buckley, Hamilton.

(d) *Thames and Mersey Insurance Co. v. Societa di Navigazione, &c.*, [1914] 111 L. T. R. 97, Cozens-Hardy, Buckley, Channell.

§ 304. An English, Scotch or Irish corporation is liable to income-tax as a "person residing within the United Kingdom," notwithstanding that all its business is carried on abroad, and that subsequently to its incorporation it has been registered abroad; and it is subject to the same rules as to the portion of its receipts on which income-tax is payable to which a natural person residing in the United Kingdom is subject.

The identity in principle of the position with regard to income-tax of a company incorporated in the United Kingdom and a natural person residing in the United Kingdom seems to be prac-

tically assumed in all the cases. If in any of them it is said that the incorporation of such a company is not conclusive of its residence, it will still be found that its residence is inferred from circumstances which are the necessary accompaniments of its incorporation. Carrying on business is of course more limited than residence, and affects the portion of the company's receipts which will be assessable. The rules as to that matter, the identity referred to being once established, belong rather to the subject of income-tax than to this book, but the following cases affecting companies may be mentioned.

Cesena Sulphur Company v. Nicholson and Calcutta Jute Mills Company v. Nicholson (1876), 1 Ex. D. 428; *Alexandria Water Company v. Musgrave* (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 174; *London Bank of Mexico and South America v. Aphthorne*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 383, [1891] 2 Q. B. 378; *Bartholomay Brewing Company (of Rochester) v. Wyatt and Nobel Dynamite Trust Company v. Wyatt*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 499; *San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company v. Carter*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 580, [1896] A. C. 31; *Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Bishop*, [1901] 1 K. B. 153; *The King v. Commissioners of Taxes for Clerkenwell*, [1901] 2 K. B. 879; *Kodak Limited v. Clark*, [1903] 1 K. B. 505; *Commissioner of Taxes for New Zealand v. Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company Limited*, [1905] A. C. 526, Davey; *Gramophone and Typewriter Limited v. Stanley*, [1906] 2 K. B. 856, Walton. *Mitchell v. Egyptian Hotels Limited*, [1915] A. C. 1022, Parmoor, Loreburn, Parker, Sumner.

§ 305. There is no technical objection to suit in England by a foreign corporation or other artificial person. It may sue, subject to the question whether the local law of the transaction authorized it to act in its corporate or other artificial character.

Dutch West India Company v. Henriques (1724), Strange 612, C. P.; (1728), Strange 807, Lord Ray 1532, B. R.; (1730), Strange 808, Lord Ray. (1535), H. of L.; *Dutch East India Company v. Henriques* (1728), Cooke's Rep. of Pr. Ca. in C. P. 44; *National Bank of St. Charles v. De Bernales* (1825), 1 C. & P. 569, Ry. & Mo. 190, Abbott. The first and third cases show that, where there is a question about the corporate name, the identity of the corporation is treated as a question of fact. It is needless to quote later authorities in support of the §, but it must be observed that all the cases I know are those of corporations; still, a hospital or college entitled *personæ vice fungi* would clearly fall within the same principle. The provision of English law that a corporation must execute a deed by a common seal does not apply to a foreign corporation carrying on business in England: *Colonial Gold Reef Co. v. Free State Co.*, [1914] 1 Ch. 382, Sargant.

§ 306. It might in the beginning have been questioned how far the laws of the United Kingdom allow a corporation deriving its artificial personality from a foreign or colonial authority to carry on business in the United Kingdom, so as to acquire a right of suit on contracts entered into in the course of such business.

In favour of such permission it may be said that there are businesses essentially of an international character, such as that of a common carrier between two countries; take for instance a railway or steamboat company, incorporated in one of those countries for such a purpose, which it could not carry out without the right to have an office in the other country and to contract there with reference to the purpose of its existence. In states where the government is entrusted with a discretion as to granting or refusing to foreign corporations the right to act within the territory, such right might in certain cases be refused even to a company desiring to act as a common carrier between that territory and another. But where, as in England, the government has no such discretion, the courts of law can only act on general rules, and there would be extreme inconvenience in their laying down a rule of exclusion which, as a general one, would be applicable to the case of trades necessarily involving two countries in the sphere of their operations. This would be to invite measures of retorsion against English companies similarly circumstanced abroad.

On the other hand, the Companies Act 1862 provided that thenceforth no association of more than ten persons should be formed for the business of banking, or of more than twenty persons for any other business, "unless it is registered as a company under this act, or is formed in pursuance of some other act of parliament or of letters patent, or is a company engaged in working mines within and subject to the jurisdiction of the stannaries": s. 4. And there had previously been legislation of a similar kind. Is it possible to suppose that parliament, while on the one hand strictly limiting unincorporated associations, and on the other hand strictly regulating domestic incorporation, intended to leave the whole field of English business open without regulation to associations possessing foreign incorporation? If not, is the construction of an act of parliament elastic enough to allow a distinction, certainly not deducible from its words, to be drawn between trades which necessarily involve two countries in the sphere of their operations and other trades? Again, if the judges are constitutionally authorized to draw such a distinction, could it without the aid of parliament be made sufficiently definite and certain in practice?

In fact however the right of foreign and colonial corporations to carry on business in England, without any authority to that effect from parliament or government, has now passed unques-

tioned for so long that it may be considered to be established; and it is a very exceptional instance of liberality. The Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, requires foreign companies which establish a place of business in the United Kingdom to file with the registrar the name and address of a person on whom legal process may be served; but with this condition they have all the privileges here of juristic personality.

In *Newby v. Van Oppen and Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company* (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; Cockburn, Blackburn, Mellor, Quain; a United States' corporation, carrying on business in England "just as an English corporation might do," was allowed to be sued on a contract made in England in the course of such business. "We see from this case," said Blackburn in delivering the judgment of the court, "that there is at least one American corporation that has set up a branch business here, and there will probably soon be more." Yet the only points argued, or noticed in the judgment, were that a foreign corporation could not be sued in an English court at all, and that if suable the defendant corporation had not been properly served. It may be said that the defendant corporation could not repudiate the lawfulness of the business it had carried on, but that no remark should have been made on the lawfulness of that business, when the probable frequency of the case was adverted to, may be taken as proof that no doubt about it had occurred to the judges. Similarly in *Re Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 837, Chitty, a company incorporated in the colony of Victoria and carrying on the business of life insurance in England was treated as something quite regular, though the case did not involve the enforcement of any contract made by the company in England. The British government has concluded conventions with various foreign countries—as France and Belgium in 1862, and Spain in 1883—in almost identical terms, which may be thus quoted from the convention with Spain: "Joint-stock companies and other associations, commercial, industrial and financial, constituted in conformity with the laws in force of either of the two contracting states, may exercise in the dominions of the other all their rights, including that of appearing before tribunals for the purpose of bringing an action or of defending themselves, with the sole condition in exercising such rights of always conforming themselves to the laws and customs in force in the said dominions." *London Gazette*, 6th February, 1883, p. 643. That such conventions should have been concluded without seeking parliamentary authority or ratification implies that the British government must have been advised that the foreign corporations in question could already exercise all their rights in England, and the most obvious interpretation of that expression, though certainly not the only possible one, would include the right of carrying on business in England. In *Bateman v. Service*, quoted below under § 308, it was assumed that it would be "contrary to the comity of nations to prevent a foreign incorporated company carrying on business at all": 6 App. Ca. 391. It can scarcely have been unknown to the judicial committee that, in general, it is only by express authority that foreign incorporated companies are allowed to carry on business. The meaning therefore probably was that since no special provision for the grant of such authority in proper cases had been made by the legislature of Western Australia, it would be a breach of comity to interpret the general law of that colony as refusing it in any case; an

argument which, if sound, would apply to England. And see the cases quoted under § 310.

On the other hand, in *Bank of Montreal v. Bethune* (1836), 4 Upper Canada K. B. 341, Robinson, Sherwood and Macaulay; and in *Genesee Mutual Insurance Company v. Westman* (1852), 8 Upper Canada Q. B. 487, Robinson, Burns and Draper; it was held that a bank incorporated in Lower Canada, and an insurance company incorporated in New York, could not sue on contracts made by them in Upper Canada in the course of carrying on business there. In each case it was considered that the company was acting beyond the powers given by its charter, the true construction of which limited the business of the company to the country where it was granted; but Robinson and Sherwood plainly intimated their opinion that even in the absence of this point the common law of England, as the law of Upper Canada, would have refused to a foreign corporation the power of carrying on business within the territory.

§ 307. Personal rights, not involving the question of authority to act in England in the artificial character, are certainly enjoyed in England by foreign corporations or other artificial persons, the same as by foreign natural persons.

Right to protection of trade mark: *Collins Company v. Brown* (1857), 3 K. & J. 423, Wood; *Collins Company v. Reeves* (1858), 4 Jur. (N. S.) 865, Stuart. The monks formerly of La Grande Chartreuse in France were held to retain the benefit of a trade mark which had acquired the signification that a liqueur was their personal manufacture, although by French law all their property had passed to a liquidator: *Rey v. Lecouturier*, [1908] 2 Ch. 715, Alverstone, Buckley and Kennedy; affirmed, [1910] A. C. 262, Macnaghten, Atkinson, Collins, Shaw of Dunfermline, Loreburn.

Right to protection of trade name: *Société Anonyme des Anciens Établissements Panhard et Levassor v. Panhard Levassor Motor Company*, [1901] 2 Ch. 513, Farwell.

§ 308. When the members of a corporation are not individually liable for its acts by the law from which it derives its personality, they cannot be sued in England for any acts done by it where it has authority to act in its corporate character.

General Steam Navigation Company v. Guillou (1843), 11 M. & W. 877; Abinger, Alderson, Parke, Gurney; *Bateman v. Service* (1881), 6 Ap. Ca. 386, Couch; *Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Furness*, [1905] 1 K. B. 304, Kennedy; affirmed, [1906] 1 K. B. 49, Collins, Romer, Mathew.

§ 309. A foreign corporation may be served out of the jurisdiction with notice of a writ, as well as a foreign natural person.

Westman v. Aktiebolaget Ekmans Mekaniska Snickarefabrik (1876), 1 Ex. D. 237, Kelly, Bramwell, Amphlett; *Scott v. Royal Wax Candle Company* (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 404, Cockburn, Quain, Pollock.

The new rule 8a in Order IX., made in 1920, which is set out above, at p. 242, applies to agents in England of companies which carry on

business out of the jurisdiction and permits service on such agent in respect of any contract entered into by or through him within the jurisdiction.

§ 310. A foreign corporation may be served with a writ within the jurisdiction, if it carries on business there either directly or through an agent and has there an officer "in the nature of a head officer, whose knowledge would be that of the corporation," and on whom the writ is served. See R. S. C., Order IX., Rule 8.

Newby v. Van Oppen and Colt's Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; judgment of himself, Cockburn, Mellor and Quain, delivered by Blackburn. The quotation in the § is from the judgment, p. 296. *Lhoneux Limon & Co. v. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation* (1886), 33 Ch. D. 446, Bacon. *Haggin v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris; Mason and Barry v. the same*; (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 519; Cotton, Fry and Lopes, affirming Field and Cave *La Bourgogne*, [1899] P. 1, Jeune, affirmed by A. L. Smith and Collins; further affirmed, under name of *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique v. Thomas Low & Co.*, [1899] A. C. 431, Halsbury, Macnaghten, Morris, Shand; *Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v. Actiengesellschaft für Motor und Motorfahrzeugbau vorm Cudell & Co.*, [1902] 1 K. B. 342, Collins, Romer and Mathew, affirming Channell; *Logan v. Bank of Scotland*, [1904] 2 K. B. 495, Collins and Stirling. It is a question of fact whether a foreign company is carrying on business through an agent within the jurisdiction or not. In a recent case the test was declared to be whether the agent is making contracts for the foreign company, or in carrying on his own business sells a contract with the foreign company: *Thames and Mersey Insurance Co. v. Societa di Navigazione, &c.*, [1914] 111 L. T. R. 97, C. A., Cozens-Hardy, Buckley, Channell. See too, *Okura & Co. v. Forsbacka, &c.*, [1914] 1 K. B. 715, Buckley, Phillimore, Ridley; *Saccharin Corporation Co. v. Chemische Fabrik Co.*, [1911] 2 K. B. 516, Vaughan Williams, Moulton, Farwell; *Aktiesselskabet "Hercules" v. Grand Trunk Pacific Railway Co.*, [1912] 1 K. B. 222.

Of course the § assumes that the corporation is suable within the jurisdiction, and as to Scotch or Irish corporations it is therefore subject to Order XI. of 1883, rule 1 (e), as amended by later rules, as to which see cases quoted on p. 248.

A company registered in Scotland or Ireland must be served at that office and not at a branch in England (section 116, Companies (Consolidated) Act, 1908).

In *Carron Iron Company v. Maclaren* (1855), 5 H. L. 416, Cranworth and Brougham, St. Leonards dissentient; reversing the same case, *sub nom. - Maclaren v. Stainton* (1852), 16 Beav. 279, Romilly; and in *Mackereth v. Glasgow and South Western Railway Company* (1873), L. R. 8 Exch. 149, Bramwell, Cleasby and Pollock; the service was held bad on the question of fact as to whether the business in England and the officer served there were of sufficient importance. In the first of those cases Cranworth did not discuss that question, thinking, as also did Brougham, that even if the service was good there was a substantial want of jurisdiction to grant the injunction appealed from, by which a Scotch corporation was restrained from proceeding in Scotland against the Scotch property of its deceased debtor, on the ground that a decree for the

administration of his will had been made in England, where the deceased was domiciled: see § 107. See *Palmer v. Caledonian Railway Company*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 607, Collins and Cave, reversed, *ib.* 823, Esher, Fry, Lopes: *Badcock v. Cumberland Gap Park Company*, [1893] 1 Ch. 362, Stirling.

§ 310*a*. The words "insurance company" in an Act of Parliament mean a company established under the laws of the United Kingdom: Pollock, in *Colquhoun v. Heddon* (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 497. On the appeal Esher agreed with this, but Fry disagreed: 25 Q. B. D. 135, 140. The point was not necessary to the decision.

CHAPTER XVII.

FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

§ 311. THE judgment of a competent foreign court, by which a party is personally condemned to pay a certain sum, may be sued on in England as a new cause of action in the nature of those called simple contracts. Formerly there was a fiction that the defendant had promised to pay the amount, for which promise the judgment was held to be a sufficient consideration; and he was not allowed to dispute that fiction, if all the circumstances concurred which were necessary to make the judgment a sufficient consideration. But now the writ may simply be indorsed thus: "The plaintiff's claim is £1,000 upon a judgment of the Court in the empire of Russia." *Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875.*

Hence the action might formerly be either debt or *indebitatus assumpsit*: *Walker v. Witter* (1778), 1 Doug. 1; Mansfield, Willes, Ashhurst, Buller. And the action still comes under any rule of procedure relating to contracts, on the ground that "the liability of the defendant arises upon the implied contract to pay the amount of the foreign judgment" *Grant v. Easton* (1883), 13 Q. B. D. 302; Brett, Baggallay, Bowen "This action is brought upon an English judgment, which, until a judgment was obtained in Jersey, was in that country no more than evidence of a debt": *Hawksford v. Giffard* (1885), 12 Ap. Ca. 122, Herschell; p. 128

As to the technical mode of enforcing calls made in the Scotch or Irish winding up of companies on contributories resident in England, see *Re Hollyford Copper Mining Company* (1869), L. R. 5 Ch. Ap. 93, Giffard, and *Re City of Glasgow Bank* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 628, Jessel

As to the reciprocal enforcement of judgments in the United Kingdom and other parts of the British Dominions, see the Administration of Justice Act (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81), ss. 9-14, below, p. 390.

The reciprocal enforcement of maintenance orders in the United Kingdom (except in Scotland) and other parts of the Dominions is provided for by another statute of the same year (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 33). The Act is extended by Order in Council to any part of the Dominions where reciprocal provisions have been made by the local legislature for the enforcement of maintenance orders made in England and Ireland. A maintenance order includes any order other than an order of affiliation for the periodical payment of money towards the maintenance of a wife and other dependants.

§ 312. Or without being made the subject of a personal action, the simple contract debt created by a foreign judgment may be enforced against assets in England in the same way as an English debt.

Dupleix v. De Roven (1706), 2 Vern. 540, Cowper.

§ 313. And in the admiralty division of the High Court, as formerly in the court of admiralty, effect can be given *in rem* to the sentence *in rem* of a foreign court having admiralty jurisdiction or what is equivalent thereto. Also, if the writ is indorsed as on a personal sentence, still effect *in rem* may be given if it appears that the proceedings abroad were on a maritime lien, naturally leading to a sentence *in rem*.

" 'Tis a ruled case that one judge must not refuse, upon letters of request, to execute the sentence of another foreign judge, when the persons or goods sentenced against are within his jurisdiction; and if he do, his superior must compel him to it; else it is a sufficient ground for reprisals against the territory ": Sir Leoline Jenkins, 1667, in Wynne's Life of Jenkins, vol. 2, p. 762. In arguing *Jurado v. Gregory* (1670), 1 Ventris 32, King's Bench, Finch, afterwards Lord Nottingham, said with the approval of the court " that where sentence is obtained in a foreign admiralty one may libel for execution thereof here, because all the courts of admiralty in Europe are governed by the civil law, and are to be assistant one to another, though the matter were not originally determinable in our court of admiralty." Sir R. Phillimore, sitting in the admiralty division of the High Court, said: " I am of opinion that it is the duty of this court to act as auxiliary to the Portuguese court, and to complete the execution of justice which, owing to the departure of the ship, was necessarily left unfinished by that court. In other words, it is my duty to place the English court in the position of the Portuguese court after its sentence has been given against the defendants." *The City of Mecca* (1879), 5 P. D. 28; at p. 32, after quoting Jenkins and Finch as above, and other old authorities. The Portuguese court was in this case a tribunal of commerce. The judgment was reversed, on its appearing that the proceedings in Portugal were not on a maritime lien; (1881), 6 P. D. 106; Jessel, Baggallay, Lush.

In many continental countries foreign judgments are not treated as new causes of action, but are admitted to execution, or declared executory as it is called, after a special proceeding for that purpose. It would seem from the language of Jenkins and Finch that in the ancient forms of the English court of admiralty the mode of proceeding on a foreign sentence was somewhat similar; and what has been said above, pp. 164, 165, as to the ancient co-operation of the courts of different countries in bankruptcies, may be compared. The English courts of common law and equity never joined in any such system of

express co-operation with foreign courts, but their doctrine that foreign judgments created causes of action led to results to a large extent similar, and like questions arose under each system as to the conditions of the validity of foreign judgments, and as to the right or duty of examining them before directly or indirectly enforcing them.

§ 314. The foreign judgment *in personam* which is to be sued on or otherwise enforced as above shown must be such as lays on the defendant a present duty to pay. If in its own country it cannot be executed pending the time allowed for appealing, or pending an appeal, it cannot be enforced in England during the interval; but if there is no such stay of execution in its own country the pendency of an appeal will not be a bar to an action in England, though it may afford ground for the equitable interposition of the English court to prevent the possible abuse of its process, and on proper terms to stay execution in the action.

No action lay on the foreign judgment where it could be executed in its own country, pending the appeal, only subject to security being given for repayment in case of reversal: *Patrick v. Shedden* (1853), 2 E. & B. 14, Campbell, Wightman, Crompton. Where nothing was shown as to effect of appeal in country of judgment, appeal no bar, but might afford ground for equitable interposition as above: *Scott v. Pilkington* (1862), 2 B. & S. 11, Cockburn, Crompton, Blackburn. See also *Alivon v. Furnival* (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 297, Farke and (?).

A Spanish *remate* judgment, which does not exclude the further investigation of the case in the same court, is not a final one in such a sense as to enable it to be sued on in England: *Re Henderson, Nouvion v. Freeman* (1889), 15 Ap. Ca. 1, Herschell, Watson, Bramwell, Ashbourne; affirming S. C. (1887), 37 Ch. D. 244, Cotton, Lindley, Lopes; which reversed S. C. (1887), 35 Ch. D. 704, North. See also *Jeannot v. Fuerst*, [1908] 25 T. L. R. 425, Bray. A judgment for maintenance which can be varied or terminated by the court according to the circumstances of the child to be maintained, is not final and conclusive: *Re Macartney*, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, Astbury.

So too, a judgment for maintenance of a wife, to be paid in instalments, where there was power for the court to vary the order or to abrogate it, is not final and conclusive: *Harrop v. Harrop*, [1920] 3 K. B. 386, Sankey.

§ 315. Also the duty to pay laid on the defendant must be a duty to pay in settlement of the cause of action. A foreign order to pay a sum of money into court, to be disposed of according to a judgment thereafter to be given, cannot be enforced in England.

M'Donnell v. M'Donnell, [1921]³ 2 I. R. 148, Molony, and Gordon; *Pim diss.* There a judgment of a foreign court to pay a sum into court monthly for maintenance of a wife, till the further order of the court, was held not to be a final and conclusive judgment which could be executed in Ireland. *Paul v. Roy* (1852), 15 Beav. 435, Romilly.

§ 316. And a foreign collateral order to pay the costs of any proceeding cannot be enforced in England.

Sheehy v. Professional Life Assurance Company (1857), 2 C. B. (N. S.) 211; Cresswell, Cockburn, Crowder

§ 317. Although a foreign judgment which awards costs while disposing of the cause of action may be enforced in England for the costs.

Russell v. Smyth (1842), 9 M. & W. 810; Abinger, Parke, Alderson, Rolfe; where the costs were given in a foreign suit for divorce.

§ 318. The foreign judgment must be for a sum certain.

And therefore, if any costs are to be deducted from the sum awarded by the judgment, they must have been taxed in the foreign court before it can be sued on: *Sadler v. Robins* (1808), 1 Camp. 253; Ellenborough, Grose, Le Blanc, Bayley. But since the original cause of action is not deemed in England to merge in a foreign judgment, if the latter be for a sum certain with liberty to the defendant to establish a counterclaim, it will none the less be evidence in England in favour of the plaintiff, though the defendant may have ground to apply for a stay of proceedings in order that he may establish his counterclaim abroad according to the liberty reserved: *Hall v. Oßber* (1809), 11 East 118; same four judges.

§ 318a. And it must not be barred by the English statute of limitations, running as against a simple contract.

Bouchet v. Tulledge, [1894] 11 T. L. R. 87.

§ 318b. The foreign judgment must not have been rendered in a penal action, for to enforce such a judgment would violate indirectly the rule that "the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." For the purpose of that rule the test of a penal law is that the penalty is "recoverable at the instance of the state, or of an official duly authorised to prosecute on its behalf, or of a member of the public in the character of a common informer." And the court in which the judgment is sued on is not bound by the decision of the court which rendered the judgment as to its penal character within the rule.

Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] A. C. 150, judgment of himself and Lords Halsbury, Bramwell, Hobhouse, Morris and Shand delivered by Lord Watson.

A judgment for damages which has been obtained by intervening as a civil party in a French criminal suit is severable from the penal judgment and can be enforced in England: *Raulin v. Fischer*, [1911] 2 K. B. 93, Hamilton.

§ 319. Coming now to the question of competence reserved in § 311, it must first be observed that what we have here to deal

with is international competence, not domestic, for the question of giving effect to a judgment in another country is distinct from that whether the competence on which the judgment is founded is a reasonable one for internal purposes. See what was said by Lord Hobhouse in delivering the opinion of the judicial committee in *Ashbury v. Ellis*, [1893] A. C. 339, at p. 344. Hence also the competence here considered has nothing to do with the rules by which litigation may be portioned out among different courts existing in the same country, as for instance between the tribunals of commerce and what are called civil tribunals in France. If the foreign suit was not brought in the right court of a country which as a territory was internationally competent, this was matter of defence which ought to have been pleaded in that court: *Vanquelin v. Bouard* (1863), 15 C. B., N. S. 341; pp. 350, 13th plea, 368, Erle, and 374, Keating. And the party cannot take the objection in England.

§ 319a. A court within the jurisdiction of which the defendant has expressly elected a domicile, with a view to legal proceedings relating to certain matters, is competent for such proceedings.

Vallée v. Dumergue (1849), 4 Exch. 290; Alderson, Pollock, Rolfe, Platt. It is only a particular case of this, if the defendant has become party to an instrument by which his domicile for the purpose of the obligations thereby created is declared to be at a certain spot, in default of his electing another: *Copin v. Adamson* (1874), L. R. 9 Exch. 345, Kelly, Amphlett and Pigott; (1875), 1 Ex. D. 17, Cairns, Blackburn and Brett. *Feyerick v. Hubbard*, [1902] 71 L. J. K. B. 509, Walton; *Jeannot v. Fuerst*, [1908] 25 T. L. R. 424, Bray. The effect is not the same if the defendant has become a partner in a mine in the country where a judgment is obtained against him relating to that mine. *Emanuel v. Symon*, [1907] 1 K. B. 235, Channell; corrected, S. C., [1908] 1 K. B. 302, Alverstone, Buckley, Kennedy.

§ 320. But where by the proper law of a contract, *lex loci contractus* or *solutionis* as the case may be, a party to the contract is deemed to elect a certain domicile for legal proceedings relating to it, it is doubtful whether the court of that domicile, as such, is competent.

In *Meeus v. Thellusson* (1853), 8 Exch. 638, Pollock, Parke, Martin; leave to amend a replication was granted, though the amendment would have been useless except on the footing of the affirmative of this question, which however had not been argued. The question arose again in *Copin v. Adamson*, quoted under § 319a, but became unimportant by reason of the decision on the point there mentioned. Kelly was for the affirmative, in the particular case of the contract made by taking shares in a company, and Cairns, though the question was not argued on the appeal, seems to have inclined to the same opinion; but Amphlett and Pigott maintained

the negative. The general case appears to me not to be distinguishable from that of § 322, for if the *lex contractus* does not otherwise carry with it the *forum contractus*, it can scarcely do so the more because it appoints a certain place, as a domicile deemed to have been elected, at which notices with a view to proceedings in the *forum contractus* may be served. And the particular case of taking shares in a company does not appear to me to be distinguishable from the general case.

§ 321. It may be considered as now settled that the *forum rei* is admitted in England as a sufficient ground of competence for a foreign judgment which it is sought to enforce, whether that forum be grounded on political nationality; on domicile in the sense admitting but of one domicile, in which it must be taken when used as the criterion of personal law; or on domicile in the looser sense in which it may be taken in those countries which are familiar with it as the ground of jurisdiction. "If the defendants had been at the time of the judgment subjects of the country whose judgment is sought to be enforced against them, we think that its laws" [meaning jurisdiction] "would have bound them. Again, if the defendants had been at the time when the suit was commenced resident in the country, so as to have the benefit of its laws protecting them, or as it is sometimes expressed owing temporary allegiance to that country, we think that its laws" [meaning jurisdiction] "would have bound them." Blackburn, delivering the judgment of himself, Mellor, Lush and Hannen, in *Schibsby v. Westenholz* (1870), L. R., 6 Q. B. 161.

This doctrine long remained obscure, as might be expected from the fact that the competence of the English courts themselves with regard to personal obligations had not been based either on allegiance or on domicile. In the older cases, where the foreign judgment had been pronounced against an absent defendant, the endeavour was to determine in each instance whether it was agreeable to natural justice that the defendant should be held to be bound.

In *Buchanan v. Rucker* (1807), 1 Camp. 63, Ellenborough, and (1808), 9 East 192, Ellenborough and (?), constructive notice was held not to bind one who had never been "present" in the country; and it may be inferred from some of the expressions used that what was intended was that it should not bind one who had never been "resident" in it. In *Cavan v. Stewart* (1816), Star. 525, Ellenborough said: "it is perfectly clear on every principle of justice that you must either prove that the party was summoned, or at least that he was once on the island. In the case before Lord Mansfield it was in proof that the person leaving the island left an attorney in his place to act for him." Here again it is not certain that "was once on the island" should not be read as "resided once."

In *Becquet v. MacCarthy* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 951; Tenterden, Parke, and (?); the foreign law required the process to be served on a public officer, but made no provision for his communicating with the absent party. This was held sufficient, because "it must be presumed that" the officer "would do whatever was necessary in the discharge of that public duty." Brougham said in *Don v. Lippmann* (1837), 5 C. & F. 21: "*Becquet v. MacCarthy* has been supposed to go to the verge of the law, but the defendant in that case held a public office in the very colony in which he was originally sued." And it is now agreed that the case is only supportable on the duty of residence implied by that ground. *Emanuel v. Symon*, [1908] 1 K. B. 302, Alverstone, Buckley, Kennedy.

In *Obicini v. Bligh* (1832), 8 Bi. 335, where the admiralty court at Malta had given damages and costs against the captor of a ship brought in there, but which did not seem to have been submitted by the captor for adjudication, the proof was defective, but Tindal and Gaselee appear to have considered that it would have been unnecessary to prove actual notice to the captor, because it was his duty to take the cause into the court.

In *Douglas v. Forrest* (1828), 4 Bing. 686, Best and (?), it would seem to have been held that the domicile of origin is a competent forum when the defendant retains property there after establishing a domicile elsewhere, perhaps also subject to the condition that the debt sued for was contracted there. "We confine our judgment to a case where the party owed allegiance to the country in which the judgment was so given against him, from being born in it, and by the laws of which country his property was, at the time those judgments were given, protected. The debts were contracted in the country in which the judgments were given, whilst the debtor resided in it," u.s., p. 703. Though allegiance is mentioned it would seem that domicile must have been intended, for the case was one of a judgment recovered in Scotland against a Scotchman who had gone to live in India, so that his British allegiance afforded no ground for suing him in Scotland rather than in the British courts in India. The reasoning in this case was disapproved in *Gibson v. Gibson*, [1913] 3 K. B. 379, Atkin, where it was held that a person born in a British colony was not a subject of that colony, so as to make a judgment recovered against him in his absence in the colonial court enforceable here. There is one uniform tie of allegiance binding all persons alike born within the King's dominions, and no local allegiance to any part of the dominions on which jurisdiction may be based.

That domicile, coupled with the possession of property in the territory, is a sufficient ground of competence for a foreign judgment, appears to have been assumed by all the judges in *Cowan v. Braidwood* (1840), 1 M. & Gr. 882, 2 Sc. N. R. 138; Tindal, Bosanquet, Coltman, Maule.

In *Reynolds v. Fenton* (1846), 3 C. B. 187, Tindal, Maule and Cresswell, the only point which seems to have been thought material was whether the defendant had had the opportunity of defending the foreign suit. But the insufficiency of such opportunity as a ground for enforcing the judgment in England, where the international competence cannot be otherwise justified, is now established by *Turnbull v. Walker*, [1892] 67 L. T. 767, Wright, and *Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote*, [1894] A. C. 670, judgment of himself, Watson, Hobhouse, Macnaghten, Morris, Shand and Couch delivered by Selborne.

§ 322. With regard to the *forum speciale obligationis*, it must be remembered that even according to Roman principles, which

are the only ones that can be asserted as possessing any claim to general reception, this forum is not constituted by the obligation alone, but is subject to the condition that the defendant is either present in the territory or possesses property there. See above, p. 231. On the other hand the English courts, which at first did not possess this forum at all, afterwards for some time enjoyed under act of parliament a jurisdiction over defendants out of the territory and not possessing property within it, in cases of contracts made in England and torts and breaches of contract occurring within the jurisdiction. And they now enjoy a jurisdiction over defendants out of the territory and not possessing property within it, in the case of the breach of a contract which according to its terms ought to be performed in England. See above, p. 244. It might therefore be expected, and the facts agree with the expectation, that the oldest English authorities should be silent about the *forum speciale obligationis* as a ground of competence for foreign judgments, that later ones should show some disposition to admit that ground without insisting on the Roman limitations, and that finally, in the progress of legal science in this country, that ground of international competence should be altogether rejected. "No exception is made in favour of the exercise of jurisdiction against a defendant not otherwise subject to it, by the courts of the country in which the cause of action arose, or (in cases of contract) by the courts of the *locus solutionis*. In those cases, as well as all others where the action is personal, the courts of the country in which a defendant resides have power, and they ought to be resorted to, to do justice." *Sirdar Gurdial Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote*, [1894] A. C. 670, per Lord Selborne at p. 684.

This overrules the *dictum* in *Schibsby v. Westenholz*: "if at the time when the obligation was contracted the defendants were within the foreign country, but left it before the suit was instituted, we should be inclined to think the laws" [meaning jurisdiction] "of that country bound them; though before finally deciding this we should like to hear the question argued": L. R. 6 Q. B. 161. In that case the defendants possessed no property in the country of the judgment, and it may be doubted whether under the circumstances the Roman *forum contractus* would have been in that country, even had they been casually present and made the contract there, although those who systematically defend the importance of the *locus celebrati contractus* would answer that query in the affirmative. In *Rousillon v. Rousillon* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 351, where also the defendant possessed no property in the country of the judgment, Fry refused to give effect to a judgment obtained in France, the *forum contractus celebrati*, without notice to the defendant; and he mentioned as "a very material circumstance" that the contract, "though made in France, was evidently

intended to be performed in England"; p. 357. The same decision would now have to be given without reference to that circumstance. See *Emanuel v. Symon*, [1908] 1 K B 302, cited under § 319a, and *Jaffer v Williams*, [1908] 25 T. L. R. 13, Bucknill

§ 323. With regard to the possession of property in the territory as one of the alternative conditions for putting in force the Roman *forum speciale obligationis*, another passage may be quoted of the judgment in *Schibsby v. Westenholz* (1870), L. R., 6 Q. B. 163. "We should however point out that whilst we think that there may be other grounds for holding a person bound by the judgment of the tribunal of a foreign country than those enumerated in *Douglas v. Forrest*, we doubt very much whether the possession of property, locally situated in that country and protected by its laws, does afford such a ground. It should rather seem that, whilst every tribunal may very properly execute process against the property within its jurisdiction, the existence of such property, which may be very small, affords no sufficient ground for imposing on the foreign owner of that property a duty or obligation to fulfil the judgment."

Cavan v Stewart, quoted under § 321, was an action against the garnishee in the foreign suit, and such garnishee was not allowed to plead in answer to his creditor the payment which he had been compelled to make in that suit. It is therefore at variance with the doctrine submitted in this §

§ 324. Where the legislation of any country establishes a *forum actoris*, this is a jurisdiction founded on circumstances neither personal to the defendant nor connected with the obligation, but personal to the plaintiff—as is done by Art. 14 of the Code Napoleon; see above, p. 233—this will not be considered a sufficient ground of competence for enforcing such a judgment in England.

Schibsby v Westenholz (1870), L. R. 6 Q B 155; Blackburn, Mellor, Lush, Hannen.

Supposing that the court in which the foreign judgment was pronounced is not deemed to have been internationally competent on any of the grounds which have been considered, the judgment may yet be enforceable in England by reason of a competence as against the party arising from his conduct with relation to the suit in which it was pronounced.

§ 325. "We think it clear, upon principle, that if a person selected as plaintiff the tribunal of a foreign country as the one in which he would sue, he could not afterwards say that the

judgment of that tribunal was not binding upon him." In *Schibsby v. Westenholz*, as quoted in § 321, L. R., 6 Q. B. 161.

Where the judgment of a foreign court was pleaded by the defendants in England as conclusive on the plaintiffs, Parke, delivering the judgment of himself, Abinger, Alderson and Gurney, pointed out that the plaintiffs "did not select" the foreign tribunal, in which case "the determination might possibly have bound them: they were mere strangers, who put forward the negligence of the defendant as an answer in an adverse suit in a foreign country, whose laws they were under no obligation to obey." In *General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou* (1843), 11 M. & W. 894.

§ 326. But does the defendant bind himself by appearing and defending the foreign suit? "We think it better to leave this question open, and to express no opinion as to the effect of the appearance of a defendant, where it is so far not voluntary that he only comes in to try to save some property in the hands of the foreign tribunal. But we must observe that the decision in *De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone* is an authority that where the defendant voluntarily appears, and takes the chance of a judgment in his favour, he is bound." In *Schibsby v. Westenholz*, as quoted in § 321, L. R., 6 Q. B. 162. And it would seem that, if he appears only conditionally and applies to set aside the service out of the jurisdiction upon him, a judgment given against him by the foreign court will be valid and executed here. *Harris v. Taylor*, [1915] 2 K. B. 586: Buckley, Pickford, Bankes, affirming Bray. In the last edition of this book Westlake remarked:—"If the point reserved were not decided in accordance with the obvious leaning of Lord Blackburn and his colleagues, the defendant would be bound to abandon his property abroad, as the price of saving his English property from the grasp of a court having *ex hypothesi* no international jurisdiction in the case." The court, however, in the later case held that if a defendant voluntarily places himself in such a position that it has become his duty to obey a judgment of the foreign court, this judgment is enforceable against him in this country (*loc. cit.*, at p. 588).

In *De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone* (1861), 6 H. & N. 301; Martin, Channell and Wilde; it was averred in the plea which failed that the defendants were possessed of property in the country of the judgment, liable to seizure in case of judgment by default, and that they appeared and defended the suit in order to prevent such seizure. In *Voinet v. Barrett*, 55 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 39, where the defendants had appeared in the French action because "they had business transactions with French houses, and were frequently in such a position that a judgment in a French court could be executed against property belonging to them in

France," Esher, Cotton and Bowen distinguished that case from one of an appearance before any property of the defendant has been seized, and held the defendants bound. In doing so they reversed Wills—54 L. J. Q. B. 521—who had observed that "the necessity of saying other property from execution in case of a judgment by default . . . is nearly as cogent a species of duress" as that under which "the appearance is to save property then in the hands of the tribunal." Nevertheless, where a judgment by default was given against a British defendant in the foreign court and he subsequently made opposition to that judgment in order to protect his goods, which had been provisionally attached, and having gained "on opposition" was brought as respondent before the Court of Appeal in the foreign country, the judgment of that Court was valid against him and executed in England, because his appearance in the French court was held to be voluntary. *Guiard v. De Clermont*, [1914] 3 K. B. 145, Lawrence. It would appear that the only safe course for a British defendant sued in a foreign court whose jurisdiction he contests is to enter a protest against the jurisdiction and do no more until application is made to enforce the judgment in England. He may lose the property he had in the foreign country, but he may be able to resist the execution of the foreign judgment against his property in England; whereas, if he submits in any way to the foreign jurisdiction, he will lose that power. The principle that jurisdiction is given by voluntary appearance was maintained in *Boissière & Co. v. Brockner & Co.* (1889), 6 T. L. R. 85, Cave, where the defendant contested the foreign suit both on the question of jurisdiction and on the merits, and practically also in *Carrick v. Hancock*, [1895] 12 T. L. R. 59, Russell of Killowen, and in *Gaboriau v. Maxwell & Co.*, [1908] *The Times Newswp.*, Dec. 12, Pickford.

With regard to the old cases, in *Malony v. Gibbons* (1810), 2 Camp. 502, Ellenborough, the fact that the defendant appeared in the foreign suit by an attorney who made no defence to it was held reason enough for enforcing the judgment against him. Indeed Ellenborough, who in *Cavan v. Stewart*, as quoted under § 321, appears to have been willing to content himself with proof that the party had been summoned, would *à fortiori* have been content with proof that he had appeared. A similar remark may be made with regard to the judges who decided *Reynolds v. Fenton*, also quoted under § 321. On the other hand, see *General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou*, as quoted under the last §.

In *The Challenge and Duc d'Aumale*, [1904] P. 41, Gorell Barnes, parties were held not to have bound themselves to submit to a French court by appearing in Belgium, where their ship had been arrested to abide the result of the proceedings in France.

If a person has the opportunity of appearing in a foreign court, and instead pays money under protest into court, he cannot afterwards recover back the money so paid. *Clydesdale Bank, Lim. v. Schroeder & Co.*, [1913] 2 K. B. 1. See above, p. 199.

§ 326a. "Where the judgment of the foreign court is one *in rem* affecting status or a judgment *in personam* ancillary to or accessory to such judgment *in rem* and regularly pronounced by the law of the court which gave it, the jurisdiction of the court over a British defendant not domiciled or even resident in the foreign country will be upheld in England, at least where the

court pronouncing and the court enforcing the judgment are courts of the same sovereign."

This new class of case in which the English court will enforce a foreign judgment was enunciated by Scrutton, J., in *Phillips v. Batho*, [1913] 3 K. B. 25, where he enforced a judgment of an Indian court granting damages against an English co-respondent to a divorce suit tried in India, though the defendant was not domiciled in India and had no property there and had been served in England with the summons by registered post. The court held that the jurisdiction of the Indian court over the absent co-respondent was justified on the same principles as those which led the English divorce court to assume jurisdiction over foreign co-respondents; see *Rayment v. Rayment and Stuart* above, p. 89, and as the judgment of divorce, being a decree *in rem*, was valid everywhere, so the judgment *in personam* ancillary to it against the co-respondent was valid here. The judge inclined to the view that the jurisdiction should be upheld and the judgment enforced, even if the court giving it were that of a foreign country not subject to the same sovereign, but the decision is actually limited to the case where the two countries are embraced under one sovereignty.

§ 326*b*. It was recommended by the Imperial Conference of 1911 that steps should be taken to facilitate the reciprocal enforcement of judgments between different parts of the British Empire. Effect has been given to this resolution in the Administration of Justice Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. V., c. 81), which provides in Part II. for the enforcement in the United Kingdom of judgments obtained in a superior court in other British dominions, and registration of the judgment obtained in that court. The judgments which can be registered comprise those given by the court in any civil proceedings wherever any sum of money is made payable, and include awards in proceedings of arbitration. They do not, however, comprise judgments in matters of personal status, such as divorce. The effect of the statutory provision is that judgments of courts of the British empire which can be registered will be executed in England as though they were judgments of the English court; and it will no longer be necessary for the judgment creditor to start a fresh action in England based on the judgment already obtained. It is, however, important to note that the registration is subject in every case to the discretion of the court, and the procedure differs, therefore, from the procedure in regard to the enforcement in England of Scottish or Irish judgments, which can be registered in every case.*

* See an article by Professor Keith in the *Journal of Comparative Legislation*, 1921 (3rd series), vol. iii., p. 310.

Article 9 (2) of the Act specifies a number of cases in which the registration of judgments is not permitted, "and throws a clear light on the doctrine of the conditions under which foreign judgments generally should be recognized."

No judgment may be registered if it was obtained by fraud or if an appeal is pending or is intended to be brought against it, or if it is in respect of a cause of action which for reasons of public policy could not have been entertained by the registering court or if the original court acted without jurisdiction. No judgment again may be registered if the judgment debtor—

(a) being a person who was neither carrying on business nor ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction of the original court, did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit or agree to submit to the jurisdiction of that court, or

(b) being the defendant in the proceedings, was not duly served with the process of the original court and did not appear, notwithstanding that he was ordinarily resident or was carrying on business within the jurisdiction of that court or agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of that court.

It would seem to follow from this that, provided the judgment debtor is carrying on business or is resident in a country which forms part of the empire, the court has jurisdiction, although he is not domiciled there; and even if he is not carrying on business, yet if he submits to the jurisdiction after due service of a process upon him, the judgment will be valid. This embodies the principle laid down in the cases of *Harris v. Taylor* (u.s.) and *Guiard v. De Clermont* (see p. 389), and extends the old doctrine of voluntary appearance to any submission.

§ 327. A peculiar case, which may perhaps best be classed as one of competence, is presented when by the law of a company's domicile the shareholders in it are personally liable on its contracts, and a judgment obtained against it may be executed against any of such shareholders although they were not individually parties to the action. Such a judgment may be enforced in England by action against any shareholder, as if it was a judgment rendered against him by a court to the competence of which he had subjected himself by accepting shares in the company. Indeed the foreign action may be considered as having been in fact brought against the individual shareholders in a collective name, and on that footing the question of enforcing it in England against a shareholder would be strictly one of competence.

Bank of Australasia v. Harding (1850), 9 C. B. 661; Wilde, Maule, Cresswell, Talfourd: *Bank of Australasia v. Nias* (1851), 16 Q. B. 717; Campbell, Patteson, Coleridge, Wightman. But where the company is domiciled in England, the fact that it is also registered in a foreign country for the purpose of doing business there does not expose its shareholders to this liability. *Risdon Iron and Locomotive Works v. Furness*, [1906] 1 K. B. 49, Kennedy, Collins, Romer, Mathew.

§ 327*a*. The international competence being established, no irregularity of procedure in the foreign court can be objected in England to its judgment, so long as the proceedings do not offend against English views of substantial justice.

Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, Lindley, Rigby and Vaughan Williams reversing Kekewich. See what was said about natural justice with regard to the regular practice of a foreign court in *Boissière & Co. v. Brocker & Co.*, [1899] 6 T. L. R. 85, Cave, and in *Bater v. Bater*, [1906] P. pp. 237—238, Romer. In two recent cases the principle has been upheld, and the plea that the foreign judgment involved a denial of natural justice has been rejected. *Scarpetta v. Lowenfeld*, [1911] 27 T. L. R. 509, Lawrence, and *Robinson v. Fenner*, [1913] 3 K. B. 835, Channell. In both the objection to the foreign procedure was on the ground of admitting evidence; the English courts held that differences of standpoint on this question were not to be treated as a matter of substantial justice.

Supposing it to be established that the foreign court was competent, or that the defendant in England is precluded from objecting to its competence, there arises the question whether its judgment has the force of *res judicata*. In the continental system of declaring foreign judgments executory, the form of this question is whether such declaration must be preceded by an examination of the substance of the judgment as to its accuracy in fact and law. In the Anglo-American system of suing on a foreign judgment, the form is whether such judgment is a conclusive proof of the claim decreed for by it, or merely a presumptive one which the defendant may rebut by showing it to be erroneous in fact or law. The judgments of the several states which composed the old German empire had mutually the force of *res judicata*, but those of states foreign to that empire had not that force within it. In the Germanic body which was instituted at the Congress of Vienna the system of reciprocity was adopted, so that the judgments of German states, and those of all other states which allowed the force of *res judicata* to German judgments, but those only, were admitted to execution without examination; and by §§ 660 and 661 of the Code of Procedure for the German empire, which came into operation in 1879, a foreign judgment is not to be put in execution in Germany unless

the courts of its proper country are in the practice of giving effect in like manner to the judgments of German courts. The same system has prevailed widely over Europe, as for example in Switzerland and the Sardinian and Papal states; and in Spain reciprocity is required in the absence of treaty, but the foreign judgment is executed if there are no precedents showing want of reciprocity. In France the practice of the courts has at last settled that every foreign judgment must be examined, though this conclusion, depending on the interpretation of the codes and the continuance in force of the 121st article of the ordinance of 1629, was long disputed. In Belgium and Rhenish Prussia, as the question rested on the French codes introduced without the ordinance of 1629, foreign judgments were allowed the force of *res judicata*; except in Belgium French judgments, by the law of 9th September, 1814, and in Rhenish Prussia, by the decisions of the courts, judgments given against inhabitants of Prussia in countries where Prussian judgments are submitted to examination.

§ 328. In England it is now established, after much uncertainty, that the judgment of a foreign competent court is in general a conclusive proof of the claim decreed for by it. "Several pleas," said Lord Denman, delivering the judgment of himself, Williams, Coleridge and Wightman, in *Henderson v. Henderson* (1844), "were pleaded to show that the defendant had not had justice done him in the Court of Chancery at Newfoundland. This is never to be presumed, but the contrary principle holds unless we see in the clearest light that the foreign law, or at least some part of the proceedings of the foreign court, are repugnant to natural justice; and this has often been made the subject of inquiry in our courts. But it steers clear of an inquiry into the merits of the case upon the facts found, for whatever constituted a defence in that court ought to have been pleaded there." 6 Q. B. 298. What is here said about repugnance to natural justice refers chiefly to the discussions as to the sufficiency of the mode taken in the foreign court for summoning an absent defendant, which were common before the system of testing the authority of the foreign court by fixed principles of jurisdiction had become so far established in England as we have seen it to be. Whenever competence is based on the *forum rei* or the *forum situs*, technical means must be used for conveying notice to an absent defendant, which must sometimes fail of conveying actual notice to him in cases where nevertheless the

interests of justice require that the suit shall proceed. It is not likely that in any civilized country, such as those between which the rules of private international law apply, these technical means should be so glaringly insufficient as to furnish a reason for declining to enforce in England its judgment against an absent defendant, in a case where the court was competent on principles generally recognized. Without however denying that such cases may possibly occur, or forgetting that the reservations of the court in *Henderson v. Henderson* may receive other applications where the foreign law embodied in the judgment is contrary to stringent notions of morality or public policy entertained in England, and still more where the question involves the law or jurisdiction of some state scarcely civilized enough to be admitted within the intercommunion of private international law, it remains that the judgment of the competent court of an ordinary European or American state cannot be questioned in England for error either in fact or in law.

This was the doctrine of Lord Nottingham, who allowed one partner to charge another with money paid for a partnership debt under a foreign sentence, "the justice whereof," he said, "is not examinable here" *Gold v. Canham* (1679), from Nottingham's MSS in 2 Sw. 325: S. C. 1 Ca. in Ch. 311. From *Cottington's Case* (1678), same MSS in 2 Sw. 326, it appears that that great judge was led to this doctrine by the respect due to foreign sentences in matrimonial causes, and to the practice of enforcing foreign admiralty judgments, as to which see above, p. 380. In *Sinclair v. Fraser*, where the Court of Session in Scotland had put a party to prove over again a demand for which he had obtained judgment in Jamaica, the House of Lords declared "that the judgment of the supreme court of Jamaica ought to be received as evidence *prima facie* of the debt, and that it lies upon the defendant to impeach the justice thereof, or to show the same to have been irregularly or unduly obtained" 1771; 1 Doug. 4 a, 20 State Trials 468. Perhaps the terms of this declaration do not imply any greater deduction from the authority of a foreign judgment than is contained in the reservations of the court in *Henderson v. Henderson*, but it seems to have been understood at the time as allowing an examination without limit, and Mansfield said in *Walker v. Witter* "foreign judgments are a ground of action everywhere, but they are examinable." (1778), 1 Doug. 6. In *Galbraith v. Neville* (1789), 1 Doug. 6, the two systems were put in open opposition, Kenyon saying, "I cannot help entertaining very serious doubts concerning the doctrine laid down in *Walker v. Witter* that foreign judgments are not binding on the parties here"; while Buller said, "the doctrine which was laid down in *Sinclair v. Fraser* has always been considered as the true line ever since, namely that the foreign judgment shall be *prima facie* evidence of the debt, and conclusive till it be impeached by the other party."

Since then Mansfield and Buller have been followed by Eyre; in *Philips v. Hunter* (1795), 2 H. Bl. 410. By Bayley in *Tarleton v. Tarleton*, which was an action on a covenant of indemnity applicable to a foreign

suit in which a judgment had been obtained against the plaintiff; (1815), 4 M. & S. 23. And at least to some extent by Romilly, in *Reimers v Druce* (1857), 23 Beav. 150. On the other hand Shadwell adopted the doctrine of Nottingham and Kenyon, in *Martin v. Nicolls* (1830), 3 Sim. 458. And Brougham's dicta in *Houlditch v. Donegall* (1834), 8 Bl. N. R. 301, 2 C. & F. 470, and in *Don v. Lippmann* (1837), 5 C. & F. 1, though formally in favour of the examinable character of foreign judgments, are such that it may be doubted whether he had more in his mind than the examination of them with regard to competence or sufficiency of notice to the defendant, or to such differences of law as exist between Christian and Mahometan countries.

The doctrine of Nottingham and Kenyon was ultimately established by *Henderson v. Henderson*, quoted in the § *Bank of Australasia v. Nias* (1851), 16 Q. B. 717; Campbell, Patteson, Coleridge, Wightman: *De Cosse Brissac v. Rathbone* (1861), 6 H. & N. 301; Martin, Channell, Wilde. and *Vanquelin v. Bouard* (1863), 15 C. B. (N. S.) 341; Erle, Williams, Keating. In the last two cases the judgment in question was a foreign one in the strict sense, but although in the first two the judgments were colonial, the language of the court in each of them put colonial and strictly foreign judgments on a par. A doubt was thus settled which might have been founded on *Henderson v. Henderson* (1843), 3 Ha. 100—see pp. 117, 188—Wigram, namely, whether colonial judgments were not entitled to some higher degree of authority, as being subject to appeal to this country.

A conviction in a criminal prosecution in a foreign court of competent jurisdiction is not conclusive in a civil action in England based on the same facts. *Caine v. Palace Steam Shipping Co.*, [1907] 1 K. B. 670, Lawrence, Collins, Cozens-Hardy, Farwell.

A foreign judgment *in personam* will not be enforced if it recognises the right of a posthumous illegitimate child to perpetual maintenance against the estate of the putative father, both because the judgment is contrary to English public policy and because the cause of action is unknown in England. *In re Macartney*, [1921] 1 Ch. 522, Astbury.

§ 329. It has been said that where English law was properly applicable to the decision of the foreign suit, and the foreign court has mistaken that law, the English court must not enforce its judgment; also that the same result follows where the foreign court selected for the decision of the suit before it, the law of a country which was not applicable according to the maxims of private international law received in England. But these views have become discredited in proportion as the idea has gained ground that the obligation to obey a foreign judgment is based on the competence of the court, and that the true subject of inquiry is not whether on the whole, in the case from time to time presented, it is agreeable to natural justice that the defendant should be held to be bound. The errors referred to may be more easily ascertainable by the English court than other errors of law or fact, but in their relation to the merits of the case they do not seem to differ from other errors.

In *Arnott v. Redfern* (1825), 2 C. & P. 88, Best's opinion at *nisi prius* was against enforcing a foreign judgment in the cases here supposed, but on argument pursuant to leave reserved the point proved to be immaterial. In *Novelli v. Rossi* (1831), 2 B. & Ad. 757, Tenterden and (?), the defendant was held not to be discharged by a French judgment in his favour in which English law had been mistaken; but Blackburn in *Castrique v. Imrie* (1870), L. R. 4 E. & I. A. 435, has pointed out that the case might have been argued and decided on other grounds. Romilly in *Reimers v. Druce* (1857), 23 Beav. 156, inclined against enforcing a foreign judgment proceeding on what he deemed an erroneous view of private international law, but the point was not material. In *Godard v. Gray* (1870), L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, Blackburn and Mellor decided against admitting a mistake of English law as a defence; but Hannen was not prepared to decide that such a mistake, appearing on the face of the foreign proceedings, might not be used as a defence by a party who in those proceedings had adduced proper evidence of the English law. The same decision, the point reserved by Hannen not arising, was given in *Re Trufort, Trafford v. Blanc* (1887), 36 Ch. D. 600, Stirling.

In *Meyer v. Ralli* (1876), 1 C. P. D. 358, Archibald, Coleridge and Grove, it was admitted by the parties that the foreign court had mistaken its own law, and its judgment was accordingly disregarded. Cf. *Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co.*, [1920] 2 K. B. 624, see below, p. 407.

§ 330. A foreign judgment will of course not be enforceable in England if it is shown that it was obtained by the fraud of the party seeking to enforce it.

Sinclair v. Fraser, as quoted above, p. 394; *Blake v. Smith* (1810), 8 Sim. 303, Eldon; *Bowles v. Orr* (1835), 1 Y. & C. Exch. 464, Abinger; *Price v. Dewhurst* (1837), 8 Sim. 279, Shadwell, in which the principle is applied to a decision given by interested persons in their own favour; *Ochsenbein v. Papelier* (1873), L. R. 8 Ch. App. 695, Selborne and Mellish affirming Malins; *Manger v. Cash* (1889), 5 T. L. R. 271, Denman and Manisty.

In fact the respect due to an English judgment is as much forfeited by fraud in procuring it as that due to a foreign one. See the authorities collected in the reporter's note to *Innes v. Mitchell* (1857), 4 Dr. 102. But a judgment on a contract which itself was obtained by fraud is not vitiated on this ground. *Robinson v. Fenner*, [1913] 3 K. B. 85.

A decree *in rem*, in which a decree of divorce is included, whether English or foreign, cannot so long as it is unreversed be attacked by a person not a party to it, on the ground of fraud not going to the jurisdiction: *Castrique v. Behrens* (1861), 30 L. J. Q. B. 163; Cockburn, Wightman, Crompton, Blackburn: *Bater v. Bater*, Gorell Barnes, affirmed by Collins, Romer and Cozens-Hardy, [1906] P. 209.

And the same principle will apply even although, to prove the fraud, it may be necessary to retry the merits of the case.

Action on a Russian judgment: defence, that plaintiff fraudulently concealed from the Russian court that the goods for which the judgment was given were in her possession all the time. Defence admitted, because the issue whether she had the goods was not the same as the issue whether she fraudulently misled the court as to her having them, though the

evidence might be the same on both. *Abouloff v. Oppenheimer* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 295, Coleridge, Baggallay and Brett affirming Mathew and Cave. This case was followed in *Vadala v. Lawes* (1890), 25 Q. B. D. 310, Lindley and Bowen.

§ 331. When the judgment of a foreign court was given as by confession or on an award, where the submission to arbitration contemplated the intervention of that court, the questions of competence and *res judicata* which have been considered in this chapter do not arise, but it must be seen that the judgment was duly confessed, or is in accordance with the submission to arbitration. In fact a claim on such a judgment is a claim on contract.

Henley v. Soper (1828), 8 B. & Cr. 16, Tenterden, Bayley, Holroyd, Littledale; and *Alivon v. Furnival* (1834), 1 C. M. & R. 277, 4 Tyr. 751, Parke and (?); judgments on awards. *Frankland v. McGusty* (1830), 1 Knapp 274, Leach; judgment as by confession, but confession not duly proved.

§ 331a. An award in a foreign arbitration is not a decision which the court will enforce as a foreign judgment; a fresh action must be brought on the award.

Merrifield v. Liverpool Cotton Association, 105 L. T. 97, Eve.

§ 332. It cannot be said of the claim for which a foreign judgment has been given that *transit in rem judicatam*: the plaintiff may sue in England on the original cause as well as on the judgment until the latter is satisfied, and it is common in the cases before the Judicature Acts to find counts on each in the same declaration.

Maule v. Murray (1798), 7 T. R. 470, (?): *Hall v. Odber* (1809), 11 East 118; Ellenborough, Grose, Le Blanc, Bayley: *Smith v. Nicolls* (1839), 5 Bi. N. C. 208; Tindal, Bosanquet and Erskine, while Vaughan seems not to have been quite of the same opinion: *Bank of Australasia v. Harding* (1850), 9 C. B. 661; Wilde, Cresswell and Talfourd, Maule doubting: *Bank of Australasia v. Nias* (1851), 16 Q. B. 717; Campbell, Patteson, Coleridge, Wightman. In *Newland v. Horsman* (1681), 2 Ch. Ca. 74, 1 Vern. 21, according to the former report it was not argued that the foreign sentence excluded the jurisdiction, but only what regard ought to be paid to it; while if Nottingham thought that the action would not lie on the original cause after full determination abroad, as the report in Vernon may indicate, it must be remembered that the foreign sentence was in a court of Admiralty.

When the foreign judgment has been satisfied by the defendant, it is a satisfaction of the claim on which it was given; it becomes equivalent to a judgment in his favour, as to which see the next §: *Barber v. Lamb* (1860), 8 C. B. (N. S.) 95; Erle, Willes, Byles, Keating.

§ 333. A judgment for the party defendant in England rendered in a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, and being such that it is conclusive in its own country, is also a conclusive bar to any attempt to reopen the matter in England.

Burrows v. Jamineau (1726), as above, p. 304, and Dick. 48, King; where the party sued on his acceptance in England had been the plaintiff abroad in a suit to have the acceptance vacated: *Plummer v. Woodburne* (1825), 4 B. & C 625, Abbott, Bayley and (?); colonial judgment not conclusive only because it might have been in the nature of a nonsuit: *Ricardo v. Garcias* (1845), 12 C. & F. 368, Lyndhurst, Brougham and Campbell; not at variance as to the point of the § with the decision of Shadwell in the same case (1844), 14 Sim 265 *Société Générale de Paris v. Dreyfus Brothers* (1887), 37 Ch D. 215; Cotton, Lindley, Lopes. And if the foreign proceedings were *in personam*, an adverse judgment in them will not the less exclude the plaintiff from proceeding in England *in rem*; Lushington, in *The Griefswald* (1859), Swabey 435. See also *General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou*, quoted under §§ 325 and 326, in which case the efficacy of the bar, even had it been properly pleaded, was questioned by the judges on the ground that the foreign court was not competent to bind the party defendant before it, and therefore also not competent for the purpose of binding any one else towards that party.

§ 334. Similarly the English court, after a final judgment in favour of a defendant, will restrain the plaintiff by injunction from prosecuting in another country a suit for the same matter.

Booth v. Leycester (1837), 1 Keen 579, Langdale.

§ 335. But a foreign judgment pleaded by the defendant will be subject to question, with regard to the competence of the court or otherwise, on the same grounds, so far as applicable, on which a foreign judgment sued on by the plaintiff may be questioned.

"If the decree of the supreme court" of Newfoundland "is conclusive upon one party, it must I conceive be conclusive upon both; and if not conclusive upon both, it ought to be conclusive upon neither": Wigram, in *Henderson v. Henderson* (1843), 3 Ha. 117.

§ 336. And because the plaintiff has been refused certain relief abroad, it will not follow that he is not entitled to other relief in England on the same facts.

Callanda v. Dittrich (1842), 4 M. & Gr. 68, 4 Sc. N. R. 682; Tindal, Coltman, Erskine, Cresswell: relief by way of rescission of contract having been refused abroad, plaintiff may still sue for damages in England on the same facts.

§ 337. "The plea of *res judicata* applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judg-

ment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time": Wigram in *Henderson v. Henderson* (1843), 3 Ha. 115. On the other hand: "It is indeed true that the case made by the second bill," in England, "must be taken to have been known to the plaintiff at the time of the institution of the first," in New South Wales, "and might have then been brought forward, and it may be said therefore that it ought not now to be entertained; but I find no authority for this position in civil suits, and no case was cited at the bar, nor have I been able to find any, in which a decree of dismissal of a former bill has been treated as a bar to a new suit asking the same relief, but stating a different case giving rise to a different equity": Westbury, in *Hunter v. Stewart* (1861), 31 L. J., Ch. 346, reversing Wood, 1 H. & M. 226, who had relied on Wigram as cited above. What is chiefly remarkable here is that both Wigram and Wood on the one side and Westbury on the other treat the question as the same, whether the judgment, set up as conclusive be English or foreign. It will be observed that the case before Lord Westbury, the same relief prayed on different facts, is the converse of that in § 336, different relief prayed on the same facts.

The sentence of a foreign court of admiralty, condemning a ship as enemy's property, is conclusive evidence in favour of the underwriters against the warranty of neutrality. *Geyer v. Aquilar* (1798), 7 T. R. 681; Kenyon, Ashhurst, Grose, Lawrence. This point is rather anomalous, with reference to the principles of the doctrine of *res judicata*; but it illustrates the identity of treatment which that plea receives, whether the judgment invoked be English or foreign.

§ 338. *Lis pendens*. When the plaintiff in England has previously for the same cause commenced proceedings in another country which are still pending, there is no general rule that this is an answer to the English action. "The proper course in such cases is to apply here to stay proceedings in one or other of the suits, and the court will upon such an application have no difficulty in putting the plaintiff under terms": Parker in *Ostell v. Lepage* (1851), 5 De G. & S. 106. See the same case (1852), 2 D. M. G. 892, Knight-Bruce and Cranworth. The plaintiff had there obtained a decree for account at Calcutta, but such a decree until the accounts have been taken under it presents only a case of *lis pendens* and not one of judgment. "As to the inconvenience, considering the difficulties of administering justice between parties occasionally living under the separate

jurisdictions, I think the parties ought to be amenable to every court possible, where they are travelling from country to country; and we must then endeavour to correct the mischief of these double suits as much as we can, by allowing in each country the benefit of all the other proceedings in the other part of the king's dominions": Camden in *Bayley v. Edwards* (1792), 3 Sw. 711, appeal from Jamaica.

"The principles by which the court ought to be guided in applications of this nature"—that the plaintiff may be ordered to elect between English and foreign actions—"were fully examined and discussed in the case of *McHenry v. Lewis*"—(1882), 22 Ch. D. 397, Jessel, Cotton and Bowen, affirming *Chitty* (1882), 21 Ch. D. 202; which was an application by the defendants to stay the English proceedings on account of concurrent litigation abroad. "That case," Lord Justice Lindley proceeded, "appears to me to be a most valuable decision. As I understand it it comes to this, that where the plaintiff is suing in this country and also abroad in respect of the same matter, and a motion is made to compel the plaintiff to elect, it is not sufficient for the person so moving to point out that there are two proceedings being taken with reference to the same matter; he must go a step further and show that there is vexation in point of fact, that is to say that there is no necessity for harassing the defendant by double litigation. Moreover I think the court ought to be very cautious before it interferes in cases of that kind, and for this reason: the court here is not and cannot be alive to all the advantages which a person may expect to derive from suing in the foreign court." In *Peruvian Guano Company v. Bockwoldt*, 23 Ch. D. 225, Jessel, Lindley and Bowen, 1883, affirming *Bacon*, 1882.*

See *Dillon v. Alvares* (1798), 4 Ves. 357, Loughborough; *Imlay v. Ellefsen* (1802), 2 East 453, Ellenborough and (?) *Naylor v. Eagar* (1828), 2 Y. & J. 90; Garrow, Hullock, Vaughan: *Cox v. Mitchell* (1859), 7 C. B. (N. S.) 55; Erle, Williams, Crowder, Byles: *Scott v. Seymour* (1862), 1 H. & C. 219; Pollock, Martin, Bramwell, Wilde, Wightman, Williams, Crompton, Willes, Blackburn: *The Mali Ivo* (1869), L. R. 2 A. & E. 356, Phillimore: *Wilson v. Ferrand* (1871), L. R. 13 Eq. 362, Malins: *The Catterina Chiazzare* (1876), 1 P. D. 368, Phillimore: *The Christiansborg* (1885), 10 P. D. 141; Hannen, affirmed by Baggallay and Fry, Esher dissenting: *Thornton v. Thornton* (1886), 11 P. D. 176; Cotton, Bowen and Fry, affirming Butt: *Mutrie v. Binney* (1887), 35

* Ghirardini holds that the exception of *lis pendens* is one of incompetence, and that *lis pendens* abroad can never have the effect of stopping a suit in Italy. See his article in the *Rivista di Diritto Internazionale*, anno II.

Ch. D. 614; Cotton, Lindley and Lopes, reversing North. *Dillon v. Alvares* and *Cox v. Mitchell* were commented on by the court of appeal in *McHenry v. Lewis*, where it was laid down that the vexatious character of double litigation will be more easily established when the other action is in Scotland or Ireland, and probably also where it is in a British dependency, than where it is in a country politically foreign. But in *Cohen v. Rothfield*, [1919] 1 K. B. 410, C. A., Scrutton and Eve, reversing Shearman, the court refused to restrain a plaintiff in England from proceeding with an action against a defendant who had already instituted proceedings against him in Scotland, not being satisfied that the continuous prosecution of the action was oppressive or vexatious. Scrutton, L.J., said, at p. 415: "The same rule of procedure applies, whether the action to be stayed is in another court in the King's dominions or in a foreign country." And in *Heilmann v. Falkenstein*, [1917] 33 T. L. R. 383, Astbury, the court granted an injunction to the plaintiff in England to restrain an American defendant from taking proceedings in America concerning English trusts till the trial of the English action. The distinction between parts of the British Empire and countries politically foreign on this head does not appear therefore to be maintainable.

As to the defendant in foreign proceedings commencing proceedings in England having an intimate connection with their subject, see *Transatlantic Co. v. Pietroni* (1860), Johns. 604, Wood; *Luw v. Garrett* (1878), 8 Ch. D. 26, Bacon affirmed by Baggallay, James and Thesiger; *The Manar*, [1903] P. 95, Bucknill. The second case shows that an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court is an agreement to refer to arbitration within the meaning of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, s. 11. And this was followed in effect in *Kirchner & Co. v. Gruban*, [1909] 1 Ch. 413, Eve, and in *The Cap Blanco*, [1913] P. 130, Evans, P., where proceedings in England were stayed because of a clause in a bill of lading that any dispute should be decided in Hamburg according to German law; and in *Johannesburg Municipal Council v. Steward*, H. L., [1909] W. N. 161, where proceedings were stayed in Scotland concerning a contract to be performed in South Africa which was made in Scotland but to be determined according to English law, in order that the proceedings in England might continue undisturbed. See, too, *Pena Copper Mines, Lim. v. Rio Tinto, Lim.*, [1912] 105 L. T. 846, C. A., Cozens-Hardy, Moulton, Farwell. Defendant in a proceeding *in rem* in a British dependency having commenced an action *in personam* in England, his proceedings were stayed as a matter of discretion: *The Peshawur* (1883), 8 P. D. 32, Phillimore.

If there was only *lis pendens* abroad at the date of the commencement of the English action, a judgment rendered abroad during the progress of the latter will not be deemed to constitute *res judicata*; the English court should have been applied to, to compel an election between the two proceedings: *The Delta*, *The Erminia Foscolo* (1876), 1 P. D. 393, Phillimore.

And it would seem that *lis pendens in personam* abroad is not a reason for so much as putting the plaintiff *in rem* in England to his election: *The Bold Buccleugh* (1851), 7 Mo. R. C. 267, Jervis.

As to proceedings in England for the preservation of property pending litigation abroad, see *Cruikshank v. Roberts* (1821), 6 Mad. 104, Leach, and *Transatlantic Co. v. Pietroni*, as above.

In *The Mannheim*, [1897] P. 13, Gorell Barnes, a guarantee given

abroad for payment of what might be adjudged by a competent court was held not to be equivalent to the commencement of proceedings abroad

As to the effect of *lis pendens* abroad in case of an application for leave to serve a writ out of the jurisdiction, see *The Hagen*, [1908] P. 189, Alverstone, Farwell and Kennedy, overruling Bargaive Deane.

§ 339. When the English proceedings are the first commenced, "there can be no doubt that the general rule precludes parties from proceeding in any other court for the same purpose for which they are proceeding in this court, whether the other proceedings are taken in this or in any other country; and if the party conceives there are any circumstances in his case which constitute an exception to the rule, I think that his proper course is not to take proceedings in another court of his own authority, but to apply to this court for permission to take such proceedings": Cottenham in *Wedderburn v. Wedderburn* (1840), 4 M. & Cr. 596. The principles on which it will be determined whether the double litigation will be allowed are the same as in the case of § 338: in *Peruvian Guano Company v. Bockwoldt*, there quoted, the English action was the first commenced. See *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, [1892] P. 98, Jeune.

In the following cases the second litigation was commenced abroad by the defendant in England, and the court weighed the circumstances in its discretion.

Hyman v. Helm (1883), 24 Ch. D. 531; Brett, Cotton and Bowen, affirming Chitty; where the defendant in England took proceedings abroad, and it was held that a special case of vexation must be made out in order to restrain him. *Dauckins v. Simonetti*, 50 L. J. P. 30, Jessel, Cotton and Lush affirming Hannen. *The Jasep*, [1896] 12 T. L. R. 375, Jeune. *Vardopulo v. Vardopulo*, [1909] 25 T. L. R. 518, Cozens-Hardy, Buckley, Kennedy, reversing Bigham; where a husband who had acquired a foreign domicile was not restrained from taking proceedings for divorce in the courts of his domicile, after proceedings for judicial separation had been commenced by his wife in England.

A creditor who had come in before the master after decree in an administration suit was restrained from proceeding with an action afterwards commenced by him in Scotland for the same debt: *Graham v. Maxwell* (1849), 1 M. & G. 71, Cottenham affirming Shadwell. See *Heilmann v. Falkenstein*, u. s., p. 401).

A second debenture holders' action commenced in the Lancaster Palatine Court after notice of similar proceedings already commenced in the High Court was restrained: *Re Connolly Bros., Lim., Wood v. Connolly Bros., Lim.*, [1911] 1 Ch. 731, Parker, Cozens-Hardy, Moulton, Buckley.

§ 340. The authority of a foreign judgment *in rem* on the property in a movable has been considered in § 149, and that of a foreign sentence of divorce in §§ 50 and 51. The conditions under which authority will be allowed in England to a foreign

judgment on the validity of a marriage have not been thoroughly discussed. That such a judgment, by a court "having proper jurisdiction," would be conclusive, was said by Hardwicke in *Roach v. Garvan* (1748), 1 Ves. Sen. 159; but the opportunity for saying what was proper jurisdiction did not arise. Finch (Nottingham)'s remarks in *Cottington's Case* (1678), 2 Sw. 326, are not less vague, and the foreign sentence which gave occasion to them was one of divorce. Simpson in *Scrimshire v. Scrimshire* (1752), laid great stress on the *forum contractus celebrati*; 2 Hagg. Cons. 408, 419. And Scott (Stowell) in *Sinclair v. Sinclair* (1798), 1 Hagg. Cons. 297, did the same, not however like Simpson on the ground of the supposed competence of the forum, but because "the validity of marriage must depend in a great degree on the local regulations of the country where it is celebrated," which the courts of that country can best appreciate; and he added that he was "not prepared to say that a judgment of a third country, on the validity of a marriage not within its territories, *nor had between subjects of that country*" —the italics are mine—"would be universally binding." (Cf. *Keyes v. Keyes*, [1921] P. 204, Duke, P., where the English court refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Indian courts to decree dissolution of marriage between parties not domiciled in India, though the marriage was celebrated and the parties were resident there.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PROCEDURE.

§ 341. THE procedure of the English court is governed exclusively by English law.

That procedure is governed by the *lex fori* is a matter of private international law that has never been questioned in theory, though doubts have occurred on some of its applications. *Aut quæris*, says Bartolus, *de his quæ pertinent ad litis ordinationem, et inspicitur locus judicii*. It would be impossible to import into any court a new system of procedure for every case in which foreign things or acts might be involved, since there would exist neither the machinery nor the minute and curious learning necessary for it. Nor is there any reason why it should be desired to do so, for the principle of enforcing foreign rights, be it comity or justice, can be carried no higher than to place them on a level with domestic rights, entitling the party to the same remedies and subject to the rules incident to those remedies. It may be in some cases doubtful whether a particular rule of the *lex fori* is a rule of substantive law or a rule of procedure. This question would naturally be determined according to the *lex fori*.

The 4th section of the Statute of Frauds which declares that no action shall be brought in respect of certain agreements is a rule of procedure: *Leroux v. Brown* (1852), 12 C. B. 801. The same character has been attributed to the Gaming Acts of 1845 and 1892; *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746, at p. 753, Collins. But the Moneylenders Act, 1900, which provides that "where proceedings are taken in any court" certain rules are to apply, is not a rule of procedure: *Schrichand & Co. v. Lacon*, [1906] 22 T. L. R. 245, Ridley.

It remains to mention certain applications of the maxim, and to guard against certain errors which might be made in applying it.

§ 342. The *lex fori* determines in what name an action must be brought, so far as that question can be separated from the question of the title sued on.

See § 135, and the cases on the name in which a foreign republic must sue, under § 192. See also *Wolff v. Oxholm* (1817), 6 M. & S. 92, at p. 99; judgment of court delivered by Ellenborough.

§ 343. The term of prescription for personal actions is held in England to depend on the *lex fori*, but this rule is not universally received, and is questionable in principle: see §§ 238 and 239. The term of prescription for immovable property, however, depends on the *lex situs*: § 171. And see pp. 188, 189, as to the prescription of corporeal chattels.

§ 344. The *lex fori* determines whether any particular kind of claim, as that on a bill of exchange, is entitled to the benefit of a special procedure.

§ 345. The *lex fori* determines whether any personal constraint can be used, as by arrest or the writ *ne exeat regno*.

It was at one time supposed that there ought to be no arrest of the person on a contract the proper law of which gave no such procedure. *Talleyrand v. Boulanger* (1797), 3 Ves. 447, Loughborough. *Melan v. Fitzjames* (1797), 1 Bos. & Pul. 138; Eyre and Rooke, against Heath who laid down the true principles.

The true view was maintained by Ellenborough in *Imlay v. Ellefsen* (1802), 2 East 455; in *De la Vega v. Vianna* (1830), 1 B. & Ad. 284, Tenterden and (?); in *Brettillot v. Sandos* (1837), 4 Scott, 201, Tindal and Vaughan; and by Chelmsford in *Liverpool Marine Credit Co v. Hunter* (1868), L R 3 Ch Ap. 486.

§ 346. The *lex fori* determines whether a set-off can be pleaded, this being distinct from any defence to the claim itself that may be available.

Allen v. Kemble (1848), 6 Mo P. C. 314, Pemberton Leigh; explained by Cockburn in *Rouquette v. Overmann* (1875), L R 10 Q. B. 541. Willes in *Meyer v. Dresser* (1864), 16 C. B. (N. S.) 646, at p. 655

But where the law of a bankruptcy lays down a rule of set-off as between the trustees, or by whatever other name the persons administering for the creditors may be called, and a debtor to the estate who is also a creditor of the bankrupt, the former are bound by that rule wherever they sue, because they take or represent the debtor's estate only subject to it.

Macfarlane v. Norris (1862), 2 B. & S. 783, Cockburn, Wightman, Blackburn, Crompton.

§ 347. When, by the proper law of a contract made with an unincorporated firm, each partner in that firm may be made liable on it *in solidum* by some mode of procedure or other, the *lex fori* determines whether any partner may be sued individually before the others have been sued.

Bullock v. Caird (1875), L. R. 10 Q. B. 276, Blackburn, Mellor, Field. The principle was applied in the administration of a deceased partner's estate: *Re Doetsch, Matheson v. Ludwig*, [1896] 2 Ch. 836, Romer.

§ 348. The *lex fori* determines the admissibility and force of any particular kind of evidence. See §§ 124 and 207—209, as to certain questions which arise on the application of this rule.

The marginal note of *Tulloch v Hartley* (1841), 1 Y. & C. Ch. 114, Knight-Bruce, is misleading. the enrolment and record were an actual conveyance, by the *lex situs*, which was the proper law to decide that point; therefore the English law of evidence was not violated.

The admissibility as evidence of certain documents which indicated testator's intention to exercise a power of appointment by will, was held to be governed entirely by English law, the *lex fori*, though testator was domiciled in France. *Re Scholefield*, [1905] 2 Ch 408, Kekewich.

For the general point see *Bain v. Whitehaven and Furness Junction Railway Company* (1850), 3 H. L. 1, Brougham; *Abbott v Abbott* (1860), 29 L. J. (N. S.) P. M. & A. 57, Cresswell; *Finlay v Finlay* (1862), 31 L. J. (N. S.) P. M. & A. 149, Cresswell.

§ 349. The rule of English law, by which a party or witness is excused from disclosing what may tend to expose him to criminal proceedings or to forfeiture, equally applies to cases where the criminal proceedings or forfeiture might be incurred abroad, provided the court be sufficiently informed of the foreign law under which they might be incurred.

United States of America v McRae (1867), L. R. 4 Eq. 327, Wood, 3 Ch. Ap. 79, Chelmsford; overruling as to the general proposition *King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox* (1851), 1 Sim. (N. S.) 301, Cranworth, the particular decision in which case however was admitted in the later one to have been right, because of the want of sufficient information as to the foreign law.

§ 350. As to the judicial discretion to suspend proceedings in order to have the benefit of the determination of some foreign law or matter by a foreign court, see the judgment of Lord Selborne in *Phosphate Sewage Company, Limited v. Molleson* (1876), 1 Ap. Ca. 787, and *Re Low, Bland v. Low*, [1894] 1 Ch. 147, North, at p. 150.

§ 350a. Conversely, the English court will entertain an action for a declaration of the English law on a point which arises for decision by a foreign court.

Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay, [1915] 2 K. B. 536, Pickford, Banks affirming Bailhache, Buckley dissenting. *Hope v. Hope* (1854), 7 D. M. & C., Cranworth.

§ 351. The *lex fori* determines all priorities which in any administration of assets may be allowed to certain classes of creditors or of unsecured debts, the assets being first cleared of all securities affecting them, for the question of security is one of property. See §§ 110 and 111, the latter being one of those

exceptions which are said to prove rules, the priorities following the law of that which is deemed the proper forum for administration instead of that of the actual forum. Also § 148; and the rule that a foreign judgment ranks in England with debts by simple contract, in § 311.

In proceedings *in rem* in the Admiralty Division, the *lex fori* decides the priority between a mortgagee and the master's claim for wages and disbursements *The Tagus*, [1903] P 44, Phillimore.

§ 352. The *lex fori* determines the time allowed for appealing.

Lopez v. Burslem (1843), 4 Mo. P. C. 300, Campbell.

Proof of Foreign Laws. .

The mode of proving foreign laws, being a part of procedure, depends on the *lex fori*; but it will be useful here to give the English rules with respect to it.

§ 353. Foreign law is presumed to be the same as English, of course excluding those parts of the latter which only exist as special institutions with special machinery, as bankruptcy: the existence and operation of such institutions in any foreign country, and in other respects the difference between foreign and English law, must be averred and proved by any party, plaintiff or defendant, who relies on it, and if the proof fails English law will be applied.

Brown v. Gracey (1821), Dow & Ry. N. P. 41 note, Abbott and (?); *Smith v. Gould* (1842), 4 Mo. P. C. 21, Campbell; Willes, delivering the judgment of the court in *Lloyd v. Guibert*, L. R. 1 Q. B., at p. 129.

Foreign law is a question of fact for the English court, and the judgment of a foreign judge about his own law is not binding on the English court. It is the opinion of an expert on the fact, to be treated with respect, but not necessarily conclusive *Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co.*, [1920] 2 K. B. 663, Warrington, Scrutton, Pickford; reversing *Bailhache*.

In the same case *Bailhache* had held that where there was an express decision of a foreign judge upon the construction of a document, the English court which was called on to construe that document by the foreign law must follow the judgment of the foreign court. The Court of Appeal held that the English court must consider as a question of fact whether the decision of the foreign judge was correct and must consider it on the evidence before it.

The onus is on those who contend that the foreign law differs from the law of England: *Dynamite A. G. v. Rio Tinto Co.*, [1918] A. C. 301, per *Parker*.

The English law lords, on an appeal from Scotland, will take judicial notice of the law of England, and not be bound by the evidence of that law given to the court below: *Douglas v. Brown* (1821), 2 Dow. & Cl. 171,

Brougham; *Cooper v. Cooper* (1888), 13 A. C. 88, Halsbury, Watson, Macnaghten.

§ 354. Any question as to the effect of the evidence given with respect to foreign law is now decided by the judge alone, and is not submitted to the jury. See section 15 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, which changes the former practice, by which a question about foreign law, being a fact in the cause, was left for the jury, if there was one, to decide whether it was proved or not.

The foreign law relied on by the defendant not having been proved to the satisfaction of the jury, English law was applied and the plaintiff recovered: *Nouvelle Banque de l'Union v. Ayton*, [1891] 7 T. L. R. 377, Halsbury, Esher and Fry affirming Wright.

§ 355. From the same circumstance, that foreign law or the difference between it and English law is a fact in the cause, it follows that it must be proved afresh whenever relied on, no matter how familiar the court may be with it from the evidence in previous actions.

McCormick v. Garnett (1854), 5 D. M. G. 278, Knight-Bruce and Turner.

Indeed it would be unsafe to assume that the foreign law had not been changed by some new statute or course of decision.

§ 356. The foreign law must always be proved by the evidence of experts: even when a code or a statute is concerned it is neither sufficient to produce such code or statute, nor is it necessary to produce it when an expert refers to it. "The opinions of persons of science must be received as to the facts of their science. The rule applies to the evidence of legal men, and I think it is not confined to unwritten law, but extends also to the written laws which such men are bound to know. Properly speaking, the nature of such evidence is not to set forth the contents of the written law, but its effect and the state of law resulting from it. The mere contents indeed might often mislead persons not familiar with the particular system of law: the witness is called upon to state what law does result from the instrument. I do not think that the case of treaties is applicable: there no class of persons are so peculiarly conversant with the subject matter as to invest it with the character of a science." Lord Denman in *The Baron de Bode's Case* (1844), 8 Q. B. 250. "The question for us is not what the language of the written law is, but what the law is altogether, as shown by

exposition, interpretation and adjudication." Coleridge in the same case, p. 265.

To the same effect Cottenham, Brougham, Denman, Campbell and Langdale, in *The Sussex Peerage Case* (1844), 11 Cl. & F. 114—117. A different opinion was formerly entertained as to the mode of proving foreign law contained in written documents: the older authorities are quoted and criticised in *The Baron de Bode's Case*.

The judgment of Lord Langdale in *Nelson v. Bridport* (1845), 8 Beav. 527, is worthy of attentive study, with reference to this and other §§ relating to the proof of foreign laws.

§ 356a. But there has been a tendency of the courts in recent years to allow colonial laws concerning marriage to be proved by production of a certified copy of the statutes without an expert or affidavit.

Bonhote v. Bonhote, [1917] L. T. Journal 149, p. 251, Duke, P.; *Roe v. Roe*, [1917] 115 L. T. 792, Shearman; *Gibson v. Gibson*, [1921] W. N. 12, Duke.

In *Brown v. Brown*, [1917] 116 L. T. 702, Hill was of the opinion that an expert witness must be called to prove the law in such cases; but his view has not been followed.

For proof of the validity of a Scotch marriage, see *Drew v. Drew*, [1912] P. 175, Evans, P.

§ 357. The expert by whose evidence a foreign law is to be proved need not necessarily be a judge or lawyer engaged in its practice. "The witness is in a situation of importance; he is engaged in the performance of important and responsible public duties; and connected with them, and in order to discharge them properly, he is bound to make himself acquainted with this subject of the law of marriage. That being so, his evidence is of the nature of that of a judge. It is impossible to say that he is incompetent." Langdale in *The Sussex Peerage Case*, (1844), 11 Cl. & F. 134. "He comes within the description of a person *peritus virtute officii*." Cottenham in the same case, *ib.*

In the last-mentioned case the evidence of a Roman Catholic Bishop in England, who was wont to exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction, was accepted to prove the Canon Law of Rome.

The certificate of the consul-general, or of the diplomatic representative of a country, has been received in proof of the law of that country: *Re Dormoy* (1832), 3 Hagg. Eccl. 767, Nicholl; *Re Klingemann* (1862), 3 S. & T. 18, Cresswell; *Re Prince P. G. Oldenburg* (1884), 9 P. D. 234, Butt. Also the affidavit of a secretary to an embassy, who was officially required to know his country's law: *Re Dost Aly Khan* (1880), 6 P. D. 6, Hannen: of a notary, accustomed to prepare deeds and documents according to the foreign law in question: *Re Whitelegg*, [1899] P. 267, Gorell Barnes, "with hesitation": of an ex-governor of a colony, who stated that he was

well acquainted with its laws relating to British subjects, the question being the validity of their marriage; *Cooper-King v. Cooper-King*, [1900] P. 65, Gorell Barnes. The evidence was received of a Reader in Roman-Dutch Law to the Council of Legal Education who had made a special study of that law for the purpose of instructing students who intend to practise in the colonies where the Roman-Dutch law prevails. *Brailey v. Rhodesia Consolidated, Limited*, [1910] 2 Ch. 95, Warrington. The court accepted the evidence as to the law of Uruguay given by a doctor of laws called to the bars of England and Spain, who was entitled on application to a diploma permitting him to practise in Uruguay. *Barford v. Barford*, [1918] P. 140, Horridge.

But the evidence of the following persons is inadmissible. A merchant: *Clegg v. Levy* (1812), 3 Camp. 166, Ellenborough. A private gentleman: admitted by Wightman in *Regina v. Dent* (1843), 1 Car. & Kir 97; which case Cottenham said was contrary to "the universal opinion both of the judges and the lords," in *The Sussex Peerage Case* (1844), 11 Cl. & F. 134. A person whose knowledge of the law of a country is derived from having studied it at a university in another country: *Bristow v. Sequerville* (1850), 5 Exch. 275, Pollock, Alderson, Rolfe, Platt; *Re Bonelli* (1875), 1 P. D. 69, Hannen; *Re Turner, Meyding v. Hinchcliff*, [1906] W. N. 27, Kekewich.

§ 358. When the experts have given their evidence, the part of the court has been stated by Lord Langdale. "Though a knowledge of foreign law is not to be imputed to a judge, you may impute to him such a knowledge of the general art of reasoning as will enable him, with the assistance of the bar, to discover where fallacies are probably concealed, and in what cases he ought to require testimony more or less strict. If the utmost strictness were required in every case, justice might often have to stand still; and I am not disposed to say that there may not be cases in which the judge may, without impropriety, take upon himself to construe the words of a foreign law, and determine their application to the case in question, especially if there should be a variance or want of clearness in the testimony. In the case of *Lindo v. Belisario**, in which the evidence taken upon the interrogatory was not clear and positive, Lord Stowell thought that he should not transgress his duty if he looked beyond the evidence, but not farther than the evidence fairly led. And in both the cases of *Lindo v. Belisario** and *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple*† I understand him not to have considered any authority, opinion or passage not distinctly referred to by the witnesses, and so not to have looked farther than he considered the evidence to have fairly led, and yet to have gone beyond the evidence in considering for himself the effect of the

* (1795), 1 Hagg. Cons. 216.

† (1811), 2 Hagg. Cons. 54.

authority referred to, with the view of acquiring for himself notions by which he might be better able to decide upon the effect of the varying or obscure testimony of the witnesses." In *Nelson v. Bridport* (1845), 8 Beav. 537.

As soon indeed as it is allowed that foreign law is matter of fact to be proved by witnesses, the certainty arises that in many cases the evidence about it will be obscure or discrepant; and in those cases it seems inevitable that a judge must exercise as much discretion in dealing with the evidence as is here claimed.

Chelmsford in *Di Sora v. Phillapps* (1863), 10 H. L. 640, noticed that the Privy Council had since done in *Bremer v. Freeman* (1857), 10 Mo. P. C. 306, what Langdale here claimed the right to do; and he reinforced Langdale's caution against using any source of knowledge beyond the passages referred to by the witnesses. The same thing was done by Cotton, Lindley and Lopes in *Concha v. Murieta, De Mora v. Concha* (1889), 40 Ch. D. 543.

§ 359. By an act of 1859, st. 22 & 23 Vict. c. 63, any court within the British dominions may send a case for the opinion of a superior court in any other part of the British dominions, on the law administered by it as applicable to the facts set forth in such case. The parties may pray to be heard before the court whose opinion is asked, and the court which asked the opinion must apply it when obtained; with the option however, when it has been obtained before trial, of submitting it "to the jury with the other facts of the case as evidence, or conclusive evidence as the court may think fit, of the foreign law therein stated." But the House of Lords or privy council, in the event of an appeal to them, will not be bound by any opinion so obtained from any court whose judgments are reviewable by them respectively.

§ 360. By an act of 1861, st. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 11, any superior court within the British dominions may send a case for the opinion of such superior court, in any foreign state with which her majesty shall have entered into a convention for the purpose, as shall be agreed on in such convention, on the law administered by it as applicable to the facts set forth in such case. But the court which asked the opinion will not be bound by it, and may return the case, with or without amendment, for further opinion, or similarly consult any other such superior court in the same state, and so from time to time. There is a corresponding provision for the British courts answering cases sent from abroad.

Various.

It will be sufficient to refer briefly here to certain topics of procedure which will be found enlarged on in the statute book or in books of practice.

§ 361. For the mode of proving

(1) Proclamations, treaties, and other acts of state of any foreign state or British colony :

(2) Judgments, decrees, orders and other judicial proceedings of any court of justice of any foreign state or British colony :

(3) Affidavits, pleadings, and other legal documents filed or deposited in any such court :

See st. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 7.

§ 362. For the power of courts in the British dominions to take evidence in suits depending in other parts of the British dominions, see st. 22 Vict. c. 20, and *Campbell v. Attorney-General* (1867), L. R., 2 Ch. Ap. 571, Turner and Cairns.

As to the scope of st. 6 & 7 Vict. c. 82, s. 5, see *Burchard v. Macfarlane, exp. Tindall*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 241.

§ 363. As to the mode in which a foreign court ought to act on a requisition addressed to it by the English court, requesting it to summon witnesses and take their examination, see *Hitchins v. Hitchins* (1866), L. R., 1 P. & M. 153, Penzance.

If litigation is proceeding in England the admissibility in evidence of questions and answers put in the examination in a foreign country is determined by English law. *Dessilla v. Fels* (1879), 40 L. T. R. 423.

§ 363a. As to the reasons which will weigh with the English court, in determining whether to issue a commission to a foreign court for taking evidence, see *Berdan v. Greenwood* (1880), 20 Ch. D. 764, note, Baggallay and Cotton; *Re Boyse, Crofton v. Crofton* (1882), 20 Ch. D. 760, Fry; *Lawson v. Vacuum Brake Co.* (1884), 27 Ch. D. 137, Baggallay, Cotton, Lindley, affirming Bacon; *Coch v. Allcock & Co.* (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 178, Esher, Lindley and Lopes affirming Field and Wills; *West v. Lord Sackville*, [1903] 2 Ch. 378, where it was desired to perpetuate testimony, Vaughan Williams, Romer and Stirling reversing Kekewich. And see *Jones's Divorce Bill*, [1899] A. C. 348.

An application by a defendant for such a commission will be more easily granted than one by a plaintiff who has chosen his own forum.

Ross v. Woodford, [1894] 1 Ch. 38, Chitty; *New v. Burns*, [1894] 43 W. R. 182, Lindley and A. L. Smith reversing Day.

§ 364. Where British consuls are not allowed by the *lex loci* to administer oaths, affidavits may be sworn before the local authorities.

Re Fawcus (1884), 9 P. D. 241, Hannen.

§ 365. An action for discovery only, in aid of proceedings in a foreign court, will not be entertained.

Dreyfus v. Peruvian Guano Company (1889), 41 Ch. D. 151, Kay.

§ 365a. *Security for Costs.* The rule is that a plaintiff ordinarily resident abroad must give security for costs: *Pray v. Edie* (1786), 1 T. R. 267, Buller; Jessel, in *Re Percy and Kelly Nickel Cobalt and Chrome Iron Mining Company*, 2 Ch. D. 531. But the court has a discretion "when the plaintiff's claim is founded on a judgment or order or on a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument" (Order LXV., rule 6 b, R. S. C., issued in 1920. It makes no difference that the action is on a foreign judgment pronounced in proceedings in which the defendant appeared: *Crozet v. Brogden*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 30, Lopes and Davey against Collins; or that the plaintiff sues as administrator of an estate situate within the jurisdiction; *Wheelan v. Irwin*, [1909] 1 I. R. 294, Meredith. Security need not be given if there is a co-plaintiff resident in England (*D'Hormusger v. Grey* (1882), 10 Q. B. D. 13), but otherwise if the co-plaintiff is an English attorney only joined by the foreign plaintiff to evade giving security: *Jones v. Gurney*, [1913] W. N. 72, Swinfen Eady. Where the claimant appears under a general inquiry, see *Re Milward & Co.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 405; *Re Pretoria-Pietersburg Railway Company*, [1904] 2 Ch. 359. Where a foreign creditor appeals against the acceptance or rejection of a proof by a trustee in bankruptcy, see *In re Semenza, ex parte Paget*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 15, Esher, Lopes, Kay; *Re Pilling, ex parte Chapman*, [1906] W. N. 99, Bigham. As to security against the costs of a defendant's counterclaim, see *Neck v. Taylor*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 560, *The James Westoll*, [1905] P. 47, and *New Fenix Compagnie Anonyme d'Assurances de Madrid v. General Accident Fire, Life and Assurance Corporation, Limited*, [1911] 2 K. B. 619, Vaughan Williams, Moulton, Farwell, overruling Lawrence. What security is sufficient: *Aldrich v. British Griffin Iron and Steel Company*, [1904] 2 K. B. 850. Security unnecessary: *Re Apollinaris Company's Trademarks*, [1891] 1 Ch. 1.

CHAPTER XIX.

CONCLUSION.

WE have now travelled through nearly all that can be found in the English precedents on the subject of this book. The exception is what relates to criminal jurisprudence and extradition, which were shown in the introduction to belong to private international law, but which for English purposes it would scarcely be convenient to include in one work with the civil part of the subject: moreover extradition has been exhaustively treated by Sir Edward Clarke. However, the authorities with regard to the bearing of foreign penal laws on property and personal capacity may be cited.

§ 366. It was said by Loughborough, delivering the judgment of the court in *Folliott v. Ogden* (1789), 1 H. Bl. 135, that the penal laws of a foreign country create no personal disability to sue in this, and affect only what can be seized by virtue of their authority; that a fugitive from them can maintain all his other rights by action in England. And this doctrine was repeated by Buller on the appeal—*Ogden v. Folliott* (1790), 3 T. R. 733 and by Ellenborough, delivering the judgment of the court in *Wolff v. Orholm* (1817), 6 M. & S. 99. It must therefore be deemed to be the doctrine received in England, and was referred to as such in § 16. But Grose in *Ogden v. Folliott*, 3 T. R. 735, reduced it within more reasonable limits, saying “that the penal laws of one country cannot affect the laws and rights of citizens of another.” See, too, *Rey v. Lecouturier*, [1910] A. C. 262, where it was held that a French law confiscating the property of religious associations could not affect the property of those associations outside France (*per* Lord Macnaghten at p. 265) and *Re Fried. Krupp*, [1917] 1 Ch. 185, Younger, where an ordinance passed in Germany during the war cancelling the liability for interest on debts due from Germans to British subjects was not recognized as valid by the English courts. The ordinance was opposed to Art. 23 (h) of The Hague Laws of War on Land as interpreted in Germany itself and was not conformable to the usage of nations and therefore could have no effect here. As affecting the property of its own subjects,

there seems to be no reason why the operation of a foreign penal law should not be admitted, always supposing that it is not one which shocks our national sense of right, as a penalty imposed for religious belief would do, or one to enforce which would be in fact to take a side in the internal politics of the foreign country. Even however should this view be accepted, it might still be considered contrary to public policy that where a fugitive from criminal justice had made his escape into British territory, and for any reason was not subject to extradition, he should be unable lawfully to contract the tie of marriage.

Taking now a general view of the ground thus travelled over, it will be seen that the English jurisprudence on private international law embodies the idea that the civilized world is a united whole, for the acquisition of rights such as modern society depends on; and that wherever, or under whatever system of law, such rights have been acquired, they should be maintained by our courts when they come before them. This indeed is the idea embodied in the jurisprudence of every civilized country on the subject, though the form of the embodiment is far from being everywhere the same. And so (reverting to the introduction at p. 21) it may be said that in England, if the notion of comity was ever radically different from that of justice, it has now been completely merged in the latter, and that the notion of a conflict of laws has again given place to that of determining the proper application of each territorial law, so that conflict between them may be precluded by the satisfactory determination of their respective fields. But while in this direction the subject has tended to revert to its older form, in another the departure from that form has been at least maintained. It would now be as idle as ever, perhaps more so, to regard the subject as governed by maxims of universal acceptance, unless one were content with maxims too vague to be of much practical use.

Nor does the prospect of arriving at a real international agreement on the subject, by means of doctrinal writing, seem at all more hopeful than at any previous time.* The directions in

* See, however, the *International Privatrecht* (Haarlem, 1915), of Professor Jitta, of Holland, and his recent study *La renovation du droit international sur la base d'une communauté juridique du genre humain* (La Haye, 1919), attempting to lay down the principles of private international law in a way which will render them acceptable by all countries.

which such a result might be sought for are either historical or theoretical. The only historical direction that any one could think of pursuing is that of the Roman law, not as directly applicable, for it belonged to an empire in which a practical unity of law had been established, but by starting from its rules on jurisdiction, and assuming that when the most appropriate jurisdiction for each case has been found, the law of that jurisdiction will be applied to it. But the tendency of modern legislation in most countries is towards the enlargement of jurisdiction, which is certainly not without its convenience in multiplying the means of redress, but is as certainly unfavourable to that manner of looking at the subject in which jurisdiction might come to be an accepted basis for law. And the only theoretical direction in which there seems to be much activity is that of determining the true law of each matter by the notion of sovereignty, which presents much analogy to Austin's analysis of national law; but the more the affairs which courts of justice have to deal with are examined, the more will it be doubted whether those notions, however accurate they may be as giving an account of facts, are capable of throwing any light on what the decision should be on points that have not yet taken their place among the facts of jurisprudence.

To the English practitioner the difficulty of arriving at an international agreement by doctrinal writing will have but little importance, considering on the one hand the binding authority of precedent in our system, and on the other the extent to which the subject is now covered by English decisions. Nevertheless the want of an agreement is a mischief to commerce and to all other social international relations, and the other method of remedying it, namely by international conventions confirmed where necessary by national statutes, would have seemed to be the one which England was especially called to promote. It must therefore be regarded as deplorable that, while the continent has become awake to the necessity of adopting it, England has thus far stood aloof from the conferences and conventions which have already given the results mentioned on p. 33. If we had joined, we might in the course of mutual concession have had to surrender some of the rules cherished by our lawyers, but the general equity of our jurisprudence is such that I cannot believe we should have had to surrender more than others.

INDEX.

PAGE

ABUSE OF PROCESS OF COURT,

jurisdiction not exercised in case of § 180 .. 237, 238

ACCOUNT,

action for, as to debts payable abroad § 226 .. 299, 300

of rents and profits of foreign land § 176 221

ADMINISTRATION, LETTERS OF *See* PROBATE AND LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ASSETS ON DEATH 105-155

alien enemies, by Public Trustee ... 116

breach of trust by foreign administrators § 100 ... 128

colonial grant § 70a ... 113

commission to foreign administrators § 109 134

consul, grant to § 79 116

creditor, grant to § 77 115

cum testamento annero ... 105*de bonis non*: § 66 111

debts, as to §§ 95, 95a, 160 125, 126, 209

declaration of court of last domicile conclusive § 60 ... 107, 108

different executors for English and foreign property § 72 ... 114

distribution of assets where deceased domiciled abroad § 105 ... 131, 132

English administrators liable for all assets received § 104 ... 131

grant of probate or administration necessary § 63 ... 109

to whom made §§ 65-68, 71-77

110, 111, 113-115

not necessary to maintain suit in

England § 64 ... 110

English law, principles as to 105-107

estate duty: §§ 112, 113a 136-140

for what English executors and administrators must account to
creditors §§ 103, 104 129-131

foreign assets brought into England liable to administration .

§§ 99, 103 128, 129

administrators cannot be sued in England if no breach

of trust: § 101 129

guardian, grant to § 76 115

heir, grant to § 75 115

heir with benefit of inventory, liability of: § 102 129

hotchpot, when heir must bring immovables into: § 121 147

how surplus after payment of debts is to be dealt with §§ 105,

106 131, 132

injunction to restrain proceedings abroad, as to: §§ 107, 108 ... 133, 134

interest charged against an administrator, rate of: § 119 146

legacy and residuary duty: §§ 114, 115 141, 142

legatees, grant to § 75 115

probate 105

negotiable instruments, as to: § 96 126

not granted if only foreign property: § 78 115, 116

next-of-kin, grant to: § 75 ... 115

principal and ancillary administrations 130

	PAGE
ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ASSETS ON DEATH—<i>cont.</i>	
priorities in payment of debts : §§ 110, 111	134, 135
probate and administration duties : §§ 112, 113, 113a	136-139
<i>And see PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.</i>	
property which passes under English grant : §§ 95, 103	125, 129
recoupment of debts by English personality to foreign immovables :	
§ 118	145, 146
retrospective law of last domicile · § 62	108
Scotland and Ireland, English grant as to property in : § 70 ...	112
surplus after payment of debts in case of intestacy goes by law	
of domicile : §§ 59, 120, 121	107, 147
assets, effect of will on : § 122	148
may be handed over to foreign administrators :	
§ 105	131, 132
where there is an action for administration : § 106 ..	132
when law of domicile refers to national law . § 60 .. .	107, 108
proceedings for administration abroad restrained . § § 107,	
108	133, 134
where no one entitled, grant to consul : § 79	116
will operates as to surplus by law of domicile : §§ 122, 125 ...	147, 153
ADMIRALTY ACTIONS <i>See SHIPS.</i>	
AFFIDAVIT,	
filed in foreign Court, proof of : § 361	412
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY,	
covenant to settle abroad · § 172	216
AGE,	
capacity according to, by personal law : § 2	40
AGENT,	
authority of : § 151	200
right of undisclosed principal to sue on contracts by : § 223	297, 298
service of writ on, when principal outside jurisdiction	239
ALIEN	
enemies, administration of estates of, by Public Trustee	116
contracts with	292
ALIENAGE,	
declaration of : §§ 289, 290	361, 362
ALLEGIANCE. <i>See BRITISH NATIONALITY</i>	
AMBASSADOR,	
appointment obtained for purpose of protection against creditors,	
effect of	266
extent of privilege	266
nationality of children of : § 281	355
proceedings against : § 194	263-266
service as, effect on domicile : § 194	264
servants of, who are	265
sovereign cannot be sued in name of ambassador	264
submission to jurisdiction by	264
waiver of privilege	265
AMERICAN LAW,	
as to movables	189, 190

APPEARANCE

under protest, England : § 181	240
abroad	389

APPOINTMENT. *See* POWER OF APPOINTMENT.

ARBITRATION,

agreement to refer to, of foreign court : § 331	397, 401
award in, enforcement of : § 331a	397
service out of jurisdiction of summons ..	247

ARMY,

domicile of officers . §§ 273-277	348-351
marriages abroad · § 31	67

ARREST,

governed by <i>lex fori</i> . § 345	405
---	-----

ASSIGNMENT OF CONTRACTS : §§ 236, 237 312

ATTACHMENT

of debt due to bankrupt . § 139	174
--	-----

ATTAINED PERSON,

capacity of, to contract marriage abroad ..	59
---	----

ATTORNEY OF EXECUTOR,

grant to	111
-------------------	-----

AUSTRIA,

code of 1811	26
--------------------	----

AUTHORITY

of foreign guardian : §§ 6, 7	45
guardian of estate : § 9	46, 47
master of ships	201, 296
parent over child . § 4	44

BANKRUPTCY, 156-182

concurrent bankruptcies · § 130	163, 165, 167
conditions for English adjudication : §§ 127, 130	163-165, 167
Continental views	156-160, 181
creditors who obtain payment out of foreign property, right to prove	175-180
curators. <i>See</i> Trustees.	
debtor compelled to pay by foreign law cannot be made to pay again : § 139	174
debtors who can be declared bankrupt : § 127	163-165
discharge in : §§ 240-242	316, 317
dividends received abroad must be brought into hotchpot : § 144	179
domicile of petitioning creditor immaterial : § 129	165, 166
double proof : § 146	180
English bankruptcy affects all movable property in British dominions : § 138	173, 174
creditors must refund payments obtained abroad : § 142	177
views	160-163

BANKRUPTCY—cont.

equities against the bankrupt's property : § 147	180
foreign assignee has no powers over English land : § 166	212
creditor, right to retain payments obtained abroad :	
§§ 141, 143	176-179
movables, how far affected by : § 140	174-176
property in hands of trustee § 147	180
foreigner departing out of England, when an act of bankruptcy	167
French law as to	159, 160, 162, 163, 181
German law as to	157-159, 181
immovable property abroad, bankrupt cannot be compelled to	
assign : § 140	174-176
jurisdiction of English courts § 127	163-165
minor, of	41
partner in business in England not trading in England	165
payments from foreign partners of English debtor : § 145	179, 180
out of foreign immovables may be retained . § 141 ..	176, 177
movables : §§ 142, 143	177
pending proceeding in another country . § 130	167
petition by person not domiciled in England : § 128	165
position in England of curators under foreign bankruptcy :	
§§ 134-136	169-171
presence of debtor in England immaterial	166
property within the British dominions : § 137	172, 173
receiver, rights of against foreign creditors	179
Savigny's views	156, 157
Scotch law as to	170, 171
set-off : § 346	405
staying proceedings on ground of prior adjudication in another	
country : § 130	167
trustees appointed by the court of the domicile entitled to	
English assets : § 134	169-171
foreign, when accountable in England . § 136	171
title may be dependent on a particular form of convey-	
ance : § 135	171
unity and universality	156, 161
what property passes by English bankruptcy or winding-up :	
§§ 137-140	172-176
when creditors of English bankrupt may retain payments	
received abroad : §§ 141-145	176-180

BAR, VON,	
views on domicile and nationality	32, 33

BARRISTER,	
right of, to sue for fees, depends on his bar	295

BARTOLUS	16-17
-----------------------	-------

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES,

acceptance or making : § 229	304
acceptor, liability of : § 230	304, 305
Bills of Exchange Act : § 227	301, 302
damages and re-exchange : § 234	307, 308
days of grace : § 229	304
demand, protest, and notice : §§ 231, 232	305-307
dishonour, re-exchange on : § 234	307, 308
drawer, position of : § 230	304, 305
drawing : §§ 227, 230, 233	301, 302, 304, 305, 307

	PAGE
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES—cont	
forms § 228	303
gaming contracts, in respect of §§ 215, 229	293, 304
Hague conventions as to	31 (n) 43 300
indorsement § 228	303
instrument signed in one country and sent to another § 233	38 39 307
invalid by its proper law cannot be made valid by <i>lex fori</i>	
§ 213	291
legality of consideration	288, 293
notice of dishonour § 232	306, 307
payment, duties as to § 229	304
promissory notes payable to bearer § 229	304
protest §§ 231, 233	305, 307
re exchange on dishonour § 234	307, 308
<i>situs</i> of § 154a	204
special procedure as to § 344	405
stamps on	282, 283, 301, 303
transfer of § 154a	204
uniformity of law of proposals as to	31 (n)
validity as regards form § 227	301, 302
BILLS OF SALE,	
operation of Bills of Sale Acts in Scotland and Ireland	199
BIRTH	
as a foundation of nationality	355, 356
BONA VACANTIA,	
do not follow the law of the domicile § 121a	148
BOTTOMRY,	
contracts of	296
BOULLENOIS,	
as to <i>lex loci contractus</i>	233
evidence of contract	280
BRITISH NATIONALITY,	
acquisition of § 284	358, 359
in dominions or colonies	360
capitulations in country subject to	356
ambassadors children § 281	355
declaration of alienage §§ 289, 290	361, 362
during war § 289a	361
denization § 285	359
expatriation §§ 291-293	362
during war § 291a	362
in cases of cession of territory §§ 298, 299	364
personal union between kingdoms and the dissolution of such union § 300	364-365
mandate in country subject to	356
married woman § 294	362 363
minor children §§ 295-297	363, 364
natural born subjects at common law §§ 280, 281	355
by statute §§ 282, 283	355-358
naturalization <i>See</i> NATURALIZATION	
readmission to British Nationality § 287	360
widows § 294a	363
BRITISH PROTECTORATES,	
Foreign Marriages Act applies to § 30	66
nationality of children born in	356

	PAGE
BROCHER,	
views as to <i>forum delicti</i>	268
BURGUNDUS	18, 163
BUSINESS,	
right of foreign corporations to carry on, in England : § 306 ...	373-376
CAPACITY,	
as depending on age, whether referring to personal law or to special law of transaction : § 2	40-44
on coverture · § 3	44
foreign penal or religious incapacity : § 16	50
immovables : § 165a	212
<i>lex loci contractus</i> as to	43, 57
married woman, of : § 3	44
modified capacity is one entire institution · § 15	49, 50
to appoint a guardian	41
contract marriage : §§ 19, 21, and <i>see</i> MARRIAGE	42, 57
give receipts	42
CARGO,	
service on : § 183	243
CARRIER,	
contract of . § 222	297
CESSIO BONORUM. <i>See</i> BANKRUPTCY.	
CESSION OF TERRITORY,	
effect on nationality . §§ 298, 299	364
CHAMPERTY,	
foreign contract involving	294
CHANGE OF DOMICILE. <i>See</i> DOMICILE, CHANGE OF.	
CHARITIES,	
validity of gifts to, what law applicable	149
CHARITIES, FOREIGN : § 301	371
CHATELLÈNIE	15
CHEQUE,	
<i>See</i> BILLS OF EXCHANGE.	
CHILD,	
meaning of, in will : § 126	155
CHINA,	
acquisition of domicile in	325, 328
CHOSE IN ACTION,	
assignment of : § 152	201-208
CITATION	
for restitution of conjugal rights, rules for service of	92
CIVIS,	
meaning of, in Roman law	227 (n)
CLOG ON EQUITY OF REDEMPTION	
of land abroad : § 172	216-218

	PAGE
CODE NAPOLEON,	
debts	126
foreigners in France	24-26
<i>forum actoris</i>	387
<i>contractus</i>	283
movables	187, 188
public order and morals	51
status of Frenchmen abroad	25, 26
substitutions under	142
succession to movables	106
CODICIL,	
whether a document is a will or codicil . § 84	118
COLLISION AT SEA	272-278
compulsory pilotage : § 204	277
exemption of owners from liability : § 203	277
limitation of liability : §§ 202, 202a	274-277
rule of road : § 205	277, 278
COLONIES,	
act of indemnity in, effect of	269
bankruptcy discharge in . § 242	317
Colonial Probates Act, 1892 : § 70a	113
effect of English bankruptcy on land in . § 137 ..	172, 173
deeds of arrangement in . § 242a	317
Governments of, cannot be sued under Order XI.	258
ships of, belong to Crown	258
judgments in, enforcement of . § 326b ..	390
marriages in, under Foreign Marriages Act, 1892 . § 30 ..	66, 67
naturalization in . § 288 ..	360
COMITY	15, 20
COMMISSION	
payable to foreign administrator . § 109	184
to examine witnesses abroad § 363a	412
COMMITTEE OF LUNATIC <i>See</i> GUARDIANSHIP OF INFANTS AND LUNATICS.	
COMPANIES,	
arrangement deed does not bind foreign creditors . § 242a	317
contract to take shares in	383
between shareholders : § 223a	298
courts will not interfere with internal affairs of foreign : § 302 ...	371
foreign, deeds of, need not be under seal	373
liability of members of : §§ 308, 327	376, 391, 392
<i>And see</i> CORPORATIONS; WINDING UP OF COMPANIES	
COMPETENCE. <i>See</i> JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS.	
COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS,	
Ireland, in, effect of, on proceedings in England : § 242b	318
CONFIRMATION	
of executors appointed in Scotland or Ireland : § 70	112, 113
effect on English leaseholds .	
§ 164	211

	PAGE
CONJUGAL RIGHTS,	
determined by <i>lex fori</i> : § 33	68
restitution of: § 48	91, 92
CONQUERING STATE,	
liabilities of	261
CONSEIL JUDICIAIRE,	
not recognised in England. § 15	49, 50
CONSENT,	
of parents, &c, necessary for valid marriage §§ 18, 25 ...	56, 59-63
where it is a matter of form. § 23	59
CONSTRUCTION	
of wills	149-152
by a law other than that of the domicile according to	
testator's intention	152
CONSUL,	
grant of administration to foreign § 79	116
not entitled to privileges of ambassadors. § 195	266
oaths before. § 364	413
service as, effect on domicile § 274 ...	349
CONSULAR COURTS,	
jurisdiction of. § 195 .	266
CONTRACTS,	
alien enemies, with	292
conflicting with English policy or public morals. § 215	293
contemplating breach of English law. § 214	292
contract illegal by its own law: § 213 ...	291
contracts by letters or telegrams. § 224	298
discharge of, by bankruptcy §§ 240-242 .	316-318
effect of	285-290
in England of English formalities observed abroad. § 210	283
evidence governed by <i>lex loci contractus celebrati</i> : § 208	280, 281
exchange: § 226	299, 300
foreign land, as to. § 172	216-218
formalities governed by <i>lex loci contractus celebrati</i> : §§ 207, 209	280-281
where accidental in place where made. § 210	283
general average. § 220	296, 297
illegality of: § 213	291
immovables, as to. §§ 172, 216	216-218, 294
impossibility of performance, effect of. § 213a .	291, 292
intention as a guide to interpretation ..	283-285
interest: § 225 ..	299
interpretation: § 211 ..	80, 283-285
as distinguished from effect of	283-285
letters, by: § 224 .	298
married women, by	44
monopolies. § 217	294
obligations <i>quasi ex contractu</i> : § 235	308, 309
of affreightment: § 219	295, 296
agency: § 223	297, 298
carriage: § 222	297
marine insurance: § 221	297
marriage: §§ 212, 224	298

	PAGE
CONTRACTS—cont	
of sale of goods § 223b	298
service § 218	295
place of when made by post § 224	298
restraint of trade	294
revolution abroad in aid of void	291
stamps on necessity for	281 283
subject to English law of evidence § 208	280 281
tacit on marriage	72 73
to be performed within the jurisdiction what is	244 248-250
validity and effects laws of place of contract and of place of fulfilment §§ 207 209 211 212	280-282 285 290
violating English law § 214	292
a monopoly § 217	294
<i>And see</i> BANKRUPTCY BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES LIMITATION STATUTES OF TRANSFER OF OBLIGATIONS	
CONVENTION See <i>Hague Conventions</i>	
CONVERSION	
of land into money effect of § 158	208 209
CONVEYANCE OF IMMOVABLES	
form of § 169	213-215
CONVICTION	
in foreign court not conclusive of facts § 328	393 395
CORPORATIONS	
in Roman law	367
CORPORATIONS ENGLISH,	
income tax § 304	372 373
CORPORATIONS FOREIGN,	
actions by § 305	373
charitable effect of gift to § 301	370 371
domicile of	368
identity of	373
income tax § 303	372
internal disputes English court will not interfere in § 302	371
liability of members § 308	376
service on §§ 309 310	376-378
<i>siège social</i> of	368 370
their personal rights protected § 307	376
whether they may carry on business in England § 306	373-376
COSTS	
security for by plaintiff resident abroad § 365a	413
<i>And see</i> PROCEDURE	
COVERTURE See <i>MARRIAGE</i>	
CREDITORS	
grant of administration to § 77	115
priorities of §§ 110 111	184 185 406 407
determined by <i>lex fori</i> § 351	406 407

	PAGE
CRIMES ON BRITISH SHIPS	204
CROWN, deemed to be present in every part of British dominions : § 177...221, 222	
CURATORS.— <i>See</i> BANKRUPTCY; TRUSTEES.	
CURATORSHIP. <i>See</i> GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND LUNATICS	
CURRENCY	
in which legacies payable	151
in contracts relating to immovables ..	215
rate of exchange, date of reckoning ...	299
DAMAGES	
breach of contract or tort, assessment of, in foreign currency	
§ 226	299, 300
D'ARGENTRÉ,	
views on <i>lex situs</i>	17, 18
legitimation	223, 224
DEATH DUTIES. §§ 112-117	136-145
<i>And see</i> DUTY.	
DEBTS,	
assets, out of which payable ...	145, 146
assignment of · § 152 ..	201-203
foreign judgments are ...	380
incidence of, as to immovables by <i>lex situs</i> · § 162 ...	210
of a deceased person, jurisdiction to sue · § 95a ...	126
priority of payment in administration on death · §§ 110, 111 .	134, 135
in bankruptcy : § 148	180
rate of exchange · § 226 ..	299, 300
receipt of administrator for · § 98	127
secured on immovable, <i>lex situs</i> determines whether immovable ·	
§ 160	209, 210
when debt is void by <i>lex loci contractus</i> ·	
§ 163	210
separate securities for, effect of : § 161 ...	210
<i>situs</i> of · 152	201, 203
DEFINITION	
of private international law	1
DENIZATION · § 285 . . .	359
DELICTS. <i>See</i> TORTS.	
DESERTION,	
when a ground for jurisdiction in divorce : § 46	88, 89
restitution of conjugal rights ...	92
DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATIONS	
by bankruptcy	316, 317
DISCOVERY	
against foreign plaintiff	240
sovereign	260
in aid of foreign proceedings : § 365	413

	PAGE
DIVORCE AND OTHER MATRIMONIAL CAUSES,	
cause for divorce depends on <i>lex fori</i> : § 52	94-99
insufficiency by English law, effect of	95-97
contract facilitating	294
declaration of nullity or jactitation of marriage · § 49	92, 93
desertion gives jurisdiction to courts other than those of domicile · § 46	88, 89
English jurisdiction for divorce § 43	84, 85
given by domicile: § 44	85, 86
foreign jurisdiction for divorce when regarded in England as sufficient: § 51	94
Hague Conventions as to	98, 99
history of the law of	83-85
jurisdiction for divorce	84-99
judicial separation · § 47	90, 91
maintenance orders, enforcement of, in British Dominions	379
<i>mensâ et toro</i> . See JUDICIAL SEPARATION	
Moslem law, in accordance with	86, 87
place where marriage contracted of no importance to English jurisdiction for divorce · § 43	84, 85
adultery committed immaterial	84
procedure and practice in · § 189	254
remarriage after, depends on law of place where declared ...	88
residence and domicile	85-87
restitution of conjugal rights · § 48	91, 92
service out of the jurisdiction, in case of · § 189	254
of citation · § 48	92
variation of settlements in	79
DOMESTIC SERVANT	
of ambassador, who is	265, 266
DOMICILE,	
Anglo-Indian, Anglo-Turkish, etc., domiciles § 243	321-330
how acquired: §§ 265, 275	345, 349, 350
Austrian law	26
birth, effect of on	331
change of domicile of persons <i>sui juris</i>	
Anglo-Indian domicile, general doctrine	321, 323, 324
Anglo-Turkish	321, 323, 325, 327, 328
acts evidence: § 267	346
at death, as to succession · § 59	107
burden of proof · §§ 262, 263	344
change to domicile politically foreign § 263	344
death <i>in itinere</i> · § 260	343
declarations evidence · § 266	345, 346
doctrine of <i>Moorhouse v. Lord</i>	335-339, 344, 345
effect on matrimonial property · § 36a	72-76
on marriage contracts	81
evidence of intention; § 266	345, 346
fugitive criminal, of: § 272a	348
intention and fact · §§ 256-261	335-343
of return: § 264	344
last domicile as to succession	107, 108
motive immaterial	342
reverter of domicile of origin · § 260	343
service under Crown, effect of: §§ 275-278	349-352
to or from a country where authority of government is necessary, or where political nationality and not domicile is important: §§ 254, 255	334, 335
of persons not <i>sui juris</i> , minors	331-333

DOMICILE—*cont.*

choice of. <i>See</i> change of.	
conflict with nationality as basis of law	23, 70, 71
corporations, of	368-373
criterion of personal law. § 1	24, 40
French law	24, 26
definitions of	320
domicile of origin, general doctrine: § 244	330
Eastern countries, in	321-330
fugitive from justice, of: § 272a	348
guardians, power over. § 250	332
illegitimate children, of §§ 58a, 246	104, 331
infants, of	331-333
judicial separation, effect on: § 253	333, 334
last domicile as to succession	107, 108
validity of wills. § 85	118, 119
legitimated children § 247	331
lunatics §§ 251, 252	333
married women. § 253	333, 334
matrimonial. § 36	72
<i>And see</i> MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE	
must be in a territory § 243	329, 330
of origin	330, 338
reverts on abandonment of domicile of choice	343
personal law founded on. § 1	40
political refugee, of § 279	352
public service, effect of §§ 273-278	348-352
residence as a proof of intention	342, 343
reverter of domicile of origin	343
Roman law as to. § 256	319, 335
special criteria: §§ 268-272	346, 347
succession to movables governed by. §§ 59, 62	107, 108
trade domicile in time of war	352, 369, 370
unity of	337
what is, when changed during infancy	331-333
extraction known. §§ 245-247	331
unknown: § 248	331
wife, of: § 253	333, 334

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA,

rules of gifts <i>inter vivos</i> applied to § 121b	148
validity of, what law applicable to	199

DUMOULIN 15, 17, 70, 71, 76, 173, 233

DUTY,

debts, upon	203
estate: §§ 112-113a	136-139
goodwill, on. § 154b	205
legacy duty	136
on a rent-charge. § 159	209
proceeds of sale of partnership assets	209
on marketable securities	204
paid abroad, when to be paid out of residue. § 117	144
patents, on	205
personal obligation, on	205
probate: §§ 112-113a	136-139
in case of British ships abroad	126
succession: §§ 112, 116	136, 141-144
on share of child legitimated by subsequent marriage abroad: § 56	103

	PAGE
EASTERN COUNTRIES,	
acquisition of domicile in	321-330
maxims of international law not applicable to	56 61
EGYPT,	
domicile in	321-323
ELECTION	
under a will §§ 125-125b	153 154
two wills read as one § 125	153
EMBASSIES	
marriages at §§ 27 29	63 65 66
under Foreign Marriage Act §§ 28 30	64-67
ENEMIES See ALIEN	
EVIDENCE See PROCEDURE	
EXCHANGE	
rate of on judgment § 226	299 300
EXECUTOR See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION	
EXPATRIATION	361 362
EXPERT EVIDENCE,	
as to foreign law §§ 356 358	408-410
who are considered experts § 357	409, 410
EXTERRITORIALITY	256-266
ambassadors	263-266
cases of fund to be distributed and of agency for foreign state or sovereign § 193	262, 263
diplomatic immunity § 194	263-266
foreign states and sovereigns not suable on obligations §§ 190, 191	256-264
must do complete justice § 192	259-261
EXTINCTION OF OBLIGATIONS	313-318
by bankruptcy	316, 317
FEUDALISM,	
effect on law	15
FIRM See PARTNERSHIP	
FLAG,	
law of	274 295 296
And see SHIPS	
FELIX,	
as to movables	187
FORECLOSURE,	
of mortgages of foreign land § 174	219, 220
service of writ, in case of	245

	PAGE
FOREIGN	
administrator or executor, rights in England . §§ 63, 99	109, 128
when his title has expired : § 73	114
assets brought into England liable to administration : § 99 ...	128
currency. <i>See</i> CURRENCY.	
divorce, when recognised	94
grant of administration unnecessary · § 64	110
guardian, authority of : §§ 6, 7	45
<i>And see</i> GUARDIANS.	
grant of administration to : § 76	115
Marriage Act, 1892 : §§ 28, 30	64-67
minors. <i>See</i> MINORS.	
language, translation of wills : § 82	117, 118
lunatics. <i>See</i> LUNATICS.	
FOREIGN JUDGMENT. <i>See</i> JUDGMENT, FOREIGN.	
FOREIGN LAND. <i>See</i> IMMOVABLES.	
FOREIGN LAW,	
as to succession	106
invalidity of marriage for want of proper consent : § 24	59
validity of will, only conclusive as to requirements of the	
foreign law : § 81	117
case may be sent to another British court to ascertain : § 359 ...	411
foreign court : § 360 ..	411
experts, proved by . § 356	408, 409
how proved	407-411
interpretation of : § 358	410, 411
presumed to be the same as English : § 353	407
proceedings suspended for determination by foreign court · § 350	406
proved afresh every time . § 355	408
question of fact for the jury · § 354	408
FOREIGN MARRIAGE ACT 65-67	
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS <i>See</i> SOVEREIGNS.	
FORM,	
marriage settlement, of : § 37	76
of contracts	280, 281
of marriage : §§ 17, 20, 26	55, 57, 63
FORUM,	
<i>actoris</i> : § 324	387
<i>concursum</i>	5
<i>contractus</i>	5, 286, 384, 386
in middle ages	231-233
Roman law	227, 230, 232, 233, 286
<i>delicti</i>	5, 230, 267, 268, 274
<i>domicilii</i>	227, 230
of a debt : § 152	201-203
<i>originis</i>	227
<i>rei</i>	5, 6, 226, 234, 256, 267, 268, 384
<i>rei sitae</i>	5, 230, 256, 259
<i>situs</i>	5
<i>speciale obligationis</i> : § 322	5, 6, 385-387

FRANCE, LAW OF. *See* CODE NAPOLEON.

as to bankruptcy	169, 162, 163, 181
domicile of trading corporation	370
movables	186
<i>forum contractus</i>	232, 233
in the dark ages	15
nationality and domicile as criteria of personal law	24-26
<i>res judicata</i>	24, 393
<i>status</i> of Frenchmen and foreigners	25, 26

FRAUD,

judgment obtained by fraud . § 330	396
person induced to come within the jurisdiction by . § 180	238

FREIGHT,

contracts as to : § 219	295, 296
-------------------------------	----------

FUNDS IN COURT,

service out of jurisdiction	254
of notice on foreign sovereigns § 193	262, 263

GAMING CONTRACTS . § 215	293
negotiable instrument given in payment . § 215	293

GARNISHEE ORDER

for foreign debt	203, 387
-------------------------	----------

GENERAL AVERAGE . § 220	296, 297
-------------------------------	----------

GERMANY,

service of writs in	252
----------------------------	-----

GERMANY, LAW OF,

as to <i>forum contractus</i>	232
<i>renvoi</i>	31-33
bankruptcy	157-159, 181
civil code	31
marriage	53-55
movables	186, 188, 189
nationality adopted as <i>criterion</i> of personal law	31
<i>res judicata</i>	392

GERMANIC LAW	12, 13
--------------------	--------

GLOSS

of the <i>Corpus Juris</i>	13
-----------------------------------	----

GOODWILL,

<i>situs</i> of and duty on : § 154b	205
--	-----

GROTIUS,

views of, as to <i>lex fori</i>	18, 19
---------------------------------------	--------

GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND LUNATICS,

British subject, over : § 8	46
<i>conseil judiciaire</i> not recognised in England : § 15	49, 50
consent to marriages of minors, when necessary : §§ 18, 23-25	

	PAGE
GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND LUNATICS— <i>cont.</i>	
discretion of court : § 9	46-48
domicile, change of, by guardian § 250	332
of father fixes guardianship · § 250	332
English legislation and jurisdiction not generally applicable on foreign finding of lunacy : §§ 13, 14	48, 49
foreign guardians have no power over English land : § 166 ...	212
guardian <i>ad litem</i> of infant abroad . § 8	46
of estate recognised . § 9	46-48
Hague Conventions as to	33 & <i>n.</i>
payment out of court to foreign guardian or committee : § 12 ..	48
person, power to appoint, guardian of § 6	45
power of English court as to estate in foreign guardianship . §§ 10-12	47, 48
foreign guardians of estate § 9	46-48
English court as to British minors domiciled abroad : § 8	46
as to foreign minors and lunatics · § 5	44, 45
where property under control of the court §§ 10, 12 ..	47, 48
HAGUE CONVENTIONS	
as to bills of exchange	31 <i>n.</i> , 43
as to divorce and matrimonial causes	98, 99
as to guardianship of minors and lunatics	33 & <i>n.</i>
as to marriage	54, 55
sanction of rules of	4
HEIR	
born in wedlock to inherit English real estate, must be § 178	222-224
liability of foreign . § 102	129
probate granted to foreign § 74	114
HERITABLE BONDS . § 160	210
HOTCHPOT,	
when immovables must be brought into · § 121	147
HUSBAND AND WIFE,	
rights of property . § 36	72
how affected by change of domicile · § 36 <i>a</i>	72-76
ILLEGITIMACY See LEGITIMACY.	
IMMOVABLES	207-224
action for trespass to foreign soil	254, 255
appurtenances, whether they pass	216
birth after actual marriage necessary to inheritable blood for English real estate : §§ 178-179	222-224
burdens to be borne by, depend entirely on <i>lex situs</i> : § 162 ...	210
capacity as affecting . § 165 <i>a</i>	212
construction of instruments relating to · §§ 165 <i>b</i> , 170 ...	212, 215, 216
contracts and equities as to foreign land : §§ 172, 175 .	216-218, 220, 221
contracts as to : § 216	204
debt secured upon, whether immovable : § 160	209, 210
effect of separate securities for : § 161 ...	210
void contracts : § 163	210

IMMOVABLES—*cont.*

English real estate affected only by English law and jurisdiction .	
§§ 166-169	212-215
heir to, must be born in wedlock . § 178	222-224
vests in executors since Land Transfer Act, 1897 . . .	105
foreign land :—	
account of rents and profits of : § 176 ..	221
contracts and equities as to : § 172	216-218
declaration of title as to . § 173	218
mixed with movables . § 173	218, 219
whether owner of, bound by notice of equities . § 175 . . .	220, 221
will of	215
governed by <i>lex situs</i> . § 156	208
government not suable in England in respect of non-English though British land . § 177 ..	221, 222
foreign guardian, curator, &c , authority of, over English land :	
§ 166	212
heritable bonds ..	210
how affected by debts or legacies § 162	210
intestate succession : §§ 166, 178	213, 222-224
limited interests in land are . § 157 ..	208
marriage, effect of . §§ 35, 167	72, 212, 213
money to be laid out on land . § 158 ...	208
prescription . § 171 ..	216
proceeds of sale of . § 158 ...	208, 209
redemption and foreclosure of foreign mortgages . § 174	219, 220
rentcharge issuing out of land is . § 159 ...	209
restraint on disposition : § 165	211, 212
security given for a debt void by the <i>lei loci contractus</i> § 163	210
transfer of, form § 169	213-215
terms of years § 164 ...	211
trespass ..	254, 255
what interests are immovables . §§ 157, 161, 164 ...	208, 210, 211
when personal jurisdiction may be exercised over proprietor of foreign immovables in matters concerning them, and what law will determine . § 172 ..	216-218
will, of, form of § 169	213-215

IMPOSSIBILITY

of local form of marriage § 26	63
-------------------------------------	----

INCAPACITY,

penal or religious not recognised : § 16 ...	50
--	----

INCOME-TAX.

English corporations : § 304	372, 373
foreign corporations . § 303	372
payable by trustees in respect of foreign dividends .	144

INCORPORATION

of company. <i>See</i> CORPORATIONS	
of foreign will with English will : § 78 ...	115, 116

INDIA.

domicile in ..	323, 324, 328, 329
personal law in,	1 (n), 12

INFANTS *See* GUARDIANSHIP; MINORS.

	PAGE
INJUNCTION	
against foreigners in England: § 201	272
foreign sovereign	263
service out of jurisdiction, in claims for ..	245
to restrain proceedings abroad: §§ 107, 108	183, 184
foreclosure of mortgage of foreign land	220
INSOLVENCY. <i>See</i> BANKRUPTCY.	
INSURANCE,	
assignment of policies	203
marine: § 221	297
recovery of, without English grant of probate or administration .	
§ 63	109
INSURANCE COMPANY,	
Act of Parliament, meaning of, in: § 310a	378
INTENTION,	
as a guide to interpretation of contracts	283-285
settlements . § 39	78, 79
wills	149-152
INTEREST	
in judgment abroad: § 225	299
on money tortiously used abroad . § 206	279
rate of: § 225	299
charged against administrator . § 119 ...	146
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT	
as to private international law	415, 416
INTERNATIONAL COURT	
under League of Nations; enforcement of international law by	3
INTERPRETATION	
of contracts	80, 283-285
of marriage settlements	76-81
INTESTACY. <i>See</i> SUCCESSION.	
IRELAND,	
arrangement with creditors . § 242b	318
discharge in bankruptcy, effect of, in: § 242	317
IRISH LAW,	
how far dealt with	40
ITALY, LAW OF,	
code of 1866	27-31
immovables, as to	207
marriage, as to form of	54
nationality criterion of personal law	27
proof of contracts	280
public order and morals, as to	51
succession	107
JACTITATION OF MARRIAGE,	
jurisdiction: § 49	92, 98

	PAGE
JEWISH LAW,	
legitimation, as to, not recognised in England	101
marriage, as to, only recognised as to form and not as to capacity	58
JUDGMENTS, ENGLISH,	
debt payable abroad, amount fixed by rate of exchange : § 226 ...	299, 300
JUDGMENTS, FOREIGN,	
are conclusive proof of claim decided . § 328	393-395
barred by English statute of limitations by confession : § 331	397
cause of action not merged § 332	397
competence of foreign court :—	
admitted by suing in it § 325	387, 388
elected domicile §§ 319a, 320	383, 384
forum of defendant : § 321	384, 385
contract . § 322	385-387
plaintiff . § 324	387
internal competence immaterial . § 319	383
possession of property a ground of competence . § 323 ...	387
whether admitted by defending in it § 326 ...	388, 389
where shareholders liable on company's contracts . § 327 .	391, 392
conclusive abroad are conclusive in England : § 333	398
conviction for crime not conclusive § 328	395
costs, to pay . §§ 316, 317	382
debts, reduction into possession by : § 97	127
effect of, in England	392-398
enforcement of, in British Empire . § 326b	390
against company § 327	391
how enforced : §§ 311-313	379-381
what judgments enforceable : §§ 315-318 ...	381, 382
erroneous application of English law : § 329	395, 396
executory, how declared	380
fraud a defence . § 330	396
how proved : § 361	412
how far <i>res judicata</i> extends . § 337	398, 399
injunction to restrain further proceedings after § 334	398
<i>in rem</i> . §§ 149, 312	195-197, 380
<i>in personam</i> . § 314	381
interest on	299
irregularity of procedure does not affect validity of . § 327a	392, 393
is a new cause of action . § 311	379
judgment on confession or submission : § 331	397
justice of, how far examinable in England	392-397
liquidated sum, must be for . § 318	382
not examinable when court competent : §§ 328, 329	393-396
of divorce : § 51	94
of marriage . § 340	402, 403
payment into court, for : § 315	381
penal, cannot be enforced : § 318b	382
pending appeal . § 314	381
pleaded by defendant, open to question as to competence . § 335	398
proper consents : § 24	59
repugnant to general notions of justice	392, 394
<i>res judicata</i> pleaded by defendant : § 327a	392, 398
as applying to all points in the litigation : § 337 ...	398, 399
same facts may give another cause of action in	
England : § 336	398
submission to arbitration, effect of : § 331	397
validity of will as to : § 81	117

	PAGE
JUDICIAL SEPARATION,	
effect on domicile of wife : § 253	383, 384
Hague Convention as to	98, 99
history of the law of	83
jurisdiction to grant : § 47	90, 91
JURISDICTION, ENGLISH,	
as dependent on venue	235
by service of writ or of notice of the writ out of the jurisdiction : § 186	244-252
by substituted service, and by the substitution of notice for service : § 181	238-240
by personal service within the jurisdiction : §§ 180, 181	237-241
exception in case of fraud : § 180	238
where abuse of process of court : § 180	238
general view	234-237
in bankruptcy : § 127	163-165
in divorce and other matrimonial causes : § 189	254
in the case of a firm : § 128	241
lunatics, not exercised unless so found in England . § 14	49
ships removed out of the jurisdiction	243
third party notices . § 187	253
in the Court of Admiralty : § 185	243
on high seas	275-278
submission to, effect of	240, 248, 389
effect of appearance under protest	240
foreign sovereign, by	260
JURISDICTION,	
general view	225-236
meaning of	5
Roman law	225-232
JUS GENTIUM	10, 185
LAND. See IMMOVABLES.	
LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897	105, 213
LAPSE OF LEGACY	
depends on law of last domicile	148
LAW,	
meaning of	1
of nature	1
LAW MARITIME,	
same in Scotland and England	194 (n)
what it means, and its application in England	191-194, 273-276
And see EXTERRITORIALITY; IMMOVABLES; SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION.	
LEAGUE OF NATIONS,	
proposals of, to enforce international law	8
LEASEHOLDS,	
form of transfer of : § 169	213
will of	213, 214

LEASEHOLDS—cont.

are immovables : § 164	211
powers of foreign executor over : § 164	211
succession to : §§ 114, 115	140, 141

LEGACY,

currency in which payable	151
of effects in a certain country	151
in satisfaction of a debt	151
lapse of	148
to charitable or superstitious uses	149

LEGACY DUTY. See DUTY.**LEGISLATION**

does not apply to foreign lunatics without express words : § 13 ...	48
---	----

LEGITIM,

right to, depends on last domicile : § 122	148
--	-----

LEGITIMACY,

as depending on marriage after divorce . § 53	101
depends on domicile of parents at birth : § 58a	104
illegitimate children entitled abroad to succeed as such, not legitimate in England . § 58	103
jurisdiction as to	99, 100

LEGITIMATION PER SUBSEQUENS MATRIMONIUM 100-104

does not confer inheritable blood for English real estate §§ 178, 179	222-224
effect of naturalization : § 57	103
Jewish law not recognised in England	101
makes one a "child" within the meaning of the Statute of Distributions : § 126 154, 155 of the British Legacy and Succession Duty Acts : § 56 103 of a devise under an English will .. 155	
personal law of father, at dates both of birth and of marriage, must allow it §§ 54, 55	101, 102
Savigny's views as to	102
political nationality : § 57	103

LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. See PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.**LETTERS OF REQUEST**

from foreign tribunals : § 186	247
--------------------------------------	-----

LEX FORI: §§ 341-352 6, 8, 403-407

as to admissibility of a will not in accordance with the law of the domicile : § 124	152, 153
as to evidence required to prove a contract : § 208	280, 281
as to lien on chose in action	202
as to transfer and extinction of obligations	312-318
determines conjugal rights : § 33	68
illegality of contract by : § 213	291
procedure governed by : §§ 341-352	404-407

	PAGE
<i>LEX LOCI ACTUS</i>	
as to contracts	286
as to wills § 87	120
defined	8
when form impossible § 26	63
<i>LEX LOCI CONCURSUS,</i>	
applied to priority of debts § 110	6 8 9 134
<i>LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS</i>	6
as governing capacity	43
domicile of elected § 320	383
formalities of contracts §§ 207 208	280 281
sale of ships	191-194
transfer of obligations	311 312
<i>LEX LOCI DELICTI COMMISSI</i> See <i>FORUM DELICTI</i>	6
<i>LEX SITUS</i>	6
applied to immovables	207-224
recovery of debts	203
restraint on anticipation	203
ships	198 199 201
transfer of movables § 150	197 200
in case of bills of sale	199
goodwill patents § 154b	205
pledge	200
shares	205
liability of agent	200
<i>LIBEL</i>	
in Ireland or Scotland	250
in a foreign country privileged	269
<i>LIEN</i>	
maritime against foreign sovereign	260
on a chose in action	202
on land is immovable § 157	208
<i>LIMITATION STATUTES OF,</i>	
as to immovables governed by <i>lex situs</i> § 171	216
continental views as to	314 315
foreign judgments effect on § 318a	382
obligations governed by English law §§ 238 239	313-315
<i>LIS PENDENS,</i>	
where English suit first § 339	402
foreign suit first § 338	399-402
<i>LOCAL AND TRANSITORY ACTIONS</i>	285 236
<i>LORD CAMPBELL S ACT,</i>	
foreigners can claim benefit of § 200a	272
<i>LORD KINGSDOWN S ACT</i> §§ 85 87 88	118-120
as to leaseholds	213-214
as to wills executed under a power § 91	122
construction of wills effect on	150
how far confined to British subjects	119
only one law at a time under § 90	121

	PAGE
LUNATICS See GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND LUNATICS	
domicile of §§ 251 252	333
jurisdiction not exercised unless enquiry be made in England § 14	49
MAJORITY	
age of whether referred to personal law or to special law of transaction § 2	40-48
MARINE INSURANCE § 221	297
MARITIME LAW	191-194 273-276
<i>And see</i> LAW MARITIME	
MARRIAGE	
abroad §§ 27-32	63-68
ambassadorial and military marriages §§ 27-32	63-68
army abroad may use forms of their personal law § 31	67
capacity to contract	41-43
authorities for depending on <i>lex loci actus</i> § 19	57
must now be by personal law § 21	57 58
colonial protectorates and dependencies Foreign Marriage Act	
applies to § 30	66
consent of parents or guardians when belonging to forms and	
and when to capacity §§ 18 23-25	56 59-63
conjugal rights flowing from marriage § 33	68
consular § 27	63 64
cousins between § 21	58
declared invalid by courts of the domicile effect § 24	59
ecclesiastical law rules of how far regarded § 17a	55 56
effect of on capacity to contract § 3	44
on property in foreign land	69-71
English land §§ 35 167	72, 212, 213
exception as to penal or religious incapacity § 22	58, 59
foreign judgment of effect § 340	402 403
Foreign Marriages Order 1913	65
form where <i>lex loci actus</i> is inapplicable § 26	63
must follow <i>lex loci actus</i> § 17	55
validity of according to <i>lex loci actus</i> § 20	57
German code as to	53-55
Gretna Green marriages § 23	59
Hague Convention of 1902 as to	54 55
Hindu	69
jactitation of § 49	92 93
Jewish	58
<i>lex loci actus</i> to be satisfied as to forms § 17	55
as to consent § 18	55
monogamous non christian marriages recognised § 34	68 69
<i>Ne temere</i> decree, effect of	56
nullity of § 49	90, 91
papal dispensation, effect of	58
personal law must be satisfied as to capacity § 21	57, 58
polygamous marriage § 34	68, 69
prohibited degrees, marriages of persons in §§ 19, 21	56, 59, 60
promise of §§ 212, 224	290, 298
provincial legislature, power of, to make rules as to	62 (n)
religion, christian wife does not acquire non christian	87
religious vows or orders, incapacity arising from § 22	58, 59

	PAGE
MARRIAGE—cont.	
restraint of, conditions in § 122	148
revocation of will, by, depends on law of domicile : §§ 80, 86 ...	117, 119
Royal Marriage Act, effect of : § 25	60
settlements <i>See</i> MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.	
ships, abroad, on : §§ 30, 32	66, 68
succession to husband or wife on death § 42	82
validity as regards capacity : §§ 19, 21	57, 58
consent of parents, etc § 18	56
form . §§ 17, 20	55, 57
religious ceremony · § 17a	55, 56
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS,	
effect of change of domicile on	81
form of : §§ 37, 38	76
husband a trustee for wife	81
peculiar rules as to	76-79
powers in	79
property not comprised in · § 41 ...	81
validity in respect of capacity ...	44
MARRIED WOMEN,	
capacity : § 3	44
contract abroad of	44
domicile of . § 253	333, 334
partner with husband	44
proprietary rights by law of domicile : § 36	72
restraint on anticipation	44, 203
MARSHALLING OF ASSETS : § 118	146
against land : § 162	210
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. <i>See</i> DIVORCE AND OTHER MATRIMONIAL CAUSES.	
MATRIMONIAL CAUSES BILL, 1920,	
jurisdiction in divorce	88, 89
nullity, decree of, following foreign judgment	94
recognition of foreign judgments	93
MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE,	
in case of agreement to transfer domicile : § 40	81
for purposes of divorce	84-87
rights as to movables by : § 36	72
variation of settlement in accordance with	79
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY	
not comprised in a settlement · § 41	81
succession to on death : § 42	82
MINORS. <i>See</i> GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS AND LUNATICS.	
capacity of : § 2	40-48
domicile of : §§ 245-250	331-333
foreign, power to appoint guardian of : §§ 5, 6	44, 45
receipts by	42
ward of court, discretion as to treating foreign minor as : § 11	48
MOBILIA SEQUUNTUR PERSONAM	184 sq.
as to legitimacy	222

	PAGE
MONEY SUBSTITUTED FOR LAND : § 158	208, 209
MONOPOLIES,	
contracts violating : § 217	294, 295
MORTGAGES,	
foreclosure of : § 174	219, 220
service of writ	245
of foreign immovables : § 174	219, 220
on land are immovables . § 160	209
priorities, determined by <i>lex fori</i> § 351	406, 407
redemption : § 174	219, 220
<i>And see</i> IMMOVABLES.	
MORTMAIN ACTS,	
as to foreign charity : § 165	211, 212
land	212
leaseholds in England	211
MOSLEM LAW,	
divorce under, how far recognised in England	86, 87
MOVABLES,	
American law as to transfer of	184, 189-191
beneficial interest in . § 153	203
German, French and Roman laws as to	183-189
how affected by judgments <i>in rem</i> . § 149	195-197
incorporeal : § 152	201-203
<i>lex situs</i> and personal law of owner . §§ 150, 151, 153 ...	197-201, 203
restraint on anticipation	44, 203
succession to, on death	105-155
<i>And see</i> ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ASSETS ON DEATH.	
whether and when political rights are deemed movable property	
§ 155 ..	206
NATIONALITY,	
as to criterion of personal law	23-28
as to effect of marriage on property, not applied	71
British— <i>See</i> BRITISH NATIONALITY.	
how acquired : § 280	355
Italian law as to	27, 28
is single	365
statelessness, condition of	365, 366
NATIONS, LEAGUE OF. <i>See</i> LEAGUE OF NATIONS.	
NATURAL LAW	1
NATURALIZATION,	
conditions of grant . § 286	359, 360
effect on children : § 295	363
where child legitimated : § 57	103
on wills made in accordance with Lord Kingsdown's Act	120, 121
grant of certificate of : § 288	360
in British colonies or dominions, effect of : § 288	360
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. <i>See</i> BILLS OF EXCHANGE.	

	PAGE
NOTARIAL ACTS,	
when required for marriage settlements	77
NOTICE	
assignment of debt of § 152	201 202
effect of as to charges on a trust fund	202
service of out of jurisdiction See SERVICE OUT OF THE JURIS DICTION	
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,	
jurisdiction founded on residence § 49	92 93
place of marriage contract	93
foreign judgment as to §§ 49a 340	93 403
OATH	
before foreign consul § 364	413
OBLIGATIONS	
extinction of	313-318
transfer of §§ 236 237	312
ORIGINATING SUMMONS	
service of See SERVICE	
PARENT	
authority of foreign § 4	44
over children's property	47
consent of when requisite to marriage of child §§ 18 23-25	56 59-63
PARTIES See PROCEDURE	
PARTITION	
of foreign land action will not lie for § 173	218 219
PARTNERSHIP,	
bankruptcy of partner in England § 145	179 180
capacity of married woman to be partner with her husband	44
foreign agreement on behalf of illegal by English law § 214	292
individual liability of partners § 347	405
service of writs upon § 182	241 242
suing and being sued in firm name § 182	241 242
PATENT	
duty on § 154b	205
infringement out of the jurisdiction	250
of by foreign sovereign	263
service out of jurisdiction as to	250
status of § 154b	205
PAYMENT	
in foreign currency of debts	215 299
of legacies	151
PAYMENT INTO COURT,	
foreign orders for § 315	381
PAYMENT OUT OF COURT	
to foreign guardian or committee §§ 10 12	47, 48

	PAGE
PENAL LAWS,	
foreign : § 366	414, 415
action to enforce § 318b	382
civil rights included in § 318b	382
incapacity by . §§ 16, 22	50, 58, 59
PENAL STATUS,	
disregarded in England . §§ 16, 22	50, 58, 59
PERSONAL ESTATE. See MOVABLES	
PERSONAL LAW	
in India	1 (n), 12
of the dark ages	12
determined by domicile and not by political nationality § 1	40
PERSONAL RESTRAINT,	
legality of, depends on <i>lex fori</i> § 345	405
PILLET	22
PILOT,	
effect of compulsory employment of § 204	270, 277, 278
PLACE See SITUS.	
of contract, made by post § 224	298
PLEDGE,	
rights of pledgee when determined by domicile or <i>lex situs</i>	200
POLITICAL RIGHTS,	
when deemed property § 155	206
POLYGAMY	
not recognised . § 34	68, 69
POST,	
contracts by . § 224	298
POST-GLOSSATORS	15, 16
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT,	
defective execution aided § 91	121-123
in marriage settlements	79, 80
wills made under : §§ 91, 92, 93	121-123
must be proved in England : § 94	123
PRACTICE. See PROCEDURE.	
PREFERENCE SHARES,	
rights attaching to . § 223a	298
PRESCRIPTION See LIMITATION, STATUTES OF, and PROCEDURE.	
PRIORITIES. See ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ASSETS ON DEATH, BANKRUPTCY, PROCEDURE.	
effect of notice to trustees	202

	PAGE
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW	
defined	1
history of	10 sq.
is part of the national law	9
view of English jurisprudence	415
PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION,	
administration by consul pursuant to convention : § 79	116
alien enemy, of estate of, granted to Public Trustee	116
attorney, grant to	111
codicil, whether judgment of court of domicile followed as to : § 84	118
Colonial Probates Act, 1892 . § 70a	113
colonies should follow English grant	111
creditor, to : § 77	115
different executors for English and foreign property · § 72 ..	114
English grant of	105
necessary for personal property in England . § 63	109
makes administrator liable for all assets received by him : § 104	131
executor according to the tenour · § 69 ..	112
executors, duties of	105
real property vests in, since Land Transfer Act, 1897	105
executor of a foreign executor is not executor in England	129
foreign grant not necessary § 64	110
conclusive only of the form required § 81	117
of translated will . § 82	117
will be followed § 65 ..	110, 111
which has expired · § 73	114
judgment as to codicils followed : § 84	118
validity followed : § 82	119
property only, grant not made as to · § 78	115
in case of two separate wills · § 72 ..	114
will, translation . § 82	117
form of grant	110
grant to whom and how made · §§ 65-77	110-115
heir or universal legatee, how granted to · § 74	114
Irish grant, confirmation of · § 70	112, 113
judicial administrator, to : § 67	111
Land Transfer Act, 1897, effect of	213
liability, breach of trust of foreign administration · § 100	128
not expressly limited to English assets	130
probate and administration duties : §§ 112, 113	136-139
provisional executor, to : § 68	111
receipt by administrator for debt for which he could not sue : § 98	127
revocation of probate on the strength of a judgment of the court of the domicile : § 80	117
Scotch grant, confirmation of : § 70 ..	112, 113
suspended to wait decision of court of last domicile : § 83	118
what property passes by grant : §§ 95-98	125-128
not primarily passing by the grant may be judicially administered in England : §§ 99-103...	128-130
where executor of Scotchman has been confirmed in Scotland : § 70	112, 113
no administrator has been appointed abroad : § 71	113
no will or no executors : § 75	115
will relates only to foreign property : § 78	115, 116
will executed under a power of appointment : §§ 91, 92	121-123

PROBATE DUTY. *See* DUTY.

PROCEDURE,

arrest and <i>ne exeat regno</i> . § 345	405
appealing, time for : § 352	407
appearance under protest, England : § 181	240
abroad	389
burden of proof as to foreign law : § 353	407
costs, foreign order to pay : §§ 316, 317	382
security for : § 365a	413
discovery against foreign plaintiff	240
sovereign	260
in aid of foreign proceedings : § 365	413
discretion of court to await foreign judgment : § 350	406
evidence abroad : §§ 363, 364	412, 413
admissibility : § 348	406
of expert, as to foreign law. §§ 356-358	408-411
of document may be admissible, though invalid : § 124	152, 153
power to take, in suits outside England. § 362	412
foreign law, how proved	408, 409
garnishee order for foreign debt	203, 387
Hague conventions as to	34
irregularity of, does not affect validity of a foreign judgment.	
§ 327a	392
<i>lex fori</i> governs : § 341	404
<i>And see</i> LEX FORI.	
<i>lis pendens</i> : §§ 338, 339	399-402
no discovery in aid of foreign proceedings : § 361	412
name to sue in. § 342	404
parties, adding new : § 187a	253
prescription § 343	405
priorities § 351	406, 407
protection of witness. § 349	406
proof of foreign acts of state and proceedings : § 361	412
security for costs. § 365a	413
service out of jurisdiction. <i>See</i> SERVICE.	
set-off. § 346	405
special procedure : § 344	405
suing parties singly § 347	405
third party notice : § 187	253
witness, right to refuse to answer § 349	406

PROCEEDINGS

abroad, effect of as <i>lis pendens</i>	399-402
suspending, to have question of foreign law determined : § 350	406

PROHIBITED DEGREES

marriages of persons in. §§ 19, 21	57, 58
--	--------

PROMISSORY NOTES. *See* BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.

PROTEST,

appearance under, in England : § 181	240
in foreign court	389

PRUSSIA. *See* GERMANY.

	PAGE
PUBLIC POLICY ORDER AND MORALS	50
contract conflicting with § 215	293-294
restitution of conjugal rights is a question of § 33	68
statute of limitations may be	313
PUBLIC TRUSTEE	
administration of estates of alien enemies by	116
QUASI EX CONTRACTU	
obligations § 235	308 309
RAILWAY	
contract of carriage by § 222	297
REAL ESTATE <i>See</i> IMMOVABLES	
devolution of in English law § 169	213-215
vests in executor since Land Transfer Act 1897	105
RECEIPT	
for debt by administrator not entitled to sue § 98	127
RECEIVER	
for debenture holders rights of against foreign creditors	179
of foreign land § 172	218
proceedings taken abroad not an interference with § 154c	205
service out of jurisdiction as to	251
RECOURSE	
right of heir who has paid debt, out of realty § 118	145 146
REDEMPTION	
of mortgages of foreign land § 174	219 220
REDUCTION INTO POSSESSION	
of foreign property effect of	124 125
by judgment § 97	127
REFUGEE	
domicile of criminal § 272a	348
political § 279	352
RELIGIOUS DISABILITIES	
as affecting marriage § 22	58 59
not recognised in England § 16	50
REMARRIAGE OF DIVORCED PERSONS	
depends on law of place where divorce granted	88
RENT CHARGE	
issuing out of land is immovable § 159	209
RENVOI	
Bate views of	34
discussed	28-39
English practice as to	35-38
German code as to	31-34
Hague conventions as to	33 & n

	PAGE
<i>RENOVI—cont</i>	
jurists' majority against <i>renvoi</i>	34
meaning of	28
opinion of the author as to	37-39
origin	23 28
<i>RES JUDICATA,</i>	
foreign judgment § 337	398 399
in early French law	24
RESIDENCE	
falling short of domicile not a ground for jurisdiction for divorce	84 85
RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS § 48	91 92
RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE,	
condition of in will	148
RESTRAINT OF TRADE,	
contracts in enforceability of	294
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION,	
movables	14, 203
immovables § 165	211, 212
RETROSPECTIVE LAW,	
effect of § 62	108
REVENUE LAWS,	
foreign §§ 155 209	206 281 282 289
REVERSIONARY INTEREST,	
priority of assignments § 152	202
REVOCATION	
of wills by marriage depends on domicile §§ 80 86	117 119
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT	
contract to aid	291
RODENBURG	163 181
ROMAN LAW	
as to corporations	367
domicile	319 335
jurisdiction	226-232
movables	185, 186
<i>quasi</i> contracts	309
<i>RUCKVERWEISUNG</i> See <i>RENOVI</i>	
RULE OF THE ROAD AT SEA § 205	277 278
RUSSIA,	
recognition of Soviet Government	244, 261
SALVAGE,	
jurisdiction in contract for	249

	PAGE
SATISFACTION	
of debt by legacy	151
SAVIGNY	21
views as to bankruptcy	156-158, 181
evidence of contracts	280, 281
<i>forum contractus</i>	227-231, 288
<i>delicta</i>	268
movables, succession to	147, 188
<i>origo</i>	12 (n.)
SCOTCH EXECUTOR,	
confirmation of § 70	112, 113
SCOTCH LAW	
as to bankruptcy	170, 171
case may be sent to Scotch courts : § 359	411
marriage according to	67
method of dealing with Scotch appeals	40
SCOTLAND,	
effect of discharge in bankruptcy	317
not a foreign country	252
SEA,	
jurisdiction on	275-278
SECURITY	
for costs . § 365a	413
debt. <i>See</i> DEBTS.	
SEQUESTRATION <i>See</i> BANKRUPTCY.	
SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION,	
agent appointed to receive service	240, 242, 250
of foreign principal, by leave of court . § 182	242
alternative claims, in case of	251
arbitration award, of	247
citation, petition, and decree in restitution actions	92
concurrent proceedings abroad, where § 186	265
damage within the jurisdiction, by act abroad	253
discovery, order for	240
divorce practice of : § 189	254
evidence required	252
foreigners carrying on business within the jurisdiction	241
foreign co-respondent : § 46b	89, 90
foreign process, of	247
interpleader, summons of	247
notice of, as to funds in court	254
motion	254
service where notice is required is void	240
to settle list of contributories	379
originating summons, of	147, 252
submission to jurisdiction, effect of	248
summons, of	253
third party notice, of : § 187	253
writ of, in action relating to land : §§ 183, 186	243, 244
administration, for	244-248
Admiralty actions <i>in rem</i> : § 184	243
charge upon land, to enforce	245

	PAGE
SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION— <i>cont</i>	
charging order, for	249
construction of documents, for	244
contract to be performed within the jurisdiction	248, 249
county court rules	248
defendant domiciled within jurisdiction	260, 262
foreign corporation, on : §§ 309, 310	376, 377
foreclosure of mortgages, for	245, 249
form of	249
injunction, for	245, 250
Ireland, in	245, 250
nuisance, in case of	245
partners, upon . § 182	241, 242
probate actions, in	246
procedure for	246, 247, 252
proper party out of jurisdiction	245, 251
Scotland, in	245, 250
ships	251, 253
slander of title to land	243, 248
time for	246
tort, in case of . § 188	244, 252
Workmen's Compensation Act, under	254
SET-OFF. <i>See</i> PROCEDURE	
SETTLEMENT ON MARRIAGE <i>See</i> MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT	
SHARE CERTIFICATES,	
of deceased person	126
SHAREHOLDERS,	
rights <i>inter se</i> § 223a	298
SHARES,	
<i>status</i> of : § 154b	205
SHIPS,	
actions against, by seamen, etc. : § 185	243
agent's authority § 151	200, 201
authority of master	201, 296
bottomry	296
British, foreign judgments enforced against . §§ 313, 337	380, 399
marriages on board : §§ 30, 32	66-68
when British territory : § 154	204
colonial governments, of	258
compulsory pilots : § 204	270, 277, 278
contracts for affreightment : § 219	295, 296
service on : § 218	295
foreign governments, of	257, 258
general average : § 220	296, 297
lay days	296
mortgage of	196, 199
priorities : § 351	407
probate duty on	126
register, effect on liability	270
right of captain to sell cargo	198
rule of the road : § 205	277, 278
sale of	201
service of process : §§ 183, 184	248, 251, 253
submission to jurisdiction	240

	PAGE
SHIPS— <i>cont</i>	
torts committed abroad by	269, 270
transfer of . § 150	197-200
when British territory and what law therefore applicable § 154	204
<i>And see</i> COLLISIONS AT SEA.	
SIEGE SOCIAL,	
of corporation	368, 370
SITUS	
of debts § 152	201, 202, 205
goodwill and patents § 154b ..	205
negotiable instruments § 154a ..	204
shares	205
ships	204
SLANDER OF TITLE	
service out of jurisdiction in action for	248
SLAVE TRADE	279
SOVEREIGN,	
court will take judicial cognizance of nature and extent	258
foreign §§ 190-193	256-263
agent for	261, 262
as British subject § 191 ..	258, 259
counterclaims, and cross-actions against § 192	259-261
cannot be sued in England § 190 ..	256-258
discovery against	260
security for costs or damages ..	260
submission to jurisdiction, by	260
extent of territory § 190	258
funds in court belonging to § 193	262
lien against ships of ..	257, 258
must respect obligations of predecessor ..	261
proceedings against property of, in England	263
recognition of ..	260, 261
tort abroad under authority of ..	270
writ cannot be served on ambassador of <i>See</i> AMBASSADORS.	
STAMPS <i>See</i> REVENUE.	
STATELESSNESS,	
condition of	365, 366
STATUTE OF FRAUDS ..	281
STATUTES,	
personal and real	8
STATUS,	
foreign penal or religious status not recognised : § 16	50
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU	197
STORY,	
as to assignment of debts	204
movables	184, 186
prescription	314, 315

	PAGE
STORY— <i>cont</i>	
bills of exchange, views as to	903
property passing by grant of probate	125, 136
SUBMISSION TO THE JURISDICTION,	
as affecting jurisdiction	240 248, 389
by a bankrupt debtor effect of § 128	165
defendant § 326	388 389
by foreign sovereign	260
SUBSTITUTED SERVICE § 181	238-241 247
SUCCESSION TO IMMOVABLES § 168	213
heir must be born in wedlock §§ 178 179	222-224
SUCCESSION TO MOVABLES	105-155
husband and wife of § 42	82
law and <i>res judicata</i> of deceased's last domicile conclusive as to	
beneficial interest after payment of debts §§ 59-62	107-109
<i>and see</i> ADMINISTRATION OF PERSONAL ASSETS ON DEATH	
SUCCESSION DUTY	
foreign § 117	114
on English realty § 112	136
on legacies left by persons domiciled abroad	140 141
on settled property § 116	141-144
SUMMONS	
order made on service out of jurisdiction of	251
originating service out of jurisdiction of	247 252
SUPERSTITIOUS USES	
validity of bequest for how decided	149
SYNDICS <i>See</i> BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEES	
TAXES <i>See</i> DUTY	
TECHNICAL WORDS	
in contracts	80
in wills	151
TERMS OF YEARS <i>See</i> LEASEHOLDS	
THELLUSSON ACT	
applies to leaseholds in England	211
THIRD PARTY NOTICE § 187	253
TORTS	
authority of foreign sovereign, under	270
damages not recoverable by <i>lex loci delicti</i> , effect of §§ 196,	
200	269
Fatal Accidents Act, § 200a	272
foreign defendant § 201	272, 273
interest where property tortiously used § 206	279

	PAGE
TORTS— <i>cont</i>	
must be a wrong by <i>lex loci delicti commissi</i> § 196	269
English law §§ 197 198	270
service out of the jurisdiction for § 186	244
slave trade	279
where criminal proceedings are necessary by the <i>lex loci delicti commissi</i> § 199	271
where damages are not given by the <i>lex loci delicti commissi</i> § 200	271 272
<i>And see</i> COLLISIONS AT SEA and LORD CAMBELL'S ACT	
TRADE CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF	294
TRADE DOMICILE IN TIME OF WAR	352 369 370
TRADE MARKS	
foreign corporation right of to protection of § 307	376
does not pass under law of domicile	205
service abroad of notice of motion to expunge	254
TRADE NAME	
right of foreign corporation to protection of	376
TRANSFER	
of immovables § 169	213-216
movables § 150	197-201
obligations §§ 236 237	312
TRANSLATION	
of foreign will grant of probate of § 82	117 118
TREATIES	
how proved § 361	412
TRESPASS	
to foreign soil	254 255
TRUSTEE	
husband as of wife's property under foreign settlement	81
UNDUE INFLUENCE	
contract obtained by abroad § 215	293
UNION OF TWO CROWNS	
effect on nationality § 300	364 365
UNIVERSAL ASSIGNMENTS § 153	203 204
UNIVERSAL LEGATEL	
administration only granted to § 74	114
UN SOUND MIND <i>And see</i> LUNATIC	
person of powers of foreign committee	48
USURY LAWS	
effect of foreign	299

VALIDITY

of wills of personal estate § 80	117
contracts <i>See</i> CONTRACTS	

VARYING SETTLEMENTS ON DIVORCE

79

VENUE

in England	235 236
abolition of § 180	238

VOET

19 20

WAR

acquisition of British nationality during	365 366
trade domicile in time of	352
of corporation	369, 371

WASTE

committed abroad	270
------------------	-----

WHARTON

as to movables	189
----------------	-----

WILL

admissible in evidence although not in form required by foreign	
law § 124	152 153
British subject of form of § 88	119
capacity to make depends on personal law § 86	119
change of domicile effect on validity of §§ 85 86	118 119
child meaning of in § 126	155
construction § 123	149-152
election § 125	153
English rules as to law determining validity § 85	118 119
foreign land jurisdiction to construe will of	218
language in construction of	152
law as to includes foreign private international law	
§ 89	121
probate not entirely conclusive § 81	117
property as to when incorporated with English will	
§ 78	115 116
form of execution § 86	119
lipse § 122	148 149
power of appointment executing §§ 91 92 93	121-123
naturalized persons of	120
only one law at a time § 90	121
operates by law of domicile as to surplus after payment of	
debts §§ 122-125	148
personal estate of construction § 123	149-152
probate <i>See</i> PROBATE	
real estate of § 169	213
restraint of marriage condition in	148
revocation of by marriage §§ 80 86	117 119
same where will is intended to execute power §§ 91-94	121-123
satisfaction of debt by legacy	151
separate will referring to foreign property § 78	115 116
superstitious uses	149
technical terms	151
translation of probate of § 82	117 118

	PAGE
WILL— <i>cont.</i>	
validity depends on law of last domicile : § 85 ..	118, 119
judgment of court of the last domicile followed : § 80	117
of wills made in the United Kingdom : § 79 ..	116
WINDING UP COMPANIES	161, 162, 167-169
English · § 181	167, 168
affects all movable property in the British dominions .	
§ 138	173, 174
deeds of arrangement § 242a	317, 318
foreign · §§ 132, 133	168, 169
calls how enforced	379
notice to settle list of contributories served abroad .	379
* receiver for debenture holders, rights of, against foreign creditors	179
Scotch or Irish	168
<i>And see</i> BANKRUPTCY.	
WITNESS,	
commission to examine, when granted : § 363a . . .	412
right to refuse to incriminate himself : § 319 ...	406
examination of foreign : § 363	412
WRIT,	
service of <i>See</i> SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION.	

THE END

